venson, a judgment creditor of the estate, for $74,000; Joseph A. Cassatt for $9,500, by note; and N. King Knox for a claim of $10,601. They contest the claims of the plaintiff as illegal, and deny that she has a legal mortgage on the property of the estate.

The plaintiff had judgment in her favor in the court below, for $88,845.87, with five per cent. interest from Sep. 1, 1863, on the sum of $87,012.54; and eight per cent. interest from Aug. 12, 1868, on the sum of $1,883.33. The intervention of Stevenson and that of Knox was dismissed; the judgment set up by Stevenson was decreed null and without effect. From this judgment the intervenor, Stevenson, alone appealed.

In this court the appellant has filed his affidavit under the provisions of the Act of Congress, approved Mar. 2, 1867, entitled "An Act to Amend an Act Entitled An Act for the Removal of Causes in Certain Cases from State Courts," approved July 27, 1866, he being a citizen of New York. He declares that "From prejudice and local influence, he has reason to believe and does really believe, he will not be able to obtain justice in the Supreme Court." He tenders his bond with security, as required by the statute referred to, and prays for the removal of this cause, so far as he is a party and interested therein, to the Circuit Court of the United States for this District.

This court, being exclusively appellate in its jurisdiction, is confined to the consideration of appeals taken from final judgments rendered by the inferior courts of the State, except in cases of interlocutory decrees, calculated to work irreparable injury.

The appellant, if the attitude he occupies in this litigation entitles him to the benefit of the Act of Congress referred to, having failed to interpose his right to have the cause transferred before the final judgment in the case was rendered by the state tribunals from which he appeals, we think he cannot now invoke the aid of Congress. That Act provides for the transfer of causes "at any time before the final hearing or trial of the suit."

This right, too, seems to be restricted to cases where a citizen of another State than that in which the suit is brought, is either plaintiff or defendant. The appellant in the case before us is neither plaintiff nor defendant. He is an intervenor, voluntarily making himself a party in a suit between citizens of the same State, the result of which could in nowise have affected his rights, had he kept aloof from the controversy. He chose to run the chances of obtaining a judgment in his favor in a state court; and failing in that, he seeks for better fortune in another tribunal, which is incompetent to revise the judgment appealed from, and which is without jurisdiction ratione person arum of the original parties to the suit. We conclude, therefore, that he has no right to claim a transfer of the cause, and his application is, therefore, refused.

On the merits, we find no error in the judgment. The notes on which the appellant's large claim is founded, were proved to have been given for a loan of Confederate money. It was also established that, at the time the loan was made and the contract entered into, Stevenson lived in Nashville, Tennessee, when within the Federal lines, and that Williams, who gave the'

note, lived in Louisiana. The plaintiff appears to have established, with sufficient certainty, her claims against the succession, and they were properly allowed.

Messrs. J. A. Campbell and D. G. Campbell, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Durant and Hornor, for defendants in error.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:

The application of the appellant for the removal of the suit from the Supreme Court of Louisiana to the Circuit Court of the United States was made too late, and was properly refused on that ground. The Act of Congress of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. at L., 558, under which the removal was asked, only authorizes a removal where an application is made "before the final hearing or trial of the suit," and this clearly means before final judgment in the court of original jurisdiction, where the suit is brought. Whether it does not mean still *more-before the hearing or trial of [*576 the suit has commenced which is followed by such judgment-may be questioned; but it is unnecessary to determine that question in this

case.

After a final judgment has been rendered in the State Court, the case cannot be removed to the Circuit Court of the United States, and "there proceed," as the statute provides, "in the same manner as if brought there by original process,' ," without setting aside the trial and judgment of the State Court as of no validity. No such proceeding is contemplated by the Act; and since the decision of Justices of N. Y. v. Murray, reported in 9 Wall., 274, 19 L. ed. 658, legislation directed to that end, where, at least, the trial has been by jury, would be of doubtful validity.

The judgment recovered by Stevenson against the succession of Williams, appears to have been annulled on two grounds: 1, that the notes on which the judgment was rendered were given for a loan of Confederate money; and 2, that the transactions, which resulted in the acquisition of the notes, were had between enemies during the late civil war, in violation of the Proclamation of the President forbidding commercial intercourse with the enemy.

The first ground would not be deemed, in a Federal Court, sufficient to set aside a judgment rendered for the cash value, in national currency, of the Confederate money, especially when, as in this case, the judgment was entered upon a stipulation with the executor of the estate for an extended credit. And the evidence in the record leads us to doubt whether the transactions detailed properly fall within the rule of public law, or the Proclamation of the President, forbidding commercial intercourse with the enemy.

But the ruling of the State Court in these particulars, however erroneous, is not the subject of review by us. It presents no Federal question for our examination. It conflicts with no part of the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States.

