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II. It is not conceded that the mortgage creditors had a lien. The law of Louisiana allows and recognizes no mortgages against personal property or vessels as between her citizens.

Rev. Stat., 1869, p. 712; Civil Code, art. 3248, old ed.; Franklin v. Warfield, 8 Mart. (N. S.), 442; Wickham v. Levistones, 11 La. Ann., 702; Succession of Broderick, 12 La. Ann., 521.

The mortgage could not be enforced in any of the state courts, and neither of the United States Courts had jurisdiction of the parties to it, nor of the subject-matter.

III. Article 123 of the Constitution of Louisiana does not create a new rule as to privileges of vessels. It relates wholly to mortgages and privileges against the realty and the products of the realty. Its purpose was to break up the wide-spread and injurious system of tacit mortgages and privileges, which had no record of their existence, and rendered transactions in landed estates extremely precarious. It will be observed, in every article referred to, of the Constitution, of the Civil Code and the Revised Statutes, relative to the recording of privileges and mortgages, that it must be done in the parish where the property to be affected is situated.

For supplies furnished to this boat, which was enrolled in the Port of New Orleans, at Shreveport, if appellants' position be the true one, where should the claim for privilege be

recorded?

There has always been a maritime lien enforceable in admiralty for supplies to a domestic vessel, although for a time the remedy of process in rem was unlawfully suspended by the Rules and practice of the Supreme Court. The Constitution of the United States provides that the judicial power of the Government shall extend, among other things, "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." U. S. Const., art. 3, § 2, sub. 1.

This is confirmed by the laws of Oleron, the Black Book of the Admiralty, and all ancient treatises on the subject.

Subsequently there arose a strife between the common law courts and the admiralty courts, but in 1648, the jurisdiction of the admiralty court was settled by an ordinance, which gave the admiralty court cognizance and jurisdiction against the ship or vessel, among other things, "In all causes which concerned the repairing, victualing or furnishing provisions for the sending of such ships or vessels to sea."

Scoville's Collection, 1648, p. 147 § 100, Ben. Adm., 53.

"The civil law, the general maritime law, and the particular maritime Codes, without exception, extended this lien or privilege to all ships and vessels without distinction as to foreign or domestic ships." Ben. Adm., sec. 272. No reason can be adduced why there should be a lien on a foreign, more than on a domestic vessel, unless it be that the presence of the owner raises a presumption of credit given to him. The true criterion, whether contracts are within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, is their nature and subject-matter, as whether they are maritime contracts having reference to maritime service, maritime transactions or maritime casualties, without regard to the place where they are made.

Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall., 29, 20 L. ed., 98; especially see the brief of Mr. Loring, p. 10 (90), as to jurisdiction entertained by the Vice-Admiralty Court of Massachusetts, and before the adoption of the Constitution over case of supplies to a domestic vessel.

The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall., 555, 18 L. ed., 451.

The true doctrine in regard to admiralty liens upon domestic vessels is, that there has never been a time when there was not a lien in admiralty for materials furnished to a domestic vessel. True, the Supreme Court in 1858 amended the 12th Rule, so as to forbid the issuing of process. The lien itself, however, rested not in any rule of the court, but in well

mulgation or amendment of the Rule had nothing to do with the existence of the maritime lien; neither did local statutes. They were simply declaratory of the admiralty law, relative to liens or vessels. 7th Am. Law Review, p.-.

The Act of Congress passed in September, 1789, and familiarly known as the Judiciary Act, declared that the district courts "Shall al-known principles of admiralty law. The proso have exclusive cognizance of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors in all cases the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is competent to give it." 1 Bright. Dig., 230, § 11. The term "cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," in the Constitution and Judiciary Act, embraces such cases of a maritime nature and character, as were cognizable in the admiralty courts, at the time when the Constitution was adopted.

The Colony of New York, before the adoption of the United States Constitution, adopted and enacted the Statute of 15 Richard II., whereby jurisdiction in courts of admiralty was conceded over all maritime contracts.

Ben. Adm., § 176, et seq. Other Colonies had given still broader jurisdiction, § 167, et seq.

