« ForrigeFortsett »
marshal; Nat. Union Bank v. Dodge, 42 N. J. L. 320, and in case State court exercises further jurisdiction, its proceedings, if not held void, as being coram non judice, will be reversed as erroneous. Approved, arguendo, in Warren v. Wisconsin, etc., Ry. Co., 6 Biss. 431, F. C. 17,204.
Distinguished in Continental Ins. Co. v. Kasey, 27 Gratt. 222, 225, holding a party is not entitled to remove cause on grounds of diverse citizenship, after cause has once been tried in State court and new trial has been ordered by appellate court.
Removal of causes. — State statute forbidding foreign insurance companies to do business in State without filing an agreement not to remove causes to Federal courts, is void, and an agreement so entered into is void, p. 458.
Reafirmed and doctrine relied upon in Barron v. Burnside, 121 U. 8. 197, 199, 200, 30 L. 919, 920, 7 S. Ct. 933, 936, a case presenting the same question; Southern Pac. Co. v. Denton, 146 U. S. 207, 36 L. 945, 13 S. Ct. 46, applying rule to State statute making similar requirement of all corporations; Cunningham v. County of Ralls, 1 McCrary, 118, 1 Fed. 454, holding State statute requiring all actions whatsoever brought against counties to be commenced in Circuit Court of that county, does not deprive Federal courts of jurisdiction; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 6 Biss. 463, F. C. 6,160, holding the statute above being void, the provision therein authorizing the revocation of license of such companies as apply to have causes removed, is also invalid; Commonwealth v. East Tenn. Coal Co., 97 Ky. 243, 244, 30 S. W. 610, construes a similar Kentucky statute likewise; Moore v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., 21 Fed. 819, holding State act providing foreign corporations doing business in State shall be deemed domestic corporations, is, in so far as it seeks to deter such corporations from submitting their controversies to Federal courts, invalid; Allen v. Texas, etc., Ry. Co., 25 Fed. 515, is a similar case and holds likewise; Vincent v. County of Lincoln, 30 Fed. 753, where section in act under which county bonds were Issued, providing suit thereon should only be brought in State court, was held invalid; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Becker, 32 Fed. 853, holdlng State act relating to foreign corporations and providing that if such corporations, when sued in State court, shall attempt to remove cause to Federal courts they shall be subject to certain penalties, is repugnant to Federal Constitution; Bigelow v. Nickerson, 70 Fed. 121, 34 U. S. App. 261, 30 L. R. A. 340, holding Wisconsin statute providing that actions for death in that State caused by negligence must be brought in some court established by State Constitution and laws, is invalid; Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Cary, 28 Ohio St. 214, 216, and Railway v. Stringer, 32 Ohio St. 473, 478, where Ohio statute, pro. viding that foreign railroad corporations by operating roads in that State will be deemed to have waived the right to remove cases
brought against them to Federal courts, was held repugnant to Federal Constitution; Rece v. Newport News, etc., Co., 32 W. Va. 170, 173, 9 S. E. 214, 215, 3 L. R. A. 575, 576, and n., holding State cannot, by statute, make all foreign corporations doing business within its territory domestic corporations, so as to deprive such corporations of the right to remove suits to Federal courts; dissenting opinion in Doyle v. Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 543, 24 L. 152, the opinion of the majority distinguishes (see infra); Phil. Fire Ins. Co. v. New York, 119 U. S. 125, 126, 127, 30 L. 349, 7 S. Ct. 116. 117, majority holding valid a tax imposed on foreign corporations doing business in State. Cited, arguendo, in Barrow Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 111, 42 L. 968, 18 S. Ct. 530, Reimers v. Seatco Co., 70 Fed. 575, 37 U. S. App. 426, 30 L. R. A. 366, Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. McNall, 81 Fed. 897, Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 256, 19 S. Ct. 172, Parrott's Chinese Case, 6 Sawy. 384, 1 Fed. 516, Tinker v. Van Dyke, 1 Flipp. 533, F. C. 14,058, and Chattanooga, etc., Ry. Co. v. Evans, 66 Fed. 814, 31 U. S. App. 432, without special application. Approved, arguendo, in Hollingsworth v. Southern Ry. Co., 86 Fed. 354, where South Carolina statute relating to foreign corporations is construed; Hartford, etc., Ins. Co. v. Raymond, 70 Mich. 503, 504, 38 N. W. 483, where Michigan statute, authorizing the revocation of license to foreign corporations to transact business in State, in case such corporations failed to comply with law relating thereto, was held valid; Koshland v. Insurance Co., 31 Or. 220, 49 Pac. 849. See monographic notes, 95 Am. Dec. 538, 96 Am. Dec. 343, and 15 Am. St. Rep. 221.
