This legislation, prior to the hearing of this case in the court below, had been declared invalid, because in conflict with the Constitution of the State of Michigan, in two cases decided by the Supreme Court of that State. People v. Salem, 20 Mich., 452; Bay City v. State Treasurer, 23 Mich., 499. plify the jurisdiction," the rule has been steadily adhered to, unless the case was within some of the recognized exceptions. It has been contended by the defendant in error that the case falls within the exception to the rule in that class of cases where it has been held that, "If a contract when made was valid under the laws and Constitution of a State, as they had been previously expounded by its judicial tribunals, and as they were understood at that time, no subsequent action by the Legislature or the judiciary will be regarded by this court as establishing its invalidity." But this is not true; neither this Act nor any But in the Bay City case, this very Act was like it had ever been held valid. No exposition before the court, and its invalidity was dis-had ever been made of the Constitution of 1850, tinctly and directly affirmed. In the first of these cases this particular Act was not involved, but the Act then in question was identical in all its substantial provisions, so far as they are material to the present inquiry; the difference being, that the Act under consideration in the Salem case was limited to the townships in a few counties. It was held that the statute was in conflict with article VI., section 32, which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. It was also held that the statute was subject to another fatal objection, found in the provisions of article XIV., sections 7, 8 and 9, which prohibit the State, in carefully guarded language, repeated in various forms, from being a party to or interested in any works of internal improvement. It is sufficient for the present purpose, to say that these decisions of the Supreme Court of Michigan, and notably the Bay City case, are adjudications upon the meaning of the Constitution of a State, which the Federal Courts adopt as rules for their own judgments. Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall., 678, 21 L. ed., 382. We contend that it was the duty of the circuit court in this case to have followed those adjudications. It is believed that there is no precedent for the course pursued by the court below, in its refusal to recognize the construction put upon the Constitution of the State by its highest judicial tribunal. If such a proceeding is permissible, there is practically an end to the independence of the state judiciary, and the decisions of the constitutional expositors of the local law are overhauled and set at naught by a revisory tribunal, possessing no authority to exercise such functions, upon any theory of state and federal jurisdiction hitherto recognized in our judicial history. A long series of decisions in this court stand out to witness that the federal tribunals have ever recognized and felt bound by the decisions of the state courts in matters of local law. from which it could be concluded that such legislation would be sustained. It is a clear case of a party buying these bonds, and running the hazard of their validity being sustained. There was no previous course of decision which held, even by inference, that the constitutional prohibition above referred to would authorize municipal taxation in aid of works of internal improvement. Messrs. C. I. Walker, D. Darwin Hughes, . S. Black, H. F. Severn and C. A. Kent, for defendant in error: The law authorizing the issue of the municipal bonds in suit, is not in conflict with the Constitution of Michigan. 1. The repeated decisions of this court in suits upon municipal bonds issued in aid of railroad companies arising in Wisconsin and Iowa, have settled that the doctrine of this court is, that laws authorizing municipal aid to railroads are not in conflict with the Constitution of either of said States, and that such laws are valid in every State unless forbidden by some provision of the State Constitution. Gelpcke v. The City of Dubuque, 1 Wall., 175, 17 L. ed., 520; Thompson v. Lee Co., 3 Wall., 327, 18 L. ed., 177; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall., 654, 18 L. ed., 79; Campbell v. The City of Kenosha, 5 Wall., 194, 18 L. ed., 610; Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall., 270, 18 L. ed., 350 (1866); Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall., 166, 18 L. ed., 768 (1867); Beloit v. Morgan, 7 Wall., 619, 19 L. ed., 205 (1868); The City v. Lamson, 9 Wall., 477, 19 L. ed., 725 (1869). 