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ceive them, and he kept them ready to pay | bond, by_the neglect of Gavinzel on his departill they lost all value by the termination of ture to Europe, to appoint an attorney in fact the war. to receive the money. But the last defense, as we have seen, is not sustained, and in regard to the first, this court has held substantially that contracts, based on confederate currency, will be enforced when made in the usual course of business between persons resident in the insurgent States, and not made in furtherance of the rebellion.

And it is contended by him, as the tender was prevented by the omission of Gavinzel to appoint an attorney in fact to represent him in his absence, the bond is discharged as completely as if the tender had been actually made and accepted.

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319*] *This would be so if Gavinzel was in default for not appointing an attorney. But Whether or not this was a wagering conthe bond does not require him to make the ap- tract, and therefore void, is not a question in pointment, nor to remain in Richmond. It the case, as no objection to it on that ground gives Crump the right to make the tender, if was taken in the answer or on the argument. the war continued after the first of April, The contract was plainly a contract of haz1864, but the tender could only be made in ard-mutual hazard. Each party took risks, Richmond, and only to Gavinzel or to an attor- and each received a consideration for the risk ney in fact in person who was authorized to thus taken. Manifestly, the leading object receive payment. In other words, the money Gavinzel had in the transaction was to loan was payable if Gavinzel was in Richmond, or his money, so that it would not be repaid until had an agent there to receive it, but was not the war closed, whether this event occurred payable if he was not there, or had no agent before or after the first of April, 1864; and in the city. Crump may have understood that this object, on the contingency of his being his right to discharge the bond by the tender able to go to Europe, the terms of his contract was to become absolute if the war lasted (and enabled him to accomplish. If the war ended so long as it lasted) after April 1, 1864, but by April, 1864, as he swears he thought it the contract does not admit of a construction would, his purpose was attained, whether he consistent with that understanding. And the went to Europe or not. But if the war concourt cannot, without evidence authorizing it tinued longer, and he was able to get out of to be done, import words into the contract the Confederacy, he was in as good condition which would make it materially different in a Ias if the war had terminated when he expected vital particular from what it now is. There is it would. There were, however, difficulties to no occasion to introduce parol evidence to ex-be encountered in getting through the lines, plain anything in the contract, because there is no ambiguity about it, and it is not competent by this sort of evidence to alter the terms of a contract, by showing that there was an antecedent parol agreement or understanding between the parties different in a material particular from that which the contract contained. But if it were competent, the evidence fails to establish any such antecedent agreement. Gavinzel and Crump are the only witnesses, and their statements are inconsistent one with the other. Both agree that Gavinzel was get ting ready to go to Europe, if possible; but according to Crump's evidence Gavinzel said he would certainly be back in April, 1864, and if not, he would have some one in Richmond to act for him. On the contrary, Gavinzel says he told Crump he should not return as long as the war lasted, but if unable to leave the city or the south, he would have an agent in Richmond or be there himself, to receive the money in April, 1864. In view of this difference in the recollection of the parties, to use no harsher term, how can the court say that Gavinzel agreed either to be in Richmond or to have an agent there to represent him? Both parties were present when the bond prepared by Cannon on the direction of Gavinzel was read to them, and there does not seem to have been any objection to it, or any alteration proposed in the draft of it. Nor is there anything in the record to show that the parties did not, in this transaction, stand on equal ground, with equal intelligence and equal opportunities of judging of the hazard incurred. If so, hard as the bargain 320*] is there is no good reason in the state of the pleadings why it should not be enforced. The answer sets up only two defenses, the illegality of a contract based on confederate notes, and the inability of Crump to discharge the debt, according to the last condition of the

represented by Gavinzel in his testimony "as
the greatest he ever met with in his life." If
unable to overcome these difficulties he would
be obliged to stay in Richmond, and Crump
would have the opportunity, if he chose to
avail himself of it, of paying back the loan in
the currency in which he received it.
The inducments to Crump to enter into the
contract were the present use of the money
and exemption from interest, with favorable
terms of repayment. Besides this, there was
the chance that he might be able to [*321
repay the loan in Confederate money. Both
parties not only ran the risk of the war
closing before or after the first of April, 1864,
but also the value of money whenever the war
did close, be that sooner or later, and of the
ability of Gavinzel to leave the Confederacy.
Certainly the wisdom of Crump in entering
into a contract which contemplated such haz-
ards cannot be commended, but if parties
make contracts where there is no fraud, upon
contingencies uncertain to both, with equal
means of information, the courts cannot under-
take to set them aside.