The admiralty jurisdiction of England, in the earliest times and for centuries afterwards, embraced all maritime contracts and torts; in other words, all contracts relative to the use or em ployment of a vessel or the furnishing of supplies or materials for the use of a vessel in

commerce.

Ben. Adm. § 146.

There is evidence in the case of The Genesee

Chief, 12 How., 444, and The Magnolia, 20 How., 296, 15 L. ed. 909, that the exact limit of admiralty jurisdiction was even then undetermined.

There is no decision of the Supreme Court which sustains the claim that there is no maritime lien for supplies furnished to a domestic vessel. Prior to the case of The General Smith, the lien had never been questioned; but the question was not involved directly in that case. At least, it does not appear that the vessel was engaged in foreign commerce, nor that the ancient maritime lien was insisted upon, the libelant seeming to have relied solely upon the existence of a lien by the statute or common law of Maryland.

In the case of The Planter (Peyroux v. Howard. 7 Pet., 324), at the top of p. 341, there is an intimation that the case of The General Smith did not decide the question of jurisdiction.

In the case of The Rock Island Bridge, 6|trict Court of the United States for the DisWall., 213, 18 L. ed., 753, the theory of the trict of Louisiana on the 10th day of June, claimants, which is supposed to be sustained 1871, by William Doyle and another, against by law, and which really rests solely upon the the steamer Lottawanna of New Orleans for authority of The General Smith, is rudely mariner's wages. The vessel being seized, lioverturned by the broad statement of this prin- bels of intervention were afterwards filed by ciple: The lien and the proceeding in rem are various parties, some for mariner's wages, correlative; where one exists, the other can be some for salvage services, some for supplies, taken," supplemented by the language of the materials and repairs furnished in the port of "Bold Buccleugh" 7 Moore P. C., 284, that New Orleans for the use of the steamer. "When a proceeding in rem is the proper On the 20th day of June, 1871, the appelcourse, then a maritime lien exists." lant, Catharine Rodd, administratrix, together with several commercial firms of the City of New Orleans, filed a libel of intervention by which they set up a mortgage on the vessel, given to them by the owner, on the 20th of May, 1871, and duly recorded in the customhouse on the 22d of May, to secure the payment of various promissory notes of the same date, given to said libelants by the said owner, and amounting to more than $14.000.

The Supreme Court now says, that process in rem is the proper course. It follows that there is a lien. Moreover, I insist that the language of the court in the case of The Rock Island Bridge, and the change in the 12th Rule. form a quasi adjudication of the Supreme Court upon this subject.

See, also, Wolf v. The Scow Selt, Chicago Legal News, Nov. 30, 1872; "Pathfinder," reported in Chicago Legal News, for January 14, 1873.

The furnishing of supplies implies the right to proceed in rem.

Davis v. Child, Davies, 78; The Kate Tremaine, Judge Benedict's Scrap Book; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 6 How., 392. And the contract being maritime, the material man is entitled to process.

The Phoebe, 1 Ware, 270; The Feronia, 17 L. T., 622; The Kate Tremaine, pp. 96, 103. But the Supreme Court itself has virtually overruled the case of The General Smith.

In the case of The Eddy, 5 Wall., 494, 18 L. ed., 488, the court says: "The contract being maritime, over which admiralty courts have jurisdiction, consequently either party may, in a proper case, enforce the lien by proceeding in rem." Similar language is used by the Supreme Court in the case of The N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchant's Bank, 6 How., 392.

The courts held that the amendment of the Rule in 1858 was retroactive, and that it applied to prior as well as to subsequent cases.

The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522, 17 L. ed. 180; The Potomac, 2 Black, 582, 17 L. ed., 263.

The rule confers no new jurisdiction. This jurisdiction was in the court before the rule which simply regulates the process to be issued for the enforcement of claims.

This court is now, for the first time, called upon to meet squarely the naked question, whether a material man has, by admiralty law, a maritime lien for supplies furnished to a domestic vessel in her home port. There can be no question as to the position which the Supreme Court will take upon the question, when it is presented for its judicial determination. That action is already foreshadowed in:

Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How.. 296. 15 L. ed., 909; The Rock Island Bridge, 6 Wall.. 213, 18 L. ed... 753; The Eddy, 5 Wall., 481, 18 L. ed., 486; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522, 17 L. ed., 180; The McNeil case, 13 Wall., 236, 20 L. ed. 624; The Merchants' Bank, and in the amendment of 12th Rule.