Distinguished in Doyle v. Continental Ins. Co., 94 U. S. 537, 539, 540, 24 L. 150, 151, and State v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 188, 189, 190, 192, 194, 105, 196, 198, 22 Am. Rep. 694, 695, 696, 697, 699, 700, 701, 702, both holding act of legislature authorizing the revocation of license of foreign insurance company which transferred a suit brought against it in State court to Federal court, was valid; dissenting opinion in Bigelow v. Nickerson, 70 Fed. 126, 34 U. S. App. 261, 30 L. R. A. 343, 344, see opinion of majority, supra; followed, though not approved in Railway Pass. Assn. v. Pierce, 27 Ohio St. 158, where a similar Ohio statute was construed; dissenting opinion in Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Cary, 28 Ohio St. 230, see opinion of majority, supra.
State has right to exclude foreign insurance companies from transaction of business within its jurisdiction, per Waite, C. J., dissenting, p. 458.
Cited to the effect that a State may forbid a foreign corporation from transacting business within its territory in the following: Desmazes v. Insurance Co., 7 Fed. Cas. 532, Metropolitan Ins. Co. v. McNall, 81 Fed. 896, and Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth, 87 Pa. St. 182, 30 Am. Rep. 354. See note, 96 Am. Dec. 341.
Removal of causes.- State court has jurisdiction to try question of citizenship upon petition to remove a cause to Federal courts, per Waite, C. J., dissenting, p. 459.
Reaffirmed in White v. Holt, 20 W. Va. 807.
Miscellaneous. Cited incidentally in Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. v. 8. W., etc., Ry. Co., 17 W. Va. 878. Cited in State v. Stone, 118 Mo. 401, 40 Am. St. Rep. 394, 24 S. W. 166, 25 L. R. A. 246, as authority for holding a State may impose conditions on a corporation that it cannot impose on individuals.
20 Wall. 459-474, 22 L. 371, SPROTT v. UNITED STATES.
War.- Purchaser of cotton from Confederate government cannot recover value thereof in Court of Claims when same, after purchase, had been captured and sold under authority of United States, p. 463.
Cited and principle applied in Whitfield v. United States, 92 U. S. 170, 23 L. 707, holding, where party sold cotton to Confederate government and accepted Confederate bonds in payment, but while it was still in his possession it was seized and sold by Federal authorities, he is not entitled to recover from the United States the value thereof; Lamar v. Micou, 112 U. S. 476, 28 L. 760, 5 S. Ct. 232, holding courts of United States will not regard Confederate bonds as securities in which trust funds could be lawfully invested; Branch v. Haas, 4 Woods, 589, 16 Fed. 55, where contract made since Civil War for sale of Confederate bonds was held based on illegal consideration, and void; Clements v. Yturria, 81 N. Y. 290, holding purchaser of cotton from Confederate government cannot recover the value thereof from a defendant with whom it was deposited by such government, and who converted it to his own use. Cited in Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U. S. 195, 24 L. 655, as authority for rule that all acts done in aid of Rebellion were illegal and of no validity; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 623, 24 L. 1027, and Young v. United States, 97 U. S. 58, 24 L. 997, as authority for holding that, during the war, cotton found within the Confederate territory, though owned by non-combatants, was a legitimate subject of capture by Federal forces; Snell v. Dwight, 120 Mass. 15, and Walker v. Beauchler, 27 Gratt. 520, without special application. See note, 91 Am. Dec. 280.
Distinguished in Baldy v. Hunter, 171 U. S. 398, 402, 18 S. Ct. 893, 895, upholding investment by guardian of ward's Confederate money, in Confederate bonds.
States. Powers of government exercised by insurgent States during Rebellion, when not exercised for purpose of aiding Rebellion, were valid and binding, p. 464.
Cited and relied on in United States v. Insurance Co., 22 Wall. 102, 22 L. 818, where an insurance corporation created by the legislature
of a rebel State was held a valid organization; Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 465, 24 L. 1075, where notes issued by Bank of Tennessee during period of the Rebellion were held valid; Ketchum v. Buckley, 99 U. S. 190, 25 L. 473, where general laws of a State in insurrection respecting settlement of estates of decedents, were held unaffected by the appointment of a military governor at close of hostilities; Johnson v. West India Co., 156 U. S. 646, 39 L. 566, 15 S. Ct. 531, where trustees appointed under authority of government of one of insurgent States were held lawfully appointed; Parks v. Coffey, 52 Ala. 41, and McGuire v. Buckley, 58 Ala. 126, holding acts of the de facto government of Alabama during Civil War valid, when not in violation of Federal laws and Constitution; dissenting opinion in Pennywit v. Foote, 27 Ohio St. 637, 641, majority holding judicial proceedings of courts of Arkansas under rebel government are not entitled to full faith and credit. Approved, arguendo, in Dinwiddie County v. Stuart, 28 Gratt. 539. See monographic note, 89 Am. Dec. 262.
