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interests of the State upon the terms, conditions and restrictions expressed in the Act of Congress. The further conditions as to the completion of the road imposed by the State were conditions subsequent and not conditions precedent, as contended by the defendants. The terms in which the right is reserved by the Act of the State to resume the lands granted, imply what the previous language of the Act declares, that a present transfer was made and not one dependent upon conditions to be previously performed. The right is by them restricted to such lands as at the time of the resumption had not been previously disposed of. The resumption, therefore, of the grant by the failure of the first Company to complete the road did not impair the title to the lands, which the Act of Congress authorized to be sold in advance of such completion, and which were sold by that Company.

We are of opinion, therefore, that the plaintiff took a good title to the premises in controversy by his conveyance from that Company. The judgment of the court below is, therefore, affirmed.

WARREN MITCHELL, Appt.,

บ.

UNITED STATES.

(See S. C., 21 Wall., 350-353.) Contracts with enemy-between inhabitants of rebel States-domicil—change of domicil— what constitutes-void purchase of cotton.

1. During the late civil war, all contracts of the inhabitants of the loyal with the inhabitants of the disloyal States were illegal and void.

2. Contracts between the inhabitants of the rebel States, not in aid of the rebellion, were valid. 3. By the term "domicil," in its ordinary accept ation, is meant the place where a person lives and has his home.

4. A domicil, once acquired, is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed.

5. To constitute a new domicil, two things are indispensable: first, residence in the new locality; and, second, the intention to remain there. Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work the change.

6. That one who lived in a loyal State and went into a disloyal one during the late war, went there to take up his abode, is not to be presumed; the

presumption is the other way.

quired a valid title to the cotton by his purchase of it within the Confederate lines did, for the purposes of an appeal, decide that the petition should be dismissed.

Thereupon the petitioner took an appeal to this court.

The case is fully stated by the court. Messrs. John M. Harlan and B. H. Bristow, for appellant:

Had Mitchell upon his entering the Confederate lines in July, 1861, joined the rebel army and become the owner of this identical cotton, while he was endeavoring to overturn the Govcrnment of the Union, it could scarcely be doubted that under the present course of decisions, his right to recover the proceeds of the cotton could not be questioned.

Since the decisions in Armstrong v. U. S., 13 Wall., 154, 20 L. ed., 614; Pargoud v. U. S., 13 Wall., 156, 20 L. ed., 646, and U. S. v. Klein, 13 Wall., 128, 20 L. ed., 519, neither proof of loyalty nor of special executive pardon is necessary on behalf of claimant of the proceeds of captured and abandoned property. The Amnesty Proclamation of December 25, 1868, has wholly removed the obstacle of disloyalty. placed in the way of claimants of captured and abandoned property, by the Act of March 12, 1863. 12 Stat. at L., 820.

Was there anything in the conduct of Mitchell, as described in the findings of fact, or is there any principle announced in former decisions, which will preclude this court from granting to Mitchell what it would be constrained, under its former decisions, to grant him, had he joined the Confederate Army and become the owner of the cotton while he was seeking the destruction of the Union?

His military pass could not protect him in unlawful trading between the belligerent sections; but it did "protect him in going into the lines of the enemy."

McKee v. U. S., 8 Wall., 166, 19 L. ed., 331. It seems difficult to establish the absence of such authority in General Anderson, as the commander of a department; but whether h had or not such autory is, we think, wholly immaterial in this case. If he transcended his authority as department commander, that would only prove that Mitchell violated his duty in accepting the military pass and going into the Confederate lines. For that violation of duty he may have been punished if any punishment had been prescribed by law for such an offense. Clearly, however, that violation of duty did not, in its consequences, extend to and vitiate the various business transactions which he may have had, or the various purchases of property which he may have made, within the Confederate lines after taking up his residence there; transactions wholly within enemy's territory Decided Feb. 8, 1875. and exclusively with residents of that territory,

7. Among the circumstances usually relied upon to establish the animus manendi are declarations of the party; the exercise of political rights, the payment of personal taxes; a house of residence and a place of business.

8. All these indicia are wanting in the case of the claimant, who went, during the war, from a loyal State into a disloyal one, and there pure chased cotton. His purchase was void, and gave him no title against the United States who seized and confiscated it.