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion

of the court:

The libel in this case was filed in the Dis

The steamer, up to the 16th of May, had been engaged in the river trade on the Mississippi and Red Rivers, between New Orleans and Jefferson, in Texas, and was laid up for repairs in New Orleans on that day. Most of the claims for wages and supplies arose before the date of the mortgage, although some arose afterwards. The steamer was sold for $7,500, and after deducting expenses of sale, costs, salvage and wages of mariners (which were admitted to have preference) there remained a surplus of $4,64442, which the district court decreed to be paid pro rata to the mortgage creditors, to the exclusion of the claims for repairs and supplies. This decree was reversed by the circuit court on appeal, and the surplus was decreed to be paid pro rata to the claimants for repairs and supplies, to the exclusion of the mortgage creditors, the amount not being sufficient to pay either class of creditors in full. From the latter decree an appeal was taken to this court.

The principal question presented by the appeal, therefore, is, whether the furnishing to a vessel on her credit at her home port needful repairs and supplies, creates a maritime lien. If it does. such lien would take precedence of a mortgage given for the payment of money generally, and the decree must be affirmed. If it does not, the decree must be reversed, unless the appellees can sustain themselves on some other ground.

*This very question was decided by [*571 this court adversely to the lien more than fifty years ago in the case of The General Smith, reported in 4 Wheaton, 438, and that decision has ever since been adhered to, except occasionally in some of the district courts. A solemn judgment relied on so long by the commercial community as a rule of property and the law of the land ought, not to be overruled except for very cogent reasons. If, however. in the progress of investigation, and with the new lights that have been thrown upon the whole subject of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction, a more rational view of the question demands an adverse ruling in order to preserve harmony and logical consistency in the general system, the court might, perhaps, if no evil consequences of a glaring character were likely to ensue, feel constrained to adopt it. But if no such necessity exists, we ought not to permi

any consideration of mere expediency or love of | founded on natural reason and justice. Hence scientific completeness, to draw us into a sub- the adoption *by all commercial nations [*573 stantial change of the received law. The addi- (our own included) of the general maritime law tional security which has been extended to bills as the basis and groundwork of all their mariof sale and mortgages on ships and vessels time regulations. But no nation regards itself since the passage of the Act for recording them as precluded from making occasional modificain the custom-house; and the confidence with tions suited to its locality and the genius of its which purchasers and mortgagees have invest- own people and institutions, especially in mated money therein under the existing course of ters that are of merely local and municipal condecisions on this subject, have placed a large sequence and do not affect other nations. It amount of property at undue hazard, if those will be found, therefore, that the maritime decisions may lightly or without grave cause Codes of France, England, Sweden and other be disturbed. countries, are not one and the same in every

The ground on which we are asked to over-particular; but that, whilst there is a general rule the judgment in the case of The General Smith is, that by the general maritime law, ⚫ those who furnish necessary materials, repairs and supplies to a vessel, upon her credit, have a lien on such a vessel therefor, as well when furnished in her home port as when furnished in a foreign port, and that the courts of admiralty are bound to give effect to that lien.

correspondence between them arising from the fact that each adopts the essential principles, and the great mass of the general maritime law as the basis of its system, there are varying shades of difference corresponding to the respective territories, climate and genius of the people of each country respectively. Each state adopts the maritime law, not as a code having any independent or inherent force, proprio vigore, but as its own law, with such modifications and qualifications as it sees fit. Thus adopted and thus qualified in each case, it be comes the maritime law of the particular nation that adopts it. And without such voluntary adoption it would not be law. And thus it happens, that, from the general practice of com

the basis and groundwork of their respective maritime systems, the great mass of maritime law which is thus received by these nations in common, comes to be the common maritime law of the world.

