Nutt v. U. S.,

863

CARRIERS.

SEE EVIDENCE, 42.

863

1. The burden of proof lles on the carrier to
show a loss occurred through a peril of navigation.
excepted in the bill of lading, and nothing short of
clear proof should discharge him
which the law has annexed to his employment.
from duties
The Mohler v. Home Ins. Co.,

485

2. Carriers of merchandise by water are insurers,
and liable for every loss or damage to the merchau
dise, unless it happened by the act of God, the pub.
lic enemy, the shipper, or by some other cause ex-
cepted in the contract of shipment.

Germania Ins. Co. v. The Lady Pike,

3. The carrier must provide a seaworthy vessel,
499
well furnished with proper motive power; furni-
ture necessary for the voyage; a crew adequate
in number and competent for their duty; and a
competent and skillful master,
ment and discretion and of sufficient knowledge
of sound judg
and experience.

Idem,

4. The responsibility of a common carrier may be
499
limited by an express agreement made with his
employer at the time of his accepting goods for
transportation, provided the limitation be such as
the law can recognize as reasonable and not incon-
sistent with sound public policy.

Express Co. v. Caldwell,

5. An agreement that in case of failure by the
556
carrier to deliver goods, a claim shall be made by
the bailor, or by the consignee, within a specified
period, or the liability of the carrier shall cease, is
not against the policy of the law, and is valid if
that period be a reasonable one.

Idem.

556

6. It is the duty of the carrier to furnish suitable
vehicles for transportation, and if he furnishes un-
fit or unsafe vehicles he is not exempted from re-
sponsibility by the fact that the shipper knew them
to be defective and used them.

R. R. Co. v. Pratt,

CERTIORARI.

827

V

against the steamer will bar any further claims by
the owners of the schooner, and their title will be
thereby remitted to the owners of the steamer.
Idem,
98

6. Where a steamer was going at an undue rate
colliding with a bark, she was held liable for the
of speed, and it was her fault that she came into
a position from which she could not escape without
damages.

The Pennsylvania v. Troop,

7. The bark held in fault for violation of the
148
rules of navigation which required her to blow a
fog-horn, when under way.

Idem,
nothing to do with the disaster, the liability for
8. If it clearly appears the fault could have had
148
damages is upon the ship or ships whose fault
caused the injury.
Idem.

is in actual violation of a statutory rule intended
9. But when a ship, at the time of the collision,
148
to prevent collisions, it is a reasonable presur".
tion that such fault, if not the sole cause, was at
least a contributory cause of the disaster.
10. In such a case, the burden of showing that
148
her fault could not have been one of the causes of
the collision rests upon the ship.

Sprott v. U. S.,

371

Monger v. Shirley,

320
9. Having heard and considered evidence, it
must be presumed the court found that the prop-
erty belonged to a person engaged in the rebellion.
Idem,

320
10. The Proclamations of amnesty in 1868, did
not effect a repeal of the Confiscation Act.
Idem.

Titus v. U. S.,

320
11. The Confiscation Act of Aug. 6, 1861, was in-
tended for private, not public property, for such
property of persons as required, under the laws of
war, a judicial sentence of condemnation to de-
vest the title of its owner.
400
12. An informer, to entitle himself under that Act
to the statutory reward for his service, must in-
form against property which is the subject of ju-
dicial condemnation, and not against property
which by the laws of war became the property of
the United States by completed conquest.

Idem,

400
13. The United States is not estopped by pro-
ceedings of condemnation instituted in behalf of it-
self and an informant, nor by the receipt of the
purchase money therein, from denying, as against
the informer, that the property in question was
the subject of forfeiture on joint account under the
Act.

Idem,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

SEE MARITIME LAW, 7.
RAILROADS, 1-3.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 3.

STATE LAWS AND DECISIONS, 9-12.
TAXES AND TAX SALES, 17.

400

1. A State cannot, in order to defray the expenses
of its quarantine regulations, levy a tonnage tax
on vessels owned in foreign ports and entering its
harbors in the pursuit of commerce.

