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this case on what we have said is the undis-
puted doctrine of the courts of equity, but for
the peculiar language of the statute we are
considering. We cannot say in regard to this
Act of Limitations that courts of equity are
not bound by its terms, for its very words are
that "No suit at law or in equity shall in any
case be maintained
unless brought
within two years," etc. It is quite clear that
this statute must be held to apply equally by
its own force to courts of equity and to courts
of law, and if there be an exception to the uni-
versality of its language it must be one which
applies under the same state of facts to suits
at law as well as to suits in equity.

But we are of opinion, as already stated, that the weight of judicial authority, both in this country and in England, is in favor of the application of the rule to suits at law as well as

in equity. And we are also of opinion that this

2. The 4th section of the Act of July 22, 1854, leaves no doubt of the intention of Congress to extend to the territory embraced by the States of Kansas and Nebraska, the same policy.

3. It cannot be supposed without an express declaration to that effect, that Congress intended to permit the sale of salines in Territories soon to be organized into States.

4. The purpose of reserving them was to preserve them for the use of the future States, and no State had been organized without a grant of salt-springs. 5. The locations in question in this action are not ratified by the proviso to the section granting the salt springs. 6. Patents for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale or appropriated, are void.

[No. 391.]

Argued Feb. 19, 23, 1875. Decided Mar. 29, 1875

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State

of Nebraska.

is founded in a sound and philosophical view of This action of ejectment was brought by the the principles of the Statutes of Limitation. plaintiffs in error, in the District Court of LanThey were enacted to prevent frauds; to pre-caster County, Nebraska. vent parties from asserting rights after the been given for the defendants, and affirmed Judgment having lapse of time had destroyed or impaired the upon appeal by the Supreme Court of the evidence which would show that such rights State, the plaintiffs sued out this writ of error. never existed, or had been satisfied, transferred or extinguished, if they ever did exist. To hold kins and Montgomery Blair, for plaintiff's Messrs. J. S. Black, E. Wakeley, J. H. Hopthat by concealing a fraud, or by committing in error: a fraud in a manner that it concealed itself until such time as the party committing the fraud could plead the Statute of Limitations to protect it, is to make the law which was designed to prevent fraud, the means by which it is made successful and secure. And we see no reason why the principle should not be as applicable to suits tried on the common law side of the court's calendar as to those on the equity side.

While we might follow the construction of the state courts in this matter, where those statutes governed the case. in construing this Statute of Limitations passed by the Congress of the United States as part of the law of bankruptcy, we hold that when there has been no negligence or laches on the part of the plaintiff in coming to the knowledge of the fraud which is the foundation of the suit, and when the fraud has been concealed, or is of such char350*] acter as to conceal itself, the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered by, or becomes known to the party suing, or those in privity with him.

title, unless the actual delivery of a patent is
The plaintiffs exhibited a complete legal
necessary to give it effect, or unless, after a
patent is duly executed, recorded and dispatched
to the local office for delivery, the Land
Department has the power to recall and annul
it, as the district court decided by refusing
the plaintiffs' second instruction.
that said instruction ought to have been given,
We contend
and that the plaintiffs' title is complete with-
out the delivery of the patent, and that the land
officer had no right to withhold or cancel it.

and the authorities bearing upon it very fully
This question has been recently considered,
and carefully examined in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the District of California,
in the case of Le Roy v. Clayton. In delivering
the opinion of the court, Judge Sawyer says:

"The patent of March 1, 1870, took effect from the moment it was signed by the President and passed the great seal; certainly from the time it was recorded in the proper record, and dispatched to the Surveyor-General of California, to be delivered to the claimant. A deThe result of this proposition is, that the delivery in the case of a government patent is not cree of the Circuit Court sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill must be reversed, with directions for further proceedings, in conformity to this opinion.

660*] *J. STERLING MORTON, Charles A. Manners, and Andrew Hopkins. Plffs. in Err.,

บ.

STATE OF NEBRASKA, Jesse T. Green, and

Horace Smith.

(See S. C., 21 Wall., 660-675.) Balt-springs-reserved on public lands-in Territories-improper location-patent.

1. It has been the uniform policy of the govern ment since the inauguration of our land system in 1796. to reserve salt-springs from sale.

necessary. The patentee takes by matter of record."

