1759]

ÎLE AUX COUDRES.

233

June.* The fact was immediately made known at Point Lévis by the lighted beacons. The first report magnified the force, but the true strength was soon known: ten British ships of war convoying the transports.

Durell landed some of his force on the island, and securely established himself there. The consequence was that it was abandoned by the inhabitants, who passed over to the north. shore. Their property was in no way injured, but the houses were taken possession of by the troops.

It was soon noticed that the new occupiers wandered carelessly about the island, and some of the inhabitants of the bay of Saint Paul saw that the opportunity was offered of taking some prisoners. A few of them landed unobserved, and, placing themselves in ambush, surprised three young officers who were riding about the island, among them the grandson of Durell. They were mounted, and were proceeding to place the British flag on a height. Their horses were shot, and they were made prisoners and carried to Quebec. They were interrogated, and the information given by them did not tend to quiet the public feeling. They informed them that there would be twenty-five vessels of the line, twelve frigates and two hundred transports, and that the army would amount to twenty thousand men, and had little doubt of its ultimate success. After having been kept some days at Quebec and kindly treated, they were sent to Three Rivers.

The effect of this news was to cause great vigilance on the island of Orleans, whence the women and children were sent to the woods with the cattle. De Léry was selected to carry out the duty. Durell was too late to prevent the arrival of the spring fleet, and eighteen vessels, with recruits and provisions, convoyed by two frigates, reached Quebec. It was in one of these ships de Bougainville arrived. Durell was, however, fortunate enough to take two victualler ships, which contained some stores and supplies, which proved of much use. An attempt was made with two barges to land

* De Vaudreuil's intercepted letter, 7th of June, Can. Arch., A. & W. I., 88, p. 131.

in the bay of Saint Paul. But the small force was so vigorously opposed by the armed inhabitants, that the effort was discontinued.

Durell lost no time in buoying out the channel of the traverse, and attempting its passage. On the 26th of June some of his ships were seen from the city,* and their appearance hastened the establishment of the camp at Beauport. As there was no attempt to ascend the river, and the seamen were busied with its survey, the truth began to dawn upon the defenders of Quebec, that Durell's squadron was only the forerunner of a larger and more powerful force.

De Courtemanche, with six hundred men and some Indians, was placed on the island of Orleans to observe the boats engaged in sounding, to intercept them or destroy them, as might be practicable. It is astonishing that in every operation the Canadian mind clung to the theory of la petite guerre, and never could be induced to abandon it. The results which it obtained had no influence on the contest, beyond the unfortunate consequence of greatly embittering all who suffered from it. It never had any effect beyond the destruction of those who were surprised, killed and scalped. It was regarded with detestation by every able French officer present with the troops; nevertheless, it was persevered in until the final surrender at Montreal. De Courtemanche could in no way hope to impede Durell's operations; he might kill a few of the seamen. Watching his opportunity, he succeeded in surprising a boat containing eight men, which had become separated from the rest, and in carrying them away prisoners.

A more legitimate attempt was made to destroy Durell's squadron, but the means taken failed entirely to effect what had been anticipated. Le Mercier, with some artillery, established himself at the eastern point of the island, and discharged red-hot shot at the ships. The guns were of insufficient calibre, or possibly Durell was careful to keep out of their range. His own fire was equally ineffective. So far

Journal de Lévis, p. 180.

1759]

THE TROOPS IN THE FIELD.

235

as he was able, Durell continued his examination of the channel. On his arrival he had seized some vessels, out of which he had taken the pilots, and they were forced to assist in pointing out the channel under the threat of being hanged. Beyond the petty operations I have detailed, there was no attempt to interfere with Durell.

