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Mr. Justice Strong also dissent, and concur in this dissenting opinion.

HENRY DOUGLASS, Piff. in Err.,

v.

WILLIAM DOUGLASS, Admr. of John Douglass, Deceased.

fund and pay back all taxes erroneously or illegally assessed or collected (sec. 44), and the amended Act of July 13, 1866, declares that no suit shall be maintained for the recovery of any tax alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected until such appeal shall have been made, and a decision had. Sec. 19. The suit thus prohibited is a suit brought by the person taxed, to recover back a tax illegally assessed and collected. This is different from the case now under consideration, which is a suit brought by the Government for collecting the tax, and the person taxed (together with his sureties) is defendant instead of plaintiff. Action on replevin bond-delivery of property No statute is cited to show that he cannot, when thus sued, set up the defense that the tax was illegally assessed, although he may not have appealed to the commissioner.

Is he precluded by any general rule of law from setting up such a defense? Has an assessment of a tax so far the force and effect of a judicial sentence that it cannot be attacked collaterally, but only by some direct proceeding, such as an appeal or certiorari, for setting

it aside?

It is undoubtedly true that the decisions of an assessor or Board of Assessors, like those of all other administrative commissioners, are of a quasi judicial character, and cannot be questioned collaterally when made within the scope of their jurisdiction. But if they assess persons, property or operations not taxable, such assessment is illegal and cannot form the basis of an action at law for the collection of the

tax, however efficacious it may be for the protection of ministerial officers charged with the duty of actual collection by virtue of a regular warrant or authority therefor. When the Government elects to resort to the aid of 71*] the courts it *must abide by the legality of the tax. When it follows the statute its officers have the protection of the statute, and parties must comply with the requirements thereof before they can prosecute as plaintiffs. The judgment of the Circuit Court must be reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.

Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting:

I dissent from the opinion and judgment of the court in this case because the evidence offered by the distiller to show that the assessment in question covered eight days in which his distillery could not be operated was not an answer to the whole declaration; nor could it be, as the assessment was for a deficiency and covered the regular tax for a whole month.

Suppose the evidence was admissible; still if it had been admitted, it would only have shown that the assessment was excessive in amount, in which state of the case all will agree. I suppose, that the defense must have failed, as the case showed that no appeal had ever been taken to the Secretary of the Treasury, as required by the Act of Congress, 14 Stat. at L. § 19.

Such must be the rule, else it will follow that nothing can be collected of the tax payer in any case where the assessment is for an amount greater than that authorized by law, which is a proposition at war with the whole system of federal taxation.

(See S. C., 21 Wall., 98-104.)

after judgment.

replevin action, conditioned to return the property 1. In an action on a bond given by defendant in a replevied, if it be so adjudged, on recovery by plaintiff, the seizure by the Marshal on a writ of de retorno habendo, and tender of the property to Neither could be revived by the plaintiff's refusal to plaintiff, satisfied the bond and the judgment. receive the property.

2. If the defendant injured the property, or culhis possession, a remedy must be sought in some pably suffered it to become injured while it was in other appropriate proceeding. It cannot be had in a suit on the bond.

3. If no writ de retorno habendo had issued, it would have been the duty of the defendant to seek the plaintiff and deliver the property to him if he would receive it.

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The case is fully stated by the court. Messrs. P. Phillips and W. B. Webb, for plaintiff in error:

The seizure by the Marshal, under the writ, of the property mentioned in it, was a return and delivery in full in compliance with the bond. His possession and control of the property, by virtue of the writ, issued at the instance of the plaintiff, was the possession and control of the plaintiff himself. The law makes the Marshal the plaintiff's agent. But if this were otherwise, the presence of the plaintiff himself, and his active participation in the seizure, would seem to place this matter beyond cavil.

Carrico v. Taylor, 3 Dana, 33.

The bond was to return the property and fulfill the judgment when the property was returned and the party paid the costs awarded; the judgment was, in all things, fulfilled, and the bonds fully satisfied.

Stevens v. Tuite, 104 Mass., 336.