Lott v. Prudhomme, 3 Rob. (La.) 293,which is directly in point; Donner v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 513; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; Green v. Liter, 8 Cranch, 247; Chipley v. Farris, Sup. Ct. Cal., April Term, 1873, not yet reported (since reported, 45 Cal., 527); Cunningham v. Browning, 1 Bland, 299; Philips v. Irwin, 1 Tenn. (Overt.), 235.

"If the title vested under the patent, the Commissioner of the General Land Office could not, of his own motion, devest it by canceling the patent, or the record of the patent, without the knowledge or consent of those interested. Lick v. Diaz, 30 Cal., 65, 37 Cal., 437. "This instrument, the patent, is record evidence of the action of the government upon the

title of the claimant. As against the government, this record, so long as it re mains unvacated and it can only be vacated by a judicial tribunal (U. S. v. Stone, 2 Wall., 535, | 17 L. ed., 767), is conclusive, and it is equally conclusive upon those claiming under government by titles subsequent.

Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall., 492, 18 L. ed., 92. In Hines v. Greenlee, 3 Ala. (N. S.), 73, the court says: "The law provides that, on certain things being done, the citizen shall acquire a title to a portion of the public lands, and that a patent therefor shall issue, which shall be recorder. The patent is not the title, but merely the evidence that, according to law, a portion of the public domain has been transferred to a citizen. Its efficacy proceeds from the law which authorizes certain officers to issue and record it."

In Peralta v. U. S., 3 Wall., 440, 18 L. ed., 223, the court says: "The record was the grant."

In McCauley v. State, 21 Md., 572, the court, in discussing the legal effect of an official copy made evidence by statute, says: "Such copies are prima facie evidence of all that is necessary to authorize their registration, when it appears they have been duly recorded."

To the same effect, Mayo v. Mazeaux, 38 Cal., 449.

"The general rule is, that a patent takes effect upon its being issued, and it is not necessary to show a delivery to or acceptance by the patentee."

Chipley v. Farris, not reported (since reported 45 Cal., 527).

The doctrine of delivery, as applied by us to private grants, has no application to grants made by goverment.

Donner v. Palmer, 31 Cal., 513. Delivery of patent is not necessary. Ex parte Kuhtman, 3 Rich. Eq., 257. Entry of payment by W., to whom patent issued, proof of issue of patent, though not pro

duced.

Willis v. Bucher, 3 Wash. (C. C.), 375.

In Stark v. Starrs, 6 Wall., 402, 18 L. ed., 925, the court says: "The right to a patent once vested is equivalent, as respects the government dealing with the public lands, to a patent issued."

In Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall., 72, 20 L. ed., 485, the court says that a bill could be maintained to control the title though only a patent certificate had been issued.

The defendants, having no title, could not question the title of plaintiffs.

Satarpy v. Papin, 7 Mo., 506; Parmlee v. Oswego & Syracuse R. Co., 7 Barb., 621; Crommelin v. Minter, 9 Ala. 594; Cooper v. Roberts. 18 How., 173, 15 L. ed., 338; Bissell v. Penrose, 8 How., 317; West v. Cochran, 17 How., 413, 15 L. ed., 114; Bryan v. Forsyth, 19 How., 334, 15 L. ed., 674; Ballance v. Papin, 19 How., 343, 15 L. ed., 678; Waterman v. Smith, 13 Cal., 413; People v. Mauran, 5 Den., 398; Sutton v. Menser, 6 B. Mon., 438; Taylor v. Fletcher, 7 B. Mon., 83.

acts, and officers have been appointed for the ascertainment of these matters in advance, who have ascertained them and given their judgment, then the patent, although the judgment of the officers be in fact erroneous, cannot be attacked collaterally by parties showing title subsequent from the same source, much less by those who show no color of title in themselves.

Doll v. Meador, 16 Cal., 325.

Messrs. William Lawrence, E. R. Hoar, Robert H. Bradford, J. R. Webster and L. Crounse, for defendant in error:

A patent issued for lands not authorized to be sold, or reserved from sale, is not only voidable but void, and may be attacked collaterally and defeated in an action at law.

This is so clearly true on all principle, that it would seem axiomatic. It is deemed sufficient to state it, and refer without comment to conclusive authorities.

