Sidebilder
PDF
ePub

show that as matter of law the deed was sufficiently delivered, and that it is the duty of the court to establish the trust.

First. That the trust expressed in favor of the plaintiff in and by the deed of trust, dated the 13th day of August, 1861, which is men tioned in the seventh paragraph of the plaintiff's bill of complaint, and whereof a copy is filed in this cause, be, and the same are hereby declared valid and effective in equity as between the parties hereto.

Second. That the defendant, Joseph H. Adams, Jr., be, and he is hereby required to deliver up to the complainant, or to her trustee hereinafter appointed, the said deed of trust. Third. That Edwin DeLeon, of the City and State of New York be, and he is hereby appointed trustee of the complainant, to execute the said trust in the said deed of trust declared in her favor in the stead and place of the defendant, John A. Appleton, and with the same powers, and in the same mode and manner as the said Appleton might or could execute such trusts under the said deed of trust.

Fourth. That the said Joseph H. Adams, Jr., be, and he is hereby required to deliver up to the said Edwin De Leon, trustee herein appointed, possession of the real estate and premises mentioned and described in said deed of trust.

Fifth. That the said Joseph H. Adams, Jr., be, and he is hereby required to come to an account before the auditor of this court for the rents and profits of such real estate and premises that have accrued since the filing of the bill of complaint in this cause, allowing as a credit to the said Joseph H. Adams, Jr., on such accounting, any payment or payments which the said defendant Adams may have made to the plaintiff in the mean time; and,

Sixth. That the plaintiff's costs in this suit be paid by the said Joseph H. Adams, Jr. We think this decree was well made, and that it should be affirmed. It is ordered accordingly.

AUGUSTUS C. WATSON, Plff. in Err.,

v.

WALTER E. BONDURANT.

(See S. C., 21 Wall., 123-130.)

Messrs. Geo. W. Race and E. T. Merrick, for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Clement L. Walker and Pike & Johnson, for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court:

recover possession of a lot of land containing The defendant in error brought this action to about 160 acres, in the Parish of Tensas, Louisiana. His claim to the land, as set forth in his

petition, is by virtue of a purchase made at a sheriff's sale in February, 1868. This sale embraced other land, all formerly belonging to the plantation of the plaintiff's grandfather, Daniel execution issued in a suit brought by the plaintM. Bondurant, and was made by virtue of an iff against his three uncles, Albert, John and Horace Bondurant, to recover the amount of a for his share of the purchase money thereof. mortgage given by them upon the said lands, In 1852, they had sued for a partition, and in said proceedings there had been a decree for sale. The plaintiff's father being dead, he represented him, being then an infant. As one of the heirs of his grandfather, he was entitled to one fourth of the lands. The uncles bid off the plantation for about $150,000. The sheriff, on the 4th day of December, 1852, executed to them a deed, reserving a special mortgage on the lands his share of the purchase money when he should as security for the payment to the plaintiff of sale which was executed by the sheriff and the come of age, which was in 1862. In the act of purchasers, the latter bound themselves not tc alienate, deteriorate or incumber the property to the prejudice of the mortgage, which covenant is called in Louisiana law the pact de non alienando, and dispenses with the necessity or making any person other than the mortgagors parties to a judicial proceeding upon the mort8th of December, 1852. Regularly it should gage. This mortgage was duly recorded on the have been re-inscribed within ten years from that time. But it was not re-inscribed until September, 1865. The plaintiff in his petition alleges, by way of excuse, the existence of the civil war, and that he was prevented by vis major, from re-inscribing it.

Meantime the uncles divided the plantation between themselves, and the tract in question was set off to John Bondurant, who, in 1854,

Louisiana law-sale of lands—sheriff's return, conveyed it to Watson, the defendant, who has

when not conclusive.

The law of Louisiana requires an actual seizure of land on execution in the country parishes, a sheriff's sale without a valid seizure confers no title.

The covenant known in the Louisiana law as the pact de non alienando, did not relieve the plaintiff from the necessity of pursuing the forms of the law in making a compulsory sale.

Where the sheriff's return is incomplete and presents no record evidence of the sheriff's acts, it is traversable and it may be shown that no actual seizure of the property in dispute was ever made by the sheriff.

[No. 32.]

Submitted Mar. 27, 1874. Decided Dec. 14, 1874.