Messrs. J. H. Bradley and W. S. Cox, for defendants in error:

A mere seizure or levy under a writ is a satisfaction only sub modo or conditionally, and does not become such, if the possession be afterwards surrendered; and the rule is declared by some authorities to apply only as regards third persons, and not between the parties.

Sasscer v. Walker, 5 Gill. & J., 102; Stone v. Tucker, 2 Bailey, 495; Duncan v. Harris, 17 S. & R., 436; Barker v. Wendell, 12 N. H., 119., Green v. Burke, 23 Wend., 490; Lynch v. Pressley, 8 Ga., 327; Williams v. Gartrell, 4 Greene (Iowa), 287; Campbell v. Booth, 8 Md., 107; Mr. Justice Swayne, Mr. Justice Davis and Montgomery v. Wayne, 14 Me., 373; Potter v.

James, 7 R. I., 312; U. S. v. Dashiel, 3 Wall., | and fourth pleas; to the third he replied that 688, 18 L. ed. 268. "When the Marshal seized the said goods and chattels they were much damaged and altered in condition and of materially less value than when they were delivered to said defendant as aforesaid; wherefore plaintiff refused to receive the same, and they were left by the Marshal and still remain in the defendant's possession, and this he is ready to verify."

Independently of this, the plaintiff had a right to refuse to accept the plants in a damaged and deteriorated condition. The defendant was bound to return them in the same good condition as when received by him.

Parker v. Simonds, 8 Met., 205; Young v. Willet, 8 Bosw. (N. Y.), 486; Suydam v. Jenkens, 3 Sandf., 614; Brizsee v. Maybee, 21 Wend., 144; Schuyler v. Sylvester, 4 Dutch., 488.

Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court:

There was no rejoinder to the replication. Upon this state of the pleadings the case went to the jury.

Upon the trial the plaintiff offered evidence tending to prove the value of the goods and chattels when they were delivered by the Mar

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States for the District of Colum-shal to the defendants, and also evidence tend

bia.

The action was upon a penal bond executed by the plaintiff in error, in the sum of $11,000. It recited that William Douglass, as administrator, etc., had sued out against Henry Doug. lass a writ of replevin under which had been seized and delivered to William as administrator, the articles mentioned in the writ; that Henry had moved the court to return the articles to him, and that the court ordered their return upon his giving bond as required.

The condition of the bond was as follows: "Now the condition of this obligation is such that if the said Henry Douglass shall and will return all the goods and chattels in said declaration mentioned, if the same be adjudged, and in all things stand to, abide by, and perform and fulfill the judgment of the said court, then the above obligation to be void; otherwise to be and remain in full force and virtue in law."

The declaration averred that it was adjudged in the suit that the property of the articles was in William as such administrator, and that it was considered by the court that they should be restored to him, that he should recover of Henry $537.23 for costs, "And that he have execution for the return of said goods and chattels, and for said costs of suit."

The breach alleged was "That the said Henry Douglass did not return and deliver up the said goods and chattels to the said William Douglass, administrator as aforesaid, or well and truly abide by and perform and fulfill the judgment of the said court in the premises, but hath hitherto wholly neglected and refused so to do, and still doth so refuse and neglect, whereby the said writing obligatory hath become forfeited to the said plaintiff." 100*] *The defendant filed four pleas:

1. That he did not commit the breach alleged.

2. That he did not neglect and refuse to abide by and fulfill the judgment of the court.

3. That the plaintiffs caused a writ of de retorno habendo to be issued, and that in execution of the writ the Marshal seized the goods and chattels mentioned in the declaration and tendered them to the plaintiff, who refused to receive them.

4. That he did deliver to the plaintiff the goods and chattels mentioned in the declaration, as he was bound to do.

The third and fourth pleas concluded with a verification.

The first and second concluded neither with a verification nor to the country.

The plaintiff took issue on the first, second

ing to prove that they were seized by the Marshal at several times under two writs of de retorno habendo, issued upon the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and tendered to the plaintiff by the Marshal; that the plaintiff refused to receive them; that they were then in a changed and damaged condition, and hence his refusal. The evidence was admitted and the defendant excepted.

