28. An Indiana Railroad Company forming part
of a through line from the Southern States to Bos-
ton, having contracted to carry cotton from Colum.
bus, Mississippi, to Boston, held that the clause in
the bill of lading "The Evansville and Crawfords-
ville Railroad Co. will not be liable for loss or dam-
age by fire, from any cause whatever," covered the
whole route, and was not to be limited to part of
the distance only; and the Company is not liable
for cotton destroyed by fire on the route before it
reached said Company's road.
R. R. Co. v. Androscoggin Mills,
724
29. There is no implied proviso by the Govern-
ment to pay the disloyal owner for his property
seized and sold under the Captured and Abandoned
Property Act.
738
30. The court cannot import words into a con.
tract which would make it materially different, in
a vital particular, from what it is.
31. Contracts, based on Confederate currency,
will be enforced when made in the usual course of
business between persons resident in the insurgent
States and not made in furtherance the rebellion.
Idem,
3. The subscriber for stock is released from his
subscription by a subsequent alteration of the or-
ganization or purposes of the company, only when
such alteration is both fundamental and not pro-
vided for or contemplated by either the charter it-
self or the general laws of the State.
4. Though the stock of a bank be owned by a
State, if the bank is insolvent its assets cannot be
appropriated by legislative act or otherwise to pay
the debts of the State, but must go to pay the debts
of the bank.
90
5. A State Legislature may authorize a munici-
pal corporation to aid in the construction of a rail-
road, by donating its bonds to such company and
to collect taxes for the payment of the bonds, if ap
proved by a popular vote.
100
6. Such bonds may be issued by commissioners as
agents of the town and delivered directly to the
railroad company, where it appears that delivery of
the bonds to the railroad company was contem-
plated and authorized.
Town of Queensbury v. Culver,
7. Municipal corporations have not power with-
out legislative authority, to borrow money or to
issue notes, bills or other securities of a commer-
cial character free from equitable defenses in the
hands of bona fide holders.
Nashville v. Ray,
Mayor v. Lindsey,
8. The officers of such a corporation cannot cre-
ate by their acts an estoppel against the corpora-
tion, so as to render illegal issues of ordinary city
drafts or vouchers (not authorized by law) valid in
the hands of holders for value. Such holders are
affected with notice of the illegality.
164, 180
9. Certificates of indebtedness, city warrants, or-
ders, checks, drafts, used for giving to the public
creditors evidence of the amount of their claims
against the city, are not commercial paper.
holder takes them subject to all defenses.
164, 180
10. When power to issue securities of a commer-
cial character is given to a municipal corporation,
such securities will possess the usual qualities at-
taching to like securities issued by private corpora-
tions.
Idem,
164, 180
11. Although a railroad corporation is private,
its work is public, as much so as if it were to be
constructed by the State.
12. Where each stockholder of a corporation is
bound for its debts in proportion to his stock, his
liability is not limited to the par value of his stack,
neither is he bound absolutely for the payment of
the full amount of that.
ment of the claim, does not give such attorney a
lien upon the fund appropriated by Congress to pay
the claim.
623
2. For breach of such agreement, the remedy is
at law, not in equity, and there is no jurisdiction in
equity, to sustain a bill to enjoin the claimant from
withdrawing such 25 per cent. from the Treasury.
Idem,
623
3. Under the Act of February 26, 1853, all trans-
fers of any part of any claim against the United
States, or of any interest therein are void, unless
executed in the presence of at least two attesting
witnesses after the allowance of such claim,
Idem.
GUARANTOR.
SEE ACTION, 1.
HOMSTEAD.
INSURANCE.
SEE CORPORATIONS, 16.
EVIDENCE, 32-34, 41, 42.
QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT, 2, 3.
1. In an action on an accident insurance policy,
containing a condition that the insurers would not
be liable for a death by an accident caused by a
violation of law, a recovery cannot be had in
a State where horse-racing is a misdemeanor, for
death by accident while engaged in a horse-race.
Ins. Co. v. Seaver,
155
2. Such death of the insured was caused by a vio-
lation of the law, although his opponent disre-
garded the rules of the course, and intentionally
sought to run him off the track.
3. It is not necessary to a total loss that there
should be an absolute destruction of the thing in-
sured so that nothing of it can be delivered at the
point of destination.
4. A destruction, so that, while some of its com
ponent elements or parts may remain, the thing
insured in the character or description by which it
was insured, is destroyed, is a total loss.
Idem,
5. A bill to reform a policy of insurance cannot
be sustained, after a loss, on the sole ground of us-
age.
Hearne v. Marine Ins. Co.,
6. Nor will this court, if it declines to reform the
contract, decree the return of the premium.
Idem,
395
7. Where the case is one of mere deviation, the
law annuls the contract as to the future, and for-
feits the premium to the underwriter, and equity in
such case follows the law.
Idem.
395
8. A policy not in accordance with the prelimi
nary agreement of insurance, may be reformed,
after an action at law thereon has been defeated.
