BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN, SOUTH ASIAN AND AFRICAN AFFAIRS, DOMESTIC

This area

The continuing world tensions have constantly reemphasized the political, military, economic, and geographic importance to the United States of the 91political entities in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa area. includes the states and dependent areas of Africa, the Arab States and Israel, Greece, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Ceylon.

Although not measurable in specific workload terms, the following statistics contribute to an appreciation and understanding of the complexity and magnitude of the problems confronting the United States in achieving its objectives in this

Of economic importance is the sharp increase in United States foreign trade with countries in the NEA area (illustrated below in millions of dollars):

The responsibilities of the Bureau extend to 19 independent countries and 72 dependent areas in various stages of political, economic and social development. The present tension in Africa, the Near East and South Asia can be expected to increase and the development of United States interests in this area will create additional problems. Only essential objectives may be met, however, under limited personnel and funds now available.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY

The Assistant Secretary is responsible for the general conduct of foreign relations with the countries in this area by (1) applying overall political, security, economic, public affairs, social, consular, administrative, and other policies and practices within that region; (2) maintaining and supervising relationships with foreign missions in the United States representing countries within his regional jurisdiction, and (3) directing, instructing the operations, and guiding the operation of Foreign Service establishments within the area. The immediate staff of the Assistant Secretary consists of the Deputy Assistant Secretary and an advisory staff for United Nations Affairs, Politico-Economic Affairs, and a staff assistant.

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

The Executive Director is responsible for management and control of all NEA Foreign Service and domestic administrative operations. The staff of this Office is responsible for the development of budgetary and financial plans; control and allocation of all NEA funds and positions; maintenance of all financial records and reports; review and development of standards for post operations; the conduct of management-improvement programs, analysis, assignment of action, and followup on recommendations included in Foreign Service Inspection Corps reports, the coordination and review of the Foreign Service economic reporting schedules, and the development of studies in respect to the opening and closing of foreign posts and changing the class of posts. The staff is also responsible for implementing the Department's policies pertaining to the area's personnel and operational facilities. It is concerned with administrative backstopping of NEA's posts and missions and working with other Government agencies and other offices of the Department on administrative matters affecting the area. The Office has initial action responsibility for personnel assignments and transfers; travel; operation problems involving communication facilities, consular affairs, courier and pouch services, Government-owned properties and property inventories; security enforcement; and operations incident to the procurement and economical utilization of supplies and equipment.

OFFICE OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS

The Office of African Affairs has primary responsibility for the conduct of United States relations with over 50 independent states, colonies, territories, and protectorates, the most important of which are:

Independent states

Ethiopia, Libya, and Liberia.

Colonies

Belgian Congo, Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia, and Spanish and Portuguese Guinea.

Territories

Ruanda-Urandi (trust), Tanganyika (trust), French West Africa, French Equatorial Africa, French Cameroons (trust), British and French Togo (trust), and Italian Somaliland (trust).

Protectorates

Bechuanaland, Northern Rhodesia, Kenya, Uganda, British Somaliland, Tunisia, French and Spanish Morocco, Spanish Sahara, Sierra Leone, Gold Coast, Nigeria, Nyasaland, Zanzibar, the mandate of South West Africa, and French Somaliland (trust).

North Africa, comprising Libya, Tunisia, French and Spanish Morocco, British, French, and Italian Somaliland, and Ethiopia, is of strategic importance to the United States. This Government is in the process of completing construction of six strategic airbases in North Africa and is expanding the naval base at Port Lyautey in Morocco. The establishment of these military bases, with the attendant influx of large numbers of civilian and military personnel, has served greatly to increase the workload of our offices in these areas and the departmental officers having responsibility for North Africa. The past year has been marked by disorders and near revolution in Tunisia and Morocco where native nationalism is in almost open opposition to French rule. Recently the French have deposed the Sultan of Morocco and the basic political problems in both Tunisia and Morocco remain unsolved. Our handling of these problems is of the greatest importance because of the repercussions they have on our relations

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with France and on United States policy objectives in Western Europe and in the Arab States. In Morocco, the Department is also faced with a difficult situation which involves the question of United States treaty rights. Contacts of American businessmen with the area and the Department regarding this matter continue to increase.

The ex-Italian colony of Libya is in the first stages of its existence as a soverign state and presents all of the problems attending a struggle for survival. Additional burdens have been imposed on the officers responsible for this area as a result of the establishment in Libya of Wheelus Field, an American airbase. Throughout the entire area of Africa south of the Sahara there is a marked increase in racial and political tensions. The opportunity afforded communism to exploit these tensions to the disadvantage of the free world makes it important for the United States to give full attention to the problems of this area. It should also be emphasized that this same area supplies a long list of strategic materials such as uranium, cobalt, industrial diamonds, chrome, asbestos, copper, lead, manganese, to mention only a few, to the Western alliance. Further deterioration in race relations and in the prospects for long-range political stability in this enormous and diverse area would be inimical to the interests of the United States.

The establishment on August 1, 1953, of the British Central African Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (population 6 million), which will enjoy almost complete autonomy and by the end of this decade is expected to attain full dominion status in the Commonwealth, underlines its increasing political and economic importance.

