107.

108.

Duty of Maker or Vendor of Chattel.
Duty of Keeper of Animals.

109. Standard of Care.

110.

Of Innkeeper and Common Carrier.

111. Determining Standard of Care-Res Ipsa Loquitur.
112. Damage.

113. Contributory Negligence.

DEFINED

104. Negligence consists in failing to fulfill a legal duty to exercise a proper degree of care, whereby damage

results to one to whom such legal duty is owing.

It is manifestly impossible to define this tort with any degree of exactness, since no fixed rule of duty can be established which will be applicable to all cases. The standard of care must be determined by the circumstances of each. A course of conduct consistent with the exercise of proper care under some conditions might under others exhibit the grossest negligence.1

Negligence, being a mere omission to exercise proper precaution, must be distinguished from intentional wrongs, whether the intent be actual or constructive. It presupposes culpable inadvertence, and is therefore inconsistent with the thought of malice or design. Hence such ex

1 See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Coon, 111 Pa. 430, 440, 3 Atl. 234. Definitions are collected in 29 Cyc. 415 et seq.

2 Indiana, B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Overton, 117 Ind. 253, 20 N. E. 147; O'Brien v. Loomis, 43 Mo. App. 29; Proctor v. Southern Ry., 61 S. C. 170, 39 S. E. 351; Id., 64 S. C. 491, 42 S. E. 427. "Where an intention to commit the injury exists, whether that intention be actual or constructive only, the wrongful act ceases to be merely negligent

pressions as "willful negligence," or "wanton negligence,” are really contradictions in terms. That the distinction is important is shown by the fact that contributory negligence will be no defense if the tort has been willful. So, exemplary damages are ordinarily refused where defendant has merely been guilty, of negligence. To justify their award it has been said that the evidence must disclose "that injury and becomes one of violence or aggression." Pennsylvania Co. v. Sinclair, 62 Ind. 301, 306, 30 Am. Rep. 185.

3 Bailey v. North Carolina R. Co., 149 N. C. 169, 62 S. E. 912; Talbert v. Charleston & W. C. Ry., 75 S. C. 136, 55 S. E. 138. "When willfulness enters, negligence steps out. The former is characterized by advertence, and the latter by inadvertence." Christy v. Butcher, 153, Mo. App. 397, 401, 134 S. W. 1058, per Gray, J. "To say that an injury resulted from the negligent and willful conduct of another is to affirm that the same act is the result of two exactly opposite mental conditions. It is to affirm in one breath that an act was done through inattention, thoughtlessly, heedlessly, and at the same time purposely and by design." Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Bryan, 107 Ind. 51, 54, 7 N. E. 807, per Mitchell, J.

4 Bailey v. North Carolina R. Co., 149 N. C. 169, 62 S. E. 912. "There is a distinction between willfulness, wantonness, and recklessness. The first implies an act done intentionally, designedly. The second has various meanings; as applied to the subject in hand. action without regard to the rights of others, a conscious failure to observe care, a conscious invasion of the rights of others, willfully unrestrained action. The third, a disregard of consequences, an indifference whether a wrong or an injury is done or not, an indifference to the rights of others and of natural and probable consequences." Jensen v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. (1914) 44 Utah, 100, 138 Pac. 1185, 1189, per Straup, J. But it has been said that "a purpose or intent to injure is not an ingredient of wanton negligence. Where either of those exist, if damage ensues, the injury is willful. In wanton negligence, the party doing the act or failing to act is conscious of his conduct, and, without having the intent to injure, is conscious, from his knowledge of existing circumstances and conditions, that his conduct will likely or probably result in injury." Birmingham Railway & Electric Co. v. Bowers, 110 Ala. 328, 331, 20 South. 345, per Coleman, J. In accord, Memphis & C. R. Co. v. Martin, 117 Ala. 367, 382, 23 South. 231.

5 Taxicab & Touring Car Co. v. Cabaniss, 9 Ala. App. 549, 63 South. 774; Chicago, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Bills, 118 Ind. 221, 20 N. E. 775; Kansas Pac. Ry. Co. v. Whipple, 39 Kan, 531, 18 Pac. 730; Magar

6 Moody v. McDonald, 4 Cal. 297; Louisville, N. A. & C. Ry. Co. v. Shanks, 94 Ind. 598; O'Brien v. Loomis, 43 Mo. App. 29.

entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to consequences." Indeed, there can be no recovery whatever for negligence where damage is not shown, though nominal damages at least will be given for a willful invasion of a right."

8

ELEMENTS-DUTY TO EXERCISE CARE

105. There are three elements necessary to the existence of negligence: (1) A duty on the part of defendant to protect the plaintiff from the injury of which he complains. (2) A failure to perform that duty. (3) An injury to the plaintiff through such failure.10

11

It has already been seen that the foundation of tort liability is the violation of a duty imposed by the law upon the defendant in favor of the plaintiff. To justify a recovery for negligence, it must therefore be established that there was an obligation to exercise care toward the injured party.12 For instance, in the absence of covenant, no duty rests upon the owner of premises not to let them in a dilapi

v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387, 76 N. E. 474, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1038; Brendle v. Spencer, 125 N. C. 474, 34 S. E. 634; Bolin v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 108 Wis. 333, 84 N. W. 446, 81 Am. St. Rep. 911. 7 Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489, 495, 23 L. Ed. 374. In accord, Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Arnold, 80 Ala. 600, 2 South. 337; Wall v. Cameron, 6 Colo. 275; Chattanooga, R. & C. R. Co. v. Liddell, 85 Ga. 482, 11 S. E. 853, 21 Am. St. Rep. 169; Koestel v. Cunningham, 97 Ky. 421, 30 S.. W. 970.

