It is a rule of the common law of universal application, that where a contract express or implied is tainted with either of the vices last named, as to the consideration or the thing to be done, no alleged right founded upon it can be enforced in a court of justice. * Before considering the contract here in question, it may be well, by way of illustration, to advert to some of the cases presenting [*449 the subject in other phases, in which the principle has been adversely applied. Within the condemned category are: It is well settled that an order to pay a debt | which are not against morality, are still void out of a particular fund belonging to the debt- as being against the maxims of sound policy." or gives to the creditor a specific equitable lien Jones v. Randall, 1 Cowp., 39. upon the fund, and binds it in the hands of the drawee. Yeates v. Groves, 1 Ves., Jr., 280; Lett v. Morris, 4 Sim., 607; Bradley v. Root, Paige, 632; 2 Story, Eq., sec. 1047. A part of the particular fund may be assigned by an order, and the payee may enforce payment of the amount against the drawee. Field v. The Mayor, 6 N. Y., 179. But a mere agreement to pay out of such fund is not sufficient. Something more is necessary. There must be an appropriation of the fund pro tanto, either by giving an order or by transferring it otherwise in such a manner that the holder is authorized to pay the amount directly to the creditor without the further intervention of the debtor. Wright v. Ellison, 1 Wall., 16, 17 L. ed. 555; Hoyt v. Story, 3 Barb., 264; Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Hare, 39; Rogers v. Hosack, 18 Wend., 319. Viewing the subject in the light of these au- | thorities, we are brought to the conclusion that the appellee had no lien upon the fund here in question. The understanding between the elder Child and Trist was a personal agreement. It could in nowise produce the effect insisted upon. For a breach of the agreement, the remedy was at law, not in equity, and the defendant had a constitutional right to a trial by jury. Wright | v. Ellison, supra. If there was no lien, there was no jurisdiction in equity. There is another consideration fatally adverse to the claim of a lien. The 1st section of the Act of Congress of February 26, 1853, declares that all transfers of any part of any claim against the United States, "Or of any interest therein whether absolute or conditional, shall be absolutely null and void, unless executed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses after the allowance of such claim, and the issuing of a warrant therefor." That *448] *the ascertainment of the amount due, the claim set up in the bill to a specific part of the money appropriated is within this statute is too clear to admit of doubt. It would be a waste of time to discuss the subject. But there is an objection of still greater gravity to the appellee's case. Was the contract a valid one? It was, on the part of Child, to procure by lobby service, if possible, the passage of a bill providing for the payment of the claim. The aid asked, by the younger Child, of Trist, which indicated what he considered needful, and doubtless proposed to do and did do himself, is thus vividly pictured in his letter to Trist of the 20th February, 1871. After giving the names of several members of Congress, from whom he had received favorable assurances, he proceeds: "Please write to your friends to write to any member of Congress. Every vote tells, and a simple request may secure a vote, he not caring anything about it. Set every man you know at work. Even if he knows a page, for a page often gets a vote." In the Roman law it was declared that "A promise made to effect a base purpose, as to commit homicide or sacrilege, is not binding." Just. Inst. lib. 3, tit. xix., par. 24. In our jurisprudence a contract may be illegal and void because it is contrary to a constitution or statute, or inconsistent with sound policy and good morals. Lord Mansfield said: "Many contracts An agreement to pay for supporting for election a candidate for sheriff (Swayze v. Hull, 3 Halst., 54); to pay for resigning a public position to make room for another (Eddy v. Capron, 4 R. I. 395; Parsons v. Thompson, 1 H. Bl., 322); to pay for not bidding at a sheriff's sale of real property (Jones v. Caswell, 3 Johns. Cas., 29); to pay for not bidding for articles to be sold by the government at auction (Doolin v. Ward, 6 Johns., 194); to pay for not bidding for a contract to carry the mail on a specified route (Gulic v. Ward, 5 Halst., 87); to pay a person for his aid and influence in procuring an office, and for not being a candidate himself (Gray v. Hook, 4 N. Y., 449); to pay for procuring a contract from the government, Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall., 45, 17 L. ed. 862; to pay for procuring signatures to a petition to the Governor for a pardon (Hatzfield v. Gulden, 7 Watts, 152); to sell land to a particular person when the surrogate's order to sell should have been obtained (Bridgewater v. Brookfield, 3 Cow., 299); to pay for suppressing evidence and compounding a felony (Collins v. Blantern, 2 Wils., 347); to convey and assign a part of what should come from an ancestor by descent, devise or distribution (Boynton v. Hubbard, 7 Mass., 112); to pay for promoting a marriage (Scribblehill v. Brett, 4 Bro. P. C., 144; Arundel v. Trevillian, 1 Ch., 87); to influence the disposition of property by will in a particular way. Debenham v. Ox, 1 Ves., 276; see also Aad. Cont., 91; 1 Story, Eq., ch. 7; Collins v. Blantern, 1 Sm. L. Cas., 676, Am. n. The question now before us has been decided in four American cases. They were all ably considered, and in all of them the contract was held to be against public policy, *and [*450 void. Cuppinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S., 315; Harris v. Roof, 10 Barb., 489; Rose v. Truax, 21 Barb., 361; Marshall v. R. Co., 16 How., 314. We entertain no doubt that in such cases, as under all other circumstances, an agreement express or implied for purely professional services is valid. Within this category are included: drafting the petition to set