higher than the boiler. Both are required to be sufficiently strong to resist a pressure of from ten to twenty atmosphere, and of a capacity varying according to the requirements of the manufacture, and they are connected by a tube extending from the bottom of the boiler to the bottom of the cylinder, and also by another tube, called in the specification the tube for ascension to conduct the superheated water from the boiler to the upper part of the cylinder, which terminates in the interior of the cylinder by a rose-jet, or holes may be made in the end of it, so as to distribute the water uniformly in the cylinder and to insure the intimate contact between the superheated water and the fatty substance subjected to the process. Fatty substances to be subjected to the process are placed in the cylinder, which, with other things, is furnished with a pressure gauge to indicate the pressure in the apparatus used with devices to indicate the height and level of the substance and of the water in the cylinder. boiler being heated in the furnace, called in the specification the source of heat, while the second boiler, called the cylinder, is heated from the first boiler. Unlike as the two processes are in so many material characteristics, it seems almost a work of supererogation to enter much into details, as the dissimilarity is apparent in the whole description of the respective inventions, except that both contemplate the employment of heat and water in effecting the decomposition of fatty substances; and even in that respect, they are widely different, as the patentees under whose patent the respondent works employ only moderate heat as compared with the [*416 other process, never exceeding in practice what is represented by a pressure of one hundred and eighty pounds to the square inch; and they also employ steam as well as water in a vessel which is never filled with the fatty substance or with water or with both combined. None of the other characteristic conditions of the complainant's invention are found in the specification of the patent under which the respondent works, full proof of which is shown in the enumeration of those conditions, which are as follows: Everything being arranged as described for applying the process, the boiler is completely filled with water and the cylinder is filled with water to one third of its height, and then it is filled to the level of the upper cock, shown in the drawings, with the fatty substances to be decomposed, the latter substance or substances being above the water in the cylinder, which is still not filled, there being a vacant space in the cylinder above the fatty substance. Heat is then applied to the boiler, which is placed in a furnace where it may be exposed to fire. By the direction the heat is to be gradually applied until the pressure gauge indicates a pressure of ten to twenty atmospheres, accord-intimate mechanical mixture. ing to the nature of the fatty substance to be decomposed. 1. That the fatty substances to be treated must be first mixed with water equal in bulk to one third or half of the fatty substance. Minute description is then given of what it is 415*] claimed takes place in the apparatus. Superheated water it is said acquires an ascending motion, whence it results that the heated water in the boiler ascends through the described tube into the cylinder, and being forcibly drawn out through the holes in the described rose-jet, passes through the fatty substance to the vacant space above, where the temperature being reduced, it descends through the other described tube to the bottom of the boiler, where it is again heated and then recommences its ascending motion as in the first instance, and so on during the operation. Suggestion is made that the operation may be continued from five to eight hours, according to the nature of the fatty substance composing the charge and the degree of heat and pressure applied, and it is claimed that the result will be that the fatty substance will be decomposed and that the product will be fat acids and glycerine. In their specification they admit that it is a well known scientific fact that fatty substances may be decomposed by water under the influence of heat and pressure, which could not well be denied in view of the fact that water or its equivalent was used in all the prior processes of saponification, and of the great mass of other evidence to support that proposition which is embodied in this record. Consequently those inventors do not claim to be the discoverers of that scientific truth. All they claim is that their invention consists of an apparatus wherein water and the fatty substances are heated tely in two different boilers, the first 2. That for that purpose the fatty substance and the water in the proportions mentioned must be put into the described receiving vessel, where it must be subjected to the action of the piston with the perforated disk until it causes the fat and the water to form an emulsion or 3. That the mixture so formed must then be driven, by a force pump, through the connecting tube into the heating vessel, whether a coil of iron tubing or other convenient vessel, and be subjected to a high degree of heat and pressure for ten minutes to effect the decomposition of the fatty substance. 