The defendant offered evidence tending to prove, that under the two writs of de retorno habendo, the goods and chattels had been seized by the Marshal and tendered to the plaintiff; that he refused to receive them and that, upon *one of the occasions when they were so [*101 seized, the plaintiff was present, and objected only to a few of the articles as not included in the original suit; that the deputy-marshal who served the writ and made the seizure instructed the plaintiff to furnish means of removing the articles from the premises of the defendant, which he refused to do; and that, thereupon, the deputy left them where he found them, without any consultation or understanding with the defendant, and that the defendant never accepted them from Marshal. The plaintiff objected to the evidence; the court excluded it and the defendant excepted.

The defendant prayed the court to instruct the jury that the tender to the plaintiff, by the Marshal, discharged the obligation of the bond. The court refused and the defendant excepted. The plaintiff thereupon asked the following instructions.

1. That the proceedings under the writs de retorno habendo did not bar the plaintiff's right to

recover.

2. That unless the defendant had offered to return the goods and chattels, he was liable for their value at the time they were delivered to him by the Marshal with interest from the date of the judgment of return.

These instructions were given and the defendant excepted.

The pleadings subsequent to the declaration are of an anomalous character. But as the defendant's exceptions disclose ample ground for the determination of the case, it is unnecessary further to remark upon them.

*The exceptions we have stated are [*104 all well taken.

The central and controlling question in the case is the effect of the seizure of the property by the Marsnal, and its tender to the plaintiff. He sued out the writ. It went into the hands of the Marshal by his procurement. He was the actor in causing its issuance and service.

error.

The Marshall acted for him. He cannot be per- | goods alleged to have been sold and delivered. mitted to play fast and loose with the process Judgment having been given in their favor, the he invoked. The Marshal's possession was his defendants in that court sued out this writ of possession. As soon as it was taken, the efficacy of the bond touching the return of the property was at an end. The bond stipulated for the return of the property and nothing more in relation to it. We cannot interpolate what the contract does not contain. Our duty is to execute it as we find it, and not to make a

new one.

The case sufficiently appears in the opinion of the court.

Messrs. S. W. Packard and E. L. Stanton, for plaintiffs in error:

The mere fact that the plaintiffs have, in the commencement of their declaration, added to the names of the defendants the words "co

Co.," does not amount to an averment that they contracted or promised as partners.

The seizure and tender satisfied the judg-partners doing business as C. & G. Cooper & ment of return and the defendant's obligation. Carrico v. Taylor, 3 Dana, 33. Neither could be revived by the plaintiff's refusal to receive the property. The refusal was of no legal consequence.

If the defendant injured the property, or culpably suffered it to become injured while it was in his possession, a remedy must be sought in some other appropriate proceeding. It cannot be had in a suit on the bond.

If no writ de retorno habendo had issued, it would have been the duty of the defendant to seek the plaintiff and deliver the property to him if he would receive it. Had the defendant failed to do this, there would have been a breach of the bond and he would have been liable. The action taken by the plaintiff obviated the necessity of his doing anything in that way.

The judgment is reversed, and the case will be remanded with directions to issue a venire de novo, and proceed in conformity to this opinion.

105*] *CHARLES COOPER, George Rogers, C. Gray Cooper, J. C. Debis, and Frank L. Fairchild, Piffs. in Err.,

v.

It is mere surplusage, or descriptio_personarum, and has been so held by the Supreme Court of Illinois, in a similar case arising under this same statute.

Vide, Johnson v. Buell, 26 Ill., 63; vide, also Neteler v. Culies, 18 Ill., 188; Woodworth v. Fuller, 24 Ill., 109, construing a similar statute relating to plaintiffs; Brent v. Shook, 36 Ill., 125; 1 Chit. Pl., 204, and cases cited in note; 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev., 1148; 1 Tidd, Pr., 13; Henshall v. Roberts, 5 East, 150, per Lord Ellenborough; Merritt v. Seaman, 6 N. Y., 172; Delafield v. Kinney, Pres. of the Erie Co. Bank, 24 Wend., 345; Hunt v. Van Alstyne, 25 Wend., 605; Ogdensburgh Bank v. Van Rensselaer, 6 Hill, 240; Christopher v. Stockholm, 5 Wend., 36; Woodford v. Webster, 3 Day, 472.