Had the State Court refused to uphold the judgment because of the provision in the Constitution of the State *subsequently [*577 adopted, prohibiting the enforcement of contracts founded upon Confederate money, a fed

THE MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF NASHVILLE, Plffs. in Err.,

v.

WILLIAM RAY.

See S. C., 19 Wall., 468-485.) Power of municipal corporations to make bonds, notes and drafts-validity of such securities-bona fide holder-notice to rights of. 1. Municipal corporations have not the power without legislative authority, expressly or clearly implied, to borrow money or to issue notes, bills or other securities of a commercial character, free from equitable defenses in the hands of bona fide 2. Such corporations are of a public character, instituted for purposes of local government, and constitute part of the domestic government of the State. The power of taxation is given to them for the purpose of raising the means of carrying on their functions. The creation of such special power

holders.

is exclusive of others.

3. The officers of such a corporation cannot, like the officers of a private corporation, create by their acts an estoppel against the corporation, its tax payers or people, so as to render illegal issues of ordinary city drafts or vouchers, not authorized by law, valid in the hands of holders for value. Such holders are affected with notice of the illegality. 4. Certificates of indebtedness, city warrants, orders, checks, drafts and the like, used for giving to the public creditors evidence of the amount of their claims against the city treasury, are valid instruments for that purpose, and may be transferred from hand to hand; but they are not commercial paper, in the sense of creating an absolute obliga tion to pay them, free from legal and equitable defenses. The holder takes them subject to such defenses.

5. Of course when power to borrow money and

to issue bonds and other securities of a commercial character, therefore, is given to a municipal corporation, such securities will possess the usual qualities attaching to like securities issued by pri vate corporations.

[No. 166.]

in error:

The Acts of Jan. 2, 1830 and Oct. 27, 1843, if not repealed by the Act of Jan. 31, 1848, only authorized the borrowing of money for special purposes, to limited amounts, and in particular modes, and by ordinance of the Legislative Department of the City Government. The very fact that such legislative provisions were deemed necessary, is strongly persuasive against any implied power to borrow. These Acts do not authorize the Corporation to borrow, otherwise than for the purposes, to the amounts, and in the manner pointed out; nor its officers at all. None of the checks in controversy, issued and used for the purpose of borrowing money, were authorized by ordinance under these Acts.

The charter of the City provides for the exercise of the corporate functions and powers, by ordinance of the legislative department. The city ordinances provide that liabilities of the Corporation can only be incurred by contract by the City Council; claims must be allowed and appropriations made to pay the same, by the City Council; and, by like ordinances, the Recorder is expressly prohibited from drawing warrants or checks on the Treasurer, except by order of the City Council; and the Treasurer is required to disburse the corporate funds only under the laws, ordinances and orders of the City Council. See, City Laws, Compilation of 1868, pp. 99, 100, 107.

Such city ordinances have all the force of public statutes.

Sedg. Stat. & Const. L., 462, 473; Mayor, etc., v. Eschbach, 18 Md., 276; Leavenworth v. Rankin, 2 Kan., 357; Clark v. Des Moines, 19 Iowa, 209; Cooley, Const. Lim., 218 and notes.

The "larger part" of the checks in controversy were issued without conforming to these requirements by the mayor, recorder and chairman of the finance committee of their own authority.

All power not expressly granted to municipal corporations, or necessary to carry out those powers, are denied.

Cook v. Sumner Man. Co., 1 Sneed, 698; Nichol v. Nashville, 9 Hun, 263; Cooley, Const. Lim., 194, and cases cited; Hopple v. Brown Township, 13 Ohio St., 311.

Nor, in the State of Tennessee, can the Legislative constitutionally clothe a municipal corporation with power, except for a corporation purpose. Cook v. Sumner Man. Co., 1 Sneed, 660, 698; See, Cooley, Const. Lim., 211.

The rule is general and applicable to the corporate authorities of all municipal bodies, that where the mode in which that power on any given subject can be exercised is prescribed by the charter, this mode must be followed, otherwise the Act will be a nullity.

See, Sedg. Stat., 126, Com. v. Cooley, 10 Pick., 37; Com v. Marshall, 11 Pick., 350; Daniel v. Memphis, 11 Humph., 582.

This Act does not confer upon the corporation the power to borrow money.

*Headnotes by Mr. Justice BRADLEY.

NOTE. Power of municipality to issue bonds; rights of bona fide holders- see notes, 37 L. ed. U.

S. 145; 39 L. ed. U. S. 585.

Bona fide purchasers of municipal bonds-see note. 41 C. C. A. 6.

v. Carter, 2 Kan., 115; 2 Bos., 601; McSpedon v. The Mayor, etc., 20 How. Pr., 395; Abb. Corp. Dig., 522, 869; Johnson v. Indianapolis, 16 Ind., 227; Balt. v. Eschbach, 18 Md., 276; Herzo v. San Francisco, 33 Cal., 134.

