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attending nearly all infractions of the law, that the Company sought to protect itself by the clause of the policy in question, and of this class was the reckless driving of Gilmore. If his intentions were as bad as the instructions imply, they did not take the case out of the protection of the clause.

If Seaver had died the moment he was thrown 542*] from the *sulky, his death would have been caused by a violation of the law, though Gilmore may have disregarded the rules of the course, and may have intentionally sought to run Seaver off the track.

The jury, in response to a request to find specially on certain points, did, in addition to a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, make the following special finding:

"And the jury further find, that when the sulky of Seaver came into collision with the sulky of Gilmore, Seaver jumped to the ground and was entirely clear from the sulky, harness and reins, upright and uninjured, and spoke to his horse to stop, and then started forward to get hold of the lines to stop him, and in that attempt was killed."

It is said that this verdict is conclusive that the death of the deceased was not caused by the violation of the law in trotting for a wager, but by his own voluntary act when he was not trotting; and both parties appeal to the case of Ins. Co. v. Tweed, 7 Wall., 44, 19 L. ed., 65, where it is said that when a new force or cause of the injury intervenes between the original cause and the accident, the former is the proximate cause.

But we do not think this new force or cause is sufficiently made out by this verdict. The leap from the sulky and securing the reins, and the subsequent fall and injury to Seaver are so close and immediate in their relation to his racing, and all so manifestly part of one continuous transaction, that we cannot, as this finding presents it, say there was a new and controlling influence to which the disaster should be attributed. If he had been landed safely from his sulky and, after being assured of his position, had, with full knowledge of what he was doing, gone to catch the animal, his death in that pursuit when the race was lost might have been too remote to bring the case within the exception.

But as the finding presents it, we cannot say that the accident was not caused by the race which was itself a violation of the law, and which might still have gone on had he caught his mare in time.

543*] *And we are to consider that both this special finding and the general verdict were probably influenced by the erroneous instruction we have already considered, and by that we are now about to mention.

The jury were told that if the death of the insured was caused by the willful exposure of

| nary people in the part of the country where the insured resided, in view of the state of things then existing, the frequency of such races, and the way in which such matches are usually regulated, would naturally understand such language, whether as precluding such driving

or not.

The jury should also consider the nature of the business of the insured, as set forth in the application and, therefore, known to the defendant, that of a livery-stable keeper, which of course embraced the management and driving of horses.

That the question was not what construction would be given to the language at Hartford, where the defendant's Company is located, but, in view of all the circumstances and conditions above alluded to, whether intelligent. fair minded people in the vicinity of the insured where the contract was made, would regard it as excluding the driving of such a race and, if not, that the case would not come within the proviso of that clause in the policy, and the plaintiff would, so far as that is concerned, be entitled to recover."

We are of opinion that the language of this policy is to be construed by the court, so far as it involved matters of law, and by the jury aided by the court when it involved law and fact, and that in neither view of it was the opinion of ordinary people in view of the state of things where the deceased resided, or their understanding of its language in view of the *circumstances of the case, any sound [*544 criterion by which the judgment of the jury should be formed, and the instruction in this branch of the case was unwarranted and misleading.

The jury should have been left to decide for themselves, under all the facts before them attending the death of the insured, whether it was caused by his willful exposure to an unnecessary danger or peril. Such light as the court as a matter of law could give them, on the subject of the willfulness of his conduct, or the presence or absence of any necessity or the character of the necessity which would justify him, might be proper, but this general reference to what ordinary people in a particular locality might think about it, was clearly not so.

For the errors here considered, the judgment of the Circuit Court is reversed, with direction to grant a new trial.

*THOMAS J. BURKE, Plff. in Err., [*519

v.

LOUIS TREGRE and Alphonse Miltenberger. (See 8. C., 19 Wall., 519-526.)

himself to an unnecessary danger or peril with- Louisiana Provisional Court-when dissolved

in the meaning of the other clause in the policy relied on by the defendants, the plaintiff would not be entitled to recover.

military rules.