forth the claim attending to the taking of testimony, collecting facts, preparing arguments, and subtee or other proper authority, and other services mitting them orally or in writing, to a commitof like character. All these things are intended to reach only the reason of those sought to be influenced. They rest on the same principle of ethics as professional services rendered in a court of justice, and are no more exceptionable. But such services are separated by a broad line of demarcation from personal solicitation, and the other means and appliances which the cor respondence shows were resorted to in this case. There is no reason to believe that they involved anything corrupt or different from what is usually practiced by all paid lobbyists in the prosecution of their business. The foundation of a republic is the virtue of its citizens. They are at once sovereigns and subjects. As the foundation is undermined, the structure is weakened. When it is destroyed the fabric must fall. Such is the voice of universal history. 1 Mont. Sp. L., 17. The theory of our government is, that all public stations are trusts, and that those clothed with them are to be animated in the discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice and the public good. They are never to descend to a lower plane. But there is a correlative duty resting upon the citizen. In his intercourse with those in authority, whether executive or legislative, touching the performance of their functions, he is bound to exhibit truth, frankness and integrity. Any departure from the line of rectitude in such cases, is not only bad in morals but involves a public wrong. 451*] *The agreement in the present case was for the sale of the influence and exertions of the lobby agent to bring about the passage of a law for the payment of a private claim, without reference to its merits, by means which, if not corrupt, were illegitimate and, considered in connection with the pecuniary interest of the agent at stake, contrary to the plainest principles of public policy. No one has a right, in such circumstances, to put himself ¡n a position of temptation to do what is regarded as so pernicious in its character. The law forbids the inchoate step, and puts the seal of its reprobation upon the undertaking. If any of the great corporations of the country were to hire adventurers who make market of themselves in this way, to procure the passage of a general law with a view to the promotion of their private interest, the moral sense of every right minded man would instinctively denounce the employer and employed as steeped in corruption, and the employment as infamous. If the instances were numerous, open and tolerated, they would be regarded as measuring the decay of the public morals and the degeneracy of the times. No prophetic spirit would be needed to foretell the consequences near at hand. The same thing in lesser legislation, if not so prolific of alarming evils, is not less vicious in itself, nor less to be condemned. The vital principle of both is the same. The evils of the latter are of sufficient magnitude to invite the most serious consideration. The prohibition of the law rests upon a solid foundation. A private bill is apt to attract little attention. It involves no great public interest, and usually fails to excite much discussion. Not unfrequently the facts are whispered to those whose duty it is to investigate, vouched for by them, and the passage of the measure is thus secured. If the agent is truthful, and conceals nothing, all is well. he uses nefarious means with success, the spring head and the stream of legislation are polluted. To legalize the traffic of such ser*452] vice, would open *a door at which fraud If and falsehood would not fail to enter, and make themselves felt at every accessible point. It would invite their presence and offer them a premium. If the tempted agent be corrupt himself, and disposed to corrupt others, the transition requires but a single step. He has the means in his hands, with every facility and a strong incentive to use them. The wide-spread suspicion which prevails, and charges openly made and hardly denied, lead to the conclusion that such events are not of rare occurrence. Where the avarice of the agent is inflamed by the hope of a reward contingent upon success, and to be graduated by a percentage upon the amount appropriated, the danger of tampering in its worst form is greatly increased. It is by reason of these things that the law is as it is upon the subject. It will not allow either party to be led into temptation where the thing to be guarded against is so deleterious to private morals and so injurious to the public welfare. In expressing these views, we follow the lead of reason and authority. We are aware of no case in English or American jurisprudence like the one here under consideration, where the agreement has not been adjudged to be illegal and void. We have said that for professional services in this connection where they are blended and confused with a just compensation may be recovered. But those which are forbidden, the whole is a unit and indivisible. That which is bad destroys that which is good, and they perish together. Services of the latter character, gratuitously rendered, are not unlawful. The absence of motive to wrong is the foundation of the sanction. The tendency to mischief, if not wanting, is greatly lessened. The taint lies in the stipulation for pay. Where that exists, it effects fatally, in all its parts, the entire body of the contract. In all such cases, potior conditio defendentis. Where there is turpitude, the law will help neither party. The elder agent in this case is represented to have been a lawyer of ability and high character. The appellee is said to be equally worthy. This can make no difference as to *the legal principles we have considered [*453 nor in their application to the case in hand. The law is no respecter of persons. The decree of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is reversed, and the case will be remanded, with directions to dismiss the bill. WILLIAM P. LITTLE, Assignee of John R. Alexander, a Bankrupt, Appt., บ. T. LAF. ALEXANDER. (See S. C., 21 Wall., 500-503.) Judgment, when void under Bankrupt Actvoid state ordinance—void preference. *1. When the issue to be decided is, whether judgment against an insolvent was obtained with a view to give a preference, the intention of the bankrupt is the turning point of the cause, and all the circumstances which go to show such intent should be considered. 