In Illinois, the whole subject of interest is regulated by statute.

Sec. 2, ch. 54, Rev. Stat.; Gross, Stat., 3d ed., p. 370; Scates, Stat., p. 599; Purple, Stat., p. 633, declares: "Creditors shall be allowed to receive at the rate of six per centum per annum for all moneys after they become due on any bond, bill, promissory note or other instrument of writing, on any judgment recovered before

CHARLES E. COATES, George W. P. Coates, any court or magistrate authorized to enter

and J. Pennock Coates.

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1. Under the Statute of Illinois, proof of the partnership or joint liability of either the plaintiffs or defendants is unnecessary in the first instance.

2. Where a delivery of goods is proved by improper testimony, if it be afterwards proved by proper testimony, the allowance of the first testimony is not ground of error.

3. Where a bill of goods is furnished upon a written order, and a bill of lading of the articles at once mailed to defendants, and a draft drawn upon them for the amount, which they refuse to accept, it is equivalent to a demand of payment, and the account draws interest.

4. A sale of goods without a term of credit given is liquidated when contracted, and after the account is presented and impliedly admitted, the defendants are in default and chargeable with in[No. 74.]

terest.

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Suit was brought in the court below by the defendants in error, to recover for certain

NOTE. What constitutes an account stated-see note to Wiggins v. Burkham, 19 L. ed. U. S. 885. When account stated is impeachable for fraud, mistake, error, omission, accident, usurious charges -see note to Perkins v. Hart, 6 L. ed. U. S. 463.

up the same within this State, from the day of signing until the effects are sold or satisfaction of such judgment be made; likewise on money lent or money due on the settlement of accounts, from the day of liquidating accounts between the parties and ascertaining the ballance; on money received to the use of another and retained without the owner's knowledge, and on money withheld by an unreasonable and vexatious delay."

In Sammis v. Clark, 13 Ill., 544, the court says, after citing the statute: "It is a rule in the construction of statutes that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another, and it may well be insisted, when the Legislature has enumerated a variety of cases in which creditors shall be allowed to receive interest, that it was not their intention to permit them to demand it in the cases not enumerated. Dwarr. Stat., 713; King v. Cunningham, 5 East, 478; The Warden of St. Paul v. The Dean, 4 Price, 78.

In Aldrich v. Dunham, 16 Ill., 403, the court decides that "To appear and defend a suit, is a right which cannot be construed into unreasonable and vexatious delay of payment." Mr. O. K. A. Hutchinson, for defendants in error:

It was not necessary, in this case, for plaintiffs below to prove that they were partners or joint payees:

1 Stat. of Ill. by Gross, 270, sec. 11; Heintz v. Cahn, 29 Ill., 308.

Or to prove the partnership or joint liability | cles furnished by the defendants which could of defendants.

1 Stat. of Ill. by Gross, 270, § 12; Warren v. Chambers, 12 Ill., 124; Stillson v. Hill, 18 Ill., 262; McKinney v. Peck, 28 Ill., 174.

There being no evidence that the sale was upon credit, no controversy as to the amount due, and no reason for delay in payment, there was an implied promise to pay for the goods on delivery, and the court properly instructed the jury to allow interest as damages from the date of the receipt, by defendants below, of the iron forming the last item in the account.

Mills v. Bank of U. S.. 11 Wheat., 431; Waring v. Henry, 30 Ala., 721; Shields v. Henry, 31 Ala., 53; National Lancers v. Lovering, 10 Fost. (N. H.) 511; Close v. Fields, 13 Tex.,

623.

Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of

the court:

The objections in this case are none of them serious in their character.