Confederate currency was a commodity in trade, and the parties risk their judgment upon the future value of it, as they might have done upon any other commodity for sale in the community. But if it be treated in this case as a loan of money, Crump agreed to repay it by a certain time after the termination of the war, in the currency which that termination should bring with it, and onerous as the condition is, he must abide by it.

The views we have taken of this case are sustained by the decision in Brachan v. Griffin, 3 Call, 375. In that case Griffin agreed in consideration of £25,000 paper money, to be paid him by Willis in the years 1780 and 1781, to pay the latter £25,000 in specie in 1790. Griffin brought his bill in chancery for

relief against Brachan, the assignee. Fleming, Judge, denying the relief, said: "That the contract in this case was founded upon speculation on both sides. Griffin thought the present use of the money would be advantageous to him; and Willis, that it would be more benefiicial to him to receive the specie at a distant day. The contract seems to have been fully understood by the parties, and to have been fairly entered into upon both sides." The language used by this judge is applicable to this contract, which, after all, was a mere speculation upon the paper currency of the Confederacy. Besides this case from Virginia, decided in 1803, there are recent decisions in 322*] that State and Maryland which *uphold contracts of hazard similar in many respects to the one in this case. Boulware v. Newton, 18 Gratt., 708; Taylor v. Turley, 33 Md., 500.

The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and this cause is remanded to that court, with instructions to enter a decree for the complainant, in conformity with this opinion.

NICHOLAS C. STEPHEN, Appt.,

v.

WILLIAM D. BEALL et al. (See S. C., 22 Wall., 329-341.) Deed of one joint owner of land-partieswife may incumber her property for husband's debt-purchase by trustee.

1. Where grantees of land are tenants in com mon, one of them can convey his portion or interest without affecting the rights of his co-tenants. 2. The attempted conveyance by one joint tenant of the entire premises held by several, has no effect upon the interest of his co-tenants.

3. Such co-tenants who do not convey, need not be made parties defendant to a bill to enforce the conveyance made by another co-tenant.

4. A wife may incumber her individual property to secure her husband's debts, by an instrument in writing by which she expressly charges her separate property for the payment of such debts.

5. Where there is no understanding or agreement between the purchaser at a public sale and the trustee making the sale, and no collusion between them, and no fraud in fact, and the duties of the trustee are ended, and the sale confirmed by the court, the circumstance that years afterwards the trustee bought the property from the purchas

er, in good faith and for a fair price paid to him,

does not vitiate and annul the public sale to the purchaser.

[No. 187.]

Argued Feb. 11, 1875. Decided Feb. 22, 1875.

A

PPEAL from the Supreme Court of the

District of Columbia.

The case is stated by the court.
Mr. T. T. Crittenden, for appellant:

Under the laws in force in the District of Colma prior to the Act of Congress ap: proved Apr. 10, 1869, the wife could, by deed made by her husband and herself, convey all her right, title and interest in and to any real estate separately vested in her in fee simple. This was the law of Maryland at the time of the severance of the District of Columbia from that State, and includes the power to mortgage or incumber her estate.

In England the rule that, a feme covert, acting with respect to her separate property, is in all respects competent to act as if she

NOTE.-Deed; when void for fraud, insanity, drunkenness, duress, undue influence, imbecility, in fancy, or fraud on marriage, from ward to guardian, from cestui que trust to trustee, from heir to executor see note to Harding v. Handy, 6 L. ed.

U. S. 429.

were sole, has been applied to all her dealings on the subject of that property. She may give or pledge or sell it, or make any other bargain with respect to it, with any person, in the same manner as if she were an unmarried woman.

Peacock v. Monk, 2 Ves., Sr., 190; Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. C. C., 16; 1 White & T. Lead. Cas. in Eq., 3d Am., from 2d Lond. ed., p. 501. Wms. Real Prop. (marg.), 206, n. 2, 3d Am. ed.; Huntington v. Huntington, 3 White & T. Lead. Cas. in Eq., 577, 2 Bro. P. C., 1.

The power of a feme covert to charge or dispose of her separate property is recognized in New York.

Jacques v. Methodist Church, 17 Johns., 548; Mallory v. Vanderheden, 3 Barb. Ch., 10; Yale v. Dederer, 21 Barb., 287.

It is also recognized in Connecticut, Maryland, Alabama, Kentucky, North Carolina, Georgia, Missouri and Florida, though denied in Pennsylvania and South Carolina.