4. That the heating vessel must be closed and of great strength, so that the requisite amount of pressure may be applied to prevent the conversion of the water into steam. 5. That the heating vessel must be filled with the mixture and kept entirely full of it throughout the operation. 6. That the only means suggested to fulfill the condition is the forcing pump, as the provision is that, if necessary, the speed of the forcing pump should be increased. 7. That the heating vessel must be kept full of the mixture so that no steam or air shall accumulate in the heating vessel, and to pre serve the intimate mechanical mixture of the fatty substance and the water, as the description does not suggest any means to [*417 whether occasioned by evaporation or by its besupply any deficiency of water in any other way, ing converted into steam. 8. That the temperature required for the operation, if the fatty substance be such as palmoil, is 510° Fah., or, if such as beef tallow or the tallow of sheep, it must be carried to 610° Fah., or the melting-point of lead. 9. That the heating vessel should be tested, before taken into use, by a pressure of ten thousand pounds, and should be of sufficient strength to be safe at a working pressure of two thousand pounds to the square inch. 10. That the apparatus must be furnished with gauges to indicate the required heat to be applied in the operation, and with a refrigerator near the exit end of the apparatus, to cool down the product from its high temperature below 212° Fah., before it is discharged into the receiving vessel. Compare these conditions with the specification of the patent under which the respondent works, and it is clear that he does not use any such method, process or operation as those described in the letters patent of the complainant. Witnesses have been examined by each party as experts, to assist the court in making the comparison, but they differ so widely in their statements as to afford the court but little aid in the solution of the question. Attention is also drawn to the fact that several circuit judges have decided otherwise, to which the proper reply seems to be that the proofs before the court are much fuller than on any former occasion, and that the conclusion stated is the best one the court can form after having given the whole record an attentive examination. Expert witnesses, on both sides, have been examined also upon the issue of infringement, but they differ so widely in opinion that their testimony affords the court but little aid in deciding the question, which, after all, must depend chiefly upon the comparison of the descriptive portions of the two specifications. Hill v. Thompson, 1 Web. Pat. Cas., 232; Turner v. Winter, 1 Web. Pat. Cas., 77. 418*] *Two things are not the same, under the patent law, when one is, in practice, sub stantially better than the other in a case where the second improvement is not gained by the use of the same means or known mechanical equivalents. Curt. Pat., 4th ed., sec. 330. Patent laws have for their leading purpose the encouragement of useful inventions. Practical utility is their object, and it would be strange if, with such object in view, the law should consider two things substantially the same which, practically and in reference to their utility, are substantially different. Curt. Pat., sec. 331. Slight differences in degree cannot be regarded as of weight in determining the question of substantial similarity or substantial difference, but in all cases the question whether the difference in degree is sufficient or insufficient to prove the alleged infringement, is a question of fact to be determined by the jury in an action at law, or by the court in a suit in equity. Cahoon v. Ring, 1 Cliff., 621. Differences, however, so great as are exhibited in this record, relieve the case, in the judgment of the court, from all doubt and warrant the conclusion that the process under which the respondent works is substantially different from that of the complainant. On the 23d of November, 1867, the patent of the complainant was extended for seven years from the expiration of the fourteen years for which the original patent was granted. Subsequently, to wit: on the 6th of March, 1871, the complainant instituted a second suit against the respondent, founded upon the extended patent, which is No. 340 on the calendar. Both cases were heard at the same time. Suffice it to say, | in respect to the latter, that the pleadings, issues and proofs in the two cases are substantially the same, and that the latter must be disposed of in the same way as the preceding case. Decrees were entered in these cases respectively in the *circuit court in favor of the [*419 complainant, each of which must be reversed. The decree in each case is reversed, with costs, and the cases respectively remanded, with direction to dismiss the respective bills of complaint. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Swayne, Mr. Justice Strong and Mr. Justice Bradley. ion of these cases. Mr. Justice Davis took no part in the decis LEWIS STOWE, Appt., v. UNITED STATES. (See S. C., 19 Wall., 13-17.) Power of Attorney-blank in—estoppel by. 1. One who delivered to another a power of attorney, fully executed except a blank left for the name of the attorney, to collect a claim against the Government, and suffered a suit to proceed in the Court ment for the claim to be made, by an attorney of Claims to collect the claim, and allowed a settlewhose name was inserted in the blank, is estopped from disputing the validity of the settlement. 