2. Hence, when an ordinance of a State gave a *Headnotes by Mr. Justice MILLER. This is a bill in equity, brought in the Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina, | by Little, as assignee in bankruptcy of John R. Alexander, the father, against T. L. Alexander, the son. The object of the suit is to be relieved from the apparent incumbrance of a judgment of the latter against the former on real estate, which comes to the assignee as part of the bankrupt's assets. The judgment was docketed on the 19th day of May, 1869, and on the first of September, within less than four months thereafter, the petition was filed on which the judgment defendant was declared bankrupt. The question in the case on which the decision of it must turn is, whether the bankrupt intentionally aided in the procurement of this judgment, in order to give his son a preference over his other creditors. He are of opinion that he did. It is quite apparent that from the close of the late civil war, Alexander, the father, was insolvent, and that this was well known to the son, to whom he was indebted between two and three thousand dollars. He also owed other debts, and his property consisted of two or three parcels of land, and perhaps $1,000 worth of personal property. By an ordinance of the State Convention of North Carolina of March 14, 1868, which it is not necessary to give in detail, it was provided, in effect, that as to debts which were contracted prior to May 1, 1865, judgments could not be rendered before the spring terms of the courts in 1869, and if there was opposition or defense they should be continued until the Spring Terms of 1870. Other obstructions were also interposed to the collection of the class of debts called old debts by this ordinance. This provision also applied to notes or obligations given after May 1, 1865, 502*] *which were wholly in renewal of such old debts. But in suits on debts created after that time, or on notes where a part of the consideration was new, judgments could be obtained at the first term after suit was brought. This was the condition of the law as found in the statute-books of the State when, on the first day of January, 1869, the bankrupt gave his son, the appellee in this case, a note for the old debt and interest, and for $20. then first loaned to him. Nothing can be plainer, we think, considering the relationship of the parties and the known insolvency of the father than that the purpose of this transaction was to enable the son to get a judgment at the approaching spring term of the court on this note, as a new debt within the meaning of the ordinance, while his other creditors were left to the mercy which that ordinance held out to holders of old debts. If anything else were wanted to make clear this purpose, it is found in the fact that $20 were included time, to take it out of the class of renewals for in the renewal note for money received at that debts wholly created before the first of May, 1865. It adds strong confirmation of this view that a similar renewal was made in favor of Miss Hattie Alexander, a niece of the bankrupt, and in favor of the firm of which the son had been and was then a partner, and in favor of no others. In execution of this purpose, suits were brought on these three notes, and judgments obtained on all of them for want of appearance at the May Term, 1869, of the state court, while suits brought on other debts were continued until another term.. To break the force of this evidence, it is argued that the ordinance which gave this preference of new debts over old was unconstitutional and void. And in point of fact the Supreme Court of North Carolina so decided in January, 1869. But this decision was made after the new notes were given, and it appears by the evidence that it was very well known at the time the new notes were given that the local judge would enforce the provisons of the ordinance. It is *the intent with which the new [*503 notes were given which must determine the validity of the lien of the judgment, and the unconstitutionality of the ordinance, if the parties believed it would be enforced, can have no influence in repelling the presumption of the intention to give and secure priority of judgment, and by that means a preference. It is said that this case comes within the principle decided by this court in Wilson v. Bk., 17 Wall., 473, 21 L. ed., 723, because in this case, as in that, the judgment creditor had no defense and made none. But no careful reader of that case can fail to see that if the debtor there had done anything before suit which would have secured the bank a judgment with priority of lien, with intent to do so, the judgment of this court would have been different from what it was. The circuit court in this case submitted the question of fraudulent preference to a jury, but with the opinion of that court in the case, as found in the record, the jury was probably misled as to the law. At all events, in such issues from chancery submitted to the jury their verdict is not conclusive, and we think the intent to secure a preference in this case by means of this judgment, both on the part of the bankrupt and the judgment creditor, so clear, that we feel bound to reverse the decree and to remand the case with instructions to enter a decree in favor of plaintiff, that the judgment of T. L. Alexander is void as against the assignee, and is no lien on the property of the bankrupt in the hands of his assignee. Mr. Justice Bradley was not present during the argument of this cause and took no part in the decision. VIRGINIA L. MINOR, and Francis Minor, v. REESE HAPPERSETT. It is admitted by the pleadings that the plaintiff is a native born, free, white citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri; that the defendant is a registrar, qualified and acting as such; that the plaintiff, in proper time and in proper form, made application to him to be registered, and that the defendant reson that she is a female; and that she possesses the qualifications of an elector in all respects, except as to the matter of sex, as before stated. (See S. C., 21 Wall., 162-178.) Fourteenth constitutional Amendment-meaning of "citizen”—right of Suffrage not nec-fused to register the plaintiff, solely for the reaessary privilege of citizen-women not voters, under the Constitution-state laws which confer the right of suffrage upon men alone, valid. 