By the rules of common law, it is certainly necessary that parties who sue as co-plaintiffs, alleging themselves to be partners, shall make proof of that allegation. The same is true of persons who are alleged to be copartners and sued as such as defendants. By the Statutes of Illinois, the rule of law is changed in this respect unless a plea in abatement is interposed or verified pleas are filed denying the execution of a writing set up. The statute rendered unnecessary, in this case, proof of the partnership or joint liability of either the plaintiff's or defendants. Gross. Stat., vol. 1, p. 207, §§ 11, 12; Warren v. Chambers, 12 Ill., 124; McKinney v. Peck, 28 Ill.,, 174.

in

The objection to the evidence of the witness, White, in stating the dates of delivery and the weight of the iron, is not practical. If we suppose the evidence to be stricken out, as requested, the result of the case must necessarily be the same. It would then stand thus: the witness, White, testifies that he knows of the delivery to the defendants of certain plates of iron, forwarded by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, in January and February, 1870; that the freight bills were paid by the defendants, and that the defendants made no complaint that the amount of the iron was less than it should be. The plaintiffs then proved by other witnesses that the four bills of iron were shipped by them, by the Baltimore and 111*] Ohio Railroad, to the defendants, pursuance of written orders from them, marked C. & J. Cooper & Co., a few days prior to the dates mentioned in White's deposition; that the bills of lading for the iron were mailed to the defendants, and that they never came back to the plaintiffs. This was prima facie evidence of the delivery of the iron as specified and, no proof to the contrary being offered, it became conclusive. The plaintiffs' case is as well with out White's evidence as with it. The defendants suffer no injury by its retention, and have, therefore, no legal cause of complaint. Shay v. People, 22 N. Y., 317; Sherman v. Johnson, 56 Barb., 59; Weber v. Kingsland, 8 Bosw., 415. The objection to the allowance of interest was not well taken. So far as the case shows. this was the only transaction that ever took place between the parties; and it is not pretended that any payments were made or arti

give the transaction the character of a mutual account. It was simply the case of a bill of goods furnished upon a written order, and a bill of lading of the articles at once mailed to the defendants. No objection was made by the defendants to the articles or to the account. A draft was drawn upon the defendants for the amount, which they refused to accept. This was equivalent to a demand of payment. An account (assuming this to be such) draws interest after liquidation, and it is considered liquidated after it is rendered, if no objection is made. Patterson v. Choate, 7 Wend., 441.

A sale of goods without a term of credit given is liquidated when contracted, and after the account is presented and impliedly admitted, the defendants are in default and chargeable with interest. Beers v. Reynolds, 11 N. Y., 97; Pollock v. Ehle, 2 E. D. Smith, 541.

The judgment is affirmed.

GEORGE S. MARSH, Appt.,

v.

NATHANIEL M. WHITMORE.

(See S. C., 21 Wall., 178-185.) Attorney, when negligent-principal estopped by acquiescence from questioning agent's acts-stale demand.

1. An attorney cannot be charged with negligence when he accepts, as a correct exposition of the law, a decision of the Supreme Court of the State in regard to the liability of stockholders of a corporation.

2. The law prohibits one who sells on another's account from becoming a buyer on his own at the sale; but where the principal has adopted and approved of the transaction and long acquiesced in it, he is concluded from questioning it. 3. Where the complainant does not set forth specifically any impediments to an earlfer prosecution of a stale demand, nor when he first became acquainted with his supposed wrongs, but only states that he was not aware of the purchase of the subject of the action by the defendant until lately, the language is altogether too vague to invoke the action of a court of equity.

[No. 54.]

Argued Nov. 5, 6, 1874. Decided Nov. 23, 1874.

NOTE. Attorney's liability to client, for negli gence.

