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to the new relations which the States had assumed towards the maritime law and admiralty jurisdiction. For example: in 1784, the Legislature of Pennsylvania passed a law allowing persons concerned in building, repairing, fitting out and furnishing vessels for a voyage, to sue in admiralty as mariners sue for wages. Two cases, those of The Collier and The Enterprise, arising under this law, and coming before the Admiralty Court of Pennsylvania, are reported 581*] in *Judge Hopkinson's works, Vol. 3, pp. 131, 171 [S. C., Bee., 345]. No doubt other cases of the same kind occurred in the courts of other States.

But, whatever may have been the origin of the practice, and whether or not it was based on the soundest principles, it became firmly settled, and it is now too late to question its validity.

It is true that the inconveniences arising from the often intricate and conflicting state laws creating such liens, induced this court in December Term, 1858, to abrogate that portion of the 12th Admiralty Rule of 1844 which allowed proceedings in rem against domestic ships for repairs and supplies furnished in the home port, and to allow proceedings in personam only in such cases. But we have now restored the Rule of 1844, or, rather, we have made it general in its terms, giving to material men in all cases their option to proceed either in rem or in personam. Of course this modification of the Rule cannot avail where no lien exists; but where one does exist, no matter by what law, it removes all obstacles to a proceeding in rem, if credit is given to the vessel.

It would, undoubtedly, be far more satisfactory to have a uniform law regulating such liens, but until such a law be adopted (supposing Congress to have the power) the authority of the States to legislate on the subject seems to be conceded by the uniform course of decisions.

Indeed, there is quite an extensive field of border legislation on commercial subjects (generally local in character) which may be regulated by state laws until Congress interposes, and thereby excludes further state legislation. Pilotage is one of the subjects in this category. So far as Congress has interposed, its authority is supreme and exclusive; but where it has not done so, the matter is still left to the regulation of state laws. And yet this exercise by the States of the power to regulate pilotage has not withdrawn the subject and, indeed, cannot 582*] withdraw it from the admiralty *jurisdiction of the district courts. Cooley v. War dens, 12 How., 299; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall., 236, 20 L. ed., 624. And, of course, as before intimated, this jurisdiction of the State Legislatures in such cases is subject to be terminated at any time by Congress assuming the control. In some cases this is not so desirable as in others, but in the one under consideration, if Congress has the power to intervene, it is greatly to be desired that it should do so. It would be better to have the subject regulated by the general maritime law of the country than by differing state laws. The evils arising from conflicting lien laws passed by the several States are forcibly set forth by Chief Justice Taney, in the case of The St. Lawrence, before cited. It may be added that the existence of

secret liens is not in accord with the spirit of our commercial usages, and a uniform law by which the liens in question should be required within a reasonable time to be placed on record in the custom-house like mortgages, and otherwise properly regulated, would be of great advantage to the business community.

But there is another mode in which the appellees, if they had a valid lien, could come into the district court and claim the benefit thereof, namely: by a petition for the application of the surplus proceeds of the vessel to the payment of their debts, under the 43d Admiralty Rule. The court has power to distribute surplus proceeds to all those who can show a vested interest therein, in the order of their several priorities, no matter how their claims originated. Schuchardt v. Babbage (The Angelique), 19 How., 239, 15 L. ed., 625. The propriety of such a distribution in the admiralty has been questioned on the ground that the court would thereby draw to itself equity jurisdiction. The Neptune, 3 Knapp, P. C., 111. But it is a wholesome jurisdiction very commonly exercised by nearly all superior courts to distribute a fund rightfully in its possession to those who are legally entitled to it; and there is no sound reason why admiralty courts should not do the same. If a case should be so [*583 complicated as to require the interposition of a court of equity, the district court could refuse to act, and refer the parties to a more competent tribunal. See cases reviewed in 1 Conkl. Adm., pp., 48-66, 2d ed.

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In this case the appellants themselves have no maritime lien, but merely a mortgage to secure an ordinary debt not founded on a maritime contract. They, therefore have no standing in court, except under the 43d Admiralty Rule, and in the manner above indicated. Their libel was inadmissible, even under the Admiralty Rule as recently modified. Bogart v. The John Jay, 17 How., 399, 15 L. ed. 95. before the final decree they filed a petition for the surplus proceeds, and, as there is no question in the case about fraudulent preference under the Bankrupt Law, they are entitled to those proceeds towards satisfaction of their mortgage.