1 White & T. Lead. Cas. in Eq., 532, et seq. In Maryland, held that a feme covert may create a lien upon her sole and separate estate on lands without a private examination.

Berrett v. Oliver, 7 Gill & J., 191; Helms v. Franciscus, 2 Bland, 544; Price v. Bigham, 7 Har. & Johns., 296; Cooke v. Husbands, 11 Md., 492.

Mr. R. T. Merrick, for defendants in

error.

The debt sought to be secured is the individual debt of the husband, William D. Beall, and it was not competent for the wife, under the policy of the law made for her protection, and under the provisions of the deed or deeds by which she held the property in connection with her children, to incumber that property for the security of her husband's debts.

Bibb v. Pope, 8 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.), 490; Cent. Bank of Frederick v. Copeland, 18 Md., 305; Steffey v. Steffey, 19 Md., 5; 1 Washb Real Prop., 280.

Mr. Justice Hunt delivered the opinion of the court:

The court below dismissed the bill of com

plaint. In his printed brief the counsel for the appellee sustains this decree upon two grounds: 1. Because the complainants failed to join the necessary parties defendant. 2. Be cause a wife could not, at the date of the deed in question from Mrs. Beall, incumber her estate for the benefit of her husband. The oral discussion took a wider range, but the two points suggested will be first considered.

1. In August, 1857, Mrs. Beall united with her husband in a deed of trust to secure the payment to the complainant of three singe bills of $3,000 each. The land described in this deed of trust was conveyed in 1849 to Mary Bell, John W. Bell, Mary V. Bell and Sarah L. Bell, their heirs and assigns forever, to have and to hold to the said Mary, John W. Mary V. and Sarah, their heirs and assigns forever. The party first named, Mary Bell. is the same person who, as Mary Ball, executed the deed of trust just referred to, and the three others are her children. The complain ant is now attempting to enforce this deed of trust, and it is objected that the other gran tees named in the deed to Mrs. Ball. to wit: her children, are necessary parties to the suit The argument is, that in her deed of trust Mrs.

Beall professed to convey, not one fourth of tled that no cloud is cast upon a title by a prothe estate, but the entire property described | ceeding or claim, where the record through in the deed; that as the children were owners of three fourths of the property, they should be brought in to protect their right.

Mrs. Beall was the owner of one fourth of the property referred to, and no more. This one fourth she could convey, and no more. Whether the terms of her deed purported to convey this portion only, or the whole, is not important. She could not convey the remaining three fourths, nor could the general language of her deed create a cloud upon the title of her children. The record showed exactly what title she had, and exactly what title the children had. No relief was asked against the children, and no claim made by the trustees that their rights were affected by the deed of their mother. The bill was filed against Mrs. Beall and her husband only, and judgment only asked against them. No judg ment could be taken against the children or that would effect their estate, nor would a sale of their interest have any legal effect. Ward v. Dewey, 16 N. Y., 519; Heywood v. Buffalo, 14 N. Y., 534; Cox v. Clift, 2 N. Y., 118; Story, Eq., $ 700.

which title is to be made shows a defense to
the claim. Ward v. Dewey, supra; Heywood
v. Buffalo, supra; Cox v. Clift, supra; Story,
Eq., § 700. It would not be proper under
such circumstances that the children should be
parties defendants. See Reid v. Vanderheyden,
5 Cow., 719; Bailey v. Inglee, 2 Paige, 278.
*We dismiss, then, as unfounded, the [*337
argument of a want of parties defendant.
2. The dismissal of the bill is defended upon
the further ground that the debt sought to be
secured is the debt of the husband, and that
it was not competent for the wife to incumber
her individual property to secure her hus-
band's debts.

Steffey v. Steffey, 19 Md., 5, is cited in support of this argument; but it does not bear upon the question. That was not the case of an attempt to incumber the separate property of the wife for the debt of the husband. It was a case in which both husband and wife had joined in an agreement to sell the lands of the wife. Upon a bill for specific performance the interest of the husband was adjudged to be bound, but the execution of a contract simply was held to be inoperative to convey the estate of or to bind the married woman under the statutes of Maryland.

If the grantees were tenants in common, it is not denied that Mrs. Beall could convey her portion or interest without affecting the rights of her co-tenants, and that her deed in this case would effect that purpose. It is said, however, that as the law of Maryland stood in 1801, and was thence carried into the District of Columbia, the conveyance to Mrs. Beall and her children created a joint tenancy, and that being a joint tenant, her conveyance in 1857 did not bind her interest only, but affected, also, that of her co-tenants. 336*] *We cannot recognize this conclusion. We find the law on this point thus laid down. "If there be three joint tenants and one aliens his part, the other two are joint ten-applicable to the subject. ants of their parts that remain, and hold them in common with the alienee." Co. Litt., 189; Bac. Abr., "Joint Tenants," E.

