losses had amounted to nearly 2,000 men, so the strength of his army was 13,500: a formidable body of troops, in itself also an argument to shew that the retreat was in no way precipitate. The repulse of the 8th, however, had clearly established the fault of Abercrombie in commencing the campaign without proper preparation. There was no error as to the disposition of the forces for storming the intrenchments; the gallantry with which the attempt had been made was unquestionable. An assault which lasted four hours, during which 2,000 men had been placed hors de combat, could not be considered to have failed for want of courage and conduct. The attempt had been made as resolutely as soldiers could make it, and its failure had established that the impediments to be overcome were insuperable. To have repeated the attack on the following day would have been to court a similar disaster, with the additional risk that the French might have become the assailants, and the British army have greatly suffered. Had Abercrombie shewn half as good generalship in the organization of his force as, when recognizing the impossibility of success, he ordered a retreat, there would be no such unfortunate chapter in the records of British history. The fact is that the strength of the abatis had been not only underrated, but its character was unknown. A repetition of the attempt, to force them, would have been little short of madness; nevertheless, the French looked for the renewal of the attack, and when the scouts brought the news that the British force had departed, it seemed to the French that a miracle had been wrought in their behalf.* An incident happened during the attack, which is testified to by an eye-witness.† A captain of the Royal Rousillon, The profound sensation caused by this repulse throughout the army was painful to the last degree. Forbes at the time wrote to Bouquet, 23rd July, [Can. Arch., A. & W. I., p. 157.] "I send you enclosed a melancholy list of our killed and wounded at this very, very sad affair." Wolfe wrote to Rickson on his return to England months after the event, 1st Dec., 1758: "This defeat at Ticonderoga seemed to stupify us that were at Louisbourg." Indeed, it appeared inexplicable as it remains to-day, unless we accept the cause as stated in the text to be the absence of artillery. + Pouchot, I., p. 113. 1758] POUCHOT. 175 having placed a red flag at the end of a musket, waved it towards the British column. It has been represented that it was done without design, as a freak of the moment, but it was attended with serious consequences. It was accepted by the British as a signal for surrender. Accordingly, they advanced, holding their guns in the air and crosswise on their breasts as a proof of peaceful intention. The French troops regarded the proceeding as an abandonment of the attack, and as a desire to be received within the intrenchment as prisoners. The firing, accordingly, ceased on both sides, and the men placed themselves along the intrenchment to wait for the British to come in. One of the officers, M. de Fontbonne, called to his company to tell the men to drop their arms and they would be received. Pouchot, who had been temporarily absent, returned at this crisis, and, judging the situation differently, calling out "Don't you see that these men will take you?" ordered them to fire. The French, consequently, fired a volley which, according to Pouchot, placed from two to three hundred of the advancing column hors de combat. The French were reproached at the time as having been guilty of an unpardonable want of military conduct.* There does not appear to have been any deliberate breach of good faith on the part of the French, and it may be accepted in the form it is narrated. It was a crisis in the event of the day; had the men of the column obtained a footing within the intrenchment the probability is that they would have held their ground. All that Pouchot can describe as having been gathered from the retreat, is 500 pairs of shoes and buckles left behind in the boggy ground, with 700 quarters of meal taken from the lake in which it had been thrown. Lord Mahon magnifies this statement as many boat loads of provisions.+ Smollett tells us that Abercrombie's attack "was condemned as rash and his retreat as pusillanimous":‡ a question of his generalship, not of a disorderly retreat. Entick, v. III., p. 257, gives an account of the incident in a manner unfavourable to the French. + History of England, IV., p. 136. + Chap. 29, 7. The facts related clearly establish that Abercrombie withdrew from the attack without interference from the French, and that with deliberation he took the steps which he conceived necessary to his own safety. It is not impossible that he may have contemplated the renewal of the assault, but better counsel eventually prevailed. The embarkation of the troops on the morning of the 9th was conducted in a regular and orderly manner. The troops were in no way demoralized, and they retreated up the lake with the same discipline with which they had advanced to the attack, however depressed they may have been in spirit. It would be difficult to find any writer of military history, received as an authority, who can recognize the wisdom of the proposition that Abercrombie should have abandoned his basis. of operation at the head of the lake, sacrificing the advantages of being within reach of his supplies, without the slightest improvement in his position, to occupy a spot difficult of access. To have abandoned his lines of communication would have been madness. The argument has been advanced that Abercrombie could have looked for the immediate arrival of Amherst. Those who so write must be ignorant of the fact that the capitulation of Louisbourg took place nineteen days after Abercrombie's repulse; indeed it was only known to Abercrombie on the 28th of August.