1 Ops. Attys.-Gen., 420. Saline Springs, in Ill., 2 Ops. Attys.-Gen., 186, Concerning Land Patents; 5 Ops. Attys.-Gen., 9, Patents to Preempters; Stoddard v. Chambers, How,. 284; Kissell v. St. Louis Schools, 18 How., 19, 15 L. ed., 324; Easton v. Salisbury, 21 How., 431, 16 L. ed., 183; Minter v. Crommelin, 18 How., 87, 15 L. ed., 279, 9 Ala. 594; Brown v. Clements, 3 How., 650; U. S. v. Stone, 2 Wall., 525, 17 L. ed. 765; Hale v. Gaines, 22 How., 144, 16 L. ed., 264; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498; Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall., 160, 18 L. ed. 849; State of Ind. v. Miller, 3 McLean, 151; Hunter v. Hemphill, 6 Mo., 106; Jackson v. Lawton, 10 Johns., 26; Railroad Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall., 96, 19 L. ed., 599.

This, in fact, is determined by Congress in the Acts providing for the return of purchase money in the case of unauthorized sales.

Acts, March 3, 1819; May 21, 1824; January 12, 1825; May 24, 1828; 1 Lester, 34, 36, 38, 40, 667.

Then, if in this case, it is shown that the lands were not subject to private entry because they were saline, this fact, shown by parol, will defeat a patent, even if the plaintiffs had produced it, and no proceeding to cancel it is necessary.

It was the duty of the deputy-surveyor who surveyed these lands, to note in his field-book the true situations of all mines, salt-licks, salt-prings and mill-seats, which came to his knowledge.

Acts, May 18, 1796, 1 Stat. at L., 465; May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. at L., 73; Rev. Stat., 441, §8 2, 395.

This duty he did.

It was the duty of the Surveyor General: To prepare and transmit to the registers, general plats.

Act, May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. at L., 73.

But his failure to note the salt-springs on these, could not give the holder of land warrants a right to locate on land really saline. The Act of July 22, 1854, did not exclude from sale those saline lands so marked on the books and record of the register and re

If the authority to issue a patent depend up-ceiver only, but all saline lands. on the existence of particular facts in ref- The Act, of May 18, 1796, reserved for fuerence to the condition or location of the prop- ture disposal, not merely those so noted, but erty, or the performance of certain antecedent every salt-spring which may be discovered.

The purpose of Congress may readily be seen by a comparison of this with other statutes. The Preemption Act of September 4, 1841, 5 Stat. at L., 456, declares that:

"No lands on which are situated any known salines or mines, shall be liable to entry."

But when the reservation is made in the Acts of 1796 and 1854, it is not of the known salines, but "every salt-spring," and the sa

lines.

The record shows, and it was not denied on trial, that when the lands were entered, the locator knew their saline character. But, independently of this, the fact was noted on the deputy-surveyor's field-notes in the SurveyorGeneral's office. This was a public record and notice to all the world.

But the laws in relation to Nebraska went further, and designed to reserve salines, no matter when or how discovered.

This question is decided in principle by this court in Railroad Co. v. Smith, 9 Wall., 96,

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ed., 279.

The question of reservation is the hinge of this case, in volves the history of saline reservations. Those reservations began with the Act of May 18, 1796, creating the office of Surveyor-General and deputy-surveyors, and organizing our present rectangular system of surveys, and prescribing the mode of selling the domain. The statute is the mud-sill of our land system. On March 1, 1784, Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Harding, Arthur Lee and James Monroe delegates from the Commonwealth of Virginia, in the Congress of the United States of America, under the Articles of Confederation, signed and delivered a deed conveying to the United States all the right of the Commonwealth to the Territory northwest

of the River Ohio.

Public Land Laws, Opinions and Instructions, Part 1, p. 585, ed. of 1838.

The Act of Congress of May 18, 1796, was the first Act providing a system for the survey and sale of any part of that great region. It is entitled "An Act Providing for the Sale of the Lands of the United States, in the Territory Northwest of the Ohio River and above the Mouth of the Kentucky River."

Section 2 requires the land to be subdivided into townships and sections, and prescribes the mode of measuring the lines and marking the lines and corners. "Every surveyor," says the section, "shall note in his field-book, both the true situation of all mines, salt-licks, saltsprings and mill-seats, which shall come to his knowledge; all water courses, over which the line he runs shall pass; and also the quality of the lands." The section then requires these field-books to be returned to the Surveyor-General, and requires him to cause a plat of every township to be made, and to send a description of the land, with a copy of every map, to the places appointed for the sale of the lands.

