Mr. MARONEY. I know of no such plans. Obviously, I do not think we could very well destroy the information. In the event of a future criminal proceeding in which a defendant may have been overheard on one of these, we would be obligated to produce to the court and to the defendant, under a protective order, any logs of overhearings of his conversations.

Senator KENNEDY. So the reason, then, is for the preservation of the defendant's rights?

Mr. MARONEY. Well, I think we have to do that; otherwise, we would have no way of determining any possible Keith issue in a future situation.

Senator KENNEDY. Is that the only basis of access to those files? Mr. MARONEY. The only basis of access?

Senator KENNEDY. Yes, only when the defendant raises these questions?

Mr. MARONEY. Yes, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. There is no other basis for access to them?
Mr. MARONEY. No, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Of course the Army agreed last year to destroy some of the things contained in their files from spying on civilians. There was a letter from the Defense Department's General Counsel to Senator Ervin on June 10, 1971, which said, "The civil disturbance information in CRIS"-that is the Counterintelligence Records Information System-"was stored on four magnetic tapes and discs. They were all destroyed on April 12, 1970, by degaussing, for example, the information was removed from the discs and tapes by passing them through a magnetic field. No other discs or tapes contained the information which was in the Fort Monroe program. Supporting files consisted of boxes of IBM cards, existing printouts, and the user manuals. These related files were destroyed on April 22, 1970.” This letter also said, "To comply with the spirit of the new DA [Department of the Army] policy, however, all dossiers are reviewed for unauthorized materiel-which is removed and destroyed-before being released to the requester."

[The complete text of the June 10, 1971 letter to Senator Ervin from the General Counsel, Department of Defense, follows:] GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Washington, D.C., June 10, 1971.

Hon. SAM J. ERVIN, Jr.,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Your questions concerning the Fort Monroe and Fort Hood data banks and the additional files referred to on page 3 of your March 30, 1971 letter to Secretary Laird have been referred to me for reply.

As you know, representatives from the Army met with the Subcommittee's Chief Counsel for several hours on April 15 to respond to the six questions set forth on page 2 of your letter. During these discussions, he raised additional questions about the Fort Monroe and the Fort Holabird computer systems. Answers to these questions are enclosed at Tab A.

It is believed that the submissions included with this letter, plus certain follow-up actions by the Department of the Army, will provide the Committee with as complete a report of the computer operations as possible under the circumstances. In this respect, it is noted that the draft report of the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee Staff, dated April 26, 1971, suggests a certain unresponsiveness on the part of the Department of the Army. The record is to

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the contrary. The Department has endeavored at all times to furnish a full and complete account despite the fact that the computer operations in question have long since been disbanded, and the computer print-outs at Fort Holabird and Fort Monroe destroyed except for those which are now in the temporary custody of the Subcommittee. To secure a technical explanation, the Department of the Army contacted the originators of the computer system and obtained their recollections as to the meaning of the computer code symbols.

With reference to your request for further information on the Fort Monroe and Fort Hood computer data banks, answers to your various questions have been prepared from the information presently available and from the recollection of those who worked on these programs. The destruction of these computer data banks and related files last year makes it quite difficult to answer many of your questions. In this regard, the Army is unable to provide you copies of any documents, manuals, or other publications relating to the establishment of these systems because they are no longer available and in some cases existed only in a fragmentary and informal form. However, two pamphlets on coding instructions for the Fort Holabird computer are being held by the Department of Justice for purposes of the Tatum v. Laird litigation. These may be of interest to you in your inquiry.

The Fort Monroe computer data bank, known as the Counterintelligence Records Information System (CRIS), was established in January 1968 but was not computerized until May 1968, CONARC sought and obtained approval for the computerization of this sytem in April-May 1968 in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2-1, Army Regulation 18-2 (attached). This regulation does not establish the criteria for reviewing the propriety of a particular system; it only outlines the procedures for reviewing the feasibility of a particular program in light of available and prospective computer resources and requirements. On April 1, 1970, the Secretary of the Army issued a policy letter which required his personal approval of any computerized data bank on civilians not affiliated with the Department of Defense and only after consultation with Congress. DoD Directive 5200.27 now imposes the requirement that the Chairman of the Defense Investigative Review Council approve such computer operations.

CRIS, the Fort Monroe system, was designed to retrieve civil disturbance information rapidly and generate data and statistics to assist CONARC in the prediction of civil disturbances which might result in the deployment or commitment of federal troops. The attempt to predict possible civil disturbances or incidents related directly to the requirements placed on CONARC to provide Task Forces for deployment and for actual use in civil disturbances in accordance with the Army Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot). The statistics and other data produced by this program were considered to be a necessary adjunct to the requirements and responsibilities imposed by the Army Civil Disturbance Plan, and it was hoped that this data would assisst the CONARC federal troops.