Nor is Bk. v. Copeland, 18 Md., 305, also cited, an authority to the point insisted upon. It was there held that a mortgage by a wife for her husband's debts, obtained from her by threats, and the exercise by the husband of an authority so excessive as to subjugate her will, was not binding upon her.

"If one joint tenant bargains and sells his moiety, and dies before the deed is enrolled, yet the deed, being afterwards enrolled, shall work a severance ab initio, and support, by relation, the interest of the bargainee. But if one joint tenant bargains and sells all the lands, and before enrollment the other dies, his part shall survive, for the freehold not be ing out of him the jointure remains, and though afterwards the deed is enrolled, yet only a moiety shall pass, for the enrollment by relation cannot make the grant of any better effect than it would have been if it had taken effect immediately." Co. Litt., 186, 186 a; Bac. Abr., "Joint Tenant," I, 3.

It is laid down in the same authorities that if one joint tenant agree to alien, but do not, and die, this will not sever the joint tenancy, nor bind the survivor. But it is held in Hinton v. Hinton, 2 Ves., 634, that in equity it may be enforced if the articles amount to an equitable severance of the jointure. See Bacon. supra.

We think it clear upon these authorities that the attempted conveyance, by Mrs. Beall, of the entire premises had no effect upon the interest of her co-tenants, conceding them to have been joint tenants. The law is well set

There is nothing in these authorities to indicate that the law of Maryland or of the District of Columbia on this subject is in any respect peculiar. The case rests upon and must be governed by the general principles

As to a wife's individual property generally, it is well settled that she may, by joining in a deed with her husband, convey any interest she has in real estate. Such a deed conveys the interest of both. 1 Washb. R. Prop., 280.

The doctrine that a married woman has the power to charge her separate estate with the payment of her husband's debts, or any [*338 other debt contracted by her as principal or as surety, has been uniformly sustained for a long period of time.

Hulme v. Tenant, 1 Bro. Ch. Cas., 16; Standford v. Marshall, 2 Atk., 69; Bullpin v. Clarke, 17 Ves., 365; Jaques v. M. E. Ch., 17 Johns., 548; Yale v. Dederer, 22 N. Y., 450, 18 N. Y., 276; Ins. Co. v. Babcock, 42 N. Y., 615; Story, Eq., secs. 1396, 1401, a.

The question has been in respect to the manner in which the conceded power should be exercised, and in respect to the requisite evidence of its due execution. Whether the simple execution of an obligation by a married woman operates to charge her estate, or whether she must declare such to be her intention; whether an oral statement of such intention is sufficient, or whether it must be in writing; whether such intention must be manifested in the contract itself or may be separately manifested; whether a declaration of an intention to bind her separate property is sufficient, or whether the property intended to be charged

must be specifically described, have been the subject of discussion at different times. But that a married woman, by an instrument in writing by which she expressly charges her separate property for the payment of a debt, which charge is contained in the instrument creating the debt, and where the property is specifically described, and which instrument is executed in the manner required by law, may create a valid charge upon such property, is agreed in all the books.

The instrument before us contains all these requisites, and we cannot doubt its validity. Whether the property is her separate estate or her individual property merely, the result is the same.

In the argument it was contended that the bad faith of the complainant should bar his

recovery.

at the resale. The interval between the purchase by Crowley at the resale and the purchase from him by the complainant does not appear. Crowley's purchase was made in May, 1859. In February, 1872, thirteen years having elapsed, it is alleged and admitted that a conveyance had been made by Crowley to the complainant. On the principle that every pleader states his case as favorably to him as he is able to do, we may assume that this time had mostly elapsed before the purchase was made by the complainant. No proofs were taken. The case was heard on bill and answer. It narrows itself down to this: there being no understanding or agreement between the purchaser at a public sale and the trustee making the sale; there being no collusion between them; there being no fraud in fact, the duties of the trustee in respect to the sale being Mr. Beall in 1857 purchased certain property ended, and his doings confirmed by the court belonging to the estate of the deceased, Oliver having the subject in charge, does the circumB. Magruder, ordered to be sold for the benefit stance that years afterwards the trustee bought of his estate. The complainant, Stephen, was the property from the purchaser in good faith, appointed a trustee to make the sale under and for a fair price paid to him, vitiate and terms and upon conditions particularly pre-annul the public sale to the purchaser? scribed by the court, one of which was that If there was a fraud on the part of the comthe title should not be conveyed until all the purchase money was paid. The sale was made to Beall for the sum of $10,000, of which $1,000 only was paid. To secure the residue, Beall and his wife executed to Stephen the deed hereinbefore referred to, upon the property of Mrs. Beall. The payments were to be made in sums of $3,040 each, at periods of one, two and three years respectively, for which single bills were given. This sale and security was reported to the court by Stephen, the trustee, and the sale was confirmed.

