of this came out when changes in flight training procedures were effected, by the prompt cooperation of the air carriers, the airline pilots, and the FAA as a direct result of the earlier hearings held by this committee. As we proceed, I would like all of the responsible parties to consider furthering their efforts to attain a higher degree of safety through cooperative efforts rather than through any singleminded approach to the problem.

The organizations which will appear as we carry these proceedings forward should cover the entire spectrum of aviation interests in safety. I would hope and expect that individuals who have similar interests would communicate their interests through responsible representative organizations. I will have to guard against undue repetition in order to complete the record in a reasonble time period.

Our first witness this morning will be Mr. Charles Ruby, president, Air Line Pilots Association.

Mr. Ruby, I see that you have a lengthy statement and some charts. If you wish, you may summarize it, and your full statement will be included in the record.

STATEMENTS OF CHARLES RUBY, PRESIDENT, AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION; TED LINNERT, DIRECTOR, ENGINEERING AND SAFETY DEPARTMENT; AND IRIS PETERSON, VICE PRESIDENT, STEWARD AND STEWARDESS DIVISION

Mr. RUBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. Mr. FRIEDEL. Will you introduce those with you at the witness table?

Mr. RUBY. Yes. On my left is Ted Linnert, director of ALPA Engineering and Safety Department, and on my right is Miss Iris Peterson of the Air Line Pilots Association, Steward and Stewardess Division and also region 1 vice president.

Also we have a sizable contingent of working pilots present in the room. If anyone has any questions that he would like to ask of those who are flying these airplanes today, I think we have a complete cross section, those of us who are staff: Mr. Linnert and Miss Peterson, and myself and a group of working pilots. Miss Peterson is a working stewardess.

I also would like to apologize for not having delivered this material some 3 or 4 days in advance. Unfortunately, with the short notice we only completed the printing on Saturday.

On the front page there are eight items listed. Rather than read this entire report, which is some 14 pages, I will attempt to highlight what amounts to an index of the eight items, and then we will be glad to answer any questions that we are capable of answering, if anyone has such questions.

I would also like to further state that the Air Line Pilots Association has no quarrel with any other segment of the industry. We do, from time to time, have differing viewpoints on how we get an accomplishment on a particular subject.

A pressing problem that faces us today is the airport, and we have had the problem developing for many years. The question now arises, How can we finance the construction or the modification of both new and present airports? The best estimate from people who are knowl

edgeable on this subject is that it will take better than $2 billion to update the airports that are needed to handle the traffic volume that is involved today. We, of course, do not believe that it will be possible to obtain $2 billion plus from any one source. We do not pretend that we are experts on financing, but we do know from actual experience that it is going to be necessary to update these airports and, in some cases, build new ones.

The delays that are developing in major terminals today are almost unbelievable, unless you actually experience them. I had one pilot tell me this morning that a couple of days ago he sat on the ground approximately 2 hours and 40 minutes at Kennedy to fly to Chicago. Well, the ground time at Kennedy exceeded the flying time between Kennedy and Chicago.

Why has this come about? On page 3 of our summary you will find the listing of examples of rail, bus, and air schedules and costs. And this is, in my judgment, self-evident as to why the number of people who are traveling by air today are doing just that. For example, Chicago-Miami by train is 31 hours; by bus, it is 35 hours; and by air, it is 212 hours. From Washington to Los Angeles, by train is 5311⁄2 hours' train time plus 6 hours' connection at Chicago; and New York-San Francisco is 6211⁄2 hours plus 6 hours connection time in Chicago.

I remember several years ago Robert R. Young put an advertisement in a newspaper and said: "A hog can travel on the same freight car from New York to Los Angeles without changing trains, why cannot a passenger do this?" This has been the situation for years, and still is today.

By bus, we are talking about approximately 75 hours, both in the case of Washington to Los Angeles and New York to San Francisco; and the fares range from $42.90 on the bus between Chicago and Miami to a maximum of $88.35 from New York to San Francisco. These are all coach fares.