The Cris contained three basic categories of information with a cross-reference retrieval capability among them: personalities, organizations, and incidents. The information itself was stored on magnetic discs, with a backup file on magnetic tape. Information for CRIS was received from USAINTC, CONUSAMDW, and the FBI. There was not, however, a direct interconnection between other computers nor was the information fed directly into CRIS over teletype or other electrical means. Recipients of the information produced by CRIS included: Office Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, CONARC; the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Intelligence, CONUS Armies and Military District of Washington; HQ, USAINTC; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA; and the Commander, Military Traffic Management and Terminal Service. There is no way of determining how many printouts or other information derived from CRIS were produced and forwarded to the recipients listed above. However, the June 9, 1970 Army policy letter required the destruction of all civil disturbance information on civilians.

It should be pointed out that only 2.5% of available computer time was used on CRIS. The remaining computer time was consumed by 8 major programs, all of which dealt directly with CONARC's command and control functions. These programs were: Force Status, Unit Identification, Automated Army Unit Readiness Reporting System, Contingency Planning Troop List, CONARC movement Planning and Status, Computerized Airlift Planning, and Contingency Plan Map System.

The civil disturbance information in CRIS was stored on four magnetic tapes and discs. They were all destroyed on April 12, 1970, by degaussing, i.e., the information was removed from the discs and tapes by passing them through a magnetic field. No other discs or tapes contained the information which was in the Fort Monroe program. Supporting files consisted of boxes of IBM cards, existing printouts, and the user manuals. These related files were destroyed on April 22, 1970.

You have asked whether a civilian approved the initiation of the Fort Monroe program. The requirement for the approval of such computer data banks was not imposed until April 1, 1970, and, hence, there was no requirement for such approval at the time the system was initiated. The Office of the Army General Counsel did become aware of the system on or about March 1, 1970. I would stress that there was no effort to hide the system in question; it was discussed and explained at various briefings to high military officials and was viewed as a normal adjunct to the Army's civil disturbance program.

The Fort Hood system, the second system referred to in your letter, did not reach the same stage of development as CRIS. In fact, it did not become fully operational before its destruction on August 15, 1970. By way of background, a feasibility study was begun in July 1969 at Fort Hood on a computer program which could provide III Corps with the ability to retrieve civil disturbance information rapidly and assist it in predicting disturbances within its geographical area of responsibility. Under the Army Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot), Fort Hood was required to provide three civil disturbance task force headquarters and six civil disturbance brigades for possible deployment in a civil disturbance situation. The computerization of the data contained at Fort Hood was intended to supply the intelligence required to respond efficiently and rapidly to a civil disturbance situation.

The program was run on a computer which was used primarily in the areas of supply, finance, accounting, and maintenance with the secondary purpose of providing support for various systems development such as the Division Logistic Systems Tests and currently the Combat Service Support System. In fact, only 0.008 of 1 percent of computer time was used in the formulation of the civil disturbance program. A request for program approval was not submitted under the provisions of paragraph 2-1, AR 18-2, described above. However, since AR 18-2 relates only to the feasibility of the system, the question of the propriety of implementing such a system would not have been reviewed under AR 18-2. Of course, new policy letters and directives now impose a requirement that such a computer data bank be approved by civilian officials.

The information for the data banks was received from the FBI, USAINTC, and from liaison contacts with local authorities. The data bank itself listed in alphabetical order various civilian organizations which were deemed to have some relation to the III Corps responsibility under Garden Plot. Under the listed organizations, the names of certain members of the organization were also included. Since this system did not reach full operational status, only two copies of a printout were produced for distribution outside of Fort Hood. The Deputy Chief of Staff Intelligence, 4th U.S. Army, received one copy which was subsequently destroyed in August 1970. One was also forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, DA.

The computer program at Fort Hood was not known at DA, Headquarters until the latter part of April 1970 when an exception was sought from the provisions of the April 1, 1970 letter requiring the destruction of computerized data banks on civilians not affiliated with the Department of Defense. To review the propriety of the exception, ACSI, DA, requested a copy of the printout from the Fort Hood computer. This copy (referred to above) was forwarded, and after review of the document, the exception was denied and the data bank was ordered destroyed on August 5, 1970. The data bank and computer program on magnetic tape (there were no discs) were then destroyed on August 15, 1970.

As indicated above, the printout, from the Fort Hood system sent to the 4th U.S. Army was previously destroyed. It was thought that the printout provided to ACSI, DA, the only other printout, had also been destroyed. Although there had never been any written record of destruction to confirm this, several prior searches had failed to discover the document in question. However, on May 11, 1971, the last remaining printout from Fort Hood was discovered by accident among some files in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for

Intelligence, Department of the Army. On May 21, 1971, the Acting General Counsel of the Army wrote to the Department of Justice requesting its advice on the proper disposition of this item in view of the Tatum v. Laird litigation. The Justice Department has advised the Department that it should be retained for litigation purposes.

You asked about the existence of a set of records called the "Van Deman❞ files. Major General Ralph Van Deman, who formerly headed Army Intelligence, compiled intelligence files during the period of 1929-1952. There is no indication, however, that he collected these files prior to his retirement in 1929.