1. The Provisional Court of La., established by the President, October 20, 1862, had not ceased to exist June 3, 1865.

1866, when Congress provided for the transfer of 2. It was not dissolved until the 28th of July, cases pending in that court, and of its judgments and decrees, to the proper courts of the United

"Upon this part of the case, it was to be considered, however, that the language of this clause must be taken most strongly against the defendant, because used in their policy, and for the purpose of inducing parties to take policies. 3. There is no rule requiring this or any other It was also further to be considered how ordi-court to take notice of the various orders issued

States.

by a military commander, in the exercise of the sion on this ground alone, although it is suffiauthority conferred upon him.

[No. 112.]

Argued Mar. 10, 1874. Decided Mar. 23, 1874.
IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State

of Louisiana.

cient to dispose of this case, as that court may have transacted business after the military occupation ceased, and it is important, therefore, to settle when its jurisdiction terminated.

*It is very clear that the restoration [*525 of civil authority in any State could not take Burke, the owner of a mortgage on lands in place until the close of the rebellion in that Louisiana, executed by Tregre, March 24, 1865, State; and the point of time at which this ocwhich mortgage imported a confession of judg-curred has been the subject of consideration by ment, applied to the District Court of the State and obtained an order for seizure and sale, June 18, 1868.

this court in several cases involving the appliU. S. v. Ancation of Statutes of Limitation. derson, 9 Wall., 56, 19 L. ed. 615; The ProThe property being seized under this order, tector, 12 Wall., 700, 20 L. ed. 463; Adger v. Miltenberger interposed, by way of injunction, Alston, 15 Wall., 560, 21 L. ed. 235. The prinon the ground that he had purchased the prop-ciple established by these cases is, as the war erty June 3, 1865, at a sale made by one Clark, as Provisional Marshal, under execution issued from the United States Provisional Court for Louisiana.

The answer denies the validity of the judgment of said court, which was signed April 26,

1865.

The court perpetuated the injunction and overruled the objection, which is thus stated in the bill of exceptions:

"That if there existed at any time before the date of said judgment such Provisional Court, the same had ceased to exist long before the date of said judgment, by the limitation contained in the executive order upon which the existence of the court is based."

From the judgment of the district court, Burke appealed to the Supreme Court of the State, which affirmed the action of the district court, and to this judgment the present writ of error is directed.

Messrs. A. G. Riddle, P. Phillips and J. R. Beckwith, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Durant & Hornor, for defendants in

error.

Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of

the court:

The only question in this case for our consideration is, whether the Provisional Court of Louisiana, established by the President on the 20th of October, 1862, had ceased to exist, by the terms of the order creating it, on the 3d day of June, 1865, when the plantation in dispute was sold by the Marshal of that court, on a fi. fa. regularly issued, and purchased by Miltenberger, who took immediate possession of it, and has remained in possession ever since.

did not begin or close at the same time in all the States, that its commencement and termination in any State is to be determined by some public act of the Political Departments of the government. This action has fixed the 2d day of April, 1866, as the day in which the rebellion closed in all the States but Texas, and the 20th of August following, as the date of its entire suppression.

It does not, however, follow that the President's Proclamation of April 2d, 1866, ipso facto, dissolved the Provisional Court of Louisiana, although it unquestionably authorized its dissolution. It is plain to be seen that its dissolution, without proper provision for the business before it, as well as that which had been disposed of, would have produced serious injury, and this state of things, requiring the action of Congress, was doubtless recognized by the President, as nothing is said in the Proclamation about this court. If it was subject to be dissolved as soon as the Proclamation appeared, and was no longer a court de jure, it still had a de facto existence until its actual dissolution. This took place on the 28th July. 1866, 14 Stat. at L., 344, when Congress provided for the transfer of cases pending in that court, and of its judgments and decrees to the proper courts of the United States. The power of Congress to do this was recognized in The Grapeshot [supra], and, indeed, we do not see how it could be questioned, if, as we have decided, its establishment was a rightful exercise of the constitutional authority of the President, during a state of war.

It is contended by the plaintiff in error that an order of General Banks, in military command at New Orleans, during *the pe- [*526 riod of this controversy, which is set out at length in the brief of counsel, operated as an injunction upon the proceedings of the Marshal, and that, therefore, the sale of the plantation was unauthorized. The answer to this position is that, in the state of the pleadings and evidence, we are not at liberty to pass upon the legality of this order or to determine what ef fect should be given to it if properly issued. It is not in the record at all, and for aught that appears, was never brought to the notice of either of the courts in Louisiana engaged in the decision of the case.

