modifications thereof, which have been or shall be made by the Secretary of the Treasury and approved by the President, for conducting the commercial intercourse which has been or shall be licensed and permitted by the President, with and in States declared in insurrection, shall, after satisfying therefrom all nec 97*1 essary *expenses, to be approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, be paid into the Treasury of the United States; and ail accounts of moneys received or expended in connection therewith shall be audited by the proper accounting oflicers of the Treasury." Here the regulations in question are referred to by name and date, and the money accruing under their operation (the great bulk of which was derived from the bonus on cotton) was di rected to be paid into the Treasury. It is designated by the term "fees," it is true, but that was the designation, used in the regulations themselves. It will be observed that the law was prospective, relating to moneys thereafter to be received, as well as to those already received. This was clearly an implied recognition and ratification of the regulations, so far as any ratification on the part of Congress may have been necessary to their validity. It is hardly necessary, under the view we have taken of the character of the regulations in question and of the charge or bonus objected to by the plaintiffs, to discuss the question of the constitutionality of the Act or July 13, 1861, regarded as authorizing such regulations. As before stated, the power of the government to impose such conditions upon commercial intercourse with an enemy in time of war as it sees fit, is undoubted. It is a power which every other government in the world claims and exercises, and which belongs to the Government of the United States as incident to the power to declare war and to carry it on to a successful termination. We regard the regulations in question as nothing more than the exercise of this power. It does not belong to the same category as the power to levy and collect taxes, duties and excises. It belongs to the war powers of the government, just as much so as the power to levy military contributions or to perform any other belligerent act. We perceive no error in the record, and the judgment of the Circuit Court must be affirmed. SAMUEL MCCLELLAN et al., Appts., บ. THE UNITED STATES. Appeal from the Court of Claims. This case is substantially decided by the judgment just rendered in the case of Hamil ton v. Dillin, [next preceding]. It is conceded that the payments of four cents per pound on cotton, sought to be recovcred in this suit, were made under and in pursuance of the license of the President and the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, whose validity was considered in that case. The demurrer to the petition was rightly sustained, and the judgment of the Court of Claims must be affirmed. IRA G. FRENCH, Plff. in Err., v. THOMAS EDWARDS et al. (See S. C., 21 Wall., 147-151.) When a reconveyance from trustees will be presumed-proof of reconveyance, when unneces sary. 1. Where one conveyed certain lands to trustees for certain purposes, the deed to become void by its terms if a certain railroad was not completed within one year from its date; held, in an action of ejectment by the grantors against persons in possession, began more than eight years after the time limited when the deed, upon the contingency mentioned was to become void, and when the trust was impossible to be performed, a reconveyance of the premises by the trustees to the grantor will be presumed in equity and at law. 2. The trustees being bound to reconvey, it is to be presumed they discharged that duty, rather than that they violated it by continuing to hold on to the title. 3. It is not necessary that the presumption should rest upon the basis of proof that the conveyance had in fact been executed. It is made because right and justice require it. 4. In a case tried by the court, where the fact of the conveyance was found, and that the title was still in the trustees is stated as a conclusion of law, that conclusion is a manifest error. 5. It should have been presumed that the trustees had reconveyed, and that the title had thus become re-invested in the plaintiff, and the court should have adjudged accordingly. Police Jury v. Reeves, 6 Mart. (N. S.), 221; Hayden v. Stoughton, 5 Pick., 528. On failure of the only condition upon which the estate could be continued, and upon failure of which the trust was to determine, the Stat ute of Uses executed the trust in favor of the party entitled to the use. title in the grantors; for although the conveyNo conveyance was necessary to revest the ance is to the trustees and their heirs, they took under the deed that quantity of interest only which the purposes of the trust required, and as the railroad was not completed within the time limited therefor, the legal estate did not continue in the trustees beyond the period of two years. Doe v. Considine, 6 Wall., 471, 18 L. ed., 873; Doe v. Nicholls, 1 Barn. & C., 336; Doe v. Edlin, 4 Ad. & El., 589. Messrs. Delos Lake and J. H. McKune, for defendant in error: The deed to Martin and Lynch conveyed an estate in præsenti. The condition of the deed is a condition subsequent, for a breach of which the grantors have a right of re-entry, but until re-entry or equivalent acts, the estate remains in the grantee. er, 1 Conn., 79; Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick., 283; Willard v. Henry, 2 N. H., 120; Bowen v. Bowen, 18 Conn., 538; Sperry v. Sperry, 8 N. H., 477; Tallman v. Snow, 35 Me., 342; 1 Greenl. Cruise, Real Prop., 32 (marg. p.) Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court: This is a writ of error from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California. The plaintiff in error was the plaintiff in the court below. The action was ejectment. The case was submitted to the court without the in tervention of a jury. The court found the facts and gave judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff thereupon sued out this writ of error. The facts found were: (1) That Robert H. Vance, on the 1st of March, 1862, was seised in fee of the premises in controversy. It appears that the trust deed to Martin and Lynch was executed on the 9th of January, 1863. By its term it was to become void if the railroad was not completed within one year from its date. This suit was begun on the 30th of November, 1872, more than eight years after the time limited when the deed, upon the contingency mentioned, was to lose its efficacy. The court found that the road had not been begun. and that the company had not been incorporated. There is nothing in the record indicat ing that either event will ever occur. It was found that the plaintiff had a perfect title when the trust deed was executed. therefore, took their entire title from him. It is The grantees, a corollary that the other grantors had nothing to convey. Their joining in the deed, so far as the title was concerned, was matter of form and not of substance. Without incorporation, the railroad company could not share in the ap (2) That, on that day he conveyed the prem-pointment of the committee under whose direcises to the plaintiff, who thereupon became seised and the owner in fee, and that he continued such owner until the 9th of January, 1863. (3) That on that day he and the defendants executed a joint conveyance of the premises to Edward Martin and Francis E. Lynch, their 148*] heirs and assigns forever, upon *certain trusts which, so far as it is necessary to state them, were as follows: The grantees were to hold and convey the premises in lots of such size and for such prices as should be directed by a committee of four persons or a majority of them, the committee to be appointed by the parties to the deed and a railroad company then forming, and thereafter to be incorporated, to construct a railroad leading from Sutteville and connecting with the Sacramento Valley Railroad. Lt was "Provided, further, that no conveyance shall be made by the said party of the second part until the said railroad shall have been commenced in good faith as aforesaid; and this conveyance shall be void if such railroad shall not be built within one year from the date of these presents; provided, however, that if the iron for such railroad shall be lost or detained on its transit from the Atlantic States, from any accident, then the time for completing said railroad shall be extended to two years instead of one year." (4) The railroad company was never incorporated, and the railroad was never commenced. (5) The defendants were in exclusive possession of the premises at the commencement of the action, holding adversely to the plaintiff and all other persons. The court held that the legal title was vested in Martin and Lynch by the deed of the 9th January, 1863, was still vested in them, and that the plaintiff could not, therefore, recover. The case was formerly before this court in another shape. French v. Edwards, 13 Wall., 506, 20 L. ed., 702. Upon this occasion it has been argued elaborately upon the doctrine of subsequent conditions broken. 