The power of expending money, and consequently the power to contract for public purposes in municipal corporations, is lodged with the legislative, and not with the executive authority, and must be exercised by ordinance legally enacted. Philadelphia v. Flanigen, 47 Pa., 21; Leavenworth v. Rankin, supra; Ba'

the court:

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of The defendant in error, who was plaintiff below, sued the Mayor and City Council of Nashville, to recover the amount of nineteen corporation drafts or orders, ranging from a few dollars in amount to over $1,000 and together amounting, with interest, to over $9,000. In form they were drawn by the Mayor and Recorder upon the City Treasurer, payable to some person named or bearer, and were impressed with the city seal. The following is a specimen of the orders:

This was the form in which all city dues were usually paid. The indorsement by the treasurer was made when the orders were presented to him. Evidence was given by the plaintiff, tending to show that it had been the custom for many years, when the treasurer failed to pay such checks on presentation, for him to write his name on the back, with the date of presentation, and afterwards in the payment of such checks, to allow interest from that date; and that it was usual to present such checks for indorsement, to draw interest when it was known there were no funds for their payment; also, that it was the well known custom 471*] of the *proper collecting officers of the Corporation, to receive such checks for taxes and other dues of the Corporation; that at the time these checks were issued and at the time they were bought by the plaintiff, the City was largely involved in debt, and many such checks were outstanding unpaid, and were bought and sold in the market, and nearly all the city taxes were paid therewith; that for some time before the plaintiff purchased the checks in question, the taxes for the support of public schools were collected and paid over to the Treasurer of the Board of Education in such checks; and for about five months before, it had been the practice of such treasurer to sell such checks and to use the proceeds in payment of teachers; also that all the checks sued on, except one, for $1,000, payable to Julius Sax, were so received for taxes and paid to the said Treasurer of the Board of Education, and by him sold soon after receiving them to one McCrery, as agent of the plaintiff to buy the same at the rate of 80 cents on the dollar, and the proceeds paid to teachers; that the check payable to Sax was purchased from him by said McCrery, as plaintiff's agent, for $800, being one of sixteen checks of $1,000 each, issued by oder of the chairman of the finance committee of the City Council without any order of the Council, and hypothecated with Sax as security for a loan of $12,000 payable in four months, half of which was made in city checks, power

being given in the loan note to sell hypothecated checks if the loan was not paid when due. Sax sold the check in question to the plaintiff within a week after receiving it. The plaintiff also offered the evidence of the City Recorder to show that the checks sued on were made in the usual course of business and for the usual corporation purposes; also evidence tending to show that the City Collector in collecting checks for taxes was in the habit, in making change, of paying out checks previously collected and that the Mayor and Council were informed of the practice pursued by the Collector, of re-issuing checks which he had received in payment of taxes by paying a portion of them over to the Board of Education and knew of the practice of issuing and hypothecating [*472 checks for loans and selling them for money.

The defendant introduced proof tending to show that McCrery, the agent of the plaintiff, when he purchased the eighteen checks had notice that they had been received by the Tax Collector and re-issued by him to the Treasurer of the Board of Education; and also that the City Council had no knowledge of the manner of making checks on the mere order of the chairman of the finance committee, and their hypothecation and sale for money; and that some of them had no knowledge of the re-issue of checks by the collector.

The charter and ordinances of the City were put in evidence, and were referred to on the argument before us.

The former is couched in the usual form of such charters, conferring upon the Corporation power to receive, hold and dispose of property: to levy taxes, appropriate money, and provide for the payment of the debts and expenses of the City; to establish hospitals, schools, waterworks, markets, and erect buildings necessary for the use of the City; to open, regulate and light the streets; to establish a police, night watch, etc., and to pass all ordinances necessary to carry out the intent of the charter.

It contains, however, no express power to borrow money. But former laws, which were superseded by the charter, had authorized the issue of specific city bonds for that purpose: and such securities were outstanding in 1868, as appears by an Act of the Legislature passed March 16, of that year, by which it was provided that the taxes necessary to pay the coupons and interest on the bonds and funded debt of the City, should be kept distinct and should be payable only in legal currency, and no checks or orders of the City were to be received therefor. It was also enacted by the statute, that the amount necessary to be raised by tax for the sinking fund for paying said bonds, and for the support of public schools should be paid in the same manner.

same

*The public ordinances of the City [*473 were published in a book, and by these it was, amongst other things, provided that there should be a committee of improvements and expenditures, and that all propositions for improvements, or the expenditure of money, or the incurring of any liability, should be referred to this committee, who were to report to the City Council, and that no liability should be incurred unless authorized by existing laws, or by order of the City Council, and that no check should be issued by the Recorder upon the