The institution of this court was a necessity, on account of the disturbed state of affairs in Louisiana, caused by the civil war, and the authority of the President to establish it was sustained in the case of The Grapeshot, 9 Wall., 130, 19 L. ed., 651. The duration of the court was limited to the restoration of civil authority in the State, and it is insisted that this limitation expired when the last Confederate General, Kirby Smith, surrendered, which was on the 26th of May, 1865; but this position is inconsistent with the fact conceded on the argument, that military rule prevailed in the City of New It may be that the courts of the country Orleans, and the State of Louisiana, for a long time after this event, and after the sale in would take judicial notice that Louisiana, at controversy was made. This in itself is conclu- the time mentioned, was in the military occusive proof that civil authority was not then re-pation of our forces, under General Banks, but we know of no rule of law or practice requiring stored, and that the Provisional Court was in this, or any other court, to take notice of the the rightful exercise of its jurisdiction. We do not care, however, to rest our deci- various orders issued by a military commander 159

in the exercise of the authority conferred upon | Mathematics, $1,350, etc., etc. (going on to fix him. the others).

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana is affirmed.

BOLIVAR S. HEAD, Piff. in Err.,

v.

THE CURATORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE STATE OF MISSOURI.

(See S. C., 19 Wall., 526–531.) Construction of words-and of contract.

1. Where the plaintiff was elected a professor of mathematics in the University of Missouri for six years from July 5, 1856, "subject to law," this expression meant subject to whatever law the State Legislature might thing fit to pass.

2. It was a part of the contract that the Legislature could, at its discretion and in its pleasure, bring it to an earlier end.

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The case is stated by the court.

Mr. B. S. Head, pro se.

The Board, on motion, proceeded to elect officers of the faculty; whereupon William W. Hudson was unanimously elected President; Bolivar S. Head was unanimously elected Professor of Mathematics, etc., etc. (going on to elect balance).

"Resolved: That the secretary be required to notify Messrs. Hudson, Head (and others) of their election to office, and request their acceptance."

"Resolved: That the President and Professors just elected shall hold office for six years from 5th July, 1856, subject to law."

On the 10th day of July, 1856, the secretary of the Board of Curators of the University, in writing, notified the plaintiff of his election to the professorship of mathematics, at the salary and for the period aforesaid, and requested his acceptance. On the same day the plaintiff replied to the secretary of the Board of Curators, and in writing accepted the appointment tendered, entered upon the discharge of his duties, and continued to perform the same from said date to July 5, 1860.

On or about the 1st of April

1002

No counsel appeared for the defendant in tiff was notified by a circular letter forwarded

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The plaintiff alleges in his petition, that he entered into an agreement with the defendants on the 10th day of July, 1856, by which he was employed as professor of mathematics in the University of the State of Missouri, from that day until the 5th day of July, 1862, for which, by said contract, he was to receive a salary of $1,350, payable semi-annually; that about the same date he was employed to serve as librarian for the defendants, until the 5th day of July, 1862, for which they agreed to pay him $100, payable semi-annually; that he faithfully performed the duties of teacher of mathematics and librarian until the 5th day of July, 1860, when he was discharged, although he was ready and willing to continue to discharge the duties, of the respective positions until the expiration of his term of employment. He asks judgment for the sum of $2,900, and interest thereon from the time each semi-annual instalment became due.

The resolutions, upon an acceptance of which the plaintiff makes claim, were passed at a meeting of the Curators of the University, held on the 9th day of July, 1856, and are as follows, viz.:

to him by the defendants, that his office hav been vacated by the *Legislature, it be- [*529 came their duty to fill the same, and they se accordingly do so at their meeting to be held on the 15th May, 1860. On the 17th day of May, 1860, the defendants elected a professor of mathematics in place of plaintiff, for four years from July 5th, 1860, and on the 2d of October, 1860, publicly installed said professor of mathematics in the place of plaintiff, and delivered to him possession of the rooms and apparatus belonging to said professorship. On the 2d October, 1860, the defendants appointed another person librarian in the place of the plaintiff, and gave him possession of the library.