1. Under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, is not a voter in that State, Inasmuch as the Constitution and laws of the State confine the right of suffrage to men alone. 2. The word "citizen" in the Constitution of the United States conveys the idea of membership of a nation and nothing more; women are citizens of the United States. 3. The right of suffrage is not one of the necessary privileges of a citizen of the United States. 4. The Fourteenth Amendment did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen. The United States Constitution did not add the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time the Constitution was adopted. voters. 5. Suffrage was not coextensive with the citizenship of the States at the time of its adoption. It was not intended to make all citizens of the U. S. 6. A State Government is republican in form, within the meaning of the guaranty in that behalf, contained in the United States Constitution, not withstanding women are not made voters. 7. The Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone, and the constitutions and laws of the several States which commit that important trust to men alone, are not necessarily vold. [No. 182.] Argued Feb. 9, 1875. Decided Mar. 29, 1875. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State or Missouri. IN The question is thus broadly presented, of a conflict between the Constitution of the State of Missouri and that of the United States, as contemplated by the 25th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, and 5th February, 1867. Messrs. John K. Krum, John B. Henderson and Francis Minor, for plaintiff in error. Smith P. Galt, for defendant. *Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered [*165 the opinion of the court: The question is presented in this case, whether, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, a woman, who is a citizen of the United States and of the State of Missouri, is a voter in that State, notwithstanding the provision of the Constitution and laws of the State, which confine the right of suffrage to men alone. We might, perhaps, decide the case upon other grounds, but this question is fairly made. From the opinion we find that it was the only one decided in the court below, and it is the only one which has been argued here. The case was undoubtedly brought to this court for the sole purpose of having that question decided by us, and in view of the evident propriety there is of having it settled, so far as it can be by such a decision, we have concluded to waive all other considerations and proceed at once to its determination. It is contended that the provisions of the This was an action brought in the Circuit Constitution and laws of the State of Missouri Court of St. Louis County, Missouri, by the which confine the right of suffrage and regisplaintiffs in error, against the defendant, a reg-tration therefor to men, are in violation of the istering officer, for refusing to register Virginia L. Minor as a lawful voter. The defendant demurred, and the court sustained the demurrer, and rendered judgment against the plaintiffs. On appeal, this judgment was sustained by the General Term, and the plaintiffs sued out a writ of error and removed the cause to the Supreme Court of the State, where the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. The case in the Supreme Court of the State was heard upon an agreed statement, which was substantially as follows: The defense, in substance, was based upon the Constitution of Missouri, which provides, art. 2, sec. 18, that "Every male citizen of the United States, etc., shall be entitled to vote;" and also upon the Registration Law of said State, approved March 10, 1871, to the same effect; and it is claimed, therefore, that the defendant was justified in refusing to register the plaintiff on account of her sex. The plaintiff, however, denies the validity of this clause of the Missouri Constitution and the Registration Act based thereon, and contends that they are in violation of and repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, and particularly to those articles and clauses thereof which she has specified in her petition. NOTE Right of women to vote—see note, 21 L. R... 662. Constitution of the United States and, therefore, void. The argument is, that as a woman, born and naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is a citizen of the United States and of the State in which she resides, she has the right of suffrage as one of the privileges and immunities of her citizenship, which the State cannot by its laws or Constitution abridge. There is no doubt that women may be citizens. They are persons, and by the Fourteenth Amendment "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof" are expressly declared to be "citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside." But, in our opinion, it did not need this Amendment to give them that position. Before its adoption, the Constitution of the United States did not in terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several States, yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision. There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an *association of persons for [*166 the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in thi connection, reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance. had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was For convenience it has been found necessary