149*] *We have not found it necessary to consider that subject. Another ground of decision is disclosed, which we think free from difficulty and upon which we are satisfied to place our judgment. tion the lots were to be sold and the proceeds were to be distributed. Hence there could be no sale, and the trustees were powerless to do anything but remain passive and hold the title. The object of the conveyance had wholly failed, and the trust was impossible to be performed. The trust thus became barren. One more dry and naked could not exist. It was the plain duty of the trustees to reconvey to their grantor. He was the sole cestui que trust, and had the exclusive beneficial right to the property. A court of equity, if applied to, could not have hesitated to compel a reconveyance. Under these circumstances such reconveyance will be presumed in equity and at law as well. In Lade v. Holford, Bull. N. P., 110, Lord Mansfield said that when trustees ought to convey to the beneficial owner he *would leave it to [*150 the jury to presume, where such presumption might reasonably be made, that they had conveyed accordingly, "In order to prevent a just title from being defeated by a matter of form." This case was approved and the doctrine applied by Lord Kenyon in England v. Slade, 4 T. R., 682. Three things must concur to warrant the presumption: (1) It must have been the duty of the trustee to convey. (2) There must be sufficient reason for the presumption. (3) The object of the presumption must be the support of a just title. Hill, Tr., Bisph., 394. The case must be clearly such that a court of equity, if called upon, would decree a reconveyance. The present case is with these categories. The trustees being bound to reconvey, it is to be presumed they discharged that duty, rather than that they violated it by continuing to hold on to the title. The trust was executory. When its execution became impossible, common honesty, their duty, and the law required that they should at once give back to the donor the legal title which he had given to them. It is not necessary that the presumption should rest upon a basis of proof or conviction that the conveyance had in fact been executed. It is made because right and justice require it. It never arises where the actual conveyance would involve a breach of duty by the trustee or wrong to others. Like the doctrine of relation it is applied only to promote the ends of justice, never to defeat them. Hillary v. Waller, 12 Ves., 252; Best, Pres., 112. The rule is firmly established in the Englis law. Langley v. Sneyd, 1 Sim. & Stu., 55; Hil lary v. Waller, supra; Goodson v. Ellisson, Russ., 588; Doe v. Sybourn, 7 T. R., 3; Angier v. Stannard, 3 Myl. & K. 571; Carteret v. Pas chal, 3 P. Wms., 198. It is equally well settled in American jurisprudence. Doe v. Campbell. 10 Johns., 475; Jackson v. Moore, 13 Johns.. 513; Moore v. Jackson, 4 Wend., 62; Aikin v. Smith, 1 Sneed, 104; Washb. Real Prop., 415 and n. Properly guarded in its application, the principle is a salutary one. It prevents circuity of action, with its delays and expense, quiets possessions and gives repose and security to titles. Sir William Grant said: "Otherwise 151*] *titles must forever remain imperfect, and in many respects unavailable, when, from length of time, it has become impossible to discover in whom the legal estate, if outstanding, is actually vested. What ought to have been done, should be presumed to have been done. When the purpose is answered for which the legal estate is conveyed, it ought to be reconveyed." Hillary v. Waller, [supra.] If it had been one of the facts found by the court below that the title was still in the trusteesthe case would have presented a different aspect. Goodtitle v. Jones, 7 T. R., 43; Roe v. Reade, 8 T. R., 122; Matthews v. Ward, 10 Gill & J., 456. It is stated only as a conclusion of law, arising upon the facts found. Such findings of facts are regarded in this court in the light of special verdicts. "If a special verdict on a mixed queston of fact and law, find facts from which the court can draw clear conclusions, it is no objection to the verdict that the jury themselves have not drawn such conclusions, and stated them as facts in the case." Monkhouse v. Hay, 8 Price, 256. The presumption of the reconveyance arises here, with the same effect upon the specific findings, as if it had been expressly set forth as one of the facts found. The conclusion of law, that the title was still in the trustees, was, therefore, a manifest error. On the contrary, it should have been presumeu that Martin and Edwards had reconveyed, and that the title had thus become re-invested in the plaintiff, and the court should have adjudged accordingly. The judgment is, therefore, reversed, and the case will be remanded to the Circuit Court with directions to proceed in conformity to this opinion. ment against the estates of deceased persons in the ourse of administration in the States, contrary to he declared law of the State on the subject. 3. The administration laws of a State will be oberved by the Federal Courts in the enforcement of individual rights. 4. On a judgment in a Federal Court against an administrator, the real estate of the intestate canot be sold. contrary to the laws of the State upon that subject. [No. 98.] Submitted Dec. 4, 1874. I Decided Jan. 11, 1875. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Arkansas. Suit was brought in the Circuit Court of Arkansas, by the plaintiff in error, for certain · land. The defendants denied plaintiff's title thereto, and claimed to hold it under authority of Mr. William Lavender, as administrator of A. B. C. Du Bose, deceased. The plaintiff claimed it under an execution sale upon a judgment rendered in the Circuit Court of the United States in favor of one Gautier against Halliburton, a former administrator of Du Bose. Judgment having been given for the defendants, the plaintiff took an appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which adjudged "That the sale made by the Marshal of the United States Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, of the land in controversy, under an execution against the administrator of Alfred B. C. Du Bose, deceased, issued out of the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, was void for the want of power in said court to issue said process against the estate of a deceased person, and in such manner to interfere with the regular administration of such estate in the proper courts of the State, and that the Marshal's deed to the land in controversy, offered in evidence in the court by the appellant, afforded no evidence of title to the land in controversy, for the reason aforesaid." Thereupon the plaintiff sued out this writ of error. The case is further stated by the court. Mr. U. M. Rose, for plaintiff in error: In Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet., 75, in speaking of the Judiciary Act, the court said: “It was certainly intended to give to suitors having a right to sue in the circuit court, remedies coextensive with their rights." In Hyde v. Stone, 20 How., 175, 15 L. ed., 875, the court said: "The courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment, and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They 27ỏ*] *THOMAȘ D. W. YONLEY, Plff. in Err., | cannot abdicate their authority or duty u any v. WILLIAM D. LAVENDER et al. (See S. C., 21 Wall., 276-284.) State control over estates of deceased persons state law imperative on Federal Courts-sale of real estate. 1. The several States of the Union have full control over the estates of deceased persons within their respective limits. case in favor of another jurisdiction." See, also, Boyle v. Zacharie, 6 Pet., 658; Shelby v. Bacon, 10 How., 70. In Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wneat., 23, the exhausted by the rendition of its judgment, but court said: "The jurisdiction of a court is not continues until the judgment shall be satisfied." The case of Bank v. Halstead, 10 Wheat., 53; repeats the same thing. In Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat., 280, the 2. The United States courts cannot execute judg- safeguard of a tribunal which cannot be concourt says that the Constitution provides "The NOTE. -Adoption by Federal courts of remedies created by state statutes-see note, 18 L. R. A., 266. State laws as rules of decision in Federal courts -see notes, 11 C. C. A. 71; 29 C. C. A. 553. trolled by the state laws, in the application of the remedy." See, also, U. S. v. Knight, 14 Pet., 316; Beers v. Haughton, 9 Pet., 362. In McNutt v. Bland, 2 How., 17, the court says: "From the time of Palmer v. Allen, 7 | Cranch, 554, to Duncan v. Darst, 1 How., 301. the language and decisions of this court have been uniform for more than forty years, that a state law which is ‘a peculiar municipal regulation, not having any immediate relation to the progress of a suit, but imposing a restraint on state officers in the execution of the process of the courts, is altogether inoperative upon the officers of the United States in the execution of the mandates which issue to them.'" All state laws regulating proceedings affecting insolvent persons, or that are addressed to state courts or magistrates in other respects, which confer peculiar powers on such courts and magistrates, do not bind the Federal Courts, because they have no power to execute such laws. Duncan v. Darst, I How., 306; Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet., 74; S. P.; see, also, McKim v. Voorhies, 7 Cranch, 279. In Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall., 429, 19 L. ed., 261, the question would seem to be set at rest. The question is examined elsewhere with a degree of learning and ability which renders an extended argument in this brief quite unnec essary. See, 1 Am. Law Rev., p. 23; Dupuy v. Bemiss, 2 La. Ann., 513. Mr. A. H. Garland, for defendant in error: The Congress of the United States has never yet undertaken to pass laws regulating the administration of estates, but the States have full control over estates of deceased persons within their respective limits. The administration law of Arkansas (see Gould's Digest, p. 100, et seq.) provides amply for all these matters; gives a certain time in which estates are to be administered; provides how claims snall be classified and paid; how debts can be collected against such estates through her probate courts, and gives remedies alike to resident and