2. There is nothing in the Constitution of Michigan which makes the question of the validity of laws of Michigan, authorizing municipal aid to railroads, different from the question as to the validity of similar laws in Iowa or Wisconsin. The first does not refer to a single clause of the Constitution of Michigan. Nesmith v. Sheldon, 7 How., 812; Mutual Assurance Society v. Watts, 1 Wheat., 279; Shipp Two Michigan decisions only, hold such muv. Miller, 2 Wheat., 316; Jackson v. Chew, 12nicipal aid unconstitutional. People v. Salem, Wheat., 153; Fullerton v. Bank of the United 20 Mich., 452, and Bay City v. State Treasurer, States, 1 Pet., 604; Green v. Neal, 6 Pet., 291; 23 Mich., 499. Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How., 139; Webster v. Cooper, 14 How., 488; State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How., 369; Beauregard v. City of New Orleans, 18 How., 497, 15 L. ed., 469; Doswell v. De la Lanzo, 20 How., 29, 15 L. ed., 824; Parker v. Kane, 22 How., 1, 16 L. ed., 286; Amey v. Mayor, etc., of Allegheny City, 24 How., 364, 16 L. ed., 614; League v. Egery, 24 How., 264, 16 L. ed., 655; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall., 176, 17 L. ed., 520. In the second, the following provisions are cited: Art. 6, sec. 32. "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Art. 14, secs. 6, 8 and 9. "The credit of the State shall not be granted to or in aid of any Although pressed on many occasions to "am-person, association or corporation." "The State shall not subscribe to or be interested in the stock of any company, association or corporation." "The State shall not be a party to or interested in any work of internal improvement, nor engage in carrying on any such work except in the expenditure of grants to the State, of land or other property." Provisions entirely similar, so far as the argument based upon the provisions is concerned, are found in the Constitutions of Iowa and Wisconsin. Const. Iowa, art. 7, sec. 1; art. 8, sec. 2; Const. of Wis., art. 8, secs. 3, 10; In Bay City v. State Treasurer, cited above, one argument of the court may be supposed to be based upon a provision of the Constitution of Michigan not cited or referred to, viz.: art. 14, sec. 11. "The Legislature shall provide a uniform rule of taxation." Provisions similar to this are found in the Constitutions of Iowa and Wisconsin. Const. Iowa, art. 1, sec. 6: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Const. Wis., art. 8, sec. 1: "Rules of taxation shall be uniform." 3. The law authorizing the bonds now in suit does not differ in principle from the laws of Wisconsin and Iowa, which were sustained by this court in the cases cited. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has made a distinction founded upon this difference, and hold that laws authorizing the taking of stock are constitutional, and laws authorizing donations are unconstitutional. Whiting v. The Sheboygan & Fond du Lac Railroad Company, 25 Wis., 167 (1870), and a New York case makes the same distinction; Sweet v. Hulburt, 51 Barb., 316 (1868). may be laid upon one town for a railroad which benefits equally other towns, which pay nothing. This view has also been considered and rejected by several courts. Aurora v. West, 9 Ind., 74 (1857); 24 Ala., 36 Ala., and 23 Ga., as above cited. Substantially the same argument was made before this court in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall., 191, 17 L. ed., 520. In Bay City v. The State Treasurer, the Supreme Court of Michigan seeks to strengthen its position by reference to constitutional provisions, heretofore cited, which forbid the State from subscribing to the stock of any company or being interested in any work of internal improvement, and it argues that municipalities, although not within the letter are within the spirit of prohibitions on the State, and so restrained thereby. This question was discussed and decided by this court in Gelpcke v. The City of Dubuque, as it had often been before by state courts, and the doctrine denied. Cass v. Dillon, 2 Ohio St., 607 (1853); New Orleans v. Graihle, 9 La. Ann., 561 (1854); Slack v. Maysville, etc., R. R. Co., 13 B. Mon., 1 (1852); Prettyman v. Tazewell Co. 19 Ill., 406 (1858); Clarke v. The City of Rochester, 24 Barb., 446 (1857); Clark v. The City of Janesville, 10 Wis., 136 (1859); Bushnell v. The City of Beloit, 10 Wis., 195 (1860); Pattison v. Yuba County, 13 Cal., 175 (1859); Dubuque, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dubuque Co., 4 G. Green, 1 (1853); R. R. Co. v. County of Otoe, 16 Wall., 667, 21 L. ed. 375. The very numerous, almost uniform, state decisions upon the subject of municipal aid to railroads, confirm the doctrine announced by this court, that in the absence of special restraining constitutional provisions, the State Legislatures have power to authorize such aid. But the Michigan decisions are not at all based upon this ground, nor can any just foundation in principle be alleged for the distinction. Davidson v. Ramsey County, 18 Minn., 482, decided by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in 1872; Stewart v. Supervisors of Polk Davidson v. Ramsey Co., 18 Minn., 482; StewCounty, Supreme Court of Iowa, 1871; Stock- art v. Supervisors of Polk County, Sup. Ct. of ton & Visalia R. R. Co. v. Stockton, 41 Cal., Iowa, 1871; Stockton & Visalia R. Co. v. Stock147, Supreme Court of California, 1871; Olton, 41 Cal., 147; L. M. & B. R. Co. v. Geiger, cott v. The Supervisors, 16 Wall., 678, 21 L. ed., 382. The case of The People v. Salem, 20 Mich., 452, is based entirely upon the doctrine that money cannot be raised by taxation to aid in the construction of a railroad owned by individuals or private corporations. This doctrine has often been elaborately examined and rejected by many courts prior to its adoption by the Supreme Court of Michi gan and prior to the decision of this court in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall., 175, 17 L. ed., 520, above cited; Stein v. Mobile, 24 Ala., 591 (1854); Gibbons v. Mobile, etc., R. R. Co., 36 Ala., 410 (1860); Powers v. Inferior Ct. of Dougherty Co., 23 Ga., 65 (1857); Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon., 526 (1849); Police Jury v. Succession of McDonogh, 8 La. Ann., 341 (1853); Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. v. Comrs. of Clinton Co., 1 Ohio St., 77 (1852); Sharpless v. Philadelphia, 21 Pa., 147 (1853); Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120 (1837). It is said that, under the law, there will be no apportionment of the tax necessary to be raised for the benefit of any particular railroad mong municipalities equally benefited. A tax 34 Ind., 185; Cadis v. The Town of Swanton, Sup. Ct. of Vermont, 1871; Leavenworth Co. v. Miller, 7 Kan., 479, Kansas Sup. Ct., 1871; Walker v. Cincinnati, 21 Ohio St., 14; Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 1872. II. This court is not bound to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of Michigan holding the law authorizing the bonds in suit in conflict with the Constitution of Michigan. We concede that it has been determined, by a long series of adjudications, that, as a general rule, this court, in the construction of state statutes or Constitutions or the determination of common law questions affecting the title of real estate, will follow the decisions of the courts of the State when they are sufficient to settle the law. The rule requires that the state decisions which the United States courts must follow are such as to settle the law of the State. Jackson v. Chew, 12 Wheaton, 153; Polk's Lessee v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet., 449; Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 17 L. ed. 261; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat., 361; Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall., 175, 17 L. ed. 520. United States courts are not bound to follow | construction of its statutes, where there were no the decisions of a state court in questions not prior decisions of the state court upon the same affecting the title of real estate and depending or a similar statute, or constitutional provision, upon general principles of law not determinable but the prior decisions relied upon were deemed by the construction of any state statute or pro- to settle the principles which should govern the vision of the State Constitution. subsequent case. Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall., 50, 19 L. ed. 594; Chicago v. Baer, 41 Ill., 306; City of Kenosha Lamson, 9 Wall., 477, 19 L. ed. 725. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet., 1; Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall., 678, 21 L. ed. 382; Carpenter v. The Providence Washington Insurance Com-v. pany, 16 Pet., 495; Robinson v. Com. Ins. Co., 3 Sumn., 220; Austen v. Miller, 5 McLean, 153; Miller v. Austen, 13 How., 218 (1851); Gloucester Co. v. Younger, 2 Curt. (C. C.) 322; Bragg v. Meyer, 1 McAll., 408; Foxcroft v. Mallett, 4 How., 353; Lane v. Vick, 3 How., 464; Chicago v. Robbins, 2 Black, 418, 17 L. ed. 298; Yates v. Milwaukee, 10 Wall., 497, 19 L. ed. 984; Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall., 679, 20 L. ed. 666. There is a well settled exception to the rule which requires United States courts to follow, in the cases stated, the decisions of the state courts. It is this; where contracts have been entered into on the basis of a certain construc tion of the law of the State, justly supposed settled, whether from judicial decisions, the action of the state authorities or long usage, in suits upon such contracts, United States courts will hold them valid, notwithstanding decisions by the courts of the State made subsequent to the making of the contracts, settling the law of the State to the contrary. See, McKeen v. DeLancy's Lessee, 5 Cranch, 22; Gardner v. Collins, 2 Pet., 85; Patterson v. Jenks, 2 Pet., 230, The great weight to be given to the practical construction of the statutes and constitutions, has often been affirmed by this and other courts of the highest authority. Sedg. Stat. and Const. L., 251; Cooley, Const. Lim., 267; Opinion of Emmons, J., given in this case in the court below. If this court will follow, contrary to its own opinion, the construction given to a state statute by usage, for the sake of saving vested rights, the same laudable motive should lead it to refuse to follow a state court in a decision which is erroneous in principle and destroys vested rights. The cases which support the exception for which we contend, may be divided into three classes, according as the facts differ which, in the judgment of this court, show that the contracts before them were based upon such a settled construction of the state law that they would not follow the decision of a state court in overturning this construction. (a) Where the validity of a statute has been affirmed by the decisions of the highest court of the State, and contracts have been entered into based upon these decisions, and subsequently the state courts alter their decisions and hold such contracts invalid in suits upon such contracts, this court will follow the prior decision. State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 16 How., 369; Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How., 331, 15 L. ed. 401; The Mechanics' & Traders' Bank v. Debolt, 18 How., 380, 15 L. ed. 458; The Jefferson Bk. v. Skelly, 1 Black, 436, 17 L. ed. 173; Gelpcke v. The City of Dubuque, 1 Wall., 175, 17 L. ed. 520. (b) In two cases this court has refused to follow the decisions of the state court upon the (c) In several cases this court has refused to follow the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State, upon the construction or the validity of a statute of the State where there was no prior decision inconsistent therewith, basing this refusal upon a general construction of the statute by the state authorities and by the people, on the faith of which, contracts, whose validity they were to determine, had been entered into. Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How., 134; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet., 449; Truly v. Wanzer, 5 How., 141; Simms v. Hundley, 6 How., 1 (1848); Pease v. Peck, 18 How., 595, 15 L. ed. 518; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall., 294, 18 L. ed., 38; Butz v. City of Muscatine, 8 Wall., 575, 19 L. ed. 490. The case at bar does not come within the rule which requires the United States courts to follow the decisions of the State. 1. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Michigan are not founded upon the construction of any clause of the State Constitution, but upon general principles applicable to all the States, the United States and, indeed, to all free governments, and for this reason this court is not bound to follow them. 2. The decisions of the Supreme Court of Michigan have not settled the law of Michigan. It is not disputed that ordinarily two decisions by the highest court of a State will be regarded by this court as settling the law of the State. But an examination of the objections to these decisions will show that they are of such a character that they are not likely to be permanent, even in Michigan. Some of the objections to the decision in the case of the People v. Salem, are as follows: (a) It is contrary to such a weight of authority as should have been considered as absolutely decisive of the question. During a period of thirty years, the question involved had been argued before the highest courts of twenty-one States and before