The outbreak of Mau Mau terrorism in Kenya, which after a year of strenuous "emergency" military measures is by no means under control, has created a dangerous situation in the increasingly important strategic area of British East Africa (population 20 million). This area is a British military "flanking" position on the Middle East lifeline and provides the headquarters for the recently reconstituted East Africa Command stretching 2,000 miles from the south African to the Ethiopian border. The legacy of racial hatred generated by the Mau Mau movement will probably take years to alleviate, but the free world cannot afford to lose this area.

The rapidity with which developments are taking place in the British West African territories of the Gold Coast and Nigeria, now entering on the final stages of constitutional reform leading to complete self-government either within or outside the British Commonwealth, makes it important for the Office of African Affairs to pay much more attention to these two countries in particular and to west Africa in general.

OFFICE OF GREEK, TURKISH AND IRANIAN AFFAIRS

The Office of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs has primary responsibility for the conduct of United States relations with three countries whose independence and orientation toward the West are of critical importance to the free world. All three are contiguous to the Soviet Union or Soviet-dominated countries. In addition, they have all been subjected to varying forms and intensities of Soviet pressures throughout the postwar years.

American assistance to Greece has been instrumental in preserving Greek freedom which was seriously threatened by guerrilla warfare fostered from beyond Greek borders, in restoring internal security, and in strengthening the economic structure which had been all but destroyed by Nazi occupation. The United States is represented in Greece not only by the Embassy in Athens and the Consulate General in Salonika, but also by the Foreign Operations Administration and military assistance missions. Although other branches of the United States Government have primary responsibility for these missions this Office maintains close liaison on questions of mutual interest and is called upon to advise and consult with these other branches of the Government with respect to the implementation of our policies in Greece.

In Turkey, as in Greece, the United States maintains a Foreign Operations Administration mission and a military mission. The latter is responsible for assistance in equipping and training the Turkish armed forces. Turkey's determination to resist aggression and its firm desire to aline itself even more strongly with the West have resulted in a Turkish policy of looking to the United States for advice and technical assistance. This Office must be staffed to take advantage of all these approaches from a friendly and powerful ally and to deal with the many problems that arise in connection with our programs in Turkey, including economic aid, military training, road building, and technical assistance.

the The deteriorating situation in Iran following nationalization of Iran's oil industry in 1951 has imposed unusually heavy burdens on this Office. Our policy of attempting to retain Iran in the Western camp, despite strength of the Communist Tudeh Party and antiforeign feeling, requires strong Department backstopping for the Embassy and the military and technical assistance missions in Iran.

This Office must also deal with complicated politico-military considerations arising from the adherence of Greece and Turkey to NATO and from the establishment of NATO regional headquarters in Salonika and Izmir, both of which are largely staffed with American officers. It is called upon to participate actively in directing and backstopping negotiations for United States requirements under NATO. It also has important responsibilities in connection with regional security affairs, such as development of plans for Middle East defenses and guidance with respect to United States interest in growing Balkan cooperation under the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish Friendship Pact.

OFFICE OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

The stability of the Near East is being subjected to severe tests by the pressures of opposing political, military and economic forces. The nations of the areaEgypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, the Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and the peripheral areas of the Arabian peninsule, notably the Persian Gulf Shiekdoms and Muscat are faced with complex problems resulting from many crosscurrents, of which the following are examples: (1) The East-West struggle, in which proximity to the Soviet Union and the area's military weakness combine to encourage either indecision or neutralism; (2) the aftermath of the Israel-Arab war, as a result of which some 850,000 refugees are still displaced and homeless, a "cold war" on both economic and military fronts is being fought, passions on both sides continue to be high and threatening paramilitary engagements are frequently fought along the Israel border; (3) the conflict between traditional and Western way of life, which has tended increasingly to break down the Arab social structure, with encouragements to political extremists; (4) the dramatic difference between "have" and "have not" nations, in which large-scale petroleum deposits in a few of the Arab States have created new differences in attitude within a region largely maintaining its population at the subsistence level; (5) intense nationalism, and consequent friction with the Western Powers.

It is important to the security of the United States and the free world that the Near East achieve greater stability. The region either contains or provides access to half the world's known petroleum deposits, and it stretches across land, sea, and air communications of vital strategic importance.

To achieve stability, we must make effective progress in many directions, toward promoting friendly relations between the Near East and the West, developing peaceful relations within the area, creating self-sustaining economies capable of supporting a higher standard of living, expanding trade, developing natural resources to provide a livelihood for increasing populations and promoting cooperative regional thinking. Our activities must be carried on in the face of intense nationalism, widespread poverty, and a heritage of Arab suspicion against the West arising first from the rejection of colonialism, and more recently from the part played by western nations, including the United States, in the creation of the State of Israel.

Grounds for hope that the Near East can successfully withstand the pressures of current events can be found in the constructive approach being taken toward major developmental problems by several Arab States, the increasing realism to be found in Israeli economic planning, and in signs of growing political maturity within the area. We have been successful on several important occasions in encouraging moderation in the political sphere and have increased the effectiveness of the technical assistance program. The Congress has provided funds for the first time for economic aid to the Arab States, and a possibility now exists of increasing markedly the impact of our foreign economic policy in the area. During 1954 and 1955 the Office of Near Eastern Affairs will apply itself to the following major problems:

1. The Anglo-Egyptian controversy over the Suez base.

2. Programs to make the Palestine refugees self-supporting.

3. The reduction of the basic tensions between Israel and the Arab States. 4. The provision of guidance to FOA to permit the rapid initiation of development programs in coordination with our political and economic objectives.