Equitable Ins. Co. v. Hearne,
398
9. Under the charter of an insurance company,
which provides that every contract. bargain, agree
ment and policy shall be in writing or in print,
and be under the seal of the corporation, a contract
to issue a policy as an executory agreement to in-
sure is binding without a written memorial of it.
10. Credit allowed for the payment of the pre-
mium which the agents were authorized by general
usage to give, did not impair the preliminary con-
tract.
Idem,
11. The contract being valid, can be enforced in
a court of equity and having been enforced by
the procurement of a policy, an action can be
maintained upon the instrument; or the court, in
enforcing the execution of the contract, may enter
a decree for the amount of the insurance.
Idem,
12. Insurance agents may, after a loss, fill
policy, which they had, previous to the
stipulated to deliver.
13. Where the policy, filled up after the loss.
was by express stipulation to be held by the agents
in their safe for the assured, no actual manual
transfer was essential to perfect the latter's title.
Idem,
423
14. Where written proposals for insurance were
prepared by the company's agent, the proposals,
both questions and answers, are the act of the
company, which they cannot set up as a warranty
by the assured.
Life Ins. Co. v. Mahone,
15. And this is especially so, when true answers
were in fact made by the applicant and the agent
substituted for them others, thus misrepresenting
the applicant as well as deceiving his own princi-
pals.
593
16. Nor does it make any difference that the an-
read to the applicant and signed by him.
swers as written by the agent were subsequently
and the policy is made and accepted upon, the ex-
17. Where the application for insurance states,
press condition and agreement, that the statements
in all respects true, this stipulation is made as to
and declarations contained in said application are
all statements whether material or not, and a
has made any other application to have his life in-
false answer to an inquiry whether the applicant
sured, and whether he is married or single, will
avoid the policy.
Jeffries v. Life Ins. Co.,
INTEREST.
429
14. But if it be found that the federal question
must control the whole case, or that there has
been no decision by the state court of any other
matter which is sufficient of itself to maintain the
judgment, then this court will reverse ne judgment
and render such judgment as the state court should
have rendered, or will remand the case to that
24. In such a case if due validity and effect has
not been given to the federal judgment, and if
such right or immunity claimed has been thereby
lost, this court will reverse the judgment of the
state court.
25. If jurisdiction of the case was acquired only
by reason of the citizenship of the parties, and the
state law alone was administered, then only such
validity and effect can be claimed for the judgment
as would be due to a judgment of the state courts
under like circumstances.
588
26. A court of equity has not jurisdiction to
avoid a will or to set aside the probate thereof, on
the ground of fraud, mistake or forgery.
Kieley v. McGlynn,
599
27. To give this court jurisdiction to re-examine
a state judgment, it must appear that a federal
question "was necessarily involved in the decision"
of the state court.
28. Where the alleged unconstitutionality of a
railroad charter was set up as a defense in a state
court to an action by the State, the state court was
bound to pass upon it; and having decided against
the exemption thus claimed, this court is author-
ized to review the decision.
678
29. Where the question for decision in the state
court was not whether, if the bankrupt had title.
it would pass to his assignee by the operation of
the Bankrupt Act, but whether he had title at all,
the decision of that question by the state court does
not present a question of which this court can take
jurisdiction.
729
30. Consent of parties cannot give the courts of
the United States jurisdiction, but the parties may
admit the existence of facts which show jurisdle-
tion, and the courts may act judicially upon such
an admission.
set aside, the United States held the land as if no
entry had been made, and could grant it again.
McCarthy v. Mann,
49
2. Where the Act of Congress declared that a
patent should issue to the person who made the en-
try and that the title should inure to the benefit of
his grantees, by his grantees are meant those claim-
ing title under him, and an equity vested in each
of them by the Act, and on the Issuing of the patent
the legal title vested in them.
49
146
5. Congress did not intend to change this system
grants of land to build railroads.
Idem,
in the new policy adopted by it, to aid States by
6. Under the Act of the 3d of March, 1863, by
which the Solicitors of the Treasury is authorized
to sell. with the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury, certain lands of the U. S., his approval
is a condition precedent without which the solicitor
has no authority whatever to sell.
U. S. v. Jonas,
177
7. The purchaser may require written evidence
of this approval or he may refuse to accept the
deed.
Idem,
177
8. The United States may maintain an action to
recover logs sold by Indians from their reservation
to a third person, where the logs were not cut for
the improvement of the land.
U. S. v. Cook,
15. An entry cannot be made under the pre-emp-
tion laws by one in trust for another, and a court
of equity can not decree that it was so made.
Idem,
219
16. The Act of June 3, 1856 and the Act of May
5, 1864, granting lands to Wisconsin to aid in
building railroads, are grants in presenti and pass
the title to the odd sections designated to be after-
wards located; when located the title acquires pre-
cision and becomes attached to the land.
Schulenberg v. Harriman,
Schow v. Harriman,
17. The lands granted do not revert to the United
States, although the road was not constructed with-
in the period prescribed, no action having been
taken, either by legislation or judicial proceeding
to enforce the forfeiture of the grants.
18. The provision in the Act of 1856, that all
lands remaining unsold after ten years shall revert
to the United States if the road be not then com-
pleted, is a condition subsequent.
556
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