Section 3 enacts, "That a salt-spring, lying upon a creek which empties into the Scioto River, on the east side, together with as many contiguous sections as shall be equal to one township, and every other salt-spring which may be discovered, together with the section of one mile square, which includes it, and also four sections at the center of every township, containing each one mile square, shall be reserved for the future disposal of the United States; but there shall be no reservation except for salt-springs, in fractional townships, where the fraction is less than three fourths of a township."

Section 4 enacts, "That, whenever seven ranges of townships shall have been surveyed, and the plats made and sent, conformably with the provisions of the Act, the said sections of 640 acres (excluding those hereby reserved), shall be offered for sale, at public vendue, at Cincinnati or Pittsburgh; and that the townships remaining undivided shall be offered at the seat of Government of the United States, in quarter townships, excluding the four central sections, and the other reservations before mentioned."

This Act is now the law for all SurveyorsGeneral and their deputies. The Act of September 27, 1850, 9 Stat. at L., 496, declares "That a Surveyor-General shall be appointed for the Territory of Oregon, who shall have the same authority, perform the same duties respecting the public lands and private land claims in the Territory of Oregon, as are vested in and required of the surveyor of lands in the United States northwest of the Ohio, except as hereinafter provided."

Section 14 declares "That no mineral lands, nor lands reserved for salines, shall be liable to any claim under and by virtue of the provisions of this Act."

And the Act of July 22, 1854, 10 Stat. at L., 308, section 4 of which, as we contend, preserved the salines in dispute here, declares in section 1, that a Surveyor-General shall be appointed for New Mexico, "Whose authority and duties shall be the same as those provided by law for the Surveyor-General of Oregon."

It declares, in section 10, that the President shall also appoint "A Surveyor-General for the Territories of Nebraska and Kansas, who shall locate his office at such place as the President of the United States shall from time to time

direct, and whose duties, powers, obligations, responsibilities and compensation shall be the same as those of the Surveyor-General of Wisconsin and Iowa." Wisconsin Territory formerly embraced the State of Iowa. 5 Stat. at L., 235.

The office of public lands in Wisconsin Territory, was created by Act of June 12, 1838, 5 Stat. at L., 243, whose 1st section devolves upon him

"The same duties respecting the public lands and private claims in the Territory of Wisconsin, as are now vested in and required of the Surveyor of the Lands of the United States in Ohio."

Thus it appears that the Act of May 18, 1796, so far as it prescribes the duties of Surveyors-General and their deputies, is the law of New Mexico, Kansas and Nebraska, and a more extended view of the statute would show that it is also the law governing every Surveyor-General and deputy-surveyor in the Union.

In this case the deputy who surveyed the lands in controversy obeyed the 2d section of the Act of 1796, and noted in his field-book the true situations of all salt-licks, salt-springs, etc., on those lands; but the Surveyor-General disobeyed that section, and failed to show these things on the plat, or in his description of the whole lands surveyed, and this suppressio veri bred error of fact, and misled the President into offering for sale these reserved lands, which it was not lawful for him to offer.

The Act of June 1, 1796, 1 Stat. at L., 490, extended the power and duties of the surveyor over other large tracts northwest of the Ohio, and required him to exercise them in the manner directed by the Act of May 18, 1796; and reserved those lands, "Except salt-springs therein and the same quantities of land adjacent thereto, as are directed to be reserved with the salt-springs in the said recited Act," 'for the satisfaction of the warrants for military services provided for by Virginia, on behalf of her troops, in her deed of cession of March 1, 1784. Thus early were salt-springs, and the sections containing them, saved from location by military bounty land-warrants, and that, too, where the satisfaction of the warrants was a condition of the cession of the general region in which they were to be located. The Mississippi Territory extends from Georgia to the Mississippi River, and from Tennessee to the 31st degree of north latitude, the present northern boundary of East Louisiana. The Act of March 3, 1803, 2 Stat. at L., 229 provides for appointing a Surveyor-General and Register in the Territory, and for the survey and sale of the public lands; and sections 10 and 4 impose on them, respectively, the du- | ties imposed on the Surveyor-General and registers north of the Ohio and above the mouth of Kentucky River. On the 30th April, 1803, we acquired Louisiana from France. 8 Stat. at L., 200. The Act of March 26, 1804, 2 Stat. at L., 283, erected the province into the Territory of Orleans and the District of Louisiana-the former to extend east to the Peraido (sales of Pub. Lands in Ter. of Orleans, 3 Ops., 697), and north to the south boundary of Mississippi Territory and to the present State of Arkansas; and the latter to embrace the rest of the Province. Therefore the District of Louisiana embraced the land in controversy. The Act of March 2, 1805, sec. 3, 2 Stat. at L., 324, divided the Territory of Orleans into two land disricts, the boundary between them to be designated by the President; and provided for a register in each district with the same powers and duties as are by law provided with respect to the registers in the several offices established for the disposal of the lands of the United States north of the River Ohio, above the mouth of Kentucky River.

