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EAST OF THE TOWN.

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additional bread and meat was required to feed them. As it was dangerous to continue to send the boats beyond Saint Augustin, it was determined to bring the provisions by land; but there was the difficulty that there were no men to drive the waggons, for they were with the army. The only alternative was to take the old men, women and children of sufficient age to perform the duty of teamsters. Two hundred and seventy-one carts were laden with several hundred lbs. of pork and flour, and by these feeble means subsistence from twelve to fifteen days reached the troops; but the women and children suffered such hardship that it was felt that the attempt could not be repeated, especially as the nights were commencing to turn cold. It will be seen that this fact had great influence on the subsequent operations. There was so much difficulty felt, owing to the presence of the frigates above Quebec in their interference with the delivery of provisions, that the project of bringing up the French vessels to attack them was discussed. A second proposal was to cut out the ships, but the more it was considered it was found the more impracticable.

While Murray was engaged with his force to the east of Quebec, Wolfe determined that some steps should be taken with regard to the country east of the island of Orleans. Parties had frequently issued from the bay of Saint Paul to fire upon the boats sent out from the shipping, and to surprise any small parties detached from the camp at Montmorency. In consequence, captain Gorham, with three hundred men, landed at three o'clock on the morning of the 4th of August, and forced two parties of twenty men who fired from the houses to take refuge in the woods. He then burned the village, which consisted of twenty houses. His loss was one killed and two wounded; the enemy left two dead behind them, and they retreated carrying away several wounded. Gorham proceeded easterly to Malbaie, and destroyed the settlement there. Crossing to the south shore, he burned the villages of Saint Roch and Saint Anne; he returned to the island of Orleans on the 15th. On the same day a party of

about one hundred and seventy of the 78th regiment was moved to the island of Orleans and bivouacked in Saint Peter's church. On the 16th they were marched to the eastern end of the island opposite Saint Joachim, where they embarked in boats. On attempting to land on the north shore, they were fired upon, but the resistance was ineffectual, and the place was taken possession of. From time to time shots were fired from the woods. The force remained at Saint Joachim till the 22nd, when they were joined by one hundred and forty of the light infantry and a company of rangers, under captain Montgomery of the 43rd. On the 23rd the force marched to the village west of Saint Joachim, which they found occupied by two hundred Canadians and Indians, who commenced firing from the houses. The troops protected themselves by lying behind fences, while the rangers were sent forward to turn the French left. As the movement began to take effect, the defenders of the village made for the woods, pursued by the British. Several were killed and wounded; many prisoners were taken. Montgomery acted with brutality, ordering them to be shot. Two of the prisoners had been promised quarter by Frazer, then a subaltern, who records the fact with expressions of horror. The houses were burned. They marched on the following day to l'Ange Gardien, being joined there by a detachment from Château Richer. Possession was taken of the houses which were fortified; the two following days were passed in felling the fruit trees and cutting the wheat. On the evening of the 27th some Indians were discovered skulking about the houses, and one man of the force was shot. On the 28th the detachment proceeded to Château Richer, where they fortified the church. On the 31st they left Château Richer and burned down the village, leaving the church untouched, and marched to the camp at Montmorency, burning everything that lay in their path. Such was the retaliation that Wolfe felt himself called upon to inflict, to deter a continuance of the cruelties of la petite guerre of the Canadians and Indians.

By the middle of August the anxieties which Wolfe had

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WOLFE'S ILLNESS.

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undergone had told upon his health. Hitherto, in the conduct of the campaign, he had consulted only his own judgment and there were not wanting those, who considered that the campaign presented the hopeless prospect of closing in failure. Of this number was brigadier Townshend, and there is a letter of Murray's extant to show that he participated in this feeling. Not so Monckton, and it may be regarded as a misfortune that his severe wound at the action of the 13th of September made his departure for New York a necessity. The admiral, however, remained perfectly staunch; he wrote on the 5th of September, during the illness of Wolfe, and before victory was assured: "the enemy appear numerous and seem to be strongly posted, but let the event be what it will, we shall remain here as long as the season of the year will permit, to prevent their detaching troops against general Amherst.”*