Peete v. Morgan,

201

2. A contract by which a railroad company
agreed that an elevator company should, in con-
sideration of the erection of an elevator, have the
handling of all through grain brought by the rail-
road company to Dubuque and receive a fixed price
therefor, is not repugnant to the commercial pow-
er of Congress nor to public policy.

Dubuque & 8. C. R. R. Co. v. Richmond, 173
3. It was never intended that the power of
Congress to regulate commerce, should be exercised
so as to interfere with private contracts not de-
signed to create impediments to commercial
intercourse among the States.
Idem,
173
4. The Michigan Act of March 22, 1869 to en-
able any township, city or village to pledge its
aid, by loan or donation, to any railroad com-
pany organized under and by virtue of the laws of
that State, is not in conflict with the Constitution
of the State.

Pine Grove v. Talcott,

227

5. A statute is not to be pronounced void upon

8. An ordinance of the City of New Orleans which
demanded of all steamboats which shall moor or
land in any part of the Port of New Orleans, a sum
measured by the tonnage of the vessel, is a ton-
nage tax within the meaning of the Federal Con-
stitution, and void.
417

Cannon v. New Orleans,

9. Compensation may be charged a vessel by a
city for the use of wharves and piers; but in the
exercise of this right, care must be taken that it is
not made to cover a violation of the Federal Con-
stitution, which prohibits the State to lay any
duty of tonnage.

Idem,

417

10. Any duty or tax, or burden imposed under
the authority of the States, which is in its essence
a contribution claimed for the privilege of arriving
and departing from a port of the United States, and
which is assessed on a vessel according to its carry-
ing capacity, is a violation of that provision, un-
less the consent of Congress be obtained.
Idem,

417
11. The provision of the Federal Constitution
which secures to every party, where the value in
controversy exceeds $20, the right of trial by jury,
does not apply to trials in the state courts.

Edwards v. Elliott,

487

12. Where. by the Constitution of a State, a lia-
bility to double the amount of their stock was im-
posed upon stockholders in private corporations.
and subsequently, by an amended Constitution.
this provision was changed so that the liability did
not extend beyond the amount of subscribed and
paid up stock, so that stockholders, subscribing
after the amendment went into operation, were re-
lieved from the effects of the former Constitu-
tion, as to debts contracted prior to the amend-
ment, held that the amendment has not the effect
of impairing the obligation of the contract, as to
such debts within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion of the United States.

Ochiltree v. R. R. Contracting Co.,

16. The words "citizens" in the U. S. Constitu-
tion conveys the idea of membership of a nation and
nothing more, and women are citizens within Its
provisions.
Idem.
627

17. The right of suffrage is not one of the neces-
sary privileges of a citizen of a State or of the
United States.
627
18. A State Government is republican in form.

Idem,

2. The Act of March 2, 1831, limits the power of
the U. S. Circuit and District Courts to punish
for contempts, to cases of misbehavior in the pres-
ence of or near to the court, and misbehavior of any
officer of the courts and disobedience or resistance
to any lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree or
command of the court.
Idem,
205
3. The 17th section of the Judiciary Act of
1789. in prescribing fine or imprisonment as the
punishment which may be inflicted for contempts,
is a negation of all other modes of punishment.
Idem,

205

4. A party to a suit, who is bound by the de-
cree, may be guilty of contempt by a pertinacious
opposition to it or by refusal to obey it, and as-
serting a different right or title from the one al-
leged and enforced by him in the suit.

Teras v. White,

819

Bulkleur. U. S.,

62

3. The remedies for the collection of a debt are
essential parts of the contract of indebtedness, and
those in existence at the time it is incurred must be
substantially preserved to the creditor.