By air from Washington to Los Angeles is 4 hours 48 minutes; New York to San Francisco is 5 hours, 37 minutes. There are only two ways most people go any more. Because of the reduction in total train services and the reduced utilization by people for long-haul bus transportation, you either drive your own automobile, or you fly. Obviously this is creating a traffic crisis the likes of which we have not seen the ultimate yet, because the stretched DC-8 than can accommodate up 250 passengers, and the 747 that can accommodate up to 480, are going to create a great problem in our terminal building space alone. This is something that we must see to believe. We have to prepare for this. This is just one element of the problem.

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Now the air traffic control situation, which is item 2 indicated on page 1, is another link in this chain that is of no small consideration; because, in the past, we have merely increased the number of personnel who are operating in the air traffic control system. There has been considerable research and development done in an attempt to somewhat mechanize this process. It is not installed yet. For example, the alphanumerics arrangement, we feel that in real high-density traffic the blips on the scope with associated numbers and identifiers are going to overlap each other to the point where they will obliterate information that should be forthcoming.

We are not opposed to advancement. All we are saying is that with the apparent increase in total aviation traffic, we must come up with a better mousetrap. It is going to take time to do it. The total flow requirements far exceed our capacity now in the high-density areas. It will get worse, gentlemen, before it gets better.

Now we have also got an overlapping situation in terms of collision avoidance equipment as opposed to the air traffic control system. We and no one else that I know of advocate that the collision-avoidance system will displace the air traffic control system. Collision avoidance would simply be a supplement to the air traffic control system. So we cannot under any circumstances consider that we can rest on our oars with the present air traffic control system and depend on a collisionavoidance device to make up for the deficiencies.

Now the collision-avoidance system, which is item 3 on the index on page 1, the present estimates are that this system after it is developed and is proven safe will cost approximately $30,000 to $50,000 per aircraft. Now the airlines and some of the business aviation can probably afford this cost. This dissertation is found on page 7. However, to make this system really do the job that it must do, we must talk about all aircraft being so equipment-military, general aviation, and commercial airlines.

It goes without saying that general aviation cannot afford a device that costs $30,000 to $50,000. A man could buy two or three airplanes for that kind of money. So, we must provide some means of developing a collision avoidance system that is either from a cost standpoint acceptable to general aviation or provide some means of a lease for the equipment per flight-hour on an as-needed basis. I do not profess to state which is the more likely or possible solution to the problem, but I am saying that you cannot have a portion of the aircraft equipped with collision avoidance system and have full effectiveness from the standpoint of its total utilization and maximum results in terms of safety. We must exert enough effort to develop this system to have it work. This is one of our big problems today. There is no question about it. I think every pilot sitting in this room can verify this, probably with experience of his own and in many cases of rather recent origin.

Also on page 7, referring to the transport aircraft crew requirements, we have made a presentation to the Federal Aviation Administration on this subject. We have delivered a copy of a book with a blue cover.

(The publication referred to, "The Need for a Three-Man Crew on Jet Transports," has been placed in the committee files.)

Mr. RUBY. We have delivered copies to the Air Transport Association and the Aircraft Industry Association; we are making no secret of our viewpoints. We do not contend that a three-man crew can eliminate all accidents, midair collisions. We are making no such contention. We are, however, stating that we do believe that a threeman crew is an essential element to help minimize this exposure. Why is this so? As we get into high-speed airplanes that operate short distances, the major portion of the operating life of this airplane will be consumed in takeoff, climb, descent, and landing. We do not have a displacement yet for the see-and-be-seen principle, even though that

is a poor crutch. Somebody has got to be looking outside when the weather is such that you can see other airplanes. With a two-man crew, you simply cannot attend to the inside of the airplane including the checklist items and look out at the same time.

We are not stating that positive control is a possibility at this time, because in our judgment the air traffic control system simply could not take on this total requirement because they simply don't have the capacity. So, you are going to have to depend on the see-and-be-seen principle for some time to come. This is only one link of the total chain. We fully expect other segments of the industry to disagree with us, either in whole or in part, but we are prepared to stand up and be counted with respect to the problem.