But

The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and it is ordered that the record be remanded, with instructions to enter a decree in favor of the appellants, in conformity with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Clifford, dissenting: Controversy, sometimes of an embittered character, existed in the courts of the parent country respecting the jurisdiction of the admiralty court for a century before the American Colonies separated from that country and proclaimed their independence. Differences of opinion also have existed here as to the proper extent of that jurisdiction ever since the adoption of the Federal Constitution, as evidneced by the decisions of the Supreme Court at different periods in our judicial history.

Attempt was made at an early period to limit the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts to tidewaters, and to exclude its exercise altogether from waters within the body of a county, whether the waters were or were not affected by the ebb and flow of the tide. Express decision to the effect that the admiralty had ro

by no means satisfactory, and expedients to obviate the embarrassment were also attempted by the courts, all of which were equally unsuccessful, until the Supreme Court was brought face to face with the question whether the rule of decision that the jurisdiction of the admiralty was limited to the ebb and flow of the tide could be upheld as a correct exposition of that clause of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.

584* jurisdiction even in a suit for *seamen's | furnish a remedy for the difficulty, which was
wages, was made in the case of The Jefferson, 10
Wheat., 428, except in cases where the service
is substantially performed upon the sea or upon
waters within the ebb and flow of the tide.
Jurisdiction of the admiralty courts at that
period in the parent country did not extend to
any case where the common law courts could
give the parties a remedy in a trial by jury, and
the theory here for a long time was that the
clause of the 9th section of the Judiciary Act
which saves to suitors the right to a common
law remedy, where the common law is compe-
tent to give it, excluded all cases from the ju-
risdiction of the admiralty courts if the cause of
action arose or accrued infra corpus comitatus.
Protracted acquiescence in that theory gave it
for a time the force of law, until the question
was presented directly to the Supreme Court,
when the whole theory was completely over-
turned in all cases where the cause of action,
whether tort or contract, had respect to acts
done or service performed upon tide-waters.
Waring v. Clarke, 5 How., 452.

Doubts of a perplexing character arose in some of the circuits whether affreightment contracts were cognizable in the admiralty, which ultimately culminated in an absolute denial of the jurisdiction in all such cases. Wide differences of opinion upon the subject existed, and in order to its final settlement the question was presented to the Supreme Court in its whole length and breadth. Nav. Co. v. Bk. [The Leaington], 6 How., 392.

Nothing was left undone in that case, on either side, which could be accomplished by a skillful argument and indefatigable research. Two of the propositions, one selected from each side, will serve to illustrate the nature of the contention and the wide range of the discussion. By the appellants it was insisted that the district courts had no jurisdiction over such a contract, because it was made on land, within the body of a county, for the transportation of 585*] goods in a described route over inland waters landlocked the whole way, and because the contemplated voyage terminated infra fauces terræ. Opposed to that, the appellees contended that in all cases of contract the question is, whether the contract or service to be performed is in its nature maritime, and that in all cases of maritime contract the proceeding may be in rem or in personam, at the option of the libelant. Elaborate discussion followed, but the Supreme Court silenced forever all well founded doubts upon that subject.

Such jurisdiction, however, was in the united view of the Supreme Court at that time, limited to tide-waters; nor did either of the learned justices who delivered the opinions of the court in those cases even intimate that the court could entertain appellate jurisdiction in such a case if the cause of action consisted of acts done or service performed on waters not affected by the ebb and flow of the tide.

Admiralty jurisdiction, by virtue of those decisions, continued in our jurisprudence to be limited to the ebb and flow of the tide for more than a quarter of a century, in spite of the deep seated dissatisfaction which existed in all parts of the country interested in Western commerce or in the navigation of the great lakes and rivers of that portion of the Union. Subsequent attempt was made by Congress to

Opposition to change induced the cry of stare decisis, just as when the argument was presented that the admiralty jurisdiction followed the tide even within the body of a county. Such a cry proved to be insuflicient to restrain the advance of admiralty jurisdiction or [*586 to prevent it from entering even into the acknowledged limits of States having tide-waters within their borders, and it was again destined to a still greater defeat when it was invoked as the means of perpetuating the great error that the admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to the great lakes and fresh water rivers of our country.