Distinguished in Bragg v. Tuffts, 49 Ark. 562, 6 S. W. 161, where acts were in direct aid of Rebellion.
20 Wall. 475-485, 22 L. 400, TETUS v. UNITED STATES.
War.- Real property acquired by Confederate States during Civil War passed by conquest to United States at restoration of peace, p. 481.
Cited to this effect in Whitfield v. United States, 92 U. S. 169, 23 L. 707, where it was held, arguendo, that the Confederate government might acquire property by purchase; Atkinson v. Central Ga., etc., Co., 58 Ga. 229, holding title to all captured property of the Confederate government became absolute in the United States when Re bellion was put down.
War.- Act of 1861, relating to confiscation of property used in aid of Rebellion, was intended to apply to private property only, p. 482.
War.- An informer, under act of 1861, does not acquire a molety by filing information after complete title to property has been ac quired by conquest, p. 482.
20 Wall. 486-488. 22 L. 375, BOLEY v. GRISWOLD.
Appeal and error.- Where code provides that judgment for plaintiff, in action for recovery of personal property, may be for return of property or value thereof, judgment is not necessarily erroneous which decrees payment of money; it will be presumed that court determined that property could not be returned, p. 488.
Cited and relied on in Sweeney v. Lomme, 22 Wall. 213, 22 L. 728, holding, in suit on replevin bond, defendants cannot avail themselves of failure in court to render in replevin suit an alter
native judgment; Burton v. Platter, 53 Fed. 908, 10 U. S. App. 657, an absolute judgment for the money is equivalent to a finding that goods cannot be returned; McCarthy v. Strait, 7 Colo. App. 62, 42 Pac. 190, and Cox v. Sargent, 10 Colo. App. 7, 50 Pac. 203, reaffirm the rule; arguendo, in Wise v. Jefferis, 51 Fed. 645, 7 U. S. App. 275, and Connor v. Bates, 92 Tenn. 470, 22 S. W. 5, no special application; Wise v. Jefferis, 51 Fed. 644, 7 U. S. App. 275, arguendo. Criticised in New England Co. v. Bryant, 64 Minn. 260, 66 N. W. 975, and dissenting opinion in Eason v. Miller, 15 S. C. 208.
Appeal and error.-In court of error every presumption is in favor of validity of judgment brought under consideration, p. 488. Cited in Parker v. People, 7 Colo. App. 58, 42 Pac. 173, error must appear affirmatively before there can be reversal.
20 Wall. 488-494, 22 L. 395, HEARNE v. MARINE INS. CO. Equity.- Power to reform written contracts for fraud or mistake belongs to courts of equity, p. 490.
Reaffirmed in Ivinson v. Hutton, 98 U. S. 82, 25 L. 67, and Messinger v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 59 Fed. 530, holding further, this power cannot be exercised by common-law courts; Dean v. Equitable Ins. Co., 4 Cliff. 580, F. C. 3,705, but party alleging mistake must show exactly in what error consists; Brugger v. State Invest. Ins. Co.. 5 Sawy. 310, F. C. 2,051, where mutual mistake in policy of insurance was corrected after loss occurred; Denver, etc., Co. v. McAllister, 6 Colo. 264, holding a bill by assignee for reformation of trust deed, containing allegations which would be good if made by assignor, is not demurrable on ground of assignment; Snell v. Insurance Co., 98 U. S. 89, 25 L. 54, holding mistake or fraud in execution of written instrument may be shown by parol proof; dissenting opinion in Bishop v. Insurance Co., 49 Conn. 177, majority holding evidence of mistake was not sufficiently clear to warrant reformation sought. Cited in Shenandoah Valley Ry. Co. v. Dunlap, 86 Va. 352, 10 S. E. 240, without special application. See note, 77 Am. Dec. 295, 65 Am. St. Rep. 481, 517.
Equity. Where mistake is alleged in execution of an instrument party alleging same must show clearly in what it consists, and the correction that should be made, p. 490.
Cited and applied in Griswold v. Hazard, 26 Fed. 138, in holding like rule applies where fraud is alleged in the execution of a bond; Cox v. Woods, 67 Cal. 318, 7 Pac. 722, and Hochstein v. Berghauser, 123 Cal. 685, 56 Pac. 549, where court refused to reform instrument, the evidence of mistake not being free from doubt; to same effect is Bishop v. Insurance Co., 49 Conn. 171, holding power to reform a written contract is one in the exercise of which there should be great caution; Donaldson v. Levine, 93 Va. 476, 25 S. E. 542, and