When Wolfe's force was organized in England, it had been determined, that it should be increased, by a strong contingent of the regiments in garrison in Nova Scotia. On examining the condition of the troops obtainable in the province, Wolfe found that the number was less than he looked for. When the regiments detailed for the defence of the province, five hundred in number, had been deducted, two thousand could only be added to the strength of the expedition. Wolfe stated the case clearly to his uncle.*

In England his army was called 12,000 men, it did not reach 9,000. The total number of Wolfe's force on leaving Louisbourg was 8,535.+ There were some marines, if the admiral

could spare them. them. For his engineering assistance he relied on Carleton. The remaining acting engineers were indifferent, and of little experience. The army Wolfe looked upon as too small for the undertaking, but it was well composed, the men having been brought under fire at the siege of Louisbourg. There is a passage in this letter to be read with the greater interest when Wolfe's death is considered. As the general in command, he had clearly no business to be where he was, when he fell at the head of the bayonet charge of the Louisbourg grenadiers, and it could only have been the desperate circumstances in which he was placed, that caused him to lead the attack.*

A correspondence between Wolfe and Whitmore, which took place at Louisbourg, may be accepted as typical of the sentiment of many officers towards Wolfe. In certain quarters there was great jealousy of his success, and envy added to this ill feeling. On May the 1st he had written to Amherst asking to be reinforced, giving him the extraordinary information that he was totally unprovided with funds. The condition of the force in this respect will be seen, that when the fleet, after the conquest, was leaving Quebec, owing to the want of money the officers of the army and navy were appealed to by Murray, to advance to the government, as a loan, all that they could spare from their private means. Wolfe asked, that instructions should be given to Whitmore to transfer to his command the company of light infantry, for that any serious loss would reduce the expedition to a division.+ Amherst promised to furnish three hundred pioneers from the Boston militia; they, however, arrived too late to embark with Wolfe. With regard to the light infantry, Amherst stated that he had received no instructions, but he was convinced brigadier general Whitmore's zeal in the service would induce him to grant them.

"You may be assured that I shall take all proper care of my own person, unless in the case of the last importance, where it becomes a duty to do otherwise. I never put myself unnecessarily into the way of danger. Young troops must be encouraged at first. What appears hazardous sometimes is really not so, to people who know the country" [? contrary.] Wright, p. 499.

+ Wright publishes this word as 'diversion.' The letter is in Can. Arch., A. &. W. I., 90, p. 233.

1759]

BRIGADIER WHITMORE.

237

Wolfe consequently earnestly addressed Whitmore, asking him for the company of light infantry omitted in the orders sent from England. He had been disappointed in the regiment expected from the West Indies. Several regiments were weaker, than in England they were thought to be, and he pointed out that it was good troops only which can make amends for want of numbers. He continued: "It is therefore my duty to signify to you that it would be much for the public service to let the other two companies of light infantry embark with the army under my command, upon condition of being replaced, man for man, by some of the rangers and some of Frazer's additional companies, who are not so proper for the field, though very efficient for the defence of a fortified place. If there was any reason to apprehend that this change might have the least ill consequence, I should not venture to propose it. Mr. Lawrence, who has a very bad fortress and a very weak garrison, accepted of the sick and recovering men of the two American battalions as part of the 500 regulars intended for the defence of Nova Scotia, knowing very well that upon the success of our attacks in Canada, the security of the whole continent of America in a great measure depends."

To this appeal, setting forth the emergency with manliness and dignity, and only in view of the public service, which it was the duty of Whitmore to safeguard, as it was that of Wolfe, Whitmore returned the coldest and most official denial. The letter was forwarded by Wolfe to England.*

Whitmore had previously received instructions from England to use the utmost diligence in executing the orders he should

If brigadier Whitmore is to be remembered, it is proper that this answer should be preserved. His answer is, therefore, given entire.

"Louisbourg, 19th May, 1759.

"Sir, I have the Honor of yours of this date wherein you acquaint me that in the Distribution of the Forces for the Invasion of Canada, it was regulated that Bragg's Regiment, three companies of Granadiers and one Company of Light Infantry besides the rangers should be taken from Louisbourg. By His Majesty's Instructions to me, I am to obey the orders I shall receive from Major General Amherst or the commander-in-chief of His Majesty's Forces in No. America.

"I have not as yet received any orders from Major General Amherst to detach