1960. According to reliable public opinion polls, in 1956 those "very much interested" rose in October to 47 percent-an increase of 1 percentage point. But in 1960, in October, after the debates, those "very much interested" rose to 57 percent-an impressive improvement of 12 points.

Besides this considerable increase in direct interest, the confrontations of the two candidates on television and radio in 1960 generated an enormous amount of material bearing upon the issues and personalities of the election in other media. They were the occasion for front-page stories in the newspapers. They were topics for featured treatment in the magazines. They were the subject of discusion, conversation and comment on the national and on the regional and local levels. In short, they breathed life into the campaign and interest into the electorate. In any event, it should be the purpose of all of us to stimulate a sharing in the governmental process by as many of our citizens as possible. Fundamental as they are, elections are only a first step in the continuing civic responsibility of the people in a democracy. If they commit themselves in the election, they are much more likely to have a clearer sense of responsibility for the subsequent policies and actions of their candidates, thereby considerably broadening the base of national discussion and of the national consensus between elections.

Quantitatively, there is convincing evidence that more people are attracted to a meaningful confrontation of candidates than to the traditional paid political broadcast, with an oratorical set price or staged question-and-answer formula with the answer carefully writ ten before the question ostensibly eliciting it is asked.

Statistical data indicate that, as a rule, when a paid political broadcast replaces a regularly scheduled entertainment program, some 30 percent of the audience drops away. But the confrontation broadcasts in the presidential campaign of 1960 drew an audience that not only did not fall off from that of the program replaced, but was actually, on the average, 20 percent larger than that of the entertainment programs they preempted.

Looked at another way, the paid political broadcast in 1960, generally speaking, drew an audience less than a third in size of that drawn by the presidential debates. Moreover, the tumeout that is customary in the course of long and serious programs did not occur in the case of the presidential debates. To a remarkable degree, the audiences stayed with the broadcasts to the conclusion. The holding power of the debates was 88 percent, compared to 77 percent for entertainment programs in similar time periods.

Even more significantly, the people who tuned in to see the candidate they preferred, or toward whom they leaned, were also given occasion to see and hear the opposition. The importance of this cannot be overestimated. People tend to go to the rallies, read the words, and listen to the speeches of the man whom they already favor or who represents the party to which they already belong. Any restrictions on radio and television that help to preserve this political immobility and inbreeding sap the vitality of the election process. They are simply helping to perpetuate a behavioral pattern that atrophies independent thinking and stagnates voting behavior.

2 "Election Studies II and III, Concerning Issues and Candidates," October and November 1960, Elmo Roper & Associates, 111 West 50th Street, New York, N.Y.

The equal-time restrictions of section 315 seem to me to offer no safeguards in any way comparable to the advantages to the electorate that their elimination would bring about. Objections to such a course generally revolve around fears that minority parties would not get a fair shake or that broadcasters uninhibited by the equal-time restrictions, would indulge in irresponsible political favoritism.

Both fears seem to me unjustified. The equal-time provisions, so far as third parties are concerned, have become no-time provisions, because for all practical purposes they restrict the granting of time to those who have the funds to pay for it. The reason for this, of course, is that no broadcaster can afford to offer free time to the presidential candidates of 20 or so parties, and no broadcasting schedule could accommodate such demands and still have an audience left for the major candidates.

Far from protecting significant third parties, section 315 penalizes them, by lumping them together indiscriminately with the insignificant. Some parties, such as this year's American Independent Party of George Wallace, can develop into meaningful forces in a campaign. Broadcasters ought to be free to treat them as such. Under section 315, they are not.

As a matter of fact, last week I received a memorandum from my colleague who is in charge of CBS news. In it he said:

We have been working for some time on a documentary on George Wallace. Obviously, he is newsworthy and can significantly affect the outcome of the 1968 election. We had scheduled it for March or April. Now that he has formally announced his candidacy, the lawyers have informally ruled that such a documentary is not exempt from section 315 since it does not treat Wallace incidentally. Hence, we would be required to provide equal opportunities for the minor party candidates who have already announced and who have no opposition. Accordingly, we have to abandon the documentary. This is a pretty stunning example of how section 315 cuts across our journalistic obligations to the American people. At the very time when Wallace is in the news and becomes particularly significant, we are hamstrung by section 315.