this court with zeal and ability which few legal contests have ever provoked. In some of the States there were many arguments. The whole number of decisions is not far from one hundred. It is not likely that any consideration bearing upon the subject had escaped notice. The result had been that every one of these high tribunals had affirmed the validity of the laws in question, and only two of them had rendered conflicting decisions. (b) The decision we are considering is based upon general principles not derived from the construction of any constitutional provisions— an Act of the Legislature, set aside because supposed to be in conflict with certain principles of unwritten constitutional law. In doing this, the court exceeded its authority, according to any just theory of constitutional law. The doctrine (that the Constitution of Michigan, by some unwritten provision, forbids municipal aid to railroads) is strangely inconsist ent with the history of such aid at the time the Constitution of Michigan was adopted, when municipal aid to private corporations had been authorized by the Legislatures of seventeen States, including Michigan. In Connecticut, Laws of 1837, p. 18; Ibid., 1838, p. 45; Ibid., 1842, p. 54; in Georgia, Laws of 1838, p. 66; in Kentucky, Laws of 1833, pp. 526, 543, 643; Ibid., 1834, p. 398; Ibid., 1836-7, p. 341; Ibid., 1837-8, p. 98; Ibid., 1838-9, p. 337, Ibid., 1848-9, p. 212; Ibid., 1849-50, pp. 285, 403; in Maine, Laws of 1848, p. 198; Ibid., 1849, p. 351; Ibid., 1850, pp. 461, 530; in Missouri, Laws of 1847, p. 348; Ibid., 1849, p. 159; in Mississippi, Laws of 1848, p. 333; in Illinois, Laws of 1849, p. 33; in Indiana, Laws of 1842, p. 3; Ibid., 1850, p. 149; in Maryland, Laws of 1839, ch. 282; in New Hampshire, Laws of 1836, p. 316; in New York, Laws of 1837, pp. 457, 341; Ibid., 1839, p. 313; Ibid., 1841, p. 329; in South Carolina, Laws of 1848, p. 542; in Ohio, Laws of 1838-9, pp. 128, 343, 349, 367; Ibid., 1841-2, p. 100; Ibid., 1844-5, pp. 232, 109, 46, 403; Ibid., 1843-4, p. 103; Ibid., 1845–6, private, pp. 109, 218, 250; general, pp. 167, 192, 250; Ibid., 1846-7, pp. 56, 65, 87, 95; in Pennsylvania, Laws of 1848, p. 273; Ibid., 1849, p. 360; in Tennessee, Laws of 1847-8, p. 58; in Virginia, Laws of 1847-8, p. 184. Numerous like Acts are found in the laws of each year until 1852, when the New Constitution went into effect, forbidding both state and municipal aid. The laws of 1848, 1849, 1850 and 1851, are crowded with Acts authorizing subscriptions to the stock of turnpike and railroad companies by_municipalities in the State. In Michigan, Laws of 1850, p. 336. In most of these States it was customary to grant state aid, as well as municipal aid, to corporations engaged in internal improvement. In Alabama state aid was granted: (Laws of 1843 and 1844, p. 136) and so far as we have ascertained, no municipal aid until 1851. Laws of 1851 and 1852, p. 218. In Louisiana, state aid was granted. Laws of 1837, p. 110; Ibid., 1838, p. 84; Ibid., 1839, p. 214. În Massachusetts, state aid was granted. Laws of 1834 and 1836, p. 810. In North Carolina, state aid was granted. Laws of 1844 and 1845, p. 103; Ibid., 1848 and 9, p. 138. In Delaware, state aid was granted, Laws of 1844, p. 521; Ibid., 1847, p. 137. The constitutionality of laws authorizing municipal aid to private corporations had often been affirmed by the highest courts of five States, and there were no opposing decisions. Bridgeport v. Housatonic R. Co., 15 Conn., 475 (1843); Talbot v. Dent, 9 B. Mon., 526 (1849); Commonwealth v. McWilliams, 11 Pa. St., 62 (1849); Nichol v. Nashville, 9 Humph., 252 (1848); Goddin v. Crump, 8 Leigh, 120 (1837). The leading members of the constitutional Convention, which in 1850 formed the present Constitution of Michigan, and all intelligent men who have been led to consider the subject of municipal aid, must have been familiar with at least a portion of these facts. To say that a constitution, formed under such a state of circumstances, prohibits municipal aid by implications, not contained in any language of the Constitution, seems to us to violate the most settled principles of interpretation. It cannot be that a decision based upon such an implication is to be regarded as the settled law of Michigan. If the case at bar comes within the rule where the United States Courts feel bound to follow the state decisions, it also comes within the exception. At the time the bonds in suit were issued, the law of the State was justly opposed and settled in favor of their validity. This confidence