I

N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of Louisiana.
The case, which arose in the court below, is
fully stated in the opinion of the court.

been in possession thereof ever since.

On the 30th of January, 1866, the plaintiff commenced an action against his uncles in the District Court, Parish of Tensas, for the recovery of the amount of his mortgage, and obtained the judgment against them under which the sheriff's sale was made, by virtue of which he now claims the land in controversy. This judgment was rendered November 14, 1867. A fieri facias was issued, directed to the sheriff of the parish. This writ was produced in evidence, and had attached thereto a statement unsigned, purporting to be a return, as follows: "Received the 9th December, 1867, and served this writ as follows, to wit: I seized, on the 25th day of December, A. D. 1867, the following described property, belonging to the defendants, *to wit: (Describing the entire planta- [*125 tion.) On the 28th day of December, 1867, I advertised said property for sale at the court

house door in this parish, on Saturday the first of February, A. D. 1856, for cash, etc. I offered said property for sale when W. E. Bondu rant bid, etc.' The sheriff's deed to the plaintiff was also offered in evidence, which recited the same facts.

The defendant proved, and the fact is found by the court, that there was no actual seizure of the property in dispute, the sheriff of the Parish of Tensas not being in the habit of making actual seizures, and that the only notice of seizure was by posting upon the court-house door a notice of seizure to the said Horace, Albert and John Bondurant, as absentees, and that the defendant had no knowledge of any proceeding to devest his title until March, 1869, long after the sale.

shall remain sequestered in his custody until
sale. "Consequently," says the law, "he may
appoint a keeper or an overseer to manage it, for
whom he shall be responsible." Article 659
declares that when the objects seized consist of
money, movables or beasts, he shall put them
in a place of safety, etc. Article 690 declares
that the adjudication thus made has, [*127
of itself alone, the effect of transferring to
the purchaser all the rights and claims which
the party in whose hands it was seized might
have had to the thing adjudged.

Other sections are equally suggestive on this
point.

The courts of Louisiana hold the seizure to be essential, and that a sale without it fails to transfer title to the purchaser.

In the case of Goubeau v. R. Co., 6 Rob. (La.), 348, it was held, that in order to make a legal and valid seizure of tangible property from which the seizing creditor may acquire a privilege in the thing seized, it is necessary that the sheriff should take the object seized into his possession; and the mere levying of an execution upon property found in the hands of the debtor, or of a third person, without showing that the sheriff took it into his actual possession, at least when he levied the writ, is not sufficient to confer any right on the creditor. This doctrine is affirmed in Simpson v. Allain, 7 Rob. (La.), 504; in Fluker v. Bullard, 2 La. Ann., 338; Offut v. Monquit, 2 La. Ann., 785; Taylor v. Stone, 2 La. Ann., 910; Gaines v. Bk., 4 La. Ann., 370.

Upon these facts the defendant requested the court below to decide that a re-inscription of the mortgage within ten years was necessary to its validity; but the court held that the perzod of the war of rebellion was to be deducted from the period prescribed for the re-inscription of mortgages. The defendant also requested the court to decide, 1. That it is essential to the validity of a sheriff's return to a writ of execution, that it should be signed by him or his deputy, in order to validate an adjudication of sale. 2. That, in order to make valid a sale of tangible property in all the parishes of Louisiana, except Orleans and Jefferson, there must be an actual seizure by the plaintiff on execution. 3. That, in order to devest the title of the defendant, notice of seizure upon Bondurant at least, if not upon the defendant, The cases here referred to are mostly cases of was essential; but the court ruled that inas- personal chattels, or securities. But the same much as the mortgage contained the pact de non doctrine has been held in regard to lands. In alienando, the defendant was not to be con- the recent case of Corse v. Stafford, 24 La. Ann., sidered in possession against the plaintiff, and 263, which was a petitory suit to recover a tract it does not matter what irregularities were in of land and plantation claimed by the plaintiff the sheriff's proceedings in selling the prop- under a sheriff's sale, it was held that the sale erty, as Watson could not avail himself of them. was void because no actual seizure had been Without adverting to the other questions made. It appeared in that case, that the sheriff raised by the defendant, we are of opinion that did no more than go on the plantation, read the the court erred in declining to allow the objec-writ to the parties, and give them notice of seiztion as to the want of seizure under the execu-ure, without doing anything else to indicate a tion. The law of Louisiana seems to us very clearly to require an actual seizure in the country parishes. The Parishes of Orleans and Jefferson are an exception, and that very exception makes the existence of the rule in other parishes more clear and distinct. The Act of 1857 declares that in the Parishes of Jefferson and Orleans "the registry in the mortgage office shall be deemed and considered as the seizure and possession by the sheriff of the property there. in described, and it shall be unnecessary to appoint a keeper thereof." This Act is itself constructive of the force and effect of the general law. That law (Code Pract., art. 642) prescribes the form of the writ of fieri facias, which must command the sheriff to seize the property of the debtor. Article 643 declares that "as soon as the sheriff has received this writ he must execute it without delay by seizing the property of the debtor." The code then goes on to direct the sheriff as to further proceeding. He must give notice to the debtor to appoint an appraiser, etc. Article 656 declares that "When the sheriff seizes houses or lands he must take at the same time all the rents, issues and revenue which this property may yield." Article 657 says, if it be land or a plantation which he has taken, unless the same be leased or rented, it