Rees v. Watertown,

72

4. Where a contract was made to transport sup-
plies for the government during war, the words
"posts or stations" used therein do not include
railway depots or stations, but only military posts
or stations.
114

Caldwell v. U. S.,

5. The words "posts on the west bank of the
Missouri River," cannot be extended to embrace
posts west of that river but more than ninety miles
therefrom.
Idem,

114

6. Where the plaintiff was elected a professor in
the University of Missouri for six years, "subject
to law," this expression means subject to any law
the Legislature might pass, and the Legislature
could shorten the term of service.
160

Head v. The University,

Nunez v. Dautel,

7. A contract to pay a sum of money as soon as
a crop could be sold, or the money otherwise raised,
is payable within a reasonable time.
161
8. Where a contract is made by a municipality
in the mode specifically provided by local law by
advertising for proposals, etc., it cannot be modified
by the officers of the municipality without its as-
sent to the change.
264
9. An agreement to release, upon the perform-
ance of certain considerations, is of no effect if
the conditions are not performed.

Memphis v. Brown,

10. The Missouri State Act of 1852 created a
contract between the State and the Pacific Railroad
Company, by which the railroad was exempt from
taxation until it was completed and put in opera-
tion, and should declare a dividend; not, however,
longer than two years after its completion.

Pacific R. R. Co. v. Maguire,

282

11. The state Ordinance of 1865, imposing a
tax of ten per cent. upon its gross earnings before
the road was completed, was a violation of this con-
tract, and the levy for its enforcement was ille-
gal.
282.

Idem,

12. An agreement in general restraint of trade is
illegal and void; but an agreement which operates
merely in partial restraint of trade is good, pro-
vided it be not unreasonable and there be a con-
sideration to support it.
Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 316
13. An agreement that a steamer should not be
used in the waters of a State for a fixed period held
to be legal.
316.

Idem,

Maryland v. R. R. Co.,

678

28. An Indiana Railroad Company forming part
of a through line from the Southern States to Bos-
ton, having contracted to carry cotton from Colum.
bus, Mississippi, to Boston, held that the clause in
the bill of lading "The Evansville and Crawfords-
ville Railroad Co. will not be liable for loss or dam-
age by fire, from any cause whatever," covered the
whole route, and was not to be limited to part of
the distance only; and the Company is not liable
for cotton destroyed by fire on the route before it
reached said Company's road.

R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin Mills,
29. There is no implied proviso by the Govern-
724
ment to pay the disloyal owner for his property
seized and sold under the Captured and Abandoned
Property Act.

Haycroft v. U. S.,

30. The court cannot import words into a con.
738
tract which would make it materially different, in
a vital particular, from what it is.

Gavinzel v. Crump,

783

31. Contracts, based on Confederate currency,
will be enforced when made in the usual course of
business between persons resident in the insurgent
States and not made in furtherance the rebellion.
Idem,

783

32. If parties make contracts where there is no
fraud, upon contingencies uncertain to both, with
equal means of information, the courts cannot
undertake to set them aside.

Idem,

783

33. A contract of sale will not pass the owner-
ship of goods at once to the buyer, where there is
no ascertainment of the whole price by weighing,
nor complete preparation for delivery, nor any de-
livery, nor payment.

Nutt v. U. S.,

863

34. A provision in the contract, that the goods
from the date thereof should be at the risk of the
purchaser, does not of itself show an intention of
the parties that the property should pass.

Idem,

863

35. The receipt of a small sum "in order to con-
firm the contract" has no bearing upon the ques-
tion whether the property passed.

Idem,

863

1. A debt against a municipality cannot be col-
lected by a remedy, which is in direct violation of
a statute in existence and known to the creditor
when the debt was incurred.

Rees v. Watertown,

72

pay

2. A subscriber for the stock of a company, is
not released from his engagement to take it and
for it. by any alteration of the organization or
purposes of the company which, at the time the sub-
scription was made, were authorized either by the
general law or by the special charter.
83

892

Nugent v. Supervisors,

Bulkleur. U. S.,

62

10. The Missouri State Act of 1852 created a
contract between the State and the Pacific Railroad
Company, by which the railroad was exempt from
taxation until it was completed and put in opera-
tion, and should declare a dividend; not, however,
longer than two years after its completion.
282

Pacific R. R. Co. v. Maguire,

11. The state Ordinance of 1865, imposing a
tax of ten per cent. upon its gross earnings before
the road was completed, was a violation of this con-
tract, and the levy for its enforcement was ille-
gal.

Idem,

421