[No. 404.] Argued Jan. 26, 1875.

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involving in no way commercial intercourse or communication, by letter or otherwise, with the territory occupied by the Federal forces, and purchases so remote in time from the date of his entrance into Confederate territory that it is impossible to establish any necessary or direct connection between those purchases and the alleged violation of duty in going into the insurrectionary district as far back as July,

1861.

88 U. S.

Armstrong v. Toler, 11 Wheat., 258; Brooks | by persons then in loyal territory, was not only ▼. Martin, 2 Wall., 70, 17 L. ed. 732.

When Mitchell left Kentucky and went into the Confederate lines, taking up his residence there, transacting business, collecting debts and making purchases during the period of more than three years, he took the chances of war from that side.

The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253; The Bernon, 1 C. Rob., 102; The Citto, 3 Rob., 38; 1 Duer, Lect., 5, secs. 8, 9; Halleck, 508; 1 Duer, 500, 509. "Time is the grand ingredient in constituting domicil. In most cases it is unavoidably conclusive." "Be the occupation what it may, it cannot happen, with but few exceptions, that mere length of time shall not constitute a domicil."

Sir W. Scott in the case of The Harmony, 2 C. Rob., 324; Lawr. Wheat. Int. L., ed. of 1863, p. 560.

"A person having a house of commerce in the enemy's country, although actually resident in a neutral country, is treated as an enemy so far forth as that part of his business is concerned, or is domiciled there quoad hoc."

Woolsey, Int. L., sec. 168.

In harmony with these principles, this court, in Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall., 419, 17 L. ed. 919, said:

"All the people of each State or district in insurrection against the United States must be regarded as enemies, until, by the action of the Legislature, or the Executive, or otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and permanently changed.

"The national character of a trader is to be decided, for the purposes of the trade, by the national character of the place in which it is carried on. If a war breaks out, a foreign merchant carrying on trade in a belligerent country has a reasonable time allowed him for transferring himself and his property to another country. If he does not avail himself of the opportunity, he is to be treated, for the purposes of the trade, as a subject of the power under whose dominion he carries it on, and as an enemy of those with whom that power is at

war."

Lawr. Wheat., 574, n. 180.

not prohibited by statute or public law, but the right to do so has been too often upheld by the courts to admit of question.

When the Non-Intercourse Act describes what goods, chattels, wares and merchandise shall be forfeited to the United States for violations of its provisions, it does not refer to goods, chattels, wares or merchandise which may have been purchased within the enemy's lines, and not to be removed therefrom, but forfeits only all goods and chattels, wares and merchandise coming from said State or section into the United States, and all proceeding to such State or section.

These views are sustained by the case of U. S. v. Anderson, 9 Wall., 56, 19 L. ed. 615. At the same term of this court was decided the case of U. S. v. Grossmayer, 9 Wall., 72, 19 L. ed., 627, which was relied upon by the Government in the court below. But that case is not in conflict with the principle upon which we rest Mitchell's right to recover.

In that case direct communication was established during the war between Grossmayer in New York and Einstein in Georgia, for the purpose of having the latter remit to Grossmayer, across the lines, the money due him from Einstein, or invest it in cotton to be held for Grossmayer, domiciled in New York.

U. S. v. Lapene, 17 Wall., 602, 21 L. ed., 693, carefully examined, will not be found against us. After the capture of New Orleans, the clerk of the New Orleans firm, with the money delivered by Avegno, and with other moneys collected by him, his principal being then in New Orleans, within the Federal lines, made purchases of cotton for his principal in those portions of Louisiana which were then under Confederate control.

The broad language used in the Lapene case seems to have been based upon a paragraph in Woolsey's International Law, section 117. That U. S., 15 Wall., 400, 21 L. ed., 98, where the paragraph was referred to in Montgomery v. court virtually concede that the rule is stated too broadly by President Woolsey.

This court says:

Had the cotton purchased by Mitchell in No"It is true the sale was negotiated by agents vember and December, 1864, been shipped for of Johnson, living outside of the enemy's terriEurope and, while on the seas, been captured tory, but it was none the less his act because it by Federal cruisers, he would not have been was done by those acting under his authority. heard to say that he was domiciled elsewhere Nothing is clearer, says President Woolsey, than in the enemy's territory. The cotton than that all commercial transactions, of whatwould have been liable to capture by the cruis-ever kind, except ransom contracts, with the ers of his deserted country; and not only free from capture by the cruisers of the Southern Confederacy, his adopted country, but under their protection.