Third parties generally are of three categories: those with an historic background of thoughtful criticism of the major parties but whose significance varies widely over the years; those concerned with a single current issue on which in a given campaign they part

company with the major parties; and those made up of chronic malcontents, panacea peddlers, or personality cultists. By a common treatment of all third parties, without regard to their political or civic significance, the equal-time restrictions impose as the sole determinant of whether they get air time, the cash resources they have to buy it. Broadcasters, unable to give time to all third parties, significant or trivial, generally give it to none. And the useful purposes that responsible and relevant third parties can serve in a largely bipartisan system-reducing lethargy or timidity in the major parties, sharpening really critical issues, and advancing bold and new approaches, for example fall by the wayside, so far as air time goes. Because, except in the news categories exempt from section 315, and in the absence of third parties normally having financial resources comparable to the major parties, the broadcasters' hands are tied.

As for the possible biases of broadcasters, I have no doubt that, like all citizens, they have their loyalties and preferences as individuals. But to indulge these personal attitudes in the conduct of the public service function of their stations would be a very risky business. A broadcasting franchise is a very precious thing. Nobody knows this better than a broadcaster. That the general devotion of the American people to the principles of fair play apply to the way broadcasters exercise their franchise has been made amply clear. No broadcaster worth his salt would risk amassing a record of biased treatment of candidates or parties.

The American people have had four decades of experience now with broadcasting. During the intervals between election campaigns, when no equal-time requirements are applicable, there is no evidence that broadcasters have favored one political party over another-even though partisan disputes became major public issues. Complaints have been extremely sparse. It has been no accident that the public trusts the fairness of broadcasters. The record shows that they have earned that trust. In the longrun, the judgment of the people can be far better relied upon to insure fairness than any mathematical formula or any rigid regulation.

The equal-time restrictions of section 315 provide nothing more than a mechanical formula that precludes broadcasters both from exercising their judgment and from carrying out their responsibility. It is easy, and it is safe. Carrying out responsibility is hard, on the other hand, and making judgments is risky.

But in this as in all areas of the democratic experience efforts and risks make for progress and improvement, while ease and safety make for reversion and stagnation. It is time for broadcasting to be freed of the section 315 restrictions. There is no evidence that this would result in weakening the electoral process. There is commanding evidence that it would strengthen that process.

This committee could make an historic contribution in that direction if, as a result of these proceedings, there could come a joint resolution, modeled after but enlarging upon the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 207, which was passed by the 86th Congress and signed by President Eisenhower on August 24, 1960, and which made the Kennedy-Nixon debates possible. Senate Joint Resolution 207, you will recall, suspended the equal-time requirements of section 315, with regard to nominees for the offices of President and Vice President for the period of the 1960 campaigns.

The test of experience proved that suspension a success. A joint res olution now calling for a 6-year suspension, including nominees for all offices, would provide a test of further experience that would embrace two general elections, an off-year election, and State and local elections at all levels. Results could be observed and reported back to the Congress not in a single isolated instance, but over a comprehensive series of elections. If any abuses arose, ways of dealing with them could be considered in the light of the facts rather than on the basis of fears and speculations. And a substantial advance will have been made in the resolution of a problem that has haunted and preoccupied us all too long and that has its roots in a legal anachronism that has long since defeated its own purpose.

Dean BARROW. Thank you, Dr. Stanton, for your excellent contribution to the panel.

Since the panel was introduced, Mr. Chairman, we have been joined by Prof. Louis Jaffe, Byrne professor of administrative law at Harvard University.

The comment on Dr. Stanton's paper will be read by Mr. Herbert E. Alexander. It has not been duplicated in advance, so you will not find it among the papers before you.

COMMENT ON PAPER NO. 2, BY HERBERT E. ALEXANDER

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear on this panel before this distinguished subcommittee.