seizure. The court said: "Under the sheriff's
sale, we think, the plaintiff did not acquire ti-
tle, because it was never taken into the posses-
sion of the sheriff and, therefore, that he can-
not maintain his petitory action. It has fre-
quently been decided that a sheriff's sale, with-
out a valid seizure, confers no title." Williams
v. Clark, 11 La. Ann., 761; Monticon v. Mullen,
12 La. Ann., 275; Mille v. Hebert, 19 La. Ann.,
58; Kilbourne v. Frellsen, 22 La. Ann., 207;
Crane v. Quinn, 23 La. Ann., 512.

*The case of Corse v. Stafford, it is [*128
true, arose under an order of seizure and sale.
But the same rule was held by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana in 1856, in the case of Wil-
liams v. Clark, supra, with regard to sales un-
der fieri facias. The plaintiff in that case
claimed the land in question under a sheriff's
sale made by virtue of a fieri facias issued on a
judgment upon an attachment; and, whilst the
judgment was held void on account of a defec-
tive citation, and of the fact that the attach-
ment was set aside, the sale was also held void,
because "No valid seizure was made of the prop-
erty adjudicated. The defendant," say the
court "at the date of the constructive seizure.
and ever since, has been in actual possession of
the property; no attempt was made to dispos-

[ocr errors]

sess him. The defendant cannot be held to a constructive notice of an invalid seizure. A purchaser at a sheriff's sale, made without a previous seizure, acquires nothing, at least against a third party in possession."

These are cases where the validity of the sale was assailed in a collateral proceeding. Instances are still more numerous in which actions of nullity have been sustained on the same ground. See, amongst others, cases before cited; and see Kilbourne v. Frellsen, supra.

been plausibility in this objection; though under the Louisiana practice it would be very doubtful. But the return was incomplete and presents no record evidence of the [*130 sheriff's acts. We think the return under the circumstances was, at least, traversable, and that it was properly shown that no actual seizure of the property in dispute was ever made by the sheriff.

The judgment must be reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.

THE SPRINGFIELD FIRE & MA- [*158
RINE INSURANCE COMPANY OF MAS-
SACHUSETTS, Plff. in Err.,

That the person in possession should be actually turned out of possession, in order to constitute a valid seizure, is not understood to be necessary. But, under the rulings of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, it does seem to be necessary that there should be some taking of possession more than a mere constructive taking; perhaps a yielding to the sheriff's demand. SIDNEY W. SEA, for the use of Daniel K. and a consent to hold under him, on the part of the person in possession, is all that is required.

As this is a pure question of local law, we feel bound to follow the decisions of the highest court of Louisiana on the subject; and, according to those decisions, it seems clear that there was no valid seizure in this case.

We think, therefore, that for the failure to make any actual seizure of the land, the sale

was void.

[blocks in formation]

The pact de non alienando relieved the plaintiff from the necessity of making Watson a party to his action; but it did not relieve him from the necessity of pursuing the forms of law in making a compulsory sale.

This very question arose in a recent case, in which the Supreme Court of Louisiana say: "We concur with the plaintiff, that the insertion in the act of mortgage of the pact de non alienando does not invest the mortgage creditor with the right to disregard the forms of law in making the forced alienation of his debtor's property.

v.