* Whatever the first fault of Abercrombie, after the repulse he acted with judgment, and his conduct is beyond reproach. The news of the disaster on reaching England on all sides caused great emotion. Pitt was greatly depressed. The fact is plain by the letters written him by Bute and George Grenville. Bute wrote that the troops had done their duty, and that to him might be attributed the revival of the courage which had cost some brave lives. George Grenville endeavoured to comfort him by the reflection that although this misfortune must be sensibly felt, affairs still had a promising aspect.+ Can. Arch., Series A. & W. I., 87.2, p. 355. + Chatham correspondence, I., p. 335. 1758] COLONEL NICHOLS. 177 CHAPTER III. No advantage was gained by the French from the repulse of the British at Ticonderoga. Abercrombie continued to hold his position at the head of the lake, which he fortified. His force was so large that it was inconceivable to the French that he should remain passive and defensive. He constructed a sloop, armed with six guns, for cruising on lake George, and to watch any movement from Ticonderoga. The French generals believed that Abercrombie would revisit them. Montcalm described himself as threatened with a second attack, and wrote that the only thought of the French was the protection of that side of the frontier during the campaign.* One duty was imposed on Abercrombie, to safeguard the convoys, for much activity was shewn by the French in their incursions. The Massachusetts' regiment of colonel Nichols was placed at Half-way brook, specially charged with the duty of sending out scouting parties; his instructions were immediately to notify Abercrombie at the lake of any trace of the enemy's approach. Nichols so badly fulfilled his duty, that a party of ten were attacked near the post, nine of whom were scalped; one escaped to give notice of the attack. A detachment was turned out in pursuit, and came up with the enemy. The men are reported to have behaved badly, and to have deserted their officers, who in vain appealed to them to follow them to the attack. Of the officers three captains, two lieutenants, and one ensign were killed; of the men nine privates and two non-commissioned officers; three were wounded, seven missing. Abercrombie heard of the affair too late to send out a reinforcement; Nichols, however, was relieved Montcalm to de Cremille, Carillon, 21st October, 1758 [N. Y. Doc., X., p. 885]; also de Bougainville to the same, Ib., p. 888. De Cremille had been appointed minister of war in connection with de Belle-Isle in April, 1758. N from his post, and replaced by 200 regulars, with some rangers and provincials.* A colonel Hart, of New Hampshire, does not figure creditably in the records of the time. On the day of his arrival at fort Edward, the 27th of July, he was called upon to convoy thirty ox teams with provisions on the following morning. He excused himself, on the ground that his men had marched the preceding day, and were greatly fatigued, as the extent of this depressing effort had been sixteen miles the reply attracted attention unfavourable to him. The teams were dispatched with an escort of 170 men; they had gone about half way to the brook, when they were attacked by 300 Canadians and Indians. Several of the escort were killed, several taken prisoners in the surprise and the petty skirmish which followed. A system of signals had been established, by which these attacks could be made known, when assistance was required, so that a force to support any detachment in difficulty could be sent out. On the concerted signal being heard, colonel Hart was ordered to go to the assistance of the escort. He came upon the scene of the attack to find that the cattle had been killed, the teams rendered useless, and much of the provisions scattered about. Many of the Canadian party had freely partaken of the liquor they had captured. The fact was afterwards known, that several of them were incapable of resistance, and with resolute men against them they might have been cut to pieces and destroyed. Hart refused to follow on the trace of the enemy; he would go no further, and the Canadian detachment escaped with their spoil and their prisoners. Hart's conduct was universally condemned. He was subsequently tried by a court-martial of provincial officers, of which colonel Schuyler was president. On hearing of the affair, Abercrombie sent out a party of 700 men, under Rogers, with instructions to intercept the French at a narrow pass at Wood's creek. They left at two in the morning. A further detachment of 1,000 men followed, Can. Arch., Series A. & W. I., 87.2, p. 297. |