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Railroads. A railroad mortgage, in favor of State, and existing by virtue of statute, incidentally recognized as valid, p. 374.

Cited to this point in note in 4 Am. St. Rep. 702.

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Constitutional law. Fundamental principles of government, found in Constitutions, must necessarily be declared in terms very general, because they must be very comprehensive, Miller, J., dissenting, p. 381.

Approved in Opinion of the Justices, 66 N. H. 655, 33 Atl. 1090, reviewing numerous authorities, holding property of railroad could not be taken for less than its value without owner's consent.

Miscellaneous.- St. Louis, etc., Ry. v. Loftin, 30 Ark. 701, not in

point.

22 Wall. 381-394, 22 L. 796, MORGAN v. CAMPBELL.

Landlord and tenant.- At common law, landlord could distrain any goods found on premises at time of taking, but had no lien until actual seizure, p. 390.

Cited in note in 41 Am. Dec. 211.

Liens. Statutory lien implies security upon the thing before warrant to seize it is levied; levy and sale are only means of enforcing it, p. 390.

Cited in Rosenberg v. Shaper, 51 Tex. 142, where statutory lien of landlord attached independently of distress warrant.

Landlord and tenant.- In Illinois, landlord has no common-law lien on goods of tenant for rent, and no statutory lien, except as to growing crops, p. 392.

Cited in First Nat. Bank v. Adam, 138 Ill. 499, 28 N. E. 957, reviewing cases, provision of lease did not give lien superior to subsequent mortgage; Kellogg v. Newspaper Co. v. Peterson, 162 Ill. 161, 53 Am. St. Rep. 303, 44 N. E. 412, sale of goods, held valid, as against subsequent levy of distress warrant for rent.

Bankruptcy.- Assignment in bankruptcy relates back to commencement of proceedings, and vests title to bankrupt's estate, in assignee, though it is then attached on mesne process as property of bankrupt, p. 393.

Approved in Cunningham v. Hall, 69 Me. 354, collecting cases, composition did not discharge attachment lien on property never conveyed to assignee; Hirshiser v. Tinsley, 9 Mo. App. 342, holding summons in creditor's suit such mesne process.

Bankruptcy.- Main purpose of bankrupt act to distribute property of bankrupt equally among creditors, and creditor, who has not security which binds property, at time proceedings are begun, is prevented from obtaining it, p. 393.

Approved in Trow v. Lovett, 122 Mass. 573, filing of bill to apply property to execution, gave no such lien.

Bankruptcy.

There is no good reason why law should protect Men of landlord, under distress warrant, levied after petition filed, and repudiate equally meritorious creditor in levy of attachment, D. 393.

Approved in In re Robinson, 20 Fed. Cas. 985, where urban landlord had no right to priority, under Texas statute.

Bankruptcy. Where, after filing petition in bankruptcy, and before decree, distress warrant for rent is levied on bankrupt's goods, landlord acquires no right to said goods as against assignee, pp. 393, 394.

Cited in Sage v. Wynkoop, 21 Fed. Cas. 149, levy of attachment, relinquished before filing of petition, created no lien against assignee.

Distinguished in Wood v. McCardell, etc., Co., 49 N. J. Eq. 435, 24 Atl. 229, under local statutes, landlord entitled to priority; Cowan ▼. Dunn, 1 Lea, 72, lien acquired by filing bill to apply property to judgment, not dissolved.

22 Wall. 395-406, 22 L. 801, AMSINCK v. BEAN.

Bankruptcy.- Where all partners become bankrupt, separate es tate of one may not claim against joint estate, in competition with firm creditors, nor shall joint estate claim against separate in competition with separate creditors, p. 402.

Cited in elaborate note in 43 Am. St. Rep. 369.

Bankruptcy. Solvent partner cannot prove separate debt against separate estate of bankrupt partner, in competition with joint creditors of firm, p. 402.

Bankruptcy. Solvent partner cannot prove against separate estate of bankrupt partner, in competition with his separate creditors, until all joint creditors of firm are paid or fully indemnified, except to firm purposes, or distinct trade is prosecuted by one or more members of firm, pp. 402, 403.

