CHAPTER VIII.

The failure at Montmorency was a serious matter, inasmuch as it created grave doubts if the Beauport shore was the spot where the attack was to be made. Townshend admits that he made a protest against its repetition.* It had, however, this advantage, that when the troops were repulsed it was easy to regain the ships. At the same time, if the landing were made good, there would have been still a battle to be fought before Quebec was reached. This truth was apparent to Wolfe, for he states that he desired to drive Montcalm to fight him on equal terms, and he had little doubt as to the result. He must have felt great anxiety when he reflected on the advanced season. It was August, and in a few weeks, from the severity of the approaching winter, the fleet must leave. At one time he thought under these circumstances, of intrenching himself at île aux Coudres, and remaining there until reinforcements should reach him in spring for the renewal of the attack. On one point he had no uncertainty, the necessity of not permitting the spirit of the men to become depressed by inactivity; accordingly he organized an expedition to destroy the French ships. They were then at the foot of what was then called the Richelieu rapids, some seven miles above the Point aux Ecureils,† where they had been stopped by the wind. Wolfe resolved to attempt to destroy them, so that he could open some communication with general Amherst. Admiral Holmes was charged with the naval part of the duty. On the 5th of August, twenty flat-bottomed boats were sent up the river to the " Sutherland," which was “Refutation of a letter to an honourable brigadier-general."

These rapids have ceased to exist in modern times, the projecting rocks which caused them having been removed. There is still on occasions some slight increase of current.

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above the town, to embark twelve hundred troops, under the command of Murray. The force consisted of detachments of the 15th regiment, the Royal Americans, the light infantry, and the rangers. His instructions were to assist admiral Holmes, and to seek every opportunity of fighting the enemy, provided he could do so on tolerable terms.

The advance of the British ships up the river pointed to the necessity of protecting the various places on the river bank, many containing provisions and property. De Bougainville was selected for the duty of defending them with a picked corps of fifteen hundred men. Some troops had previously been under the command of Dumas, but he was recalled and the number increased. De Bougainville's instructions were to watch the advance of the ships and to oppose the landing of any force, concentrating his own detachment to do so. Accordingly, when Murray made the attempt on Point aux Trembles, on the 7th of the month, he found a large body of men prepared vigourously to resist him. He made the descent at four o'clock in the afternoon, opposite the church. It appears to have been a feint and that the real attack was directed near a stream known as la Muletière, half a league above the river Jacques Cartier. De Bougainville was present with one thousand men and had thrown up some intrenchments. The boats advanced only to be beaten back with much loss.* On the following day, the 8th, Murray landed on the south shore. There was a feeble attempt at resistance by a hundred habitants, but Murray had no difficulty in establishing himself at Saint Antoine. As it was found impracticable to proceed up the river, Holmes, being unwilling to risk his ships, sailed back to his station above Quebec.

On the 11th an armed schooner passed the city, and its appearance must have puzzled de Bougainville, for he failed to be present on the 18th, when Murray attacked Dechambeau, about forty-one miles from Quebec. A large house,

* Panet says 200 killed and as many wounded. The total number of casualties in the campaign shows that this number is greatly exaggerated. The loss, however, was sufficient to lead Murray to desist in his attack.

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occupied by a Mde. Ruffio, one of the mistresses of Cadet, contained a large amount of stores of the army, and several officers had left their baggage there. It was burned. Montcalm, on hearing of the loss, went to the spot in person. He was accompanied by Dumas and 1,200 troops. He found the British had reimbarked without losing a man,* carrying with them a great many cattle, and, according to another authority, several women as prisoners, and obtaining possession of many important papers. The British recrossed the river to Saint Antoine and Saint Croix, which on the 19th they burned. On the 25th Holmes and his ships returned. Early in the month Wolfe had issued a third proclamation, which had been taken to Quebec by some Canadian prisoners who had been released. Wolfe referred to his two former appeals to the population, and he threatened them with severe reprisals if they failed to lay down their arms by the 20th of August. As Murray had been attacked in his outposts at Saint Antoine, he destroyed the country in its neighbourhood. There had always been a difference of opinion between Montcalm and de Vaudreuil. Montcalm was opposed to weakening his force by sending out detachments, de Vaudreuil advocated la petite guerre, according to the Canadian custom. Some of the Canadians who had been set at liberty by Wolfe came to Quebec, and spoke of the kind treatment they had received, and it is plain that many desired to remain quiescent. This course, however, was not permitted to them. The Indians were encouraged to continue their surprises, their destruction of stragglers, the attack of outposts, and the concomitant scalping; indeed, to carry on the war as was the custom in the time of de FronteTowards the end of July, de Vaudreuil received a letter which was unsigned, complaining of this mode of warfare. He was induced to reply directly to Wolfe, proposing a parley, adding that the use of such meetings was becoming too frequent. Colonel Barré replied on the part of Wolfe, expressing his astonishment at the remark, and entering his protest against the enormous cruelties already committed, by which Joannes, Dusieux, p. 387.