non-resident creditors, making no distinctions whatever as to these. place the whole estate, real and personal, with If it Hornor v. Hanks, 22 Ark., 572; Yonley v. Lavender, 27 Ark., 252. Such being the law of the State in respect to judgments obtained against the estates of deceased persons in the courts of the State, the inquiry is, whether a different rule is to be applied to judgments of the Federal Courts. The question arises in this manner: August Gautier, a citizen of Louisiana, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas, against the administrator of one Du Bose, deceased, obtained juagment against him, and at a sale under execution issued on this judgment, the plaintiff in error, who seems to have been the attorney of record, bought certain lands belonging to the estate of Du Bose, situate in ArkanThe argument that, because the United States sas County. These proceedings took place sevCourt rendered the judgment it had the inher-eral years after the administration of Du Bose's ent power to enforce it, is met directly by the suggestion that this general power must give way before another already holding and controlling the whole subject. The argument, that the United States Courts furnish remedies to non-residents regardless of state laws, is answered at once when it is seen that the state law, through her cots, in this respect, gives the remedy to the non-resident, as speedy and effectual as could be had in the United States Courts, and in a matter over which the State must necessarily have jurisdiction. estate had commenced, and while it was being carried on in Arkansas County, under the administration laws of the State. Shortly after the plaintiff in error purchased, he brought an All the authorities upon this subject were re-action of ejectment in the proper state court, to viewed by the Supreme Court of Arkansas, in dispossess the administrator, which resulted a masterly and acceptable opinion, in Hornor adversely to him, and the Supreme Court of the v. Hanks, 22 Ark., 572, and in Yonley v. Lav- State, on appeal, affirmed the judgment of the ender, 27 Ark., 252. lower court. It is to revise this judgment that the present writ of error is brought. We see no ground on which the validity of the sale in question can be sustained. To sustain it would be in effect to nullify the administration laws of the State by giving to creditors out of the State greater privileges in the distribution of estates than creditors in the State enjoy. It is easy to see, if the non-resident creditor, by suing in the Federal Courts of Arkansas, acquires a right to subject the assets of the estate to seizure and sale for the satisfaction of his Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of the court: The several States of the Union necessarily have full control over the estates of deceased persons within their respective limits. In Arkansas, the probate of wills and the grant of letters testamentary and of administration, are matters entirely within the jurisdiction of the probate court. The legal effect of granting letters testamentary or of administration, is to debt, which he could not do by suing in the | has jurisdiction only over the estate of a deState Court, that the whole State, in case there ceased person in case it turns out to be insolvwere foreign creditors, might be swept away. ent, when it audits the claims against the estate, Such a result would place the judgments of the directs the sale of the property, and distributes Federal Court on a higher grade than the judg the proceeds equally among all the creditors. ments of the State Court, necessarily produce Before the adjudication of insolvency by the Orconflict, and render the State powerless in a phans' Court, Benedict had obtained a judg matter over which she has confessedly full con- ment against Williams, the administrator of one trol. Besides this it would give to the contract Baldwin, in the District Court for the Northof a foreign creditor made in Arkansas a wider ern District of Mississippi, and levied an execuscope than a similar contract made in the same tion on property upon which the judgment State by the same debtor with a home creditor. would have been a lien if the estate had not The home creditor would have to await the due been insolvent. On a bill filed by the adminiscourse of administration for the payment of his trator to enjoin the execution, it was insisted, debt, while the foreign creditor could, as soon among other things, that the proceedings in the as he got his judgment, seize and sell the estate Orphans' Court were no bar to the proceedings of his debtor to satisfy it, and this, too, when in the United States Court, and so the district the laws of the State in force when both con- judge thought, but this court held otherwise, tracts were made provided another mode for the and decided "that the jurisdiction of the Orcompulsory payment of the debt. Such a