The Venus, 8 Cranch, 277; The Mary and Susan, 1 Wheat., 54.

Mitchell, therefore, being an enemy and having a domicil in the enemy's territory when he purchased the cotton in November and December, 1864, had the same rights, so far as the ports of the United States are concerned, to buy and sell within the Confederate lines that any other resident of the insurrectionary districts then had.

Trading by and between persons wholly within the Confederate lines, which did not in its prosecution require or involve intercourse across lines, or communication with or assent

subjects, or in the territory of the enemy, whether direct or indirect, as through an agent or partner who is neutral, are illegal and void. This is not inconsistent with the dotrine that a resident in the territory of one belligerent may have, in times of war, an agent residing in the territory of the other belligerent, to whom his debtor must pay the debt or deliver property in discharge of it. Such payments or deliveries involve no intercourse between enemies. The present case exhibits a transaction not wholly within enemy's territory, but a sale from an enemy to a friend. If that can be made through an agent, then the rule which prohibits commercial intercourse is a mere regulation of the mode of trade. Perhaps the rule is stated too broadly in Woolsey's Commentaries and in many elementary books; but

it is certain that 'Every kind of trading or commercial intercourse, whether by transmission of money, or of goods or orders for the delivery of either between two countries (at war) directly or indirectly, or through the intervention of third persons or partnerships, or by contracts in any form looking to or involv. ing such transmission,' are prohibited."

Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass., 576. We next invite attention to the case of ner v. U. S., 17 Wall., 517, 21 L. ed., 656, decided at the same term that U. S. v. Lapene

was.

the public Acts of the Government, even if the plantation was within the enemy's lines; and that the plaintiff upon the case reported is entitled to recover the unpaid rent and the value of the corn."

Messrs. Geo. H. Williams, Atty. Gen., and John Goforth, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee:

If Mitchell acquired a domicil within the inCut-surgent lines, his business there was legitimate, and he is entitled to recover; if not, his business there was illegitimate, and he is not entitled to recover.

This case is referred to for the purpose of showing that the contract was not held invalid because made in the territory of the enemy, but because when made one of the parties was an inhabitant of the insurrectionary district, while the other was domiciled in loyal territory, although acting, by an agent domiciled in the enemy's territory. It involved intercourse between the inhabitants of the two belligerent sections and, therefore, it was em braced by the Non-intercourse Act.

To have business intercourse with such an enemy across the lines was the intercourse which was intended to be forbidden by the Act of Congress. This is clear from the case of McKee v. U. S., 8 Wall., 166, 19 L. ed., 331, in which this court, after declaring “"that unlicensed business intercourse with an enemy during a time of war is not permitted," says: "Congress, therefore, in recognition of this principle, when it declared on the 13th of July, 1861, that commercial intercourse between the seceding States and the rest of the United States should cease and be unlawful after the Proclamation of the President, that a state of insurrection existed, authorized the President in his discretion to license trade."

This view is in harmony with the case of Kershaw v. Kelsey, supra, referred to with approval in Montgomery v. U. S., 15 Wall., 400, 21 L. ed., 98.

"The lease now in question was made within the rebel territory, where both parties were at the time, and would seem to have contemplated the continued residence of the lessee upon the demised premises throughout the term. The rent was in part paid on the spot and the residue, now sued for, was to be paid out of the produce of the land; and the corn, the value of which is sought to be recovered in this action, was delivered and used thereon. No agreement appears to have been made, as part of or contemporaneously with the lease, that the cotton crop should be transported or the rent sent back across the lines between the belligerents; and no contract or communication appears to have been made across that line, relating to the lease, the delivery of possession of the premises or of the corn, or the payment of the rent of the one or the value of the other. The subsequent forwarding of the cotton by the defendant's son from Mississippi to Massachusetts may have been unlawful; but that cannot affect the validity of the agreements contained in the lease. Neither of these agreements involved or contemplated the transmission of money or property, or other communication, between the enemy's territory and our own. We are, therefore, unanimously of opinion that they did not contravene the law, of nations, or

1. There is nothing in the case to show or indicate that Mitchell intended a change of domicil. The reverse appears. If he had intended to expatriate himself, and cast his lot with the insurgents, he would not have left them and returned to Louisville before the fate of the new Government was decided. Besides, he avers in his petition in the case to which he makes oath, that he has "at all times borne true allegiance to the Government of the United States." Certainly such an averment is inconsistent with either the fact or the intention of expatriation.