Pearson.

(See S. C., 21 Wall., 158-162.)

On trial by the court, what questions reviewable -review of evidence of the law-bill of exceptions-errors assigned-questions of fact -insufficient exception.

1. Under the Act passed in 1824, authorizing the general, only such rulings of the court in the progtrial of issues of fact by the courts, if the finding be ress of the trial can be reviewed as are presented by bill of exceptions, or as may arise upon the pleadings.

2. In such case a bill of exceptions cannot be used to bring up the whole testimony for review, any more than in a trial by jury.

3. If the parties desire a review of the law involved in the case, they must either get the court to make a special finding which raises the legal propositions, or they must present to the court their propositions of law and require a ruling on

them.

4. Objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or to such ruling on the propositions of law as the party may ask, must appear by bill of exceptions.

5. Where no errors are assigned upon the rulings of the court admitting testimony, the exceptions to those rulings are not before this court.

necessarily involved the determination of questions 6. Finding of issues for the plaintiff, which

of fact, cannot be reviewed here.

Exceptions, to be of any avail, must present distinctly and specifically the ruling objected to. The words "exceptions allowed" at the end of a bill of exceptions, is not sufficient.

[No. 99.]

The advantage of this clause Submitted Dec. 4, 1874. Decided Dec. 14, 1874.

is to save the mortgage creditor the necessity

States for the Northern District of Illinois. Suit was brought upon a policy of insurance by the defendant in error, in the Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, and transferred upon petition of the defendant to the court below, in which judgment was given for the plaintiff; whereupon the defendant sued out this writ of

of resorting to the delays of the hypothecaryIN ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United action. He can proceed to enforce his mortgage directly against his mortgage debtor, with out reference to the transferee of that debtor. But still the transferee is subrogated to his vendor's right by virtue of the purchase, and has sufficient interest in the object of the contract of mortgage to sue to annul the sale, if the forms of law have not been complied with by the mortgage creditor of his vendor in making the forced sale." Villa Palma v. Abat, 21 La. Ann., 11.

error.

The case is sufficiently stated by the court. Messrs. W. H. Swift, W. C. Grant and Jno. H. Thompson, for plaintiff in error. Messrs. S. V. Niles, Enoch Totten and

By the same reason, and according to the cases above cited, he has the right in a collater-H. G. Spafford, for defendant in error.

al proceeding, to set up, by way of defense, the failure to follow those forms.

It has been suggested that the defendant could not go behind the sheriff's return to the writ of fieri facias. Had this return been duly authenticated by the sheriff's signature, as required by the code, perhaps there might have

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action upon a policy of insurance. On the trial a jury was waived and the cause submitted to the court under the provisions of the Act of March 5, 1865, 13 Stat. at L., 501. The plea was the general issue, with a

stipulation by the parties that the defendant | deemed important by this court "to settle the might offer any and every matter in evidence under it with the like effect as though such matters had been specially pleaded.

There was a general finding for the plaintiff, and judgment accordingly.

At the trial a bill of exceptions was taken which embodied all the evidence. Several exceptions were entered to the rulings of the court upon the admission of testimony, but no one of these rulings is assigned here for error.

At the close of the testimony, the defendant made the following objections to the finding of the issues for the plaintiffs:

1. That the plaintiff's title was a conditional or equitable title and not an absolute one, at 159*] the time the policy was *issued, and that there was such a concealment of the kind of title he possessed as to vitiate the policy.

2. That the conveyance of one of the houses and lots to Mrs. Sea after the making of the policy and before the loss, without the consent or knowledge of the plaintiff, vitiated the policy, 3. That, in the proofs, the plaintiff had stated falsely that the property was his, when in fact one of the houses and lots belonged to his wife, and thereby the policy was rendered void. And the defendants claimed as evidence of the fraud, that the plaintiff, in sending a copy of the contract to the defendant, had omitted from the copy sent, the indorsement of memorandum on it showing that one lot had been transferred to Mrs. Sea.

4. That immediately after the fire, notice of the loss was not given as required by the policy, to the defendant.

But the court held and decided:

1. That plaintiff had an insurable interest in the property, notwithstanding he had not the absolute title, and that there was no such concealment of his actual interest or title as to vitiate the policy.