dif- phans' Court had attached to the assets; that ference is manifestly unjust and cannot be sup- they were in gremio legis, and could not be ported. There is no question here about the seized by process from another court." And regulation of process by the State to the in- the court says that "If the marshal were perjury of the party suing in the Federal Court. mitted to seize them under an execution, it 280*] *The question is, whether the United would not only cause manifest injustice to be States Courts can execute judgment against the done to the rights of others, but be the occasion estates of deceased persons in the course of ad- of an unpleasant conflict between courts of ministration in the States, contrary to the de- separate and independent jurisdiction." clared law of the State on the subject. If they If the Orphans' Court of Mississippi, whose can, the rights of those interested in the estate jurisdiction attaches on the ascertained insolv who are citizens of the State where the admin-ency of an estate, is saved from the interference istration is conducted are materially changed, of another court, surely the Probate Court of and the limitation which governs them does not Arkansas, vested with jurisdiction on the death apply to the fortunate creditor who happens of the testator or intestate, whether the estate to be a citizen of another State. This cannot be solvent or insolvent, is entitled to equal probe so. The administration laws of Arkansas are not merely rules of practice for the courts, It is true that the court in Williams v. Benebut laws limiting rights of parties, and will be observed by the Federal Courts in the endict, supra, expressly reserve the question forcement of individual rights. These laws, on whether State Legislatures can in all cases the death of Du Bose and the appointment of compel foreign creditors to seek their remedy his administrator, withdrew the estate from against the estates of deceased persons in the the operation of the execution laws of the State State Courts, to the exclusion of the jurisdicand placed it in the hands of a trustee for the tion of the Federal Courts, but these remarks benefit of creditors and distributees. It was were made, not to express a doubt of the corthereafter in contemplation of law in the cus-rectness of the decision in the case before the tody of the Probate Court, of which the administrator was an officer, and during the progress of administration was not subject to seizure and sale by anyone. The recovery of judgment gave no prior lien on the property, but simply fixed the status of the party and compelled the administrator to recognize it in the payment of debts. It would be out of his power to perform the duties with which he was charged by law if the property intrusted to him by a court of competent jurisdiction could be taken from him and appropriated to the pay ment of a single creditor to the injury of all others. How can he account for the assets of the estate to the court from which he derived his authority, if another court can interfere and take them out of his hands? The lands in controversy were assets in the administrator's hands to pay all the debts of the estate, and the law prescribed the manner of their sale and the distribution of the proceeds. He held them for no other purpose, and it would be strange indeed if state power was not competent to regulate the mode in which the assets of a deceased person should be sold and distributed. This case falls within the principle decided 281*] by this court in Williams v. Benedict, 8 How., 107. In Mississippi the Orphans' Court tection. court, but to *guard the rights of suitors [*282 in the courts of the United States, if a case should arise where state legislation had discriminated against them. It is possible, though not probable, that state legislation on the subject of the estates of decedents might be purposely framed so as to discriminate injuriously against the creditor living outside of the State; but if this should unfortunately ever happen, the courts of the United States would find a way, in a proper case, to arrest the discrimination, and to enforce equality of privileges among all classes of claimants, even if the estate were seized by operation of law and confided to a particular jurisdiction. The legislation of Arkansas on this subject, instead of being unfriendly, is wise and just. All creditors are placed upon an equitable foundation, and judgments obtained in the courts of the United States have the same effect as judgments obtained in the courts of the State. The law simply places the assets beyond the reach of ordinary process, for the equal benefit of all persons interested in them, and all that is asked is that the construction of this law adopted by the state tribunals shall be the rule of decision in the Federal Courts. The Federal Court in Arkansas, in entertaining the suit of Gautier, |