2. He cannot afterwards amend the petition filed in the Court of Claims, and obtain payment to himself of the claim already paid to such attorney. [No. 206.] Argued Jan. 23, 1874. Decided Mar. 9, 1874. PPEAL from the Court of Claims. A The facts found by the court below were as follows: 1. In Oct., 1863, the officers of the Quartermaster's Department refusing to deal with one A. M. White, the claimant in his own name offered to furnish the grain mentioned in the petition, and his proposal was accepted. The claimant alone was known to the officers of the Quartermaster's Department, and all vouchers and drafts under his agreement were issued to him; but White purchased the grain and received the purchase money, except in the instance hereinafter stated, allowing to the claimant a commission for his services and the use of his name. 2. The defendant having neglected to pay a portion of the money due under the agreement, the claimant, Jan. 14, 1864, at the request of White, executed a power of attorney in blank, authorizing attorney, for me and in 66 NOTE. Estoppel in pais. prima facie power of disposal of them, he will be If the owner of goods furnishes another with bound by the latter's sale to a bona fide purchaser. Steelyards v. Singer. 2 Hill, 98: Shearer v. Barrett, Hill & D., 72; Devlin v. Pike, 5 Daly, 103: Dows v. Greene, 16 Barb., 78; McNeill v. Tenth Natl. Bk.. 46 N. Y., 329; Saltus v. Everett, 20 Wend., 267; Bernard v. Campbell, 55 N. Y., 456, 14 Am. Rep., 289. One standing by and seeing another purchase or making large expenditures on property to which he had some claim of which he gives no notice, cannot afterwards assert his claim. Gray v. Bartlett, 20 Pick., 186; Carr v. Wallace, 7 Watts, 401; Henderson v. Overton, 2 Yerg., 394. 24 Am. Dec. 492; Wood v. Seely, 32 N. Y.. 116; Brown v. Bowen, 30 N. Y.. 541; Am. Exch. Bk. v. Webb, 15 How. Pr.. 198; Tilton v, Nelson, 27 Barb., 610; Cornnili v. Jackson, 44 Barb., 228; Christianson v. Siniard, 19 my name, to collect and receive any and all | bank, a warrant was drawn on Sep. 7, 1868, by moneys due and coming due to me," under the the defendant's officers, on the Treasurer of the said agreement; and to make, execute and de- United States, for the balance of the claimant's liver to any officer or person, authorized by the account set forth in the petition, payable to Government to pay said moneys, a good and "Louis Stowe, present or order." This warsufficient release, acquittal or receipt for the rant was indorsed, "Louis Stowe," by Fuller same or any part that may be paid to my said & Davis, his attorneys, under the power before attorneys, and generally to do any and all mentioned, and made payable to order of the things necessary in the premises. This power National Bank of the Metropolis. It was next was not executed before two witnesses, but was indorsed by the National Bank of the Metropacknowledged before and witnessed by a notary olis, to the order of the Treasurer of the United public. Subsequent to the giving of the power States. Sep. 9, a draft was drawn by the of attorney, the defendant paid to the claimant, Treasurer in favor of F. E. Spinner, Treasurer on account of moneys due under the agreement, United States, assignee, for the amount of the $154,856.03, which amount was paid over by warrant. The defendant then credited this the claimant to White. But the defendant re- amount to the bank and charged it to the claimfusing to pay the balance due, as set forth in ant; and the bank at the same time credited it the petition, White inserted in the power of to White; but the defendant's law officers havattorney the names of "Theodore N. Davis of ing charge of the defense of the action, were New York City, and Thomas J. D. Fuller of never informed of the settlement, and the suit Washington, D. C., as attorney in fact of the was not formally discontinued or dismissed. National Bank of Metropolis, of Washington, The claimant, Stowe, was not a party to the D. C.," and he instructed Mr. Fuller, who was arrangement with the bank, but he allowed it an attorney of the court, to bring an action to proceed without notifying the defendant of against the defendant. Mr. Fuller had no au- his alleged interest or of his objection to the thority from the claimant to bring the suit, settlement. Pending the settlement, he asserted other than the power of attorney, but brought to Mr. Fuller that he had an interest to the this action against the defendant in the name amount of several thousand dollars in the of the claimant, for the use of White, by the claim, and endeavored to obtain the requisition filing of the original petition herein. himself; but this notification and proceeding was entirely between himself and White, and between himself and the defendant. Subsequently, the claimant, with knowledge of the facts, suffered the suit so brought to proceed, and co-operated with White in the prosecution thereof. 