2. That, however it might be as to the lot and building actually conveyed to Mrs. Sea, the fact of such conveyance did not render invalid the policy of insurance as to the other houses, though not communicated to the defendant.

3. That it did not appear from the evidence that in his proofs of loss the plaintiff had, willfully or intentionally, falsely stated the title or his interest in the property; that he might have regarded it all as his in one sense, though the title to one lot was in his wife.

4. That the Company had waived any right it might originally have had, to insist upon the fact that notice in writing, of loss, was not immediately communicated to the Company.

At the end of the bill of exceptions, and immediately preceding the signature of the judge, are the words "exceptions allowed," without anything to indicate specially what was excepted to.

It is assigned for error that the court erred in 160*] ruling *upon each and all of the four points made upon the trial, as stated above.

Much protracted litigation attended the settlement of mere questions of practice under the Act passed in 1824, 4 Stat. at L., 62, authorizing the trial of issues of fact by the courts of the United States, with the consent of parties, in Louisiana. To avoid a like experience under the Act of 1865, 13 Stat. at L., 501, it was

practice under it at an early day with a precision and distinctness that could not be misunderstood," and to "require in all cases, where the parties saw fit to avail themselves of the privileges of the Act, a reasonably strict compliance with its provisions." Flanders v. Tweed, 9 Wall., 430, 19 L. ed., 680. Accordingly, as early as 1869, in the case of Norris v. Jackson, 9 Wall., 125, 19 L. ed., 608, after a very careful examination of the provisions of the Act, the following construction was given to it:

1. If the finding be general, only such rulings of the court in the progress of the trial can be reviewed as are presented by bill of exceptions, or as may arise upon the pleadings.

2. In such case a bill of exceptions cannot be used to bring up the whole testimony for review any more than in a trial by jury.

3. That if the parties desire a review of the law involved in the case, they must either get the court to make a special finding which raises the legal propositions, or they must present to the court their propositions of law and require a ruling on them.

4. That objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or to such ruling on the propositions of law as the party may ask, must appear by bill of exceptions.

The construction of the statute and the prac tice under it have also been brought to the attention of the court in Basset v. *U. S., [*161 9 Wall., 40, 19 L. ed., 549; Copelin v. Ins. Co., 9 Wall., 467, 19 L. ed., 741; Coddington v. Richardson, 10 Wall., 516, 19 L. ed., 981; Miller v. Ins. Co., 12 Wall., 295, 20 L. ed., 400; Ins. Co. v. Folsom, 18 Wall., 237, 21 L. ed., 827; Town of Ohio v. Marcy, 18 Wall., 552, 21 L. ed., 813; Cooper v. Omohundro, ante, 47; Crews v. Brewer, ante, 63; and it can certainly be said that in no one of these cases has there been any relaxation of the rules originally announced.

The practice having thus been distinctly and positively settled, it remains to consider its application to this case.

As no errors are assigned upon the rulings of the court admitting testimony, the exceptions to those rulings are not now before us.

No distinct proposition of law was in form presented to the court for adjudication and a ruling upon it asked. But by the stipulation of the parties the general issue was converted into all the appropriate special pleas that could be devised, with such subsequent pleadings as were required to present all the issues of law or fact that might properly be brought into the case.

The first, third and fourth objections urged by the defendant against the finding of the issues for the plaintiff necessarily involved the determination of questions of fact. These were found against the defendant. That finding cannot be reviewed here. The action of the circuit court to that extent is final.

In the second objection it was insisted that the conveyance of one of the houses and lots to Mrs. Sea after the making of the policy and before the loss, without the consent of the defendant, vitiated the whole policy. As to this, the court held that, however it might be as to the lot and building actually conveyed to Mrs. Sea, the fact of such conveyance did not render invalid the policy of insurance as to the other

N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the Unit

houses, though not communicated to the de-ed States for the Northern District of Flor

fendant.

ida.