Public duty required the court to review the former case, and the great magistrate presiding over the court did not hesitate to reverse the rule of decision there established and to determine to the effect that the admiralty jurisdiction is not limited to tide-waters, and that it extended to all public lakes and rivers used for the purpose of commerce and navigation between the States or for foreign trade. Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How., 454.

Strenuous effort was subsequently made to induce the court to qualify the rule there laid down, or to restrict its application so that the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts should not extend to acts done or service performed within the body of a county, if the waters were above the flux and reflux of the tide, but this court refused to adopt any such qualification, and reaffirmed, in the most authoritative manner, the rule previously announced in the two leading cases upon those subjects. Jackson v. The Magnolia, 20 How., 298, 15 L. ed., 910; Waring v. Clarke, supra; Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How., 454.

Unquestionably, the jurisdiction of the admiralty is, by those cases, made to depend upon the navigable character of the water, and not upon the ebb and flow of the tide, and the court say, in the case last cited, if the water is navigable, it is deemed to be public, and if public, it is regarded as within the legitimate scope of the admiralty jurisdiction of the Constitution.

Except for one or two expressions contained in the opinion of the Chief Justice, which are much intensified in the head note of the case, and which are repeated in the opinion in the case of The Magnolia, those two decisions would, in all probability, have settled [*587 the general question of admiralty jurisdiction under the Constitution, free from several perplexing embarrassments which presented themselves in subsequent litigations. Considerable weight is given, in those opinions, to the circumstance that the great lakes and fresh water rivers are the theater of extended commerce between different States and with foreign na

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tions, and this court subsequently fell into the error that the admiralty jurisdiction of the district courts was limited by the commercial power of the Constitution, and decided in two cases that an affreightment contract for the transportation of goods from one port in a State to another port in the same State, or that a contract for necessary repairs and supplies furnished to a vessel in such a trade, is not within the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. Allen v. Newberry, 21 How., 245, 16 L. ed., 111; Maguire v. Card, 21 How., 250, 16 L. ed. 118.

Such an error was too palpable not to attract the attention of the court as soon as a case was presented involving the same question, and two or three years later, such a question was presented in the form of a libel for a collision, and the court unanimously decided that the admiralty jurisdiction was conferred by the Constitution; that in cases of tort the question is wholly unaffected by the consideration that the ship was not engaged in foreign commerce or in commerce between the States; that the jurisdiction whether the cause of action is contract or tort, does not depend on the regulations of commerce; that the two matters of jurisdiction are entirely distinct things, and that they were conferred by separate and distinct grants; that locality is the test of jurisdiction in cases of tort, and that, consequently, if the wrongful act is done on navigable waters, the case is one properly cognizable in the admiralty courts. The Commerce, 1 Black, 578, 17 L. ed., 109.

Attention was again called to those two cases in an affreightment suit, when they were both distinctly overruled without hesitation, and the whole court decided that contracts, claims or service purely maritime and touching 588*] *rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation, are of admiralty connizance and properly cognizable in the district courts. The Belfast, 7 Wall., 637, 19 L. ed. 270. Pending these difficulties and before the Supreme Court decided that the Judiciary Act extended the admiralty jurisdiction over all our navigable waters, the restriction that it did not extend to voyages from a port in one State to another port in the same State had become incorporated into the Act of Congress passed professedly to extend such jurisdiction to the great lakes and the rivers connected with the same; but the Supreme Court, in view of the constant and perplexing embarrassment growing out of that restriction, did not hesitate to decide that the Act of Congress in that regard had become obsolete and inoperative, and that the admiralty jurisdiction created by the Constitution and conferred by the Judiciary Act was the same everywhere within the United States, and that every distinction between tidewaters and other navigable waters was in that regard obliterated and overruled. The Eagle, 8 Wall., 20, 19 L. ed. 368.

Erroneous theories also became prevalent in certain quarters in respect to the true nature of the liability of the owners of ships and vessels for necessary repairs and supplies furnished to the master on the credit of the ship, that the burden of proof was in all cases upon the merchant to show both that the ship needed such necessaries and that the master was justified in resorting to the credit of the vessel. Decrees to

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that effect were rendered in the circuit courts, but on appeal to this court the error was corrected and the true rule applied in the case. The Lulu, 10 Wall., 197, 19 L. ed. 907; The Grapeshot, 9 Wall., 129, 19 L. ed., 651.