The plaintiff makes the following points: that although the University may be a public Corporation, the professors therein are not public officers; that they are mere servants for hire, with whom contracts for service may be made, and which are binding upon the Corporation; that they have a vested right and legal property in their salaries and offices, of which they can only be devested by legal proceedings; that a contract for such service at a fixed salary and for a stipulated period is as much within the purview of the constitutional provision which prohibits the violation of contracts by the passage of a law, as if made between individuals subject to the legislative power to abolish the office.

We are of the opinion that these questions are not presented by the facts of the case be

"Resolved: That B. S. Head is hereby appointed librarian for the term of six years, commencing July 5, 1856, and ending July 5, 1862, and that his salary for services as librarian before us. fixed at $100 per annum, to be paid semi-annually.

"Resolved: That there shall be the following professorships in the faculty of arts in the University of the State of Missouri, to wit.: 1. Natural Philosophy, Astronomy and Civil Engineering; 2. Mathematics," etc., etc. (naming the others).

The Board then proceeded to fix the salaries as follows: President, $2,000 and use of mansion and grounds free of charge; Professor of

The plaintiff was elected a professor of mathematics in the University of Missouri, and it was resolved that he should hold his office for six years from July 5, 1856, "subject to law." The judge at the circuit held, and we think correctly, that this expression meant subject to whatever law the State Legislature might think fit to pass.

On the 17th of December, 1859, the Legislature did pass an Act, vacating the offices of all "the professors, tutors and teachers con

money specified to be due to the plaintiff, and prom
ised to pay him that sum, with interest, as soon as
a crop could be sold, or the money could be raised
from any other source, is not a promissory note.
2. No time having been specified within which
the crop should be sold or the money raised other-
wise, the law required that one or the other should
be done within reasonable time, and that the sum
admitted to be due should be paid within such rea-
sonable time.

determined by the court.
3. The question of reasonable time was one to be
4. Five years from the date of the instrument
was much more than a reasonable time for the ful-

[No. 217.]

nected in any manner with the University," | and providing also that a new Board of Curators should be elected in the place of the existing Board. It was by the authority of this statute that the Board of Curators elected a successor to the plaintiff, and placed him in the possession of the professorship. The plaintiff accepted his office subject to the laws then in existence, and subject to the passage of such subsequent laws as should seem wise to the Legislature. If it had not been intended to place the control of his office at the disposition fillment of the undertaking. of the Legislature, the words "subject to law," would have been quite unnecessary in the resolution. That he and his office and contract were Argued Mar. 6, 1874. Decided Mar. 23, 1874. subject to the laws in existence at the time of making it, was sufficiently evident without any 531*] declaration on the point. All persons and all contracts are in that condition. But that he would be subject to future legislative action to the extent of an immediate removal and without cause, was not so evident. It was to make that point clear, and for no other possible purpose, that his employment for six years from July 5, 1856, was declared to be "subject to law."

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If further evidence to this effect is needed, it is found in the manner in which the plaintiff received his appointment in 1856. It was by irtue of a Statute of 1855, which declared that the offices of the president, professors and tutors of the University should be vacant on the 4th day of July, 1856, and enacted that elections should be held to fill the offices thus made vacant. The legislature, by its own unquestioned authority, made a vacancy in the office of professor of mathematics. The vacancy thus created by law was filled by the election of the plaintiff. When it was, at the same time, declared that this position should be held by him for six years, "subject to law," it cannot be doubted that he understood it to be a part of the contract that the Legislature could, at their discretion and in their pleasure, bring it to an earlier end.

Without discussing other questions, for the reasons thus given, the judgment must be affirmed.

.

Dissenting, Mr. Justice Bradley.

N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Geor

gia.

The case is stated by the court.

Mr. Raphael J. Moses, Jr., for plaintiffs in error:

Messrs. R. McP. Smith and John D. Pope, for defendant in error:

Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Georgia.

The plaintiffs in error were the defendants in the court below. The action was assumpsit. The declaration contains two counts. The first was upon an instrument described as a duebill, whereby the defendants acknowledged to be due, and promised to pay to the plaintiffs, the sum of $1,619.66. The second count claimed the same amount upon an account stated. It appears by the bill of exceptions that upon the trial the plaintiff gave in evidence an instrument which was as follows: Columbus, Ga., Sep. 1, 1865, due Joseph Dautel or order, $1,619.66, being balance of principal and interest for four years and six months services. This we will pay as soon as the crop can be sold or the money raised from any other source, payable with interest.