Bankruptcy. After bankruptcy of one partner is decreed, solvent partners retain full power and authority over firm property, as though bankruptcy of partner had not occurred, p. 403.

Cited in In re Jewett, 7 Biss. 334, F. C. 7,306, same parties, as members of different firms, adjudicated bankrupt in different districts.

Bankruptcy.- Debts due by bankrupt partner, to firm, entitled to priority over debts due his separate creditors; and if joint funds are insufficient to discharge debt to firm, solvent partners may prove deficiency against separate estate of bankrupt, p. 403.

Partnership. When individual partner is decreed bankrupt, firm is dissolved, but joint property remains in hands of solvent partner

or partners, in trust, to be applied to debts of partnership and to account to bankrupt partner or his assignee for surplus, p. 403.

Cited and applied in Jones v. Newsom, 7 Biss. 323, F. C. 7,484, assignee of partner holding such trust property, held to account to firm creditors; Ia re Jewett, 7 Biss. 334, F. C. 7,306, same parties, as members of different firms, adjudicated bankrupt in two districts; Wilkins v. Davis, 2 Low. 515, F. C. 17,664, reviewing authorities, assignee of bankrupt partner recovered sums withdrawn from firm by solvent partner; Russell v. Cole, 167 Mass. 10, 57 Am. St. Rep. 435, 44 N. E. 1058, where solvent partner recovered firm property taken under attachment in action against bankrupt partner; Daugherty v. Strauss, 1 Tex. App. Civ. 509, discharge released partner from individual and firm debts. See note in 40 Am. St. Rep. 571.

Bankruptcy.- Assets are marshalled between firm creditors and separate creditors of partners only when there are partnership assets and separate assets of partners, and proceedings have been instituted against both, as provided in thirty-sixth section, bankrupt act, p. 404.

Bankruptcy. Adjudication, obtained by one partner against another, will not be sustained if real object of petitioner is to dissolve firm, and adjudication is not required for any other purpose, p. 404.

Cited in In re Hamlin, 8 Biss. 128, F. C. 5,994, petition filed by one partner, solely to harass another partner, dismissed. See note in 69 Am. St. Rep. 412.

Bankruptcy.- Assignee of estate of individual partner, has no such title as will enable him to call third parties to account for partnership property; e. g., to recover money paid to firm creditor, in fraud of other creditors and of bankrupt act; if such recovery may be had at all, it must be by partnership or assignees of joint estate, pp. 404-405.

Approved and applied in In re Jewett, 7 Biss. 334, F. C. 7,306, same parties, as members of different firms, adjudicated bankrupt in two districts; Crompton v. Conkling, 9 Ben. 228, F. C. 3,407, Corey v. Perry, 67 Me. 144, 24 Am. Rep. 18, and Poillon v. Lawrence, 77 N. Y. 218, discharge of individual partner did not release him from liability on firm debt; Lindsey v. Corkery, 29 Gratt. 654, where firm creditors proceeded against firm property, though partners were individually in bankruptcy; generally in Harmanson v. Bain, 1 Hughes, 201, F. C. 6,072.

22 Wall. 406-424, 22 L. 879, UNITED STATES v. FARRAGUT. Admiralty.- Parties to suit in Admiralty Court, whether sitting as prize or instance court, may submit case to arbitration, under

rule of court; the award will be construed, and its effect determined by same general principles which would govern it in court of common law or equity, p. 419.

Arbitration and award.-Though provision in agreement of submission is that award shall be final on questions of law and fact, it does not conclude all questions of law, p. 420.

Arbitration and award.— Award is conclusive of facts found; as to propositions of law announced, it is subject to correction in lower court or on appeal; as to proposition of mixed law and fact, where error of law cannot be distinctly shown, it is final, p. 420.

Admiralty.-Award, in arbitration of admiralty case, is liable to be set aside by court for such reasons as are sufficient in other courts, p. 420.

War.-Where owners of recaptured vessels resided on that side of line of bayonets which adhered to Union, the vessels were not liable to condemnation as prize; but if citizens, and domiciled in States in insurrection, such vessels were subject to condemnation as prize, p. 423.

War.- Where captured vessels, subject to condemnation as prizes, were returned to owners, an award of their value, plus salvage, to captors, is erroneous, p. 424.

