1760]

SICKNESS OF THE GARRISON.

361 hung about the place, and a small body of the British fell into an ambuscade, when eight men were killed and taken. Shortly afterwards Murray received information that 700 men had crossed at Pointe aux Trembles with the intention of seizing the British post at Point Lévis. Murray with a strong force crossed the river to prevent the movement, upon which the French retreated, with a loss of from fifteen to twenty prisoners. Murray learned from the latter that the force had consisted of 500 regulars, 400 of the militia and some Indians. On satisfying himself of the fact, that the French detachment had been concealed within six miles of the British post, without information having been given of its presence, Murray, as a punishment, burned the houses where the troops had found refuge. Everything that took place, and all the reports that reached Quebec, pointed to the certainty that the garrison would be attacked so soon as the weather permitted. Murray consequently commenced with vigour the preparation of pickets and fascines for fortifying the plains. With this design he ordered the adjoining parishes to make 10,000 fascines and 40,000 pickets.

One source of painful consideration with Murray had been the continual sickness of the garrison. It may be accounted for by the men being insufficiently clothed to meet the severity of winter, and the nature of their diet, which may be described as almost entirely consisting of salt pork and beef. The garrison nominally consisted of 7,000 men; of this number on the 1st of January, 1760, 4,359 rank and file only were fit for duty.*

Another extraordinary neglect of the secretary of war, lord Barrington, was that there was no money to pay the men.

They were unable to supplement their mess by better food,* and how they escaped so well as they did, must be a matter of historical thankfulness.

Everything possible had been done by Saunders and the fleet; the fault lay with the home authorities, in failing to provide for the contingency of the winter campaign, for the necessary warm clothing, and the requirements for holding the conquered city. All these wants must have been well known by the experience of the garrisons of Louisbourg and Halifax. The clothing and provisions could have been stored at one of the garrisons, and a supply of money sent there, had any prescience or care for the future been exercised. It is on the memory of lord Barrington, as secretary of war, that the discredit must lie.

Murray endeavoured in this painful situation to perform his duty as best he was able. He relates how an effort was made

In addition to the above the following were on the strength, but absent, as detailed:

The ill-health of the garrison during the winter months is established by the fact that the mortality increased as the season advanced. The deaths recorded are: Ending 24th October

50

43

63

96

92

166

149

659

* This disgraceful fact is incontrovertible. It is made on the authority of a letter from Murray to Pitt from Contrecœur, nine leagues above Montreal, 24th August, 1760. [Can. Arch., A. & W. I., 99, p. 151.] Murray distinctly states that the men had no pay since the 24th of October of the had only received £20,000 two months back. paper currency, Murray would not do so. he got through the winter.

previous year, and that he With every temptation to issue a The wonder is, how without money

1760]

FRENCH ACTIVITY.

363 to prevent the sickness from spreading. The disease was the scurvy, and instructions were given as to the best mode of boiling and preparing the salt pork, it being impossible to obtain fresh provisions or vegetables. There was also an insufficiency of blankets; an additional supply, however, was fortunately obtained from the habitants. As Murray had no money, all he could do was to pledge his word on the arrival of the shipping to pay for them, or return them.

As the French continued to send forward parties to threaten the outposts, Murray himself entertained the desire to be aggressive, but the sickly condition of the garrison deterred him from the attempt. He, however, constructed two blockhouses at Point Lévis to cover any landing he might attempt, and placed a guard in them of sufficient strength to defend them. He resolved under any circumstances to attack the French advance posts on the north side, and with this view he increased his own outposts of Saint Foy and Lorette. the morning of the 20th two parties attacked at the same hour the two posts of Calvary and Brulé, the former making seventy and the latter seventeen prisoners, without the loss of a man, and with only six wounded. Many, however, suffered from frost-bite.