So the Act of March 3, 1811, sec. 4, 2 Stat. at L., 662, creating the land district north of Red River in Orleans Territory, and providing for the appointment of a register, required of him the duties devolved by law on the registers in the Mississippi Territory, which we have seen were similar to those of the registers northwest of the Ohio.

So the Act of Feb. 17, 1818, 3 Stat. at L., 406, to provide additional land officers in the Missouri Territory, referred the duties of the

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land officers to the same original source. Missouri Territory then embraced the land in dispute, for the Act of June 4, 1812, sec. 1, 2 Stat. at L., 743, had substituted that name for the former name of Louisiana Territory.

The general duty of reserving salines from public or private sale, as prescribed by the Act of May 10, 1800, will be found, by examining the statutes, to devolve at this time on all registers; so that, if the Act of July 22, 1854, had made no express reservation of salines, such reservation in respect to the lands in controversy, might well have been implied from the general duties of Surveyors-General and deputies, as prescribed by une Act of May 18, 1796, and the general duties of registers, as prescribed by the Act of May 18, 1800, and from the succession of statutes fixing those same duties on the officers connected with these warrant locations.

All the salines in the Virginia cession were reserved, and afterwards granted to the several States carved out of that region.

The same policy was adopted in the Mississippi Territory.

See, the Reserving Act of June 15, 1809, sec. 1, 2 Stat. at L., 548; and see the grant to Alabama, by Act of March 2, 1819, sec. 6, 3 Stat. at L., 489.

And in the Louisiana purchase, which, as we have seen, embraces the premises in dispute, the salines have been as universally reserved. The first Act for the sale of lands in that Territory is that of March 3, 1811, above cited. Section 10 empowers the President to direct the sale of the lands in the Territory, after survey, with the exception of the 16th section, etc., "And with the exception also of the saltsprings and lead-mines, and lands contiguous thereto; which, by the direction of the President of the United States, may be reserved for the future disposal of the said States etc." So that the first reservation of the tract in question was made on March 3, 1811, and it attached when Richard Taylor surveyed this township in October, 1857, or at farthest, when the survey was approved in July, 1858.

When a statute says that a public officer "may" do things, it will be construed as mandatory when so required by public interest or the protection of individual rights. Supervi sors v. U. S., 4 Wall,, 435, 18 L. ed., 419.

So the reservation of land contiguous to saltsprings, by the President, under the Act of 1811, and like Acts, was mandatory, and it seems he so regarded it. The President speaks about the business committed to them. and acts through the heads of departments

Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet., 498.

the General Land Office represents the PresOn the same principle, the Commissioner of ident.

Receivers). 3 Ops. Attys. Gen. 93–96 (Author. of Reg. &

On July 22, 1854, the Act was passed reserving the salines of New Mexico, Kansas and Nebraska. There were laws passed after that, extending the system, but it is not necessary to state them. It is enough to know that, before the Act of 1854, every saline in the Louisiana purchase had, from time to time, been reserved by the legislation just reviewed, save the salines in the States of Kansas and Nebraska. To extend the system to those States as well

as to New Mexico, was hence required by the established policy. There was no reason why they should be excepted from that policy. It was a universal policy. It was a reasonable policy.

The Act of July 22, 1854 inspired by these views.

seems to have been

Section 10 provides for a Surveyor-General of Nebraska and Kansas Territories. Section 11 required him to cause the lands in the Territories to be surveyed. Section 13 provides for registers and receivers in the same Territories, who "Shall have the same powers, perform the same duties and be entitled to the same compensation as are or may be prescribed by law in relation to other land officers of the United States." The section also declares that "The President is hereby authorized to cause the surveyed lands to be exposed for sale, from time to time, in the same manner and upon the same terms and conditions as the other public lands of the United States."