plainant in making the sale, at which Crowley was the purchaser, it arose from an act, an intention, or an omission then done or existing. A subsequent purchase may afford evidence that the original sale was made [*340 to permit that purchase, and that the end illustrates what the parties all the while intended. But to make a fraudulent sale it is necessary to go back to the acts, the intents, or the neglects existing at the time of the sale. It would seem to be a self-evident proposition that when it is conceded that a sale Beall failing to make these payments as was in fact fair, honest and just when made, agreed, the same court directed Stephen to re- that no unlawful act or intent then existed, sell the Magruder property before sold to that a fraudulent intent or an unjust dealing Beall, and at the risk of Beall. This he did, as to that time could not be imputed to the and the sale was at a loss of $3,000. The pur-party from subsequent occurrences. It stands chase was made by one Crowley. This pro- upon pleadings here that at the time of the ceeding was also reported to and confirmed by the court.

The complainant, Stephen, as trustee for the Magruder estate, files the present bill of complaint to collect this deficiency from the lands described in the conveyance of Mr. and Mrs. Beall.

sale the complainant had no understanding that he should ever have any interest in the property; in other words, Crowley bought it for himself and for his own exclusive benefit. There was no collusion, that is, the property was fairly sold and for all that could be obtained for it. The sale was reported to and confirmed by the court. This constituted a discharge of the duty of the trustee in making the sale. It is quite difficult to conceive that any subsequent facts (leaving these in full force) can estab lish that such a sale is fraudulent.

The defendants file a cross-bill and allege fraud in the original sale to Mr. Beall, in that the complainant deceived and defrauded them by promising to execute a deed of the Magru der property, as soon as they made the pur339*] chase, and by misrepresentations of It is a general rule that a trustee cannot the value of the land. This is denied by the deal with the subject of his trust. If one actcomplainant in his answer to the cross-bill. ing as trustee for others becomes himself inIt will be remembered also that the order of terested in the purchase, the cestuis que trust sale expressly prohibited the giving a deed until the whole purchase money should be are entitled, of course, to have the sale set paid. Fraud is alleged again in that the pur- himself of the character of trustee (Jewett v. aside, unless the trustee had fairly devested chase by Crowley at the resale was for the benefit of Stephen, the complainant, upon an Miller, 10 N. Y., 402; Slade v. Van Vechten, agreement that the property should be trans-11 Paige, 21; Van Epps v. Van Epps, 9 Paige, ferred to him, and that the same had been 237; Bk. v. Torrey, 7 Hill, 260; Hawley v. conveyed to him. All fraud is denied in the answer. The alleged agreement or understanding between Crowley and the complainant, Stephen, is denied in all its parts. It is admitted that subsequently, without any pre- We should be unwilling to weaken the oblivious understanding, and in good faith, and gation of good faith and fidelity required by for a fair price paid, the complainant pur- the law of a trustee. We have frequently enchased of Crowley the property bought by him forced such obligations in the most rigid man

Cramer, 4 Cow., 717; Hill, Tr., 537, h), and the fact that the purchase was made through the intervention of a third person makes no difference. Same authorities.

ner. It would, however, be a great straining of a good principle to hold that a purchase by a trustee from the purchaser at a public sale, under the circumstances before us, is necessarily fraudulent.

There is a class of cases, undoubtedly, in 341*] which transfers *of property are adjudged to be fraudulent, although there be no actual fraud meditated by the parties. Such are the cases of an assignment by an insolvent debtor reserving portions of the assigned property for his own benefit, requiring releases from creditors as a condition of participating in the fund, and the like.

The case we are considering bears no resemblance to these cases. There is, in a purchase by a trustee, nothing that of itself and necessarily, vitiates the original sale. Whether culpable or commendable depends upon the circumstances of each case. It may be wrong, and it may be right. It may be approved by the parties interested and affirmed. It may be condemned by them and avoided. When it is found that the transaction is itself perfectly fair and honest, that the purchase was not contemplated at the original sale, but was first thought of years afterwards, and was then made for a full and fair consideration actually paid by the trustee, and after the fiduciary duty was at an end, we find no authority to justify us in pronouncing the original sale to have been fraudulent.