Suit was brought in the court below by the defendants in error for the purchase price of a certain railroad bridge. Judgment having been given in their favor, the defendant sued out this

The case is fully stated by the court. Mr. William M. Merrick, for plaintiff in error:

If the special exception, in proper form, had been taken to this ruling, we might possibly have been inclined to hold, under the stipulation in the case as to the pleadings, that it 162*] *was equivalent to a special finding of the conveyance to Mrs. Sea, and a judgment not-writ of error. withstanding in favor of the plaintiff for the value of the remaining houses covered by the policy. But there was no such exception. The words are "exceptions allowed." That is all. There is nothing specific. Everything is general. If the exception amounts to anything it covers the whole record. Such a practice never has been, and ought not to be, sanctioned by this court. Exceptions, to be of any avail, must present distinctly and specifically the ruling objected to. Young v. Martin, 8 Wall., 354, 19 L. ed., 418.

A case ought not to be left in such a condition after a trial, that the defeated party may hunt through the record and, if he finds an unsuspected error attach it to a general exception and thus obtain a reversal of the judgment upon a point that may never have been brought to the attention of the court below. Such a result might follow if the form of exception here adopted should be allowed. We are not inclined to depart from a rule which has so long been recognized here, and which has been found so beneficial to litgants as well as the court. The judgment is affirmed.

[blocks in formation]

The rule of damages in recoupment as sanctioned by Cilley v. Tenny, 31 Vt., 401, and Abbott v. Gatch, 13 Md., 334; Dermott v. Jones, 2 Wall., 7, 17 L. ed., 764; Clifford v. Richardson, 18 Vt., 620; 2 Pars. Cont., 458, et seq., fully supports the offer of testimony as made in the court below.

Whatever may have been the defects in the pier of the bridge, it having been completed under the direct supervision of the plaintiff's agent and according to his directions, it was adopted by him as sufficient, and that adoption was directly within the range of his agency as the superintendent of the construction of the bridge. Having through their agents accepted it as sufficient and acted upon that acceptance, at a time when, if any defect in the pier existed, it could have been remedied at the most trivial expense, it does not now lie in their mouth to make an objection which they clearly waived and took the risk of at the time.

See Dermott v. Jones, supra, and the New Jersey case therein cited.

Mr. John H. B. Latrobe, for defendants in error:

The evidence, on both sides, is referred to as showing that the difficulty was owing to a defect in the pier. It was to this point that the

C. SHALER SMITH and Charles H. Latrobe. testimony on both sides was addressed. It was

(See S. C., 21 Wall., 255-264.)

Recoupment for defects in building a structure, and for damages-exception, when available to refusal of interrogatory-insufficient excuse for defect in building.

1. All damages directly arising from the imper

fect character of a structure contracted to be built, may be proved against a demand for its price.

2. A party is not required to pay, for imperfect and defective work, the price stipulated for a perfect structure; and when that price is demanded, he may deduct the difference between that and the value of the inferior work, and also the amount of any direct damages caused by existing defects, not exceeding the demand of the plaintiffs.

3. To render an exception available in this court, it must affirmatively appear that the ruling excepted to affected or might have affected the decision of the case.

4. If the exception is to the refusal of an interrogatory, the record must show that the answer related to a material matter involved; or, if no answer was given, the record must show the offer of the party to prove by the witness particular facts, and that such facts were material.

5. The right of defendant to set up damages sustained by way of recoupment exists in all cases where an action is brought upon a building con

tract.

6. Where plaintiffs contracted to build a railroad

bridge, and a pier was built under their supervision, they cannot excuse imperfections in the bridge by reason of defects in the pier.

[No. 77.]

a pure question of fact referred to the jury by the judge's charge, and the finding of the jury as to the fact is conclusive.

The offers of testimony which the court rejected, related to the cause of the defective working of the draw, and all of it might have been admitted without affecting the question submitted to the jury.

The defect in the turning of the bridge was due to the defect in the pier.

But, says the plaintiff in error, even admitting this, it was the duty of the defendants in error, or, at least, it was one that they assumed, to see that the pier was level before they placed their work upon it, and they referred to the testimony that Grant, the agent of the defendants in error, superintended the laying of the coping.

The most that this testimony shows that Grant did, was to offer a suggestion in regard to the setting of the coping so as to protect the pier.

But, supposing that Grant did more, and superintended the work, without authority from the defendants in error, his act cannot affect them, and there is no evidence that he had any such authority.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court:

In November, 1866, the plaintiffs, Smith and Argued Nov. 19, 20, 1874. Decided Dec. 14, Latrobe, entered into a contract with the Florida Railroad Company to construct for that 513

1874.

« ForrigeFortsett »