The files, for the most part, consisted of four general categories: (1) collection of various newspapers from the West Coast alleged to be communist or communist-affiliated; (2) literature and reference material on or produced by alleged communists; (3) a photo album of assorted individuals: and (4) files on individuals and organizations based upon information acquired from various agencies and private sources. The information in the latter category largely dealt with communist activities.

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Sixth Army, assumed custody of at least some of General Van Deman's files on January 22, 1952. It is believed that certain portions of the files were removed by associates of General Van Deman before the Sixth Army acquired these files, but this cannot be verified. The reasons for assuming custody is not entirely clear. It is quite possible that there was some informal arrangement between the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Sixth Army, and General Van Deman for the transfer of these items at General Van Deman's death.

The files in the possession of the Sixth Army were shipped in 1958 to what is now designated as the United States Army Investigation Records Repository (USAIRR). Following this transfer, the index cards prepared by General Van Deman for use with his material were replaced by punch cards and integrated into the USAIRR index. His own index cards were then destroyed. In 1968, the punch cards prepared from the earlier index cards were also destroyed, and all reference to these materials in the Defense Central Index of Investigations was thereby deleted. The Van Deman files were then segregated within the USAIRR. After 1968, these files were not referenced by the DCII.

These files remained in the USAIRR, although segregated, until March 2, 1971 when they were transferred to the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee pursuant to a written request by the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee. We have found no record of an inquiry to Mr. Froehlke or to the Department of Defense related directly or indirectly to the Van Deman files prior to your letter of March 30.

In regard to your last series of questions on page 3 of your letter, the Army implemented a policy in February 1971 of reviewing each file at the USAIRR prior to its release to an authorized official for the purpose of removing mateIrial which cannot be retained under our present directives. Mr. Froehlke explicitly informed you of this policy in his appearance.

"There are dossiers within the Army Investigative Records Repository which contain FBI reports and other material which do not meet current Army criteria for retention. A mass screening of the 8 million dossiers would be a long and very expensive undertaking. To comply with the spirit of the new DA policy, however, all dossiers are reviewed for unauthorized material-which is removed and destroyed-before being released to the requester. (Report of Proceedings held before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary Mar. 2, 1971, Vol. 4, p. 600.)"

Files have been and will continue to be screened in accordance with this policy for the purpose of removing and destroying material not authorized for retention under current policy. Generally speaking, there has been no special effort to segregate files to be screened. However, upon discovering that files on certain prominent individuals contained information which is no longer authorized to be retained, the Army has specifically screened out this material. I trust that this information will assist you in your inquiry. Sincerely.

J. FRED BUZHARDT.

Are you planning any similar procedure at the Justice Department?

Mr. MARONEY. No, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Do you think there should be such a procedure? I do not know whether anyone at the Justice Department has had a chance to think about this problem. Perhaps you could write us a note about what you are doing, or about what you will do, or about why you will not do it if that is what you decide. Or are you prepared to say something about that right now?

Mr. MARONEY. I think as I indicated, if we were to follow that procedure, we would have a substantial legal problem on the question of taint in a future criminal case. The only way we can demonstrate in such a case that none of the evidence being used in the case has been tainted is to turn over the logs, have a hearing, and then demonstrate that none of the evidence being used at the trial resulted from the electronic surveillance.

Senator KENNEDY. Where is the material now that came from the illegal taps? Is it in one place, or is it still at different agencies? Have you collected it from the other agencies? Have you issued any regulations, for example, that none of this material will be available to anyone unless there is a specific order from the Attorney General and that then it will only be for the purposes of protecting a defendant's rights? Has anything been done about that?

Mr. MARONEY. No, sir.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, should there not be? Suppose there is some of that material in other departments. For example, how will they know over at the Defense Department what you are saying up here? Has the Attorney General done anything about that? Should he do something about it? Are you not concerned that something should be done to try to achieve what you have outlined herethat is that this information not be generally available?

Mr. MARONEY. None of this information is generally available, Senator.

but

Senator KENNEDY. Well, not generally available to the public,

Mr. MARONEY. All of it is handled as confidential investigative material. It has a limited dissemination. I do not think there is any danger of any improper use of this information.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, of course, even though there may be some procedures about dissemination of investigative information, it is still in the files. I am not so sure that it should be left in those same investigative files and available even to the people who are entitled to obtain investigative files. Why can't it just be assembled and put into a separate place, under a specific restriction-only for protecting defendants' rights.

Mr. MARONEY. Well, of course, the logs themselves are maintained by the FBI. They are not disseminated in any place. As a matter of fact, the only time there is an examination of those logs by anybody other than the people in the FBI is in connection with a pending court procedure in which a question arises as to turning logs over to a dependant or the court for in camera inspection.

Senator KENNEDY. Of course the original purpose of getting the information was to use it.

Mr. MARONEY. And some of the investigative information would be in investigative files, some pieces of the information.