2. At the time Mitchell left his home in Louisville, which was during the month of July, 1861, and subsequent to the 17th of the month, flagrant war existed between that part of the United States where he lived and the part to which he went, viz., the State of Georgia.

Prize cases, 2 Black, 635, 17 L. ed., 459.

Hence, he had no right to change his residence. He had no right to leave his country, much less to go into the enemy's country. Vatt., sec. 220.

"As to those who have the cowardice to abandon their country in a time of danger, and seek to secure themselves, instead of defending it, they manifestly violate the social compact, by which all the contracting parties engaged to defend themselves in a united body and in concert; they are infamous deserters, whom the State has the right to punish severely." This strong language of Vattel refers to citizens who, when their country is engaged in war. emigrate to a neutral country. It does not seem to have been in the contemplation of law writers that a citizen would, in time of war, go over to the enemy. It is not necessary in this case to discuss the general question of the right of a citizen to quit his country, or the society of which he is a member. The maxim of the common law was Nemo potest exuere patriam; and although this doctrine has been much relaxed, it has always been and still is held, that no citizen has a right to quit his country in a time of danger or distress, and when he could be of service to his sovereign.

If Mitchell, being a citizen of the United States and a resident of Louisville, had been in the State of Georgia when the war broke out. it would have been his duty to return home "without delay."

The William Bagaley, 5 Wall., 377, 18 L. ed. 583.

II. Being a citizen of the United States, resident in Louisville, Mitchell could not deal with residents of Georgia.

From the finding of facts by the court below, it is fair to presume that the appellant not only

continued to be a resident of Louisville, but | While in the Confederate States, he transacted continued in business there; and that he carried with him into the insurgent lines the means with which to purchase the cotton for which he makes claim. We cannot presume that he was ever before in the State of Georgia; much less, that during the time he was there, he acquired, from nothing, means sufficient to purchase 724 bales of cotton. That he collected debts, with in the insurrectionary districts, as the Court of Claims find, does not imply that the debts were due him before he went there; for, preliminary to this finding, the court finds that he transacted business there.

But whether Mitchell did or did not take anything with him, is not material. His residence, his home, his domicil, was Louisville, in the State of Kentucky. The purchase of cotton was in the State of Georgia, from persons resident there. This brings the case within the ruling of this court in the cases of Grossmayer, 9 Wall., 72, 19 L. ed., 627; of Montgomery, 15 Wall., 400, 21 L. ed., 97; of Lapene, 17 Wall., 602, 21 L. ed. 693; and of Cutner, 17 Wall., 517, 21 L. ed., 656.

In the case of Lapene this court briefly and clearly states the law as follows:

"All commercial contracts with the subjects or in the territory of the enemy, whether made directly by one in person, or indirectly through an agent who is neutral, are illegal and void. This principle is now too well settled to justify discussion."

The case of Kershaw v. Kelsey, 100 Mass., 561, is cited and relied upon by the counsel for the appellant. There is nothing contended for herein that is not sustained by the opinion of the court in that case. In that case it did not | appear whether Kelsey went to Mississippi before or after the beginning of the war; and the subject of the contract, so far as it was considered, in the opinion of the court, was real property."

Some stress is laid upon the fact found by the court below, that Mitchell "procured from the commanding general in Kentucky, a military pass permitting him to go through the military lines into the insurrectionary district." The pass itself is not produced, and we do not know its purport; but whatever it was, it was merely a "military pass." It derived all its force from the hand that wrote it. It would give Mitchell safe conduct through the "military line" of the Government, but would not help him in getting within the insurgent line. The power of General Anderson extended to his pickets, but no further.