nac.

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REVERSES ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN.

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the British troops were greatly exasperated. Such acts if repeated, he said, would hereafter meet with the severest reprisals, and there would be no difference made between French Canadians and Indians when taken prisoners. Barré related that by an intercepted letter Wolfe read that three grenadiers of the American regiment were destined to be burnt alive. Wolfe desired to be informed what had become of the men. The letter was answered by de Bougainville, to the effect that the tale was soldier's gossip; the fate of the prisoners had been the same as others taken by the Indians, they had been ransomed by the king at considerable expense. De Bougainville had not been instructed to reply to the menaces made; for nothing of that sort would make them cowards or barbarians. Barré had alluded to the infraction of the capitulation of William Henry, de Bougainville answered that the French were justified by the facts of that event throughout Europe.

On the 7th of the month it was known in Quebec that Niagara had surrendered. Following so soon the news of the abandonment of Ticonderoga on the 27th of July, and of Crown Point on the 31st, the public mind of the town was cast into great dejection. The news had already spread among the people. It was feared that an advance by the Saint Lawrence would be immediately made upon Montreal, if not by île aux Noix. There was nothing to oppose the descent of the river, and it will be my duty, when I have to record the operations, to examine why this course was not taken. Except some weak garrisons at Detroit on lake Michigan and on the Illinois, every vestige of French power west of Oswego had been swept away. There were longer any Ohio forts. These garrisons had been defeated in their advance to succour Niagara, and had swelled the number of prisoners which, on the conquest of that fort, had been taken and sent down the Mohawk. The only troops to oppose the descent of a British force was to be found in the few men at La Presentation and about eight hundred men stationed at "Galops" island, at the head of the rapids of

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that name, under St. Luc de la Corne. The place was utterly indefensible; de la Corne had himself written that it was not tenable. So desperate did the situation appear, that it was resolved to reinforce the western frontier even at the expense of Quebec, and as de Lévis put it, to trust somewhat to fortune.* Eight hundred men were detached from the forces defending Quebec, one hundred of whom were regulars, and de Lévis was appointed to the command of the frontier of Montreal. He left Quebec on the 9th of August, taking with him la Pause and Le Mercier. He arrived at Montreal on the 12th and left on the 14th for the West. Accordingly the operations of Amherst had some influence on the defence of Quebec, for it led to the removal of this able and distinguished soldier and the force I have named.

On the 25th the Saint Francis Abenakis brought in two officers and seven Indians whom they had seized. They were messengers from Amherst to Wolfe. By these despatches Amherst informed Wolfe that his movements would be guided by those before Quebec. There were many private letters from lake Champlain to officers of Wolfe's force; as they freely criticised the abandonment of the fortifications at Carillon, they could not have been pleasant reading to those perusing them. Holmes again received orders to endeavour to destroy the French ships. The "Lowestoffe," the "Hunter" sloop, two armed sloops and two "cats," with provisions, were ordered to pass Quebec to join the "Sutherland," but the wind was against them. It was only on the fourth attempt that they succeeded, and it was not until the 27th that they made the passage.

The appearance of these vessels caused much anxiety. The French had hitherto brought much of their provisions by water; even after the British vessels had sailed above the town the supplies were so carried to Saint Augustin, thirteen miles above Quebec. The principal storing point was Batiscan, sixty-seven miles above the city. Nevertheless provisions began to fall short, and, if the troops were to be kept together,

"On résolut de donner un peu à la bonne fortune." Journal, p. 192.