persons under these disabilities were socii and other aliens (peregrini). The praetor was prevented from naming certain persons as prosecutors, such for instance as kinsmen of the defendant, and others. The plaintiff might reject the patronus, whom the praetor appointed, if the patronus was a man of suspected character, and the praetor must appoint another (chap. iv. v.).

The sixth and seventh chapters are important. They treat of the Judices or jurymen who are to be appointed by the Praetor and placed in the Album for the year. Klenze has a valuable note here. The determination of the class who should act as jurymen on trials for Repetundae, and in other cases also, was a great matter in dispute between the two parties at Rome from the time of the Gracchi to the time of Octavianus Caesar, but for want of sufficient evidence it is very obscure. These two chapters, though both of them are imperfect, can be restored with certainty from one another; and Klenze has done it. Before proceeding to explain chapters six and seven, Klenze makes some remarks on the agreement between these chapters and what we know in other ways about the appointment of Judices. The common statement is that the law of C. Gracchus took away from the Senators the privilege of acting as Judices and transferred it to the Equestrian order, who kept it till Sulla's time. As to the Servilia Lex of Glaucia also, Cicero states that Glaucia gained the favour of the Equites by what he did for their order. But there is no mention of the Equites in the sixth and seventh chapters, though these chapters can be restored so completely that it is hardly possible that any thing can be lost, nor is there mention of the Equites in any other part of the fragments of the Servilia. Klenze concludes that the office of Judex was never given in direct terms to the Equites, but that these popular laws gave the Equites the opportunity of having the greatest influence in the trials, and that this was already effected by the law of C. Gracchus, which deprived the senate of the power of being Judices, as the Servilia certainly did, for they are excluded by chapters six and seven. The whole question then is reduced to this. The

Servilia Lex expressly excluded senators and others, as we shall see, from the office of Judex; and the law of C. Gracchus probably did the same. All those who were not expressly excluded from the office of Judex must have been admissible to it.

The following is the substance of the sixth chapter as restored by Klenze. It provides for the appointment of 450 Judices by the Praetor Peregrinus for the first year following the enactment of the Lex Servilia, and within ten days after the enactment. The law does not state from what class or classes the praetor must choose (legat) the Judices: it only declares that he must not choose persons from certain classes. The Praetor must not appoint any Tribunus Plebis, Quaestor, Triumvir Capitalis, military tribune of the first four legions, any man who is or shall be a Triumvir for the assignment of lands, or any man who is or shall be in the senate, or any man who has been hired for pay or wages, or any man who has been condemned in a Quaestio, or in a Publicum Judicium, in consequence of which he was not eligible to the senate, or any man under thirty years of age or above sixty, or any man who does not dwell in Rome or does not dwell nearer to Rome than five miles, or any man who is the father, brother, or son of a man who is or shall be in the senate, or any man who is beyond seas. Every man who is selected by the Practor must declare his father's name, the name of his tribe, and his cognomen. The names of the 450 Judices must be written on a white tablet with black characters with the name of each man's father and tribe. After the Praetor has selected the Judices, he must take care that the names be read before the people, and he must swear that he has appointed the Judices pursuant to the law. The names of the 450 so selected must be retained in the public tables "in perpetuo," which means "all through the year."

The seventh chapter provides for the appointment of 450 Judices annually for every year following the first year after the enactment of the law. This chapter is the same as the sixth except in the beginning which determines who is to appoint the 450 annually. The person who must appoint

appears to be one of the Praetors, chosen by lot, as Klenze conjectures. Accordingly by the sixth chapter the Praetor Peregrinus would name the Judices for that part of the year which would remain after the enactment of the law, and at the beginning of the next year one of the Praetors for that year chosen by lot would appoint the 450 Judices and preside at all the trials for Repetundae for that year.

The enumeration of persons who are excluded from the office of Judex contains only the Minores magistratus, but the words (queive in Senatu siet fueritve), "who ever is in the senate or shall be," comprehend the Majores magistratus, such as Dictator, Consul, and so on. The terms of this Lex however show that the persons enumerated before the Senators are not considered as Senators by virtue of their office, though they may have been Senators in some other way. The Senators as such are distinctly excluded by this chapter from the office of Judex.