1. It is said that the State, being in rebellion against the United States, was incompetent to pass the law of December 19, 1861.

2. That the cotton notes provided for by this law were issued in aid of the rebellion and were, therefore, illegal and void.

3. That the said notes are bills of credit, made illegal and void by the Constitution of the United States.

The first of these objections, although it seems to be the sole ground on which the case was decided in the state court (42 Miss., 651), is completely met and overcome by the cases of White v. Hart, 13 Wall., 651, 20 L. ed. 687; Huntington v. Texas, 16 Wall., 413, 21 L. ed. 318; and Horn v. Lockhart, 17 Wall., 580, 21 L. ed. 660. The court in Mississippi has, therefore, already been overruled on the only point on which it has chosen to rest this case; and, in fact, its ruling in this case was a departure from the law, as it had previously been settled in that State in the case of Hill v. Boylan, 40 Miss., 619, and other cases decided about the same time. The High Court of Errors and Appeals, also, subsequently recurred to the doctrine established in Hill v. Boylan, and thus overruled its own decision in the case now brought before this court.

Mister v. McLean, 43 Miss., 270; Buchanan v. Smith, 43 Miss., 97; Lawson v. Jeffries, 47 Miss., 686, 703.

The law under which the cotton notes were Upon the whole case, the decree must be re-issued was an Act of ordinary legislation, havversed and the record remanded, with directions to enter a decree in conformity with this opinion, with leave to the parties to amend their pleadings if they shall be so advised.

v.

WILLIAM B. TAYLOR, Piff. in Err., SAMUEL B. THOMAS, Sheriff, and B. H. Pitman, Deputy-Sheriff of Hinds County.

(See S. C., 22 Wall., 479–491.) Treasury notes, issued in aid of rebellion, void -legislative Acts, when void.

1. Treasury notes authorized to be issued by the Act of Dec. 19, 1861, of Mississippi, then in insurrection, inasmuch as they were issued against the public policy, and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, are illegal and void, and are not receivable in payment of taxes.

2. The Act was passed in aid of the rebellion. 3. Judicial and legislative Acts hostile in their

purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National Government, or which impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution, are invalid and void.

[No. 181.] Argued Feb. 5, 8, 9, 1875. Decided Feb. 22, 1875.

ין

N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi.

The case is stated by the court. Messrs. Fred. P. Stanton and H. S. Foote, for plaintiff in error:

The court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to the bill, and refusing the relief prayed therein. The effect of this decision was to sustain the Act of Nov. 16, 1865, and thereby to impair the obligation of the contracts assumed by the State by the Act of Dec. 19, 1861, viz.: the obligation to receive the cotton note in payment of taxes.

If the Act of Dec., 1861, is a valid law, it is plain that the law of 1865 cannot be sustained. But the former Act is alleged to be void, on three distinct grounds:

ing no reference whatever to the rebellion, and not in any way intended or calculated to promote the interests of those who sought to overthrow the authority of the Federal Government. The shipment and sale of cotton were effectually prevented by the blockade. The crop of 1861 was on hand and wholly unavailable, although in ordinary times the cotton raised in the State was the chief if not the only resource of the people, to supply a currency and to enable them to make the exchanges necessary to the very existence and support of society. This measure was evidently a mere local one of expediency, expressly avoiding all connection with any military operations, and providing for the internal commerce of the State.

The 10th section of the Act (p. 63, Acts of 1861-2) expressly and particularly distinguishes these cotton notes from the notes issued under the ordinance of the convention entitled "An Ordinance to Raise Means for

the Defense of the State," passed Jan. 26, 1861, and also from the Act of the Legislature, approved Nov. 29, 1861, entitled "An Act Making the Treasury Notes, Issued under an Ordinance of the State Convention, Receivable in Payment of Dues to the State at all Times before and after the Period Fixed for Their Redemption, and for Other Purposes." This ordinance of the Convention, and the Act pertaining to it, were confessedly passed in furtherance of the rebellion. The cotton notes were no more issued to aid in the war than if the Government of Mississippi had procured so much gold and silver coin, and advanced it to the people of the State on the pledge of their cotton crop of that year.

The construction of that clause of the 10th section of the 1st article of the Constitution, which prohibits the State to emit bills of cred

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