Mr. Justice Swayne delivered the opinion of the court: .

|

business, collected debts and purchased from different parties, seven hundred and twentyfour bales of cotton. He took possession of the cotton and stored it in Savannah. Upon the capture of that place by General Sherman, the cotton was seized by the military [*351 authorities. It was subsequently sold by the agents of the Government. The proceeds, amounting to the sum of $128,692.22, are in the Treasury. Mitchell bought the cotton in November and December, 1864. He remained within the insurrectionary lines from July, 1861, until after the capture of Savannah by the arms of the United States.

The Court of Claims was equally divided in opinion and dismissed the petition. The claimant has removed the case to this court by appeal.

When Mitchell passed within the rebel lines the war between the loyal and the disloyal States was flagrant. It speedily assumed the largest proportions. Important belligerent rights were conceded by the United States to the insurgents. Their soldiers when captured were treated as prisoners of war, and were exchanged and not held for treason. Their vessels when captured were dealt with by our prize courts. Their ports were blockaded and the blockades proclaimed to neutral nations. Property taken at sea, belonging to persons domiciled in the insurgent States, was uniformly held to be confiscable as enemy property. All these things were done as if the war had been a public one with a foreign nation. The Prize cases, 2 Black, 687, 17 L. ed., 483: Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall., 417, 17 L. ed., 919; Mauran v. Ins. Co., 6 Wall., 1, 18 L. ed., 836. The laws of war were applied in like manner to intercourse on land between the inhabitants of the loyal and the disloyal States.

It was adjudged that all *contracts of [*352 the inhabitants of the former with the inhabitants of the latter were illegal and void. It was held that they conferred no rights which could be recognized. Such is the law of nations, flagrante bello, as administered by courts of justice. Vattel, § 220; Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns., 438; Coolidge v. Guthrie, 8 Am. L. Reg., N. S. 22; Coppell v. Hall, 7 Wall., 542, 19 L. ed., 244; U. S. v. Grossmayer, 9 Wall., 72, 19 L. ed., 627; Montgomery v. U. S. 15 Wall., 400, 21 L. ed., 97; U. S. v. Lapene, 17 Wall., 602, 21 L. ed., 693; Cutner v. Ū. S., 17 Wall., 517, 19 L. ed., 656.

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While such was the law as to dealings between the inhabitants of the respective territories, contracts between the inhabitants of the rebel States not in aid of the rebellion were as valid as those between themselves of the inhabitants of the loyal States. Hence this case turns upon the point whether the appellant was domMit-iciled in the Confederate States when he bought the cotton in question.

This is an appeal from the Court of Claims. That court found the following facts:

At the beginning of the late rebellion, chell, the claimant and appellant lived at Louisville, Kentucky. He was engaged in business there in July, 1861, and after the 17th of that month he procured from the proper military authority of the United States, in Kentucky, a pass permitting him to go through the army lines into the insurrectionary territory. He thereupon went into the insurgent States, and remained there until the latter part of the year 1864. He then returned to Louisville.

When he took his departure for the South he lived and was in business at Louisville. He returned thither when Savannah was captured and his cotton was seized. It is to the intervening tract of time we must look for the means of solving the question before us. There is nothing in the record which tends to show that when he left Louisville he did not intend to return, or that while in the South he had any

purpose to remain, or that when he returned to Louisville he had any intent other than to live there as he had done before his departure. Domicil has been thus defined: "A residence at a particular place accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain there for an unlimited time." Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn., 349, n. This definition is approved by Phillimore in his work on the subject. P. 13. By the term "domicil," in its ordinary acceptation, is meant the place where a person lives and has his home. Story, Confl. L., sec. 41. The place where a person lives is taken to be his domicil until facts adduced establish the contrary. Bruce v. Bruce, 2 Bos. & Pull., 229, n.; Bempde v. Johnstone, 3 Ves., 201; Stanley v. Bernes, 3 Hagg. Eccl., 374, 437; Best, Pres., 235.

353*1 *The proof of the domicil of the claimant at Louisville is sufficient. There is no controversy between the parties on that proposition. We need not, therefore, further consider the subject.