This account of the maritime law, if correct, plainly shows that in particular matters, especially such as approach a merely municipal character, the received maritime law may differ in different countries without affecting the general integrity of the system as a harmonious whole. The government of one country may be willing to give to its citizens, who supply a ship with provisions at her home port where the owner himself resides, a lien on the ship; whilst that of another country may take a contrary view as to the expediency of such a rule. The difference between them in a matter that concerns only their own citizens, in each case cannot seriously affect the harmony [*574 and consistency of the common maritime law which each adopts and observes.

The proposition assumes that the general maritime law governs this case, and is binding on the courts of the United States. 572*] *But it is hardly necessary to argue that the maritime law is only so far operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and usages of that country. In this respect it is like international laws or the laws of war, which have the effect of law in no country any fur-mercial nations in making the same general law ther than they are accepted and received as such; or, like the case of the civil law, which forms the basis of most European laws, but which has the force of law in each State only so far as it is adopted therein, and with such modifications as are deemed expedient. The adoption of the common law by the several States in this Union also presents an analogous case. It is the basis of all the state laws; but is modified as each sees fit. Perhaps the maritime law is more uniformly followed by commercial nations than the civil and common laws are by those who use them. But, like those laws, however fixed, definite and beneficial the theoretical code of maritime law may be, it can have only so far the effect of law in any country as it is permitted to have. But the actual maritime law can hardly be said to have a fixed and definite form as to all the subjects which may be embraced within its scope. Whilst it is true that the great mass of maritime law is the same in all commercial countries, yet in each country peculiarities exist either as to This view of the subject does not in the some of the rules, or in the mode of enforcing slightest degree detract from the proper authem. Especially is this the case on the outside thority and respect due to that venerable law of boundaries of the law, where it comes in con- the sea, which has been the subject of such tact with or shades off into the local or munic-high encomiums from the ablest jurists of all ipal law of the particular country and affects only its own merchants or people in their relations to each other. Whereas in matters affecting the stranger or foreigner, the commonly received law of the whole commercial world is more assiduously observed-as, in justice, it should be. No one doubts that every nation may adopt its own maritime code. France may adopt one; England another; the United States a third; still, the convenience of the commercial world, bound together, as it is, by mutual relations of trade and intercourse, demands that, in all essential things wherein those relations bring them in contact, there should be a uniform law

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countries; it merely places it upon the just and logical grounds upon which it is accepted, and with proper qualifications, received with the binding force of law in all countries.

The proposition, therefore, that by the general maritime law a lien is given in cases of the kind now under consideration, does not advance the argument a single step, unless it be shown to be in accordance with the maritime law as accepted and received in the United States. It certainly has not been the maritime law of England for more than two centuries past; and whether it is the maritime law of this country depends upon questions which are not answered

by simply turning to the ordinary European treatises on maritime law, or the codes or ordinances of any particular country.

That we have a maritime law of our own, operative throughout the United States, cannot be doubted. The general system of maritime law which was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country when the Constitution was adopted, was most certainly intended and referred to when it was declared in that instrument that the judicial power of the United States shall extend "to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." But by what criterion are we to ascertain the precise limits of the law thus adopted? The Constitution does not define it. It does not declare whether it was intended to embrace the entire maritime law as expounded in the treatises, or only the limited and restricted system which was received in England, or lastly, such modification of both of these as was accepted and recognized as law in this country. Nor does the Constitution attempt to draw the boundary line between maritime law and local law; nor does it lay down any criterion for ascertaining that boundary. It assumes that the meaning 575*] *of the phrase "admiralty and maritime jurisdiction" is well understood. It treats this matter as it does the cognate ones of common law and equity, when it speaks of "cases in law and equity," or of "suits at common law," without defining those terms, assuming them to be known and understood.

One thing, however, is unquestionable: the Constitution must have referred to a system of law co-extensive with and operating uniformly in the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the Rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would heve defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign States.

rule of court make it broader than the judicial power may determine to be its true limits. And this boundary is to be ascertained by a reasonable and just construction of the words used in the Constitution, taken in connection with the whole instrument, and the purposes for which admiralty and maritime jurisdiction was grant ed to the Federal Government."