Where it appears that the repairs and supplies are necessary to enable the ship to proceed on her voyage the presumption is, if they are furnished in good faith, that the ship as well as the master and owner is responsible to those who supplied such necessaries unless it appears that the master had funds which he ought to have applied to those objects, [*589 and that the furnishers knew or ought to have known those facts. The Kalorama, 10 Wall., 205, 19 L. ed. 941; The Custer, 10 Wall., 215, 19 L. ed. 944.

Sufficient has been remarked to show that the several decisions referred to had the effect to remove every stumbling-block in the way of the full legitimate exercise of admiralty jurisdiction except two-the one arising from the long acquiescence of the legal profession in the opinion that the admiralty courts could not take cognizance of suits founded upon marine policies of insurance, and the other growing out of an early decision of this court which it is supposed prohibits the admiralty courts from taking jurisdiction of a libel in rem filed by a material man to enforce a contract for necessary repairs and supplies furnished to a ship in her home port.

Happily, the first of the two obstructions mentioned is removed by a more recent decision of this court, and it is much to be regretted that the majority of this court have decided not to remove the other until they "have" a more "convenient season" to accomplish that great purpose. Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 11 Wall., 21, 20 L. ed. 96.

error,

Promptitude in correcting such an when it is discovered, is very desirable, as the longer it is suffered to prevail the greater is the danger that the correction will impair vested rights. Justice is slow but sure, and it is not doubted that sooner or later the correction will come, as the rule of decision which prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction in such a case is manifestly founded in mistake.

Enough of the facts of the case appear in the opinion of the court without reproducing to much extent the details of the evidence. Suffice it to say, that the controversy has respect to the balance of a fund in the registry of the district court, derived from the sale of a steamer seized and sold for the payment of seamen's wages. Both parties in this court were interveners in the district court. Appellants claim what remains of the proceeds of the sale as mortgagees by virtue of a mortgage of the steamer executed to them by the owner. [*590 On the other hand, the appellees make claim to the same by virtue of the lien which they insist they have for repairs and necessary supplies furnished to the master on the credit of the vessel. Proofs were taken and the parties heard, and the district court ultimately determined that the mortgagees were entitled to the balance of the fund. Due appeal was taken by the interveners who furnished the repairs and supplies, to the circuit court, where the parties were again heard, and the circuit court reversed the decree of the district court and en

tered a decree in favor of the interveners who furnished the repairs and supplies. Prompt appeal was taken by the intervening mortgagees

to this court from that decree.

which it conferred was that he might retain the ship in his possession until he was paid the money due him for the repairs made or the supplies furnished.

at

Undisputed matters need not be discussed; consequently, it may be assumed that a contract for necessary repairs or supplies in a maritime contract, whether the vessel was home or abroad when the repairs and [*592 supplies were made and furnished; and it may also be assumed that neither a contract for building a ship nor to furnish the materials for the construction of the same is a maritime contract, because such contracts are not directly connected with maritime commerce. They are contracts made on land and are to be performed on land. Contractors of the kind collect their materials very largely from the forest and the mines, and until the ship is launched there is no necessary connection between the subjectmatter of the contract and her subsequent employment as a vehicle of commerce and navigation. [Ferry Co. v. Beers] The Jefferson, 20 How., 400, 15 L. ed. 964; Roach v. Chapman, 22 How., 129, 16 L. ed. 294; Morewood v. Enequist, 23 How., 494, 16 L. ed. 517; Young v. The Orpheus, 2 Cliff., 36; Edwards v. Elliott, ante, 487.