No citations.

22 Wall. 424-444, 22 L. 774, FOX v. SEAL

Liens.- Joint resolution of Pennsylvania legislature, January 21, 1843, for protection of claims of contractors and others, for work done on railroads, etc., gave unpaid contractor lien of indefinite duration, on property of railroad, having priority over every right by or under mortgage made after debt to contractor was incurred, pp. 437, 438.

Cited and applied in New Castle N. Ry. Co. v. Simpson, 26 Fed. 135, where such claim was preferred to that of company's counsel in litigation with contractor; Shamokin, etc., R. Co. v. Malone, 85 Pa. St. 35, contractor's claim given preference over right of purchaser without notice, under subsequent mortgage; Pittsburgh, etc., Ry. Co. v. Marshall, 85 Pa. St. 191, priority over mortgage, unrecorded at time certificates of indebtedness issued to contractor. See note in 54 Am. St. Rep. 424.

Limited in Title & Trust Co. v. Railway Co., 189 Pa. St. 368, 69 Am. St. Rep. 817, 42 Atl. 141, such subsequent mortgage held valid junior lien between parties. Distinguished in Reed's Appeal, 122 Pa. St. 577, 16 Atl. 101, contractor had no preference over bonds issued under trust deed, recorded prior to work.

Judgments.- Terre-tenants, against whom law of Pennsylvania requires that scire facias, to revive judgment, be sued out, in order to preserve its lien, are those who have seisin of the land, are owners, or claim ownership by title derived from defendant in Judgment; mortgagee is not such terre-tenant. There can be no such terre-tenant, who is not purchaser, mediately or immediately, from debtor, while land was bound by judgment, p. 441.

Cited in notes in 16 Am. Dec. 594, 53 Am. Dec. 443, and 94 Am. Dec. 223.

Judgment creates no lien upon personalty, p. 442.

Mortgages. Where property of railroad is sold under mortgage, lien of which is junior to that of contractor, under Pennsylvania resolution of 1843, latter lien is undisturbed, and contractor may look to proceeds of sale for payment, p. 443.

22 Wall. 444-464, 22 L. 747, RAILWAY CO. v. McSHANE.

Taxation.- Lands which have constituted part of public domain may be taxed by States, before issuance of patent, but only when right to patent is complete and equitable title is fully vested in party, without anything more to be paid or any act to be done going to foundation of his right, p. 461.

Approved and applied in Wirth v. Branson, 98 U. 8. 121, 25 L. 87, holding patent to another, void, as against such equitable owner; Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Price County, 133 U. S. 507, 33 L. 693, 10 S. Ct. 345, reversing S. C., 64 Wis. 594, 26 N. W. 99, where lands so held were subject to State tax, and unapproved indemnity selections were exempt; Shiver v. United States, 159 U. S. 499, 40 L. 233, 16 S. Ct. 57, punishing homestead settler for committing waste; Hussman v. Durheim, 165 U. S. 147, 41 L. 665, 17 8. Ct. 254, and Diver v. Friedham, 43 Ark. 206, tax sale of land, before required payments made, held invalid; Pitts v. Clay, 27 Fed. 636, and Durham v. Hussman, 88 Iowa, 35, 55 N. W. 14, citing cases, tax sale, while right to patent was in dispute, held void; Hershberger v. Blewett, 55 Fed. 180, unpatented claim, under Oregon donation act, not subject to administration; Nichols v. Council, 51 Ark. 33, 14 Am. St. Rep. 22, 9 S. W. 306, statute of limitations did not run against soldier's homestead, before right to patent was complete; Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Clark, Ind. Ter., 51 S. W. 963, homesteader, having obtained receipt from land office, maintained trespass for injury to land; Commissioners v. Young, 18 Kan. 443, wrongful tax sale of unpatented lands, held due to mistake of fact; Kohn v. Barr, 52 Kan. 277, 34 Pac. 882, land not taxable, after cancellation of certificate of entry for forgery in assignment of warrant; County of Cass v. Morrison, 28 Minn. 260, 9 N. W. 763, railroad lands taxable, though statute subsequent to grant imposed

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