was based upon many facts. (a) The decisions by this court and the highest courts of so many States upon the exact question, conclusively settled the matter in the judgment of most lawyers. (b) The decisions of the courts of Michigan contributed to the expectation that the bonds would be held valid. As we have heretofore shown, it had long been regarded as the settled law of Michigan, that no Act of the Legislature could be declared void, unless in plain conflict with some provision of the written Constitution. Swan v. Williams, 2 Mich., 427; Atty-Gen. v. Detroit & Erin Pl. Road Co., 2 Mich., 138; S. C., 12 Mich., 333; Detroit & H. Pl. Road Co. v. Fisher, 4 Mich., 37; People v. State Auditors, 9 Mich., 327; East Saginaw Co. v. The City, 19 Mich., 259. (c) The long continued action of the Legislature and state officers of Michigan, in direct opposition to the principles announced in The People v. Salem, contributed to the surprise which that decision justly awakened. In 1838 (Laws of 1838, pp. 101, 108, 252, 259) laws were passed giving bounties for making of sugar from beets; for the manufacture of silk; and authorizing loans of public money for the benefit of certain railroad companies. In 1848 (Laws of 1848, p. 348), state lands were given for the erection of churches, to such denominations as chose to apply for them. In 1850 (Laws of 1850, p. 336), township was authorized to take stock in a plank-road company. In 1853 (Laws of 1853, p. 125) the County of Saginaw was authorized to loan its bonds to a plank road company. In 1855 (Laws of 1855, p. 276), certain lots in Lansing were given to churches. In 1859 (Laws of 1859, p. 551), an Act was passed giving a bounty for the manufacture of salt. In 1861 (Laws of 1861, p. 283), 25,000 acres of state swamp land were given to the German American Seminary of Detroit. In 1863, began a series of Acts authorizing municipal aid to railroads. Between this time and the session of the Legislature in 1869, the last session prior to the decision in 1870, of the case of The People v. Salem, thirty such Acts were passed. In 1867 the Attorney-General of the State, to whom the question of the constitutionality of these laws was referred by the Legislature, gave his opinion in favor of their validity. House Journal of 1867, Vol. 2, p. 1583. Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Michigan. The facts of the case are few and undisputed, and the legal question presented has been settled by this court. On the 22d of March, 1869, the Legislature of Michigan passed an Act entitled "An Act to Enable any Township, City or Village to Pledge its Aid, by Loan or Donation, to any Railroad Company Now Chartered or Organized under and by Virtue of the Laws of the State of Michigan, in the Construction of its Road." The plaintiff in error was the defendant in the court below. It is a body corporate in the County of Van Buren, in Michigan. The case made by the declaration is as follows: The Kalamazoo and South Haven Railroad Company is a corporation organized under the laws of Michigan, having for its object the construction of a railroad from the Village of Kalamazoo to the Village of South Haven, in that State. The line of its proposed route passed through the Township of Pine Grove. Pursuant to the Act of the Legislature before mentioned, a meeting of the electors of the township was called to vote upon the proposition 673*] whether the Township *should, in aid of the construction of the road, give to the company its coupon bonds to the amount of $12,000, bearing interest at the rate of ten per cent. per annum, one-sixth of the principal to be payable at the end of each succeeding year, from March 1, 1870, until the whole amount was paid; the interest to be payable annually from that time. A majority voted for the proposition, and the bonds were issued. They bore date June 1, 1869. The plaintiff, Talcott, was the holder and owner of a part of the bonds and coupons. They are described in the declaration, and were overdue. The Township filed a demurrer. It was overruled by the court; and the Township electing to stand by it, judgment was given for the plaintiff. The Township thereupon sued out this writ of error, and has thus brought the case before this court for review. imputation of crime. The clause is confined to judicial proceedings. Article 14, clauses 6, 8 and 9, provide that the credit of the State shall not be granted to or in aid of any person, association or corporation; that the State shall not be interested in the stock of any corporation, and that the State