Guided by these sound principles, this court has felt itself at liberty to recognize the admiralty jurisdiction as extending to localities and subjects which, by the jealousy of the common law, were prohibited to it in England, but which fairly belong to it on every ground of reason when applied to the peculiar circumstances of this country, with its extended territories, its inland seas, and its navigable rivers, especially as the narrow restrictions of the English law had never prevailed on this side of the Alantic, even in colonial times.

The question as to the true limits of maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction is, undoubtedly, as Chief Justice Taney intimates, exclusively a judicial question, and no state law or Act of Congress can make it broader, or (it may be added) narrower, than the judicial power may determine those limits to be. But what the law is within those limits, assuming the general maritime law to be the basis of the system, depends on what has been received as law in the maritime usages of this country, and on such legislation as may have been competent to affect it.

To ascertain, therefore, what the maritime law of this country is, it is not enough to read the French, German, Italian and other foreign works on the subject, or the Codes which they have framed; but we must have regard to our own legal history, Constitution, legislation, usages and adjudications as well. The decisions of this court illustrative of these sources, and giving construction to the laws and Constitution, are especially to be considered; and when these fail us, we must resort to the principles by which they have been governed.

The question is discussed with great felicity But we must always remember that the court and judgment by Chief Justice Taney, deliver- cannot make the law; it can only de- [*577 ing the opinion of the court in the case of The clare it. If, within its proper scope, any change St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 526, 527, 17 L. ed., is desired in its rules, other than those of pro183, where he says: "Judicial power, in all cedure, it must be made by the Legislative Decases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, partment. It cannot be supposed that the is delegated by the Constitution to the Fed- framers of the Constitution contemplated that eral Government in general terms, and courts the law should forever remain unalterable. of this character had then been established Congress, undoubtedly, has authority under the in all commercial and maritime nations, differ- commercial power, if no other, to introduce ing, however, materially in different countries such changes as are likely to be needed. The in the powers and duties confided to them: scope of the maritime law, and that of comthe extent of the jurisdiction conferred de-mercial regulation are not coterminous, it is pending very much upon the character of the true, but the latter embraces much the largest government in which they were created; and portion of ground covered by the former. Under this circumstance, with the general terms of the it Congress has regulated the registry, enrollgrant, rendered it difficult to define the exact limits of its power in the United States. This ment, license and nationality of ships and vesdifficulty was increased by the complex charac- sels; the method of recording bills of sale and ter of our government, where separate and dis- mortgages thereon; the rights and duties of tinct specified powers of sovereignty are exerseamen; the limitations of the responsibility of cised by the United States and a State inde- ship-owners for the negligence and misconduct pendently of each other within the same terri- of their captains and crews; and many other torial limits. And the reports of the decisions things of a character truly maritime. And with of the court will show that the subject has often regard to the question now under consideration, been before it, and carefully considered, with- namely: the rights of material men in reference out being able to fix with precision its definite to supplies and repairs furnished to a vessel in boundaries; but certainly no state law can en- her home port, there does not seem to be any 576*] large *it, nor can an Act of Congress or great reason to doubt that Congress might adopt

a uniform rule for the whole country, though, | plies, repairs or other necessaries, was in force
of course, this will be a matter for considera-
tion should the question ever be directly pre-
sented for adjudication.

same.

until May 6, 1872, when the new Rule was pro-
mulgated. Now, this case was commenced in the
district court a year previous to this, and final
judgment in the district court was rendered two
months previous. It is true that the judgment
of the circuit court, on appeal, was not rendered
until the 3d day of June, 1872; but if the new
tion of the court, it could hardly have been ap-
plied to the case in its then position. All the
proceedings had been based and shaped upon
other grounds and theories, and not upon the
existence of that rule. It would not have been
just to the other parties to apply to them a rule
which was not in existence when they were
carrying on the litigation.

As to the recent change in the Admiralty
Rule referred to, it is sufficient to say, that it
was simply intended to remove all obstructions
and embarrassments in the way of instituting
proceedings in rem in all cases where liens exist
by law, and not to create any new lien, which,
of course, this court could not do in any event,
since a lien is a right of property, and not a
mere matter of procedure.