Where a client has sustained damage through the gross negligence or gross ignorance of his attorney, he is entitled to maintain an action against him for damages. Hatch v. Fogerty, 10 Abb. Pr. N. S., 147, 40 How. Pr., 492; 7 Rob., 488; Hopping v. Quinn, 12 Wend., 517; Estate of A. B., 1 Tuck., 247; Godefroy v. Dalton, 6 Bing., 460; Pennington v. Yell, 11 Ark., 212; Hogg v. Martin, Riley, 156; Sevier v. Holliday, 2 Ark., 512; Palmer v. Ashley, 3 Ark., 75; Evans v. Watrous, 2 Port., 205; Purves v. Landell, 12 C. & F., 91; Wilson v. Russ, 20 Me., 421; Kemp v. Burt, 4 Barn. & Ad., 424; Laidless v. Elliott, 3 Barn. & C., 738; Pitt v. Yalden, 4 Burr., 2060; O'Barr v. Alexander, 37 Ga., 195; Holmes v. Peck, 1 R. I., 242; Caverly v. McOwen, 123 Mass., 574; Re Spencer, 21 L. T. N. S., 808, 39 L. J. Ch.. 841; Morrill v. Graham, 27 Tex., 646; Lee v. Dixon, 3 Fost. & F., 744; Parker v. Rolls, 14 C. B., 691; Eggleston v. Boardman, 37 Mich., 14.

Client must be in some way injured by the negligence, or he cannot maintain an action even for nominal damages. Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St., 492; Grayson v. Wilkinson, 13 Miss., 268; Suydam v. Vance, 2 McLean, 99.

Where an attorney disobeys the lawful instructions of his client, and a loss follows, he is responsible for it even though he acted in good faith, for Wilcox v. what he supposed the interest of client. Plummer, 29 U. 8. (4 Pet.), 172; Gilbert v. Will 88 U. S.

A

PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the | to be so long ignorant of his rights; the means United States for the District of Maine. The bill in this case was filed by the appellant in the court below, where a decree of dismissal was entered, whereupon he took an appeal to this court.

The case is fully stated by the court. Mr. A. G. Stanchfield, for appellant: Can a case be found in the annals of equity jurisprudence, where a pledgee, as in this case, confesses in his answer that he still holds the pledge, and that its cash value is greater than the debt by many thousand dollars, and relief been denied? For the same reasons this court felt constrained to grant relief in Michoud v. Girod, 4 How., 503, and Southard v. Russell, 16 How., 547. Can you withhold it

here?

Wedderburn v. Wedderburn, 4 Myl. & C., 41; 18 Eng. (Cond.) Ch., 52; Cutts v. Salmon, 12 Eng. L. & E., 316; Brookshank v. Smith, 2 You. & C. (Exch.), 58; Atty. Gen. v. Fishmongers Co., 5 Myl. & C. 16; Hough v. Richardson, 3 Story, 659; 2 Story, Eq. Jur., 615, 20 (a); Vernon v. Stevens, 3 P. Wms., 67; Hampton v. Spencer, 2 Vern., 288.

Mr. Artemas Libbey, for appellee: Assuming that defendant could not legally purchase, his purchase was not void, but voidable by the pledgor only. It is at his option to set aside the sale, or ratify it after a full knowledge of the facts.

Hill, Trust., 248 and n., 4th Am. ed.; Story, Eq. Jur., sec. 322.

The sale was in June, 1857, and the bill was filed in court, in March, 1869, after a lapse of nearly twelve years. The sale was public and the complainant had full opportunity to ascertain the price for which the bonds were sold, and who were the purchasers. "And the possession of such means of knowledge is, in equity, the same as knowledge itself."

New Albany v. Burke, 11 Wall., 107, 20 L. ed. 159.

If complainant seeks to avoid the effects of his laches, he should set forth in his bill specifically what were the impediments to an earlier prosecution of his claim; how he came iams, 8 Mass., 51, 5 Am. Dec., 77; Cox v. Livingston, 2 Watts & S., 103, 37 Am. Dec., 486; Armstrong v. Craig, 18 Barb., 387.

In an action by an attorney for professional services, defendant may show that the services were worthless from the attorney's ignorance or negligence. Bracey v. Carter, 12 Ad. & E., 373; Bowman v. Tallman, 40 How. Pr., 1; Hopping v. Quin, 12 Wend., 517; Roe v. Stanton, 7 Grant (U. C.) Ch., 389.

Every person who enters a learned profession undertakes to bring to the practice of it a reasonable degree of care and skill. Lamphier v. Phipos, 8 Carr. & P., 479.