A domicil once acquired is presumed to continue until it is shown to have been changed. Somerville v. Somerville, 5 Ves., 787; Harvard Coll. v. Gore, 5 Pick., 370; Whart. Confl. L., sec. 55. Where a change of domicil is alleged the burden of proving it rests upon the person making the allegation. Crookenden v. Fuller, 1 Swab. & Tr., 441; Hodgson v. DeBeauchesne, 12 Moore, P. C., 288. 1858. To constitute the the new domicil two things are indispensable: First, residence in the new locality; and, second, the intention to remain there. The change cannot be made except facto et animo. Both are alike necessary. Either without the other is insufficient. Mere absence from a fixed home, however long continued, cannot work the change. There must be the animus to change the prior domicil for another. Until the new one is acquired, the old one remains. Whart. Confl. L., sec. 55, and the authorities there cited. These principles are axiomatic in the law upon the subject.

EDWARD DUPASSEUR, Plff. in Err.,

v.

ALBIN ROCHEREAU.

(See S. C., 21 Wall., 130–138.)

State judgment, when reviewed-Federal judgment effect of prior judgment—when ju risdiction denied.

*1. When in a case in a State Court a right or immunity is set up under and by virtue of a judg ment of a court of the United States, and the decision is against such right or immunity, a case is presented for a removal and review by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States, under the Act of February 5th, 1867.

2. In such a case the Supreme Court will examine and inquire whether or not due validity and effect have been accorded to the judgment of the Federal Court, and if they have not, and the right or immunity claimed has been thereby lost, it will reverse the judgment of the State Court.

3. Whether due validity and effect have or have not been accorded to the judgment of the Federal Court, will depend on the circumstances of the case. If jurisdiction of the case was acquired only by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and the validity and effect can be claimed for the judgment state law alone was administered, then only such as would be due to the judgment of the State Courts under like circumstances. Court of the United States for Louisiana, on a 4. The judgment was rendered by the Circuit vendor's privilege and mortgage, declaring it to be the first lien and privilege on the land, and the and the mortgagee purchased and paid into court marshal sold the property clear of all prior liens; for the benefit of subsequent liens, the surplus of his bid beyond the amount of his own debt. This judgment and sale were set up by way of defense to a suit brought in the State Court by another mortgagee who claimed priority to the first mortgage and who had not been made a party to the suit in the circuit court. The State Court held that the plaintiff was not bound by the former judgment on the question of priority, not being a party to the suit. The case was brought to the error, and this court held that the State Court did Supreme Court of the United States by writ of not refuse to accord due force and effect to the

judgment; that such a judgment in the State question, and the judgment of the circuit court Courts would not be conclusive on the point in

could not have any greater force or effect than judgments in the State Courts.

[No. 82.]

Submitted Nov. 24, 1874. New briefs ordered to be filed Dec. 14, 1874. Briefs submitted Feb. 1, 1875. Decided Feb. 15, 1875.

When the claimant left Louisville it would have been illegal to take up his abode in the territory whither he was going. Such a purpose Is not to be presumed. The presumption is the other way. To be established it must be proved. 12 Moore, P. C., supra. Among the circumstances usually relied upon to establish the animus manendi are: declarations of the party;N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State the exercise of political rights; the payment of personal taxes: a house of residence, and a place of business. Phillim., 100; Whart., sec. 62, and post. All these indicia are wanting in the case of the claimant.

The rules of law applied to the affirmative facts, without the aid of the negative considerations to which we have adverted, are conclusive against him. His purchase of the cotton involved the same legal consequences as if it has been made by an agent whom he sent to make it.

Obviously, important further facts bearing on the question might easily have been put in evidence by either party. We regret that it was not done. As the case is presented, our con clusion is necessarily adverse to the appellant. The judgment of the Court of Claims is affirmed.

of Louisiana.

The petition in this case was filed in the Sixth District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, by the defendant in error, for the enforcement of a certain mortgage. A decree having been entered in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant sued out this writ of error. A motion to dismiss was overruled by this court. After the case had been once submitted upon printed arguments, further arguments were, by *Headnotes by Mr. Justice BRADLEY.

NOTE. Jurisdiction of U. 8. Supreme Court, where federal question arises, or where is drawn in question statute, treaty or Constitution of United States-see notes, 2 L. ed. U. S. 654; 4 L. ed. U. S. 97; 6 L. ed. U. S. 571.

up for review in the U. S. Supreme Court by writ

What adjudication of state courts can be brought

of error to those courts-see note, 62 L. R. A. 513.

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