On the 22nd Wolfe was ill with fever, while his constant maladies, from which he was never entirely free, became more active. From his sick bed he sent a confidential letter to the brigadiers, and for the first time submitted to them his secret instructions. In his memorandum he states, that in order the public service may not suffer from his indisposition the brigadiers are to meet and consult on the best method of attacking the enemy. Wolfe foresaw that if the French army were defeated the town must surrender, as it was without provisions ; he therefore considered that Montcalm should be attacked in preference to the place itself. There were three modes of making the attack: the Montmorency could be forded eight miles above its mouth, before daylight, and an advance made to Beauport. If the march were discovered, and the intrenchments manned the consequence would be plain. Secondly, if the troops from Montmorency passed the lower ford and by night marched to Beauport, the light infantry might succeed in getting in, and Monckton would attack in front. The third plan was a general attack of all the troops against Beauport.

On the 29th of August the three brigadiers met, when they gave the opinion that the probable method of striking an * Can. Arch., A. W. I., 88, p. 41.

effectual blow, was to transfer the troops to the south shore and carry on the operations above the town.

On the 2nd of September Wolfe wrote to the minister reporting this decision. He was then still weak. He had consulted with the admiral and engineer; they had found that the passages leading from the lower to the upper town were intrenched. The lower guns would soon be silenced by the fleet, but the upper batteries could still do much injury to the shipping. He proceeded to state the reasons why he had laid waste the country; one design was to induce Montcalm to attack him to prevent further ravages; to return the insults inflicted by the Canadians; and also to obtain prisoners as hostages. Major Dalling had surprised 380 prisoners in one of the villages, and he intended to keep them, and not permit any exchange until the end of the campaign. It was in this letter he informed the minister, that in case of a disappointment, he had intended to fortify île aux Coudres, and establish there a garrison of 3,000 men for its defence; but the season was too far advanced, for sufficient material to be obtained to cover so large a body of troops. He explained that the number of Indians, always on scout around the posts, made it impossible to execute anything by surprise. There were daily skirmishes with them, in which they were generally defeated. He gave a return of the casualities during the campaign, which, in all ranks, were 182 killed, 651 wounded, and 17 missing. It was in this memorable letter he said: "In this situation there is such a choice of difficulties that I own myself at a loss how to determine."

Wolfe criticised his own generalship in the operations of the 31st of July. He wrote to the admiral: "The great fault of that day consists in putting too many men into boats who might have been landed the day before, and might have crossed the ford with certainty, while a small body remained afloat, and the superfluous boats of the fleet employed in a feint that might divide the enemy's force. A man sees his errors often too late to remedy." +

Wright, p. 551.

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MOVEMENT OF THE SHIPS.

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In the plan of making the attack above the town, the risk, which had weight in his mind, was the difficulty of regaining the boats in case of a repulse. Wolfe well knew that he had only a few weeks before him to achieve his purpose, he expressly so states, "Beyond the month of September, I conclude our operations cannot go." Accordingly, he hastened his preparations for an attack above the town, and determined that it should be made with 5,000 men. With this view he resolved to abandon the camp at Montmorency, at the same time to maintain several vessels in the north channel, and every three and four days to send seamen and soldiers round the shore of the island of Orleans, to prevent any attempt on the part of the French at its repossession. On the last of August he wrote his last letter to his mother, in which he described the difference between himself and Montcalm, whom he represented to be "at the head of a great number of bad soldiers, and himself at the head of a small number of good ones."

The movement of the ships during the next twelve days shews the design of Wolfe to conceal his own plans, and to awaken the fears of the enemy in every part of his defences. There was, however, little prospect of disarming Montcalm's caution: the one hope of the defenders of Quebec was that they could prolong their resistance until, at the latest, the middle of October, when the first snow would warn the ships that navigation would soon be closed by ice, and that they could no longer remain in safety before the town. Six weeks of dogged defence was all that was necessary to set at naught the attempts of the British general, for winter, in all its severity, would then decide the issue of the campaign. Both sides knew, that what was to be done could not be deferred, and that the issue must immediately be determined.

The French were much exercised on the last day of August by an unusual movement at Point Lévis. At the same time two vessels which were lying at Saint Augustin ascended to Point aux Trembles. The fear was entertained that an attempt was really to be made on the French frigates. Two