The words "or any man who has been hired for pay or wages" are partly restored by Klenze's conjecture (queive mercede aliqua conductus sit). Sigonius made a different restoration, but it cannot be accepted. Klenze's conjecture is certainly probable, but his explanation of the restored words is not satisfactory (p. 30, note 7). The terms of this exception would require the Praetor in choosing the Judices, to exclude any man who had ever given his services for hire in any way. It would therefore exclude a great number of the poorer people, and any body, whether rich or poor, whom the terms of the law would comprehend. The law excluded also persons below and above a certain age, and all who did not live in Rome or within a certain distance from Rome. These exclusions would limit very much the number of persons from whom the Judices could be selected, and some of them would apply to the Equites. Unfortunately the text of the law is deficient in that part which should state whether the Praetor could name any person who was not included in the exceptions above mentioned, and Klenze's restoration of this part cannot be considered certain. But the whole tenour of the chapter leads to the plain conclusion that any Roman

citizen not included in the exceptions might be selected as a Judex by the Praetor. It is however almost certain that he would choose the Judices from those who had some property, and the money class were the Equites. Thus by the complete exclusion of the senators the law of Glaucia in theory at least made the office of Judex open to every Roman citizen, with certain exceptions. This was a great change. It deprived all members of the senate of an important office which they had once exercised, and gave it to the people. But it did not go so far as to make the choice of the Judices depend on popular election. The choice was wisely given to a Praetor, who was himself appointed by the electors.

The eighth chapter treats of the mode of commencing an action by him who shall claim a sum of money under the law, and of the choice of the Judices out of the four hundred and fifty (De nomine deferundo judicibusque legundeis). This chapter is very difficult, and we can derive no help from the history of the Judices for filling up the gaps in this part of the Lex. It seems however that we may safely conclude from what Sigonius and Klenze have done for the restoration of the text, that the way of proceeding was this. The plaintiff or prosecutor named one hundred persons from the Album Judicum or jury list for the year, and the defendant selected fifty out of them, or in other words he rejected fifty. In the same way the defendant named one hundred Judices, and the plaintiff or prosecutor rejected fifty. Thus there would

remain one hundred Judices for the trial.

As this is an

even number there must have been some provision in the Lex for the case of the jury being equally divided in their verdict, if the whole number of one hundred sat on the trial. So far the meaning of this chapter appears tolerably certain. The thirteenth chapter treats of the mode in which the Judices should give their votes at the trial. tablet (sorticula) was made of box-wood and of certain specified dimensions, and covered with wax on which the Juror must write A or C or N L, which letters respectively denoted acquittal, condemnation, or indefinite adjournment. The Practor must have a voting-box prepared, named Sitella in

The voting

this chapter, and he must instruct the Judices to place their voting-tablets in this box; and the Judices must place the tablets in the box in such way that it may be certain that each Judex casts only one vote, and he must cover with his fingers the letter which is written on the tablet. The Praetor (chap. 15, 16) after counting the tablets pronounced the condemnation or acquittal according to the majority of the votes. If a man were condemned or acquitted, the judgment was final, unless it should be proved that there had been 'praevaricatio' on the part of the prosecutor, which means collusion between the prosecutor and defendant, by means of which the defendant had been acquitted; or unless there might arise some question in respect of the Litis aestimatio or amount of the damages; or some question respecting the 'legis sanctio.' The meaning of this last exception is doubtful. Klenze says that it provides for the case of an acquittal being obtained by the defendant through bribing the Judices. If the defendant were convicted, the Quaestor, he who had charge of the Aerarium, as Klenze conjectures, with the consent of the majority of the Consilium, was required to call on the defendant to give securities (praedes) for the amount at which the damages might be assessed in the Litis aestimatio; and if securities were not given, the quaestor must take possession of the defendant's property in the name of the state. This Consilium, or body of jurymen, may be, as Klenze conjectures, those who, as we shall presently see, were appointed to assess the damages; and a majority of this Consilium. determined what should be the amount of the security. (Chap. 17.)

The eighteenth chapter is de leitibus aestumandis.' The plural form was necessary to express the fact, because there might be many claims against the defendant, and the whole amount of damages could only be ascertained by adding together the assessed damages of each complainant. The amount of damages for money wrongfully taken before the enactment of this Servilia Lex was 'simplum,' as the Romans termed it, or the amount of the damage, and no more. Nothing is said about the costs of the plaintiffs, which might