never doubted that all children born in a coun to give a name to this membership. The ob- try of parents who were its citizens became ject is to designate by a title the person and the themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. relation he bears to the nation. For this pur-These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as pose the words "subject," "inhabitant" and distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some "citizen" have been used, and the choice be- authorities go further and include as citizens tween them is sometimes made to depend upon children born within the jurisdiction, without the form of the government. Citizen is now reference to the citizenship of their *par- [*168 more commonly employed, however, and as it ents. As to this class there have been doubts, has been considered better suited to the descrip- but never as to the first. For the purposes of tion of one living under a republican govern- this case it is not necessary to solve these ment, it was adopted by nearly all of the States doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have upon their separation from Great Britain, and now to consider that all children born of citizen was afterwards adopted in the Articles of Con- parents within the jurisdiction are themselves federation and in the Constitution of the United citizens. The words "all children" are certainStates. When used in this sense it is under- ly as comprehensive, when used in this connecstood as conveying the idea of membership of tion, as "all persons," and if females are includa nation, and nothing more. ed in the last they must be in the first. they are included in the last is not denied. In fact the whole argument of the plaintiff proceeds upon that idea. To determine, then, who were citizens of the United States before the adoption of the Amendment, it is necessary to ascertain what persons originally associated themselves together to form the nation, and what were afterwards admitted to membership. Looking at the Constitution itself, we find that it was ordained and established by "the people of the United States" (Preamble, 1 Stat. at L., 10), and then going further back, we find | that these were the people of the several States that had before dissolved the political bands which connected them with Great Britain, and assumed a separate and equal station among the powers of the earth (Dec. of Ind., 1 Stat. at L., 1), and that had by Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, in which they took the name of "the United States of America," en167*] tered into a firm league of *friendship with each other for their common defense, the security of their liberties and their mutual and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other against all force offered to or attack made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretense whatever. Art. Confed., § 3, 1 Stat. at L., 4. Whoever, then, was one of the people of either of these States when the Constitution of the United States was adopted, became ipso facto a citizen a member of the nation created by its adoption. He was one of the persons associating together to form the nation, and was, consequently, one of its original citizens. As to this there has never been a doubt. Disputes have arisen as to whether or not certain persons or certain classes of persons were part of the people at the time, but never as to their citizenship if they were. This That Under the power to adopt a uniform system of naturalization Congress, as early as 1790, provided "that any alien, being a free white person," might be admitted as a citizen of the United States, and that the children of such persons so naturalized, dwelling within the United States, being under twenty-one years of age at the time of such naturalization, should also be considered citizens of the United States, and that the children of citizens of the United States that might be born beyond the sea, or out of the limits of the United States, should be considered as natural-born citizens. 1 Stat. at L., 103. These provisions thus enacted have, in substance, been retained in all the naturalization laws adopted since. In 1855, however, the last provision was somewhat extended, and all persons theretofore born or thereafter to be born out of the limits of the jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or should be at the time of their birth citizens of the United States, were declared to be citizens also. 10 Stat. at L., 604. As early as 1804 it was enacted by Congress that when any alien who had declared his intention to become a citizen in the manner provided by law died before he was actually naturalized, his widow and children should be considered as citizens of the United States, and entitled to all rights and privileges as such upon taking the necessary oath (2 Stat. at L., 292); and in 1855 it was further provided that any woman who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married or *who [*169 should be married to a citizen of the United zen. 10 Stat. at L., 604. Additions might always be made to the citi-States should be deemed and taken to be a citizenship of the United States in two ways: first, by birth and second, by naturalization. is apparent from the Constitution itself, for it provides, art. 2 § 1, that "no person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President," and (art. 1, § 8), that Congress shall have power "to establish a uniform rule of naturalization." Thus new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization. The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural born citizens. Resort must be From this it is apparent that, from the commencement of the legislation upon this subject, alien women and alien minors could be made citizens by naturalization, and we think it will not be contended that this would have been done if it had not been supposed that native women and native minors were already citizens by birth. But if more is necesary to show that women have always been considered as citizens the same as men, abundant proof is to be found in the legislative and judicial history of the |