The provisions of the Act of 1854, just enumerated, seem enough, of themselves, to work a reservation of the land in controversy, but the 4th section of the Act removes all doubt by saying "That none of the provisions of this Act shall extend to mineral or school lanus, salines, military or other reservations," etc.

Mr. Justice Davis delivered the opinion of

the court:

This is an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiffs in error, to recover the possession of three hundred and twenty acres of land in Nebraska, in possession of the State under claim of title. The plaintiffs base their title to the lands under location of military bounty land warrants at the land office in Nebraska City in September, 1859. These warrants were issued by virtue of the Military Bounty Land Act of September 28, 1850, which declares that such warrants may be located at any land office of the United States upon any of the public lands in such district then subject to private entry. The State of Nebraska, the real defendant in the case, insists that the locations were with out authority of law, because the lands on which the warrants were laid were saline lands and, therefore, not subject to entry. If this be so, there is an end of the case, and we are relieved of the necessity of considering the other questions raised by the record.

The policy of the government since the acquisition of the Northwest Territory and the inauguration of our land system, to reserve saltsprings from sale, has been uniform. The Act of 18th May, 1796, 1 Stat. at L., 464, the first to authorize a sale of the domain ceded by Virginia, is the basis of our present rectangular system of surveys. That Act required every surveyor to note in his field-book the true situation of all mines, salt-licks, and salt-springs; and reserves for the future disposal of the United States a well-known salt-spring on the Scioto River, and every other salt-spring which should be discovered.

These reservations were continued by the Act of May 10, 1800, 2 Stat. at L., 73, which created land districts in Ohio, with registers and receivers, and authorized sales by them; the preceding Act having recognized the Governor of the 668*] Northwest Territory *and the Secretary of the Treasury as the agents for the sale

of the lands. And the same policy was observed when provisions was made in 1804 for the disposal of the lands in the Indiana Territory (embracing what is now Illinois and Indiana). 2 Stat. at L., 277. It was then declared "That the several salt-springs within said Territory, with as many contiguous sections to each as shall be deemed necessary by the Presi dent, shall be reserved for the further disposal of the United States." Without referring particularly to the different Acts of Congress on the subject it is enough to say all the salines in the Virginia cession were reserved from sale and afterwards granted to the several States embraced in the ceded Territory. Congress, in the disposition of the public lands in the Mississippi Territory (2 Stat. at L., 548; 3 Stat. at L., 489), and in the Louisiana purchase, preserved the policy which it had applied to the country obtained from Virginia. Over all the territory acquired from France the general land system was extended. The same rules which were prescribed by law for the survey and sale of lands east of the Mississippi River were transferred to this new acquisition. 2 Stat. at L. 324. At the first sale of lands in this region which the 'resident was authorized to make, salt-springs and lands contiguous thereto were excepted. 2 Stat. at L., 391. And this exception was concreated. Prior to this time no portion of the tinued when, in 1811, a new land district was country north of the State of Louisiana had been brought into market. The Act of March 3, 1811, authorized this to be done, but the President, in offering the lands for sale, was directed to except salt-springs, lead-mines, and lanus contiguous thereto, which were reserved for the future disposal of the States to be carved out of this immense Territory, which included the present State of Nebraska. 2 Stat. at L., 662, § 10. And so particular was Congress not to depart from this policy, that in giving lands, in 1815, to the sufferers by the New Madrid earthquake, every lead-mine and saltspring were excluded from location. Indeed, in all the Acts creating new land districts in the Territory now occupied by the States of Arkansas and *Missouri, the manner [*669 of selling the public lands is not changed, nor is a sale of salines in any instance authorized. On the contrary, they incorporate the same reservations and exceptions which are contained in the Act of March 3, 1811. In all of them the Act of

May 18, 1796, is the rule of conduct for all surMay 10, 1800, is the rule for all registers, reveyors-general and their deputies, as the Act of quiring them to exclude from sale all saltsprings, with the sections containing them. In this state of the law of saline reservations, the Act of July 22, 1854, was passed. It is by did not work the reservation of every saline in no means certain that the Act of March 3, 1811, the Louisiana purchase; but without discussing this point, it is enough to say that the Act of 1854 leaves no doubt of the intention of Congress to extend to the territory embraced by the States of Kansas and Nebraska the same system that had been applied to the rest of the Louisiana purchase. There was certainly no reason why a long established policy, which had permeated the land system of the country, should be abandoned. On the contrary, there was every inducement to continue, for the benefit of

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