3. While the action was still pending, and before the trial thereof, viz.: on or about Sep. 7, 1868, a settlement or compromise of the cause of action was effected by White and the defendant in the manner following: the National Bank of the Metropolis being indebted to the defendant, and White being indebted to the Abb. Pr., 223, 3 Rob., 230; Town v. Needham, 3 Owner of persona! property standing by and seeing another mortgage it without making known his title, will be estopped from afterwards setting up his title as against the mortgage. Thompson v. Sanboru, 11 N. H., 201, 35 Am. Dec., 490. Fraudulently asserting title in another will estop one from asserting titie in himself as against a claimant under an execution sale against the third person. Wells v. Higgins, 1 Litt., 299, 13 Am. Dec., 235. Mortgagee present when mortgaged premises were sold at auction as free from incumbrances without disclosing his mortgage, is estopped from setting up his mortgage as against the purchaser. Markham v. O'Connor, 52 Ga., 183, 21 Am. Rep., 249. Owner of land standing by and permitting another to expend his money improving it in ignorance of the former's title, may be compelled to surrender his title on payment for it, or to pay for the improvements, if he has encouraged the other to make improvements. Crest v. Jack, 3 Watts, 238, 27 Am. Dec., 353. Under the Statute of Frauds, it is not permissible that an estopple in país should work a transfer of the legal title to land. Hayes v. Livingston, 34 Mich., 384, 22 Am. Rep. 533. The case is further stated by the court. Messrs. Reverdy Johnson and J. H. Embry, for appellant. Messrs. Geo. H. Williams, Atty-Gen., and Samuel F. Phillips, Solicitor-Gen., for appellee. Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court: Monie, 56 Barb., 660; Finegan v. Carahan, 61 Barb., 255; Reynolds v. Garner, 66 Barb., 314; Sparrow v. Kingman, 1 N. Y., 253; Moss v. Averill, 10 N. Y., 459; O'Donnell v. Kelsey, 10 N. Y., 419; Plumb v. Cattaraugus, etc., Ins. Co., 18 N. Y., 395; Hathaway v. Payne, 34 N. Y., 109; Abeel v. Van Gelder, 36 N. Y., 514; Blair v. Wait, 69 N. Y., 116; Natl. Park Bk. v. Fourth Natl. Bk., 7 Abb. Pr., N. S., 142; Foster v. Newland, 21 Wend., 97; Greenvault v. Davis, 4 Hill., 648. The doctrine is only applied where it would be contrary to honest dealing and good conscience to aver the contrary. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co. v. Schuy ler, 34 N. Y., 60; Wilcox v. Howell, 44 N. Y., 402; Delaplaine v. Hitchcock, 6 Hill, 17; Frost v. Sar. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Den., 158. The estoppel must be binding on both parties. Green v. Russell, 5 Hill, 185; Wright v. Douglass, 10 Barb., 108; Cohoes Co. v. Goss, 13 Barb., 146; Clute v. Jones, 28 N. Y., 284. Before the party is concluded it must appear: 1. That he has made an admission which is clearly inconsistent with the evidence he proposes to give or the title or claim which he sets up; 2. That the other party has acted upon the admission; 3. That he will be injured by allowing the truth of the admission to be disproved. Andrews v. Etna Ins. Co., 18 Hun, 166; Requa v. Holmes, 19 How. Pr., 445; Gillespie v. Carpentier, 25 How. Pr., 257; Tilton v. Nelson, 27 Barb., 600; Huntley v. Perry, 38 Barb., Strickland, 32 Barb., 289; Greenvault v. Davis, 4 Party who has made another believe a certain state of facts to be true either by his silence, dec-573; Carpenter v. Sutwell, 12 Barb., 136; Strong v. larations or acts, is estopped from denying its truth, where such course has intended to and did influence the conduct of the other. Welland Can. Co. v. Hathaway, 8 Wend., 480, 24 Am. Dec., 51; Otis v. Sill, S Barb., 108; Martin v. Angell, 7 Barb., 410 Pennell v. Hinman, 7 Barb., 649; Lounsbury v. Depew, 28 Barb., 49; Strong v. Strickland, 32 Barb., 289; Wallace v. Bassett, 41 Barb., 97; Hawley v. Griswold, 42 Barb., 23; Stackpole v. Robbins, 47 Barb.. 218; Rice v. Dewey, 54 Barb., 471; Gerher v. Estoppel in pais is, where party has acquired some advantage, or perpetrated some fraud, by the act relied upon to estop him. Gray v. Allen, 14 Ohio, 58, 45 Am. Dec., 521. This case, as found by the Court of Claims,, discloses the following state of facts: In October, 1863, the Quartermaster's Department entered into a written contract with Stowe, to deliver mixed grain at certain agreed prices. This contract was fulfilled, and the balance found due upon it. The defendants having neglected to pay a portion of this balance, Stowe, at the request of one White, the real party in interest, executed a blank power of attorney, with the usual directions to do what was necessary to collect the money from the Government, and delivered it to White. White, on the continued refusal to pay, filled the blank in the power with the names of two attorneys, and instructed one of them to bring an action against the United States. This was done, and the suit was instituted in the name of Stowe to the use of White, with a declaration in the petition that White furnished the grain delivered to the United States in the name of the petitioner. Stowe did not communicate with Fuller, the attorney of record, until after the suit was brought, nor did he authorize its institution, unless such authority was conferred by the power of attorney. Subsequently, with knowledge of the fact, he suffered the suit to proceed and co-operated with White in its prosecution. While the action was still pending, a settlement was effected between White and the defendant. Stowe was not a party to this settlement, but he allowed it to proceed without objection or disclosure of any adverse interest. The suit was not formally