Dr. Stanton deserves praise for putting problems of political broadcasting in the context and perspective of democratic theory, and for relating broadcasting to the quality of American politics.

But posing such questions can also lead one to conclusions at variance with his, and not necessarily as optimistic.

Political broadcasting presents perhaps a classic case of conflict between the democratic theory of public dialog in free elections, and the economic freedom of the marketplace. The campaign interests of candidates do not always coincide with the interests of the electorate in full discussion; nor do they often square with the interests of the broadcaster in format design or time availability.

It seems to me that elimination of section 315 will not, by itself, do very much to get very many candidates the time they want in the form they want, on the stations they want. Section 315 may be considered negative, as Dr. Stanton says, but it is so purposely, to protect candidates from discrimination.

Section 315 may be repressive, as he says, but it is so purposely, to deter broadcasters from exercising favoritism and, by the way, 315 protects broadcasters as well as candidates.

In my judgment, for other than presidential elections, the fairness doctrine is not an adequate substitute for the protection that section 315 affords to candidates, for fairness is only a debatable standard admitting of after-the-fact administrative procedures. There can be no equity for a candidate once an election is lost.

The question is whether it is in the best interests of the American people to turn over all decisions of free candidate access to a private industry. No matter how well intentioned some broadcasters may be, some candidates are going to get hurt. Scores of complaints and court

cases are ample testimony to the varying interpretations of both equal opportunity and fairness, and the industry record in providing sustaining time leaves real doubts.

Since section 315 is no hindrance when there are not more than two candidates, as is most often the case in general elections, how much free time does the industry give when there are only two candidates! In senatorial campaigns in 1962, an FCC survey showed that television broadcasters did not provide significantly more sustaining time when only two candidates were running. There were two senatorial candidates each in 28 State contests and there were more than two in eight States. Proportionately, as many TV stations in the eight States provided sustaining time for senatorial candidates as in the 28 States.

A like analysis for radio and television in 1966 showed that the average time for major party candidates was about the same whether or not there was a third party candidate. In 1966, of 133 television stations reporting charges of more than $50,000 for paid political broadcasts, 35 percent made no free time available."

While broadcast costs increased, the statistics suggest that the ratio of paid to free program time has been declining, and probably for the same reason-it is more costly to give free time just as it is to buy it.

Of course, statistics may mislead in both directions. On the one hand, some free time that is now provided is not donated in prime-time periods. On the other hand, some free time is offered and is refused by candidates who do not like the formats offered or do not want opponents to get equal exposure.

These are reasons why I wonder how much more time would be utilized if 315 were repealed. Understandably, broadcasters are concerned about format, but should they be in a position to dictate campaign strategy by putting offers of free time on a take-it-or-leave-it basis?

Many candidates would like more exposure than is provided through debates and interviews. Many candidates would like opportunities to speak for themselves on their own terms, even if they attract smaller audiences.

Dr. Stanton says they could buy that time, but what if they don't have the money available or, as likely, the stations don't want to sell them program time? Some stations won't sell program time for the same reason they won't give it free-fear of losing audiences. Thus, broadcasters often are, in effect, in a position to substitute their judg ment for that of the candidates.

Dr. Stanton idealizes confrontation politics. Well, it can be exciting for the public, and it probably can bring increased public interest, but to put it bluntly, many candidates are simply not willing to confront either an opponent or an issue, even to get free time.

The cost of political broadcasting is high and rising, and the end is not in sight. There are potential CATV costs as both cities and rural areas get wired and candidates can be sure to reach only their constituents. Color TV will bring higher time and production costs. Yet increasingly, the bulk of money spent on political broadcasting,

Federal Communications Commission, "Survey of Political Broadcasting, Primary and General Election Campaigns of 1962" (Washington, D.C.; USGPO, 1963), pp. v-viii. 5 Federal Communications Commission, "Survey of Political Broadcasting, Primary and General Election Campaigns of 1966" (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1967), pp. 4-5.