Two errors are assigned, in substance and effect as follows: (1) That the circuit court erred in giving effect to the new twelfth Admiralty Rule, which had not been adopted when the libels of intervention were filed. (2) That the circuit court erred in awarding the fund to the material men, as it is not shown that such creditors have any privilege by the laws of the State. Contracts or claims for service or damage purely maritime and touching rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation are cognizable in the admiralty. Whenever a maritime lien arises in such a contract or claim, as in controversies respecting repairs made or supplies furnished to a ship, or in case of collision, the libelant may pursue his remedy, whether it be for a breach of a maritime contract or for a marine tort, by a suit in rem against the vessel, or by a suit in personam against the master and owner in cases where they are jointly liable for the alleged default. By the civil law a lien upon the ship is given, without any express contract, to those who repair the vessel or furnish her with necessary supplies, whether the vessel was at her home port or abroad when the repairs and supplies were made and furnished. Will. & Br. Pr., 154; The John, 3 Rob. Adm., 288; Harmer v. Bell, 7 Moore P. C., 267; 3 Kent, Com., 12th ed., 168; 3 Kent, Com., 169, n. a. 591*] *Every man, says Abboott, who had repaired or fitted out a ship, or lent money to be employed in those services, had by the law of Rome, and still possesses in those nations which have adopted the civil law as the basis of their jurisprudence, a privilege or right of payment in preference to other creditors upon the value Support to the first proposition is chiefly of the ship itself without any instrument of drawn from a decision of this court, which it is hypothecation, or any express contract or agree- supposed establishes that rule of decision. The ment, subjecting the ship to such a claim. Abb. General Smith, 4 Wheat., 443. Claims of the Ship., 142. "Qui in navem exstruendam vel in- kind, the court admit, in that case, give rise struendam credidit vel etiam emendam privile- to a maritime lien where the repairs or supplies gium habet." Dig., L. XLII., tit. 5, 1. 26. “Quod are furnished to a foreign ship or to a ship in a quis navis fabricandæ, vel emenda vel armendo, port of a State to which the ship does not bevel instruendæ causa, vel quoquo modo cred-long, and that the general maritime law followiderit vel ob navem venditam petat, habet privilegium post fiscum." Dig., L. XLII., tit. 5, 1. 34; Code du Com., Art., 197; French Code, liv. 1, tit. 12, art. 3; The Harrison, 2 Abb. (U. S.), 74; Ex parte Kirkland, 12 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 301; The Nestor, 1 Sumn:, 79. Wherever a maritime lien exists, it gives a claim upon the ship a jus ad rem to be carried into effect by legal process, and the claim travels with the ship into whosesoever possession she may come, and is enforced in the court of admiralty by a proceeding in rem. Add. Cont., 6th ed., 273; 1 Wynn, Life of Leoline Jenkins, LXXVI. to XCIX.

Beyond all doubt such is the rule of the civil law, but the only lien recognized by the common law in such cases, independent of statutory regulations, is the possessory lien which arises out of and is dependent upon the possession of the ship, as in cases where goods are delivered to an artisan or tradesman to be manufactured or repaired. Such a lien, as understood at common law, did not attach unless the ship was in the possession of the person who set up the claim, and the extent of the privilege

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Repairs and supplies were furnished by the intervening appellees to the steamer in her home port, and they claim that they have a lien upon the balance of the fund in the registry of the court for the payment of their demand, which is resisted by the appellants chiefly upon two grounds: (1) They deny that any maritime lien arises in such a case. (2) Because, as they contend, they, the appellants, have a superior claim to what remains of the fund by virtue of the mortgage of the steamer executed to them by the owner.

ing the civil law, gives the party a lien on the ship itself for his security, and that he may well maintain a suit in rem in the admiralty to enforce his right. All the authorities, ancient and modern, admit that proposition; but the court proceed to say that, in respect to repairs and necessaries in the port or State to which the ship belongs, the case is governed altogether by the municipal *law of that State, and [*593 that no lien is implied unless it is recognized by that law. Taken as a whole, the opinion in that case is more unsatisfactory than any one ever given in a commercial case by that learned judge. It is unaccountable, says a distinguished jurist, that Judge Story, in delivering the opinion of the court on a question so interesting and pregnant, should have done so little. He gives but one page to the entire opinion, cites no authorities, and treats the subject in a slight and unsatisfactory manner. 7 Am. L. Rev., 2. Other judges have attempted to give the reason for the distinction set up in that case between the remedy given to a party who furnishes necessary repairs and supplies to a ship in the port of a State other than that

to which she belongs and the remedy given to the party who furnishes like necessaries to a domestic ship. Those reasons are frankly stated by the late Chief Justice Taney in endeavoring to vindicate the action of the court in denying the process in rem to a party who had furnished such necessaries to a domestic ship in a State where the state law made such claims a lien upon the vessel. His view is, that the Supreme Court, being invested with the power to make rules, may in its discretion grant or withhold the right to use the process in rem as may seem best suited to promote the ends of justice in such controversies; that the process in rem is granted to the party furnishing necessaries to a foreign ship or a ship in the port of a State to which she does not belong because "the supplies," in such a case, "are presumed to be furnished on the credit of the vessel," and that the process in rem is denied to the party who furnishes such necessaries to the domestic ship because it is presumed that they were "furnished on the personal credit of the owner or master." The St. Lawrence, 1 Black, 527, 17 L. ed. 183.