discontinued, because the law officers of the Government were not advised of the proceeding which resulted in the settlement. Stowe afterwards, by leave of the court, filed an amended petition denying White's authority to settle, and seeking to obtain from the Government a repayment of the money already paid for White's benefit. The Court of Claims, on hearing the case, dismissed it on the ground of the conclusiveness of the settlement with White, and we think correctly. Stowe, by his own action, is estopped from disputing the validity of this settlement. If it be conceded that the power of attorney was not an effective instrument for any purpose (10 Stat. at L. 170), because not executed in conformity with law, the concession cannot operate to the advantage of Stowe, because he acted in such a way after the suit was brought as to preclude him from assuming the position he took in his amended petition. This action has induced the accounting officers of the Government to treat White as the only party in interest, and if loss is suffered on this account, it should not be borne by the defendants. Stowe, in suffering the suit to proceed, and co-operating with White's attorney in its prosecution, cannot be heard to say that the statements contained in the petition are not true. It would be wrong to allow him to stand by and see the suit settled on the basis of the truth of those statements, and then to turn round and take a new position because the partial interest which he held in the claim was left unprotected by the settlement. If there be cause of complaint against anyone for the failure to protect this interest, it is not against the defendants whose officers conducted and completed the negotiation, on the faith that *White, as declared in the petition, was [*17 the real owner of the claim, and that the suit was prosecuted for his benefit. In assisting to carry on this suit, Stowe adopted the proceeding on which it was based, and in effect notified the defendants that they could safely settle the cause of action with the attorney of record. Besides, in taking charge of it after the settlement and asking leave to amend the petition, he recognized the authority of the counsel who instituted it; and it is very clear, that the amendment which he was permitted to file, could not affect rights acquired while the suit, as originally framed, was pending. Judgment affirmed. This suit was commenced by Eldred in the Circuit Court for Oconto Co., Wisconsin, was afterward by stipulation removed to the Circuit Court for Winnebago Co., and was afterwards by stipulation again removed to the Circuit Court for Dane Co., where the same was tried, and a judgment rendered for the defendant. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of the State of Wisconsin, which court, after hearing the case, affirmed the judgment of the lower court. The case is stated by the court. Messrs. J. P. C. Cottrell and John W. Cary, for plaintiff in error. Mr. S. U. Pinney, for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court: The object of this writ of error is to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, adjudging that the defendant in error had both the legal and equitable estate to the lands claimed by the plaintiff in error. These lands, the register and receiver of the local land office at Menesha, in said State, allowed the plaintiff to enter in 1865 and 1866, at the price of $1.25 per acre; but the entries were canceled by the Commissioner of the General Land Office, on the ground that when they were made the lands were not subject to private entry at such minimum price, and this decision, on appeal, was affirmed by the Secretary of the Interior. The sole question in the case is, whether or not the position thus taken is correct. If correct, it is conceded the defendant's title obtained subsequently cannot be impeached. If incorrect, the defendant must be treated as a trustee, holding the legal title for the plaintiff. 566. The solution of the question depends upon | $1.25 per acre. 2 Stat. at L., 73; 3 Stat. at L., the effect to be given to certain land grant legislation for the benefit of Wisconsin. In June, Since that time the great body of the public 1856, 11 Stat. at L., 20, Congress granted to domain has been brought into market, after that State, to aid in the construction of a line proper notice, at this reduced price, and, unless of railroad from Fond du Lac, northerly to the Congress by special Act ordered otherwise, pristate line, every alternate section of land desig-vate entries have never been allowed unless nated by odd numbers, for six sections in width the land applied for had been previous- [*196 on each side of the road. In pursuance of a well | ly offered at public sale to the highest bidder at settled policy on the subject, the price of the the same price. This has been the established even numbered sections remaining to the Unit-practice at the Land Office, sanctioned by the ed States was doubled, and the lands declared law officers of the government, and recognized not to be subject to private entry until first by this court as a leading feature in our sysoffered at public sale at the increased price. tem of land sales. Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall., This land grant by the Legislature of Wiscon- 88, 20 L. ed., 488; Chotard v. Pope, 12 Wheat., sin became vested in the Chicago and North- 588; 2 Ops. Attys. Gen., 200; 3 Ops. Attys. western Railroad Company, which had, before Gen., 274; 4 Ops. Attys. Gen., 167. the 3d of May, 1859, located the line of its road so that the lands in controversy were within the prescribed limits. Up to this time they had never been brought into market, but on that day, by Proclamation of the President, they were offered for sale at $2.50 per acre. Not being sold, they remained subject to private entry at that sum. A change in the route of the road being desirable, Congress was asked to authorize it. This was done by the Joint Resolution of April 25, 1862, 12 Stat. at L., 618. By the 4th section, it was provided that the even sections of public land "reserved to the United States by the Act of June 3, 1856 (the original grant), along the originally located route of railroad north of the Town of Appleton (the point where the change of route began) and along which no railroad has been constructed, shall hereafter be sold at $1.25 per 192*] acre. *A change in the route of the road was made, which left the disputed lands outside of the new line. After this was done, but before the lands were offered for sale at the reduced price, the plaintiff's entries were made. On the cancellation of these entries, the lands were offered for public sale at the minimum price of $1.25 an acre, and not being sold, were subsequently purchased at private entry at that price by the defendant, to whom patents were issued in 1870. It is a fundamental principle underlying the land system of this country that private entries are never permitted until after the lands have been exposed to public auction, at the price for which they are afterwards subject to entry. They are first surveyed, then a day is appointed for their sale by the President, which is to be kept open for two weeks. At this sale they are offered at a minimum price, and cannot be sold for less, but may be sold for as much more as any one will give, and what remains unsold at the close of such sale is subject to entry at that price. There is an obvious reason for requiring a public sale before leaving the lands open to private entry. It is to secure to all persons a fair and equal opportunity of purchasing them, and to obtain for the government the benefit of competition in case the lands should be worth more than the price fixed by Congress. This system commenced at an early period of our history, and was perfected in 1820. For a period of twenty years, beginning with the commencement of this century, the public lands were sold on credit at not less than $2 an acre; but the mode of selling on credit working badly, it was in 1820 abandoned, and the price reduced to The inquiry arises whether Congress intended to change this system in the new policy adopted by it, to aid States by grants of lands to build railroads. This policy is of comparatively recent date, but there is nothing that we are aware, in any of the various Acts on the subject, which tend to show that it was the purpose of Congress, in its land grant legislation, to alter the manner in which the public lands had been brought into market and made subject to private entry. It is true the minimum price of the lands within certain prescribed limits was doubled, on the supposition that the construction of the contemplated roads would enhance the value of the lands to such an extent that the government would be enabled to realize as much for them as if the grants had not been made, but in all other respects the general system for the disposition of public lands was preserved. It is difficult, therefore, to see how the plaintiff can succeed, unless the legislation on which he rests his title was designed to be exceptional, which we think was not the case. The grant was an ordinary one to build a road in Wisconsin, for which a change of route was desirable, after the line had been located. This change was authorized by Congress, but before the line was relocated the lands in question, being within the six mile limit, had been, at a public land sale, offered for sale at $2.50 per acre, and not being sold were subject to entry at that price, but not at any less sum. The location of the new route left them outside of the required distance, and legislation was necessary to take them out of the condition of lands affected by the construction of a railroad, and to restore them to the general body of the unsold lands, so that they could be sold in the same manner and at the same price that the public *domain is usually subject to sale. This [*197 object was accomplished by the Joint Resolution of April 25, 1862, which declares that "these lands should hereafter be sold at $1.25 per acre." It is contended that this declaration fixed the price absolutely, and subjected them to private entry at that price, without any further proceeding. This proposition is based on the idea that Congress intended to adopt a different rule for the disposition of these lands from that which had always obtained for the disposition of other public lands; but there is nothing in the circumstances of this legislation which tends to prove an intentional abandonment of a long existing policy. Why make an exception in the case of these lands? There was no exigency requiring it, nor any reason to suppose that Congress had any purpose to place |