On

Towards the end of March, the oft reported designs of the French against the garrison began to take definite form. Everything suggested that an attack would be made when the ships could descend the river. The French vessels had wintered in the Richelieu, near Sorel workmen were now engaged in repairing and placing them in readiness. The regiment of Languedoc was moved from Pointe aux Trembles to Saint Augustin. As reports of an intended expedition, in great force, promising certain success, were freely circulated among the French inhabitants in the neighborhood, to shake their faith in the stability of Murray's position, and to alienate them from the recognition they had made of his government, Amherst conceived a stratagem to counteract them. He sent a sergeant and four rangers stealthily across the river and they * Journal, 9th March.

appeared before the outposts declaring that they had arrived from Amherst. The news ran rapidly through the town and was believed, and "visibly affected the French inhabitants." In order to give greater effect to the impression which had been made, Murray published a proclamation, promising that if they were quiet and orderly and took no part in the contest they would be maintained in possession of their property, in the practice of their religion and in their civil rights, while the communities should continue to enjoy their privileges; on the other hand, the most severe reprisals were threatened to those who acted otherwise.

Major McKellar, the chief engineer, was despatched to cap Rouge, to take post there and fortify the place, so that the attempt on the part of the French to land could be resisted. The hulls enclosed within the ice of the river Saint Charles were cut out and fitted up as floating batteries. The schooner "Lawrence" was brought up from the island of Orleans, caulked and made ready for sea, to communicate with lord Colville, whose arrival with the relief was looked for. She was despatched on the 21st of April with the intelligence how matters stood, so that no time would be lost by Colville's squadron in ascending the river.

On the 17th Murray heard that the French had armed the vessels which had remained in the river with the two new galleys they had lately built; that the expedition would start without delay, with the design of landing the troops at cap Rouge. Additional fortifications were added to make the disembarkation of artillery at cap Rouge impracticable, so the guns would have to be brought forward by land. On the 19th a party under Herbin crossed the cap Rouge on the ice with sixty men and some Indians to surprise the outposts, but the garrison was on the alert, and Herbin's force was dispersed with loss. The British crossed the river and even pursued the retreating French, when they "ran for it."

The conclusion was forced on Murray's mind that the attack would not much longer be deferred; consequently, he ordered all the Canadians to leave the town; this order was issued on

1760]

THE STORY OF THE CANNONEER.

365

the 21st, a week before the attack was made. The religieuses of the convents were permitted to remain. The inhabitants were directed to store the articles which they could not take away with them in the convent of the recollets, under the care of the community and two inhabitants of the town, selected by themselves. A guard was placed to prevent interference with the property. Orders were given to each regiment to have a picket in readiness in case of necessity, and preparations were generally taken to defend the place. The party from Lorette was called in and posted with that of Saint Foy, and the bridges across the cap Rouge destroyed.

These facts require to be borne in mind when the story I have to relate has to be considered. It has received general credence, but by the facts I have given it is proved to be without foundation.

On the authority of de Lévis, it is related that one of the bateaux with the artillery being crushed by the ice at cap Rouge on the evening of the 26th, a gunner saved himself on a mass of floating ice and was carried past Quebec on the morning of the 27th. He was seen and rescued, and by his presence the English were informed by him of the march of the French by old Lorette.*

This piece of romance is fully disproved by Murray's diary. Were there the slightest basis of truth in it, Murray would have had twenty-four hours only to make his dispositions for defence, whereas a week earlier he had ordered the Canadian population out of the town.

On the 23rd the ice gave way and the river became navigable. Murray determined to march five regiments to Saint Foy to be in position to sustain the advance posts and to resist any landing of the enemy; but the weather was against the proceeding. It froze hard during the night, and such was the sickly condition of the garrison that he would not

[Journal, p. 262.] The story is repeated in the "Campaign of 1760 in Canada," attributed to the chevalier Johnstone [Hist. Soc. Que., p. 9], with the addition, "this humane action of the English in saving the unhappy cannoneer saved Quebec from being taken by surprise."