Any unfaithful dealing with his client will deprive an attorney of all right to compensation for his services. Currie v. Cowles, 6 Bosw., 452; Herrick v. Catley, 1 Daly, 512; 30 How. Pr., 208.

An attorney does not guaranty success of suit nor soundness of his opinions. It is only required of him that he act honestly, and to the best of his ability. Lynch v. Com., 16 Serg. & R., 268, 16 Am. Dec., 582; Bowman v. Tallman, 27 How. Pr., 212, 2 Rob., 385; Aff'd, 40 How. Pr., 1; 41 N. Y. 619, Gambert v. Hart, 44 Cal., 542; Steven v. Walker, n; 55 Ill., 151; Gallaher v. Thompson, Wright, 466.

If injury result to client from attorney's want of reasonable degree of skill and care, he is liable for the actual amount of damages sustained. The nominal amount involved in the suit in which the attorney was negligent is not the criterion. Watson

used by defendant to fraudulently keep him in ignorance; and how and when he first came to a knowledge of the matters alleged in his bill. Stearns v. Page, 7 How., 819; Badger v. Badger, 2 Cliff., 154, 2 Wall., 87, 17 L. ed. 836. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:

The bill in this case was filed to compel the defendant to account for certain bonds of the Kennebeck & Portland Railroad Company, and to charge him with certain notes of the same corporation, received from the complainant. It alleges that the bonds and notes were placed in the hands of the defendant as security for advances to be made by him in effecting a compromise with complainant's creditors in Maine, and a reasonable compensation to himself for his own services as counsel; that the bonds were sold by him at public auction in disregard of his duty and, at the sale, were bid in by himself through the intervention of third par ties, at an amount greatly below their value at the time, which conduct the bill charges to have been in fraud of the complainant's rights, and to have come to his knowledge only within a recent period; until lately, is the language used.

With respect to the notes, the bill alleges that at the time they were placed with the defendant, he was instructed to institute suits against them and to attach certain personal property of the corporation pointed out to him, and if the notes were not thus paid, to collect them from the stockholders who were personally liable; and that the defendant agreed to attend diligently to their collection; that they were collectible of the company or stockholders, and if they were not collected the failure is attributable to his gross neglect. The prayer of the bill is, that the defendant may be charged with the full amount of the notes and interest, and may be decreed to surrender the bonds, or if that be impossible, to pay their full value in money; or that such other or further relief may be granted as the justice of the case may require. The bill calls v. Muirhead, 5 Pa. St., 161; Pidgeon v. Williams, 21 Gratt., 251; Walpole v. Carlisle, 32 Ind., 415; Harter v. Morris, 18 Ohio St., 492; Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga., 144; Eccles v. Stephenson, 3 Bibb., 517; Stevens v. Walker, 55 Ill., 151; Nisbet v.. Lawson, 1 Ga., 275; Rootes v. Stone, 2 Leigh, 650; Grayson v. Wilkinson, 5 Sm. & M., 268.

The skill required has reference to the character of the business the attorney undertakes to do. Cox v. Sullivan, 7 Ga., 144; O'Barr v. Alexander, 37 Ga., 195; Wilson v. Russ, 19 Me., 421.

Attorney receiving money to invest on real estate security, is liable for want of reasonable care as to value of security. Peters v. Weller, 30 U. C. Q. B., 4 Mare v. Lewis, 4 Ir. Eq. R., 219.

Neglect of attorney to enter order obtained, till order is set aside, for this delay is negligence for which he is responsible. Herr v. Toms, 32 U. C. Q. B., 423; Drais v. Hogan, 50 Cal., 121.

Neglect to move for judgment for return of property in replevin on nonsuit of plaintiff, in consequence of which claim is lost, renders attorney liable. Smallwood v. Norton, 20 Me., 83, 37 Am. Dec., 39.

Proceeding under wrong section of statute, so that clients are defeated, precludes attorney's recovery for service and renders him liable to clients for damages sustained. Hart v. Frame, McLean & Rob., 595; 6 C. & F., 193; 3 Jur., 547.

Attorney or collection agency, receiving a claim for collection and sending it to an attorney at a distance, is liable for the ignorance or negligence of

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