Now on page 8 you will find a heading entitled, "Communication Facilities and Equipment." This also ties in very directly with the air traffic control requirements in this particular aspect. At the busy terminal today the utilization of time on the communications frequencies are such that you simply cannot handle the communications requirements for the total number of airplanes that are trying to use them and complete the communication. For example, many clearances will be issued and the receiving pilot will not be able to repeat back the clearance to assure the traffic controller that the proper airplane has received the clearance and, if he has, that he has received it correctly.

What we are stating is that there must be a considerable reduction in voice communications. This will require some additional research and development to reduce the voice communications, and it will require the implementation of facilities and equipment that will provide certain information to the ground controller and to the pilot in the air that does not require voice communication on the radio.

Now the evolution of this industry started back in the days when the radio communication was handled by Morse code. You can readily understand that if today we were trying to handle communications with Morse code we couldn't handle one-tenth, probably not even onehundredth of the traffic that we do with voice communications today. What I am now saying is that the voice communications have reached the saturation point in the high-density areas, so we must develop a system to impart certain information that does not require voice communications. We simply must do this, if we are going to accommodate the traffic demand that exists today.

On page 9, the heading entitled "Weather Minimums," you will find a position taken by the membership of this association with respect to the reduction in operating minimums. They have taken a stand that they do not wish to go to 100-foot decision height and 1,200foot runway visual range at this time. They take the strong position that we should stay with the 150-foot decision height and the 1,600foot runway visual range until we have acquired enough experience and competence at that set of minimums to then consider going lower. Now why is this a situation that takes considerable time? Gentlemen, the answer is really quite simple. Up to this point we do not have simulation that accurately simulates these restrictions in visibility. I think this is coming, but it is not here as of this instant. Secondly, the actual experience is quite limited, because there are very few times that any sizable number of crews can actually operate the airplane with this

kind of ceiling and visibility limitation. So the total amount of prac tice that the crew gets is quite limited. We must be sure that we are going to do the job accurately and safely before we go even lower. That is the substance of that commentary.

Now on page 10 you will find a statement that involves pilot training. I am sure that this committee is aware that as the result of a meeting that developed between the Air Transport Association, the Pilots Association, and the FAA, a system has been worked out which is on a trial basis for the time being, and in our judgment that was one of the most constructive things that has been accomplished. It was done on an industry basis. The record indicates so far that what has been done is a proper path. In my judgment, we should continue this kind of effort within the industry and, in all probability, if we can continue this type of program we will solve a lot of problems before they happen rather than waiting until after they happen. Gentlemen, we are interested in a solution before rather than after the accident. This is one of the most important steps that this whole industry can make today.

Now the record so far, and admittedly it is of relatively short duration, indicates that the revised training methods that are in use, wherein the training and the type ratings that are involved with half of the powerplants out on one side, has proven extremely successful without exposing either the aircraft, the crew aboard, or people on the ground. This is the substance of what I am saying, that in this case an ounce of prevention really amounts to a billion dollars of cure before we ever have the disease in the first place. So what we need is to do more of this on a cooperative basis. I think we are then beginning to get the show on the road.

Now to cap this thing off, we recognize that the Congress cannot take into consideration every specific detail; but you do have the requirement to have some basic background of the problems, what the possible solutions are and, probably of greater importance, how much does it cost to get these solutions in terms of accomplishment.

If you turn to page 12 under the title "The Systems Approach," this is really what we are leading to. In the past this industry, like many others, has simply grown like Topsy. This means that there has been a considerable lack of coordination and cooperation, not only between various segments of the industry, but also the Government agencies and, to a degree, the Congress.

To give you an example of a case in point, when we start talking about airports, if they are not geographically spaced with some logic you can sink a mint of money in the construction or the modification of an airport, and its proximity to another airport in fact makes that expenditure a complete nullity; because the inefficency that exists between the two airports and the accident exposure rate becomes ridiculously high.

To cite one airport as one example, Floyd Bennett Field in New York and Kennedy are so close together geographically that they are incompatible from a local traffic standpoint alone, to say nothing of the air traffic control situation. Someday, somehow we have got