Signed by the defendants.

The execution of the instrument was admitted. The plaintiff gave no other evidence.

The defendants thereupon "requested the court to charge the jury that if the plaintiff had proved a special agreement which was still

ISRAEL M. NUNEZ and Raphael J. Moses, as operative, he could not recover for an account I. M. Nunez & Co., Plffs. in Err.,

v.

JOSEPH DAUTEL.

(See S. C., 19 Wall., 560-563.)

Promissory note, what is not-time of payment -reasonable time, when question for the court.

1. A paper which acknowledged the amount of NOTE. Promise to pay upon or after the happening of a future event, or from a certain fund.

Where a debt is due and the happening of a future event is fixed upon as a convenient time for payment merely, and the future event does not happen as contemplated, the law implies a promise to pay within a reasonable time. De Wolf v. French, 51 Me., 420; Sears v. Wright, 24 Me., 278; Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me., 195, 20 Am. Rep., 687; Capron V. Capron, 44 Vt., 412; Ubsdell v. Cunningham, 22 Mo., 124.

Where a note is made payable, when a sale is made by the maker, the maker is bound to sell withIn a reasonable time, and failing in that, the note 19 WALL U. S., Book 22.

stated; whereupon the court charged the jury that the paper introduced did not prove such special agreement, and directed the jury, upon the evidence, to find a verdict for the plaintiff." The jury found accordingly, and judgment was entered upon the verdict.

The only point presented for our consideration is, whether this instruction was properly given.

is due. Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me.. 195, 20 Am. Rep., 687; Sears v. Wright, 24 Me., 278.

A note payable on demand after date "when convenient" is payable absolutely in a reasonable time. Works v. Hershey, 35 Iowa, 340.

A note given upon a wager that a railroad will not be completed to a certain point at a specified time and payable on a certain day in case the railroad is so completed, is void as a wager contract, and also because of the uncertainty whether the condition upon which payment depends will ever be fulfilled. Eldred v. Malloy, 2 Colo. 320, 25 Am. Rep., 752.

A note payable at a fixed date, or before, if made 161 11

1

The paper was clearly not a promissory note, because it was not payable at a time certain. and it was not such a due-bill as the law regards as in effect a promissory note for the same reason. Story, Pr. Notes, sec. 27; Salinas v. Wright, 11 Tex. 575; Ex parte Tootell, 4 Ves., 372. It was made up of the following particulars: It acknowledged the amount specified, consisting of principal and interest, to be due to the plaintiff for four years and six months' services, and promised to pay him that sum, with interest, as soon as the crop could be sold, or the money could be raised from any other source.

No time having been specified within which the crop should be sold or the money raised otherwise, the law annexed as an incident that one or the other should be done within reasonable time, and that the sum admitted to be due should be paid accordingly. Payment was not conditional to the extent of depending wholly and finally upon the alternatives mentioned. The stipulations secured to the defendants a reasonable amount of time within which to procure in one mode or the other the means necessary to meet the liability. Upon the occurrence of either of the events named or the lapse of such time, the debt became due. It could not have been the intention of the parties that if the crop were destroyed, or from any other 563*] cause *could never be sold, and the defendants could not procure the money from any other source, the debt should never be paid. Such a result would be a mockery of justice. Hicks v. Shouse, 17 B. Mon., 487; Ubsdell V. Cunningham, 22 Mo., 124. The question of reasonable time, as the case was presented, was one to be determined by the court. Frothingham v. Dutton, 2 Me., 255; Kingsley v. Wallis, 14 Me., 57; Manning v. Sawyer, 1 Hawks, 37; Cocker v. Hemp & Flax Mfg. Co., 3 Sumn., 530. When the suit was instituted more than five years had elapsed from the date of the instrument. This was much more than a reasonable time for the fulfillment of the undertaking of the defendants, and the plaintiff was entitled

to recover.

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1. The Act of Congress of Mar. 2, 1867, only au thorizes a removel from a State to a United State judgment in the court of original jurisdiction where Court, where an application is made before final the suit is brought.