On this subject the remarks of Mr. Justice Nelson, in delivering the opinion of the court in Bk. v. Smith, 7 Wall., 655, 656, 19 L. ed. 213 (which established the validity and effect of the Act respecting the recording of mort-Rule had at that time been brought to the attengages on vessels in the custom house), arc pertinent. He says: "Ships or vessels of the United States are creatures of the legislation of Congress. None can be denominated such, or be entitled to the benefits or privileges thereof, except those registered or enrolled according to the Act of September 1, 1789; and those which, after the last day of March, 1793, shall be registered or enrolled in pursuance of the Act of 31st December, 1792, and must be wholly owned by 578*] a citizen or citizens of the United* States, and to be commanded by a citizen of the Congress having created, as it were, this species of property, and conferred upon its chief value under the power given in the Constitution to regulate commerce, we perceive no reason for entertaining any serious doubt but that this power may be extended to the security and protection of the rights and title of all persons dealing therein. The judicial mind seems to have generally taken this direc tion." This case was subsequently affirmed by Aldrich v. Etna Co., 8 Wall., 491, 19 L. ed., 473. Be this, however, as it may, and whether the power of Congress is or is not sufficient to amend the law on this subject (if amendment is desirable), this court is bound to declare the law as it now stands. And according to the maritime law as accepted and received in this country, we feel bound to declare that no such lien exists as is claimed by the appellees in this case. The adjudications of this court before referred to, which it is unnecessary to review, are conclusive on the subject; and we see no sufficient ground for disturbing them.

This disposes of the principal question in the

case.

But it is alleged by the appellees that by the law of Louisiana they have a privilege for their claims, giving them a lien on the vessel and her proceeds; and that the court was bound to enforce this lien in their behalf, though not strictly a maritime lien.

On examining the record, however, it appears that the appellees never caused their lien (if they had one) to be recorded according to the requirements of the state law. By the 123d article of the Constitution of Louisiana, adopted in 1869, it is declared that no "mortgage or privilege shall hereafter affect third parties, unless recorded in the parish where the property to be affected is situated," And an Act of the Legislature, passed since that time, adopts the very terms of the constitutional provision. And a further Act provides that if the privilege be not in writing, the facts on which it is based must 579*] be stated in an *affidavit, which must be recorded. Rev. Civ. Code, Arts. 3273, 3274, 3093. None of these requisites having been performed, no lien can be claimed under the state law.

But if there were any doubt on this subject, the case of the appellees is met by another difficulty. The Admiralty Rule of 1859, which precluded the district courts from entertaining pro. endings in rem against domestic ships for sup

Had the lien been perfected, and had the Rule not stood in the way, the principles that have heretofore governed the practice of the district courts exercising admiralty jurisdiction, and which have been repeatedly sanctioned by this court, would undoubtedly have authorized the material men to file a libel against the vessel or its proceeds. The General Smith, 4 Wheat., 438; Peyroux v. Howard, 7 Pet., 324; The Orleans v. Phœbus, 11 Pet., 175; The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 522, 17 L. ed. 180. It seems *to [*580 be settled in our jurisprudence that so long as Congress does not enterpose to regulate the subject, the rights of material men furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her home port may be regulated in each State by state legislation. State laws, it is true, cannot exclude the contract for furnishing such necessaries from the domain of admiralty jurisdiction, for it is a maritime contract, and they cannot alter the limits of that jurisdiction; nor can they confer it upon the state courts so as to enable them to proceed in rem for the enforcement of liens created by such state laws, for it is exclusively conferred upon the District Courts of the United States. They can only authorize the enforcement thereof by common law remedies, or such remedies as are equivalent thereto. But the District Courts of the United States having jurisdiction of the contract as a maritime one, may enforce liens given for its security, even when created by state laws. Cases supra. The practice may be somewhat anomalous, but it has existed from the origin of the government and, perhaps, was originally superinduced by the fact that prior to the adoption of the Constitution, liens of this sort created by state laws had been enforced by the state courts of admiralty; and as those courts were immediately succeeded by the District Courts of the United States, and in several instances the judge of the state court was transferred to the district court, it was natural, in the infancy of federal legislation on commercial subjects, for the latter courts to entertain jurisdiction over the same classes of cases, in every respect as the state courts had done, without due regard

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