shall not subscribe to or be interested in any work of internal improvement, or engage in carrying on any such work, except in the expenditure of grants to the State of land or other property. In this case it is the Township and not the State that is concerned. The State has done nothing, and is in nowise liable. The present Constitution was adopted in the year 1850. Before that time numerous Acts, involving the same principle with the one here in question, had been passed by seventeen States. Congress, by the Act of June 3, 1856, 11 Stat. at L., 21, granted a large quantity of land to Michigan, to be used in aid of the construction of railroads. This land was appropriated by the State to several different companies, pursuant to the provisions of the Act. Other companies were subsequently aided in the same way. In 1863 began a series of special legislative Acts authorizing the municipal subdivisions of the State named therein to give their aid respectively to the extent and in the manner prescribed. Between that time and the year 1869 thirty such statutes were enacted. In the latter year the general law was passed, under which the bonds in question were issued. This summary shows the understanding in the Legislature, and out of it in the State, that there was no constitutional prohibition against such legislation. It does not appear that its validity was ever in any instance judicially denied until the year 1870. The case as to the Constitution is a proper It is not alleged that the bonds were not issued one for the *application of the maxim, *675 in conformity to the Act, nor that there has Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The inbeen any want of good faith on the part of the strument is drawn with ability, care and fullrailroad company, nor that the plaintiff, Tal-ness of details. If those who framed it had incott, was not a bona fide holder. But it has been argued that the Act of the Legislature was void. This presents the only question in the case, and it is fundamental. If the foundation fails the entire superstructure reared upon it must fall. It is said the Act is in conflict with the Constitution of the State. It is an axiom in American jurisprudence that a statute is not to be pronounced void upon this ground, unless the repugnancy to the Constitution be clear and the conclusion that it exists, inevitable. Every doubt is to be resolved in support of the enactment. The particular clause of the Constitution must be specified and the Act admit of no reasonable construction in harmony with its meaning. The judicial function involving such a result is one of delicacy, and to be exercised always with caution. Twitchell v. Blodgett, 13 Mich., 127; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich., 320; People v. Mahany, 13 Mich., 482. It must be admitted that the Constitution here in question contains nothing directly adverse upon the subject. But we have been re674*] ferred in this connection to the following provisions: The 32d section of article 6 declares that "No person, in any criminal case, shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, or be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." Here there is no tended to forbid the granting of such aid by the municipal corporations of the State, as well as by the State itself, it cannot be that they would not have explicitly said so. It is not to be supposed that such a gap was left in their work from oversight or inadvertence. The 11th clause of the same article declares that the Legislature shall provide a uniform rule of taxation, except as to property paying specific taxes, and that taxes shall be levied upon such property as shall be prescribed by law. The object of this provision was to prevent unjust discriminations. It prevents property from being classified and taxed as classed, by different rules. All kinds of property must be taxed uniformly, or be entirely exempt. The uniformity must be co-extensive with the territory to which the tax applies. If a state tax, it must be uniform all over the State. If a county or city tax, it must be uniform throughout such county or city. Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 514, 17 L. ed. 307. But the rule does not require that taxes for the same purposes shall be imposed in different territorial subdivisions at the same time. If so, a county could not levy a tax to build a court-house, jail, or infirmary without rendering it necessary for every other county in the State to do the same thing without reference to the different circumstances of |