2. The ruling of a State Court (that notes on loan of Confederate Money; and that the transacwhich a judgment was rendered were given for a tions which resulted in the acquisition of the notes were had between enemies during the late civil war, forbidding commercial intercourse with the enemy) in violation of the Proclamation of the President is not the subject of review by this court. It presents no federal question.

[No. 212.] Argued Mar. 10, 1874. Decided Mar. 23, 1874. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.

IN

The following opinion of the State Supreme Court contains a sufficient statement of the

case.

On the death of his wife, in 1854, Alfred A. Williams became tutor to his three minor children, of whom the plaintiff, now the wife of Von Phul, was one. He died in Sep., 1863. The plaintiff sues the estate for $71,571, with five per cent. interest from Mar. 1, 1863, being, as she alleges, for property and money derived by inheritance and donations, and which her father, as tutor received and never accounted for. She avers that no inventory of her property, when a minor, was ever made by her tutor, and that he failed to present accounts of his administration of her property. The dative testamentary executor, himself a co-heir with the plaintiff and another to the succession of their common father, admits that the plaintiff has rights and valid claims against the estate, but says the extent and amount of the same are unascertained and unliquidated, and for the purpose of a legal adjustment thereof, he denies the allegations of the plaintiff's petition

The Circuit Court instructed the jury cor- and requires proof. rectly, and the judgment is affirmed.

out of a certain article, or from a certain specified source, is a valid negotiable promissory note, payable absolutely at the time fixed, and sooner if the alternative event transpires. Walker v. Woollen, 54 Ind., 164, 23 Am. Rep. 639; Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Pa. St., 13; 15 Am. Rep., 542; Cota v. Buck, 7 Met., 588, 41 Am. Dec., 464; Stevens v. Blunt, 7 Mass., 240; Goodloe v. Taylor, 3 Hawks, 458; Gardner v. Barger, 4 Heisk., 669; Palmer v. Hummer, 10 Kan., 464; Smilie v. Stevens, 39 Vt., 316; Blood v. Northrup, 1 Kan.. 29.

A written promise to pay a certain time after date, in case other notes are not paid, is not negotiable (Haskell v. Lambert, 16 Gray, 593); nor is a promise to pay a certain time after the arrival of a certain vessel (Grant v. Wood, 12 Gray, 220); nor is a note payable when a certain estate is settled (Husband v. Epling, 81 Ill., 172); nor one payable when a certain amount is collected (Corbett v. Georgia, 24 Ga., 287); nor one payable when certain dividends are declared (Brooks v. Hargreaves, 21 Mich., 255); nor one "subject to this policy." Am. Exch. Bk. v. Blanchard, 7 Allen, 332.

The making an instrument payable out of a particular fund is attaching such a condition thereto as destroys its negotiable quality. The condition

An intervention was filed by Vernon K. Steis the sufficiency of the fund. Cases cited above: Richardson v. Carpenter, 46 N. Y., 661; Munger v. Shannon, 61 N. Y., 258; Averett v. Booker, 15 Gratt., 165; Harriman v. Sanborn, 43 N. H., 128; Worden v. Dodge, 4 Denio, 159; Wadlington v. Covert, 51 Miss., 631; Clarke v. Perceval, 2 B. & Ad., 660; Haydock v. Lynch, Raym., 1563; Josselyn v. Lacier, 10 Mod., 294; Kenny v. Hinds, 44 How. Pr., 7; Mills v. Kuykendale, 2 Blackf., 47.

So if the order or promise is payable, provided certain terms are complied with, or certain events happen, or when a certain thing is done, the contingency implied deprives the instrument of its character as a bill or note, as the events named may never happen. Tomkins v. Ashby, 6 B. & C., 541: S. C., 1 M. & M., 32; Melanotte v. Teasdale, 13 M. & W., 216; Ellis v. Ellis, Gow, 216; Roberts v. Peake, 1 Burr., 323; Shelton v. Bence, 9 Yerg., 24; Pearson v. Garrett, 4 Mod., 242; Beardsley v. Baldwin, Str., 1157; Palmer v. Pratt, 2 Bing., 185; Horne v. Redfearne, 4 Bing. N. C., 433; Ex parte Tootle, 4 Ves., 372; Hill v. Halford, 2 B. & P., 413; Salinas v. Wright, 11 Tex., 572; Coolidge v. Ruggles, 15 Mass., 387.

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