Sometimes it is said that the process is granted in the former case because the presumption is that the owner is absent, and that it is denied in the latter case because the presumption is that the owner is present, which is but another mode of stating the same rule of 594*] decision. Unless the credit is given to the ship, the true rule is that there is no maritime lien in either case, and if the credit is given to the ship, reason and sound policy dictate that the party furnishing the necessary repairs and supplies to the domestic ship should be allowed to proceed against the ship, as well as the party who afforded similar relief to the foreign ship or to the ship of a State to which she did not belong.

Examples almost without number may be given to illustrate the impolicy, injustice and absurdity of a rule of decision founded on such a distinction. Suppose a vessel, whose home port is York, Maine, all of whose owners ex cept one resided in Portsmouth, N. H., nine miles distant. Well manned and equipped the vessel starts on a voyage for St. Johns, but meeting with rough weather and receiving damage she puts into Eastport, four hundred miles distant from her home port, for repairs and supplies. Material men there, under the supposed rule of decision, would have no maritime lien upon the ship, and the master being unknown there and without credit, the necessary repairs and supplies could not be procured, although the presumption of the law is that the owners in such a case are present, because the Port of Eastport is in the State to which the ship belongs. Unable to find relief there for the want of credit, the ship being only crippled and not entirely disabled, may possibly be able to return; and suppose the master decides to make the attempt, and that the ship arrives in safety off the port of Portsmouth, and puts in there for the relief she vainly sought in her first port of refuge, it may now be assumed that she will meet with no difficulty at that port in obtain ing credit, as the material men there will have a lien upon the ship because the legal presumption is that the owners are absent, though they all reside there except one, whose residence is only nine miles distant.

Apply these suggestions to the different local

ities of navigation, and it will be easy to see that such rules of decision must lead to unparalleled mischiefs and perplexities. Commerce requires more sensible rules of decision, and those whose interests are embarked in such perilous pursuits are entitled to better [*595 protection than such rules of decision afford. Executory contracts for repairs and supplies to a domestic ship, it is admitted, are as much within the jurisdiction of the admiralty court as one for similar necessaries furnished to a foreign ship, or to the ship of a State other than that to which the ship belongs; but the argument of the opinion under consideration is, that the party in the case of the domestic ship must seek his remedy against the person and not against the vessel. What Judge Story's reasons were for his conclusion does not appear, as he gave none, but it is safe to conclude, in the absence of such, that the best which exist are those given by the organ of the court in the case last cited. The St. Lawrence, supra. He expressly conceded that the contract was a maritime contract, and placed the vindication of the prior decision upon the ground that the process in rem given for repairs and supplies to a domestic vessel by the court of admiralty, in those countries where the principles of the civil law prevail, is no part of the general maritime Code, and he insists that it is obvious that the court, in the prior case, based the decision upon the ground that the laws of those countries are local laws. Here, then, all interested in the question may see the fatal error pervading those decisions, which is that the rule of decision embodied in the several maritime Codes are mere local laws, each of the particular country where the Code was framed and ordained.

Unless the principles embodied in the ordinances, treatises, sea laws, digests and Codes adopted by the countries where the civil law prevails, constitute, to the extent that they concur in the rule of decision, the general maritime Code as known in judicial investigation, it is difficult even to imagine what does, as it is known to every legal reader of judicial history that those countries never convened, as in a Congress of Nations, and ordained a system of maritime regulations which can properly be regarded as the standard authority upon that subject.

*Such a maritime Code as that re- [*596 ferred to in that opinion does not exist; and, if not, and all the Codes of the respective countries which adopt the civil law are to be regarded as mere local laws, the inquiry arises: from what source came the rule of decision that the district courts, as courts of admiralty, have jurisdiction over contracts for repairs and supplies furnished to a foreign ship or to the ship of a State to which the ship does not belong, or over contracts of affreightment. Certainly, the rule of decision was not derived from the jurisprudence of the parent country as administered at the period of the Revolution, as the prohibition of the common law courts had, long before that event, compelled the admiralty to relinquish all claim to the exercise of such jurisdiction.

Support to such a claim of jurisdiction could not be drawn from that source and, if not, and the civil law Codes are to be regarded as mere local laws, it is impossible to see, if the views of the appellants are correct, that the admiral

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