8 See supra, p. 74; infra, p. 539.

9 Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40, 68 L. R. A. 956. Cf. Wartman v. Swindell, 54 N. J. Law, 589, 25 Atl. 356, 18 L. R. A. 44. 10 Faris v. Hoberg, 134 Ind. 269, 274, 33 N. E. 1028, 39 Am. St. Rep. 261.

11 See supra, p. 7 et seq.

12 Atlanta & W. P. R. Co. v. West, 121 Ga. 641, 49 S. E. 711, 67 L. R. A. 701, 104 Am. St. Rep. 179; Flint & Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind. 491, 79 N. E. 503, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 924; Tuttle v. Gilbert Mfg. Co., 145 Mass. 169, 13 N. E. 465; Akers v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 58 Minn. 540, 60 N. W. 669; Prosser v. West Jersey & Seashore R. Co., 72 N. J. Law, 342, 63 Atl. 494; Miller v. Woodhead, 104 N. Y. 471, 11 N. E. 57.

dated or unsafe condition,13 unless there is some latent or concealed defect which he knows will render their occupation dangerous, and which is not known to the lessee, or discoverable by inspection, for in the latter event it is the duty of the lessor to make disclosure. 14 Nor is the landlord bound to make repairs after leasing.15 If, however, he undertake to repair, he must exercise care in so doing,16 and "if the premises are rented for a public use, for which he knows that they are unfit and dangerous, he is guilty of negligence, and may become responsible to persons suffering injury while rightfully using them." 17 Furthermore, at duty to exercise reasonable care exists with respect to that portion of the premises over which he retains control as a stairway, hall, or elevator for use in common by different tenants in the same building,18 and, as elsewhere stated,"

13 Smith v. State, Use of Walsh, 92 Md. 518, 48 Atl. 92, 51 L. R. A. 772; Bowe v. Hunking, 135 Mass. 380, 46 Am. Rep. 471, note; Rhoades v. Seidel, 139 Mich. 608, 102 N. W. 1025; Towne v. Thompson, 68 N. H. 317, 44 Atl. 492, 46 L. R. A. 748; Johnston v. Nichols (1915) 83 Wash. 394, 145 Pac. 417; Lane v. Cox (1897) L. R. 1 Q. B. 415. See Jaffe v. Harteau, 56 N. Y. 398, 15 Am. Rep. 438.

14 Borggard v. Gale, 205 Ill. 511, 68 N. E. 1063; Cowen v. Sunderland, 145 Mass. 363, 14 N. E. 117, 1 Am. St. Rep. 469; Cesar v. Karutz, 60 N. Y. 2:29, 19 Am. Rep. 164; Anderson v. Hayes, 101 Wis. 538, 77 N. W. 891, 70 Am. St. Rep. 930.

15 Rhoades v. Seidel, 139 Mich. 608, 102 N. W. 1025; O'Brien v. Capwell, 59 Barb. (N. Y.) 497; Whitehead v. Comstock & Co., 25 R. I. 423, 56 Atl. 446.

16 Mann v. Fuller, 63 Kan. 664, 66 Pac. 627; Gregor v. Cady, $2 Me. 131, 19 Atl. 108, 17 Am. St. Rep. 466; Gill v. Middleton, 105 Mass. 477, 7 Am. Rep. 548.

17 Barrett v. Lake Ontario Beach Imp. Co., 174 N. Y. 310, 314, 66 N. E. 968, 61 L. R. A. 829, per Gray, J. In accord, Colorado Mortg & Inv. Co. v. Giacomini, 55 Colo. 540, 136 Pac. 1039, L. R. A. 1915B, 364; Mead v. Baum, 76 N. J. Law, 337, 69 Atl. 962; Junkermann V. Tilyou Realty Co., 213 N. Y. 404, 108 N. E. 190, L. R. A. 1915F, 700.

18 Sawyer v. McGillicuddy, 81 Me. 318, 17 Atl. 124, 3 L. R. A. 458, 10 Am. St. Rep. 260; Shea v. McEvoy (1915) 220 Mass. 239, 107 N. E. 945; McGinley v. Alliance Trust Co., 168 Mo. 257, 66 S. W, 153, 56 L. R. A. 334; Dollard v. Roberts, 130 N. Y. 269, 29 N. E. 104, 14 L. R. A. 238.

19 See p. 567 et seq.

he may be responsible if the premises are in such a condition as to constitute a nuisance.20

DUTY OF OCCUPANT OF LAND

106. In determining what duty, if any, rests upon the occupant of premises, a division will be made into cases where the injured party is (1) a trespasser; (2) a licensee; (3) an invited person; (4) the owner or occupant of adjoining premises.

Trespassers

The trespasser must take the premises as he finds them. The landowner is under no obligation to see that they are in a safe condition. He owes the trespasser no duty of affirmative care, and is only bound to refrain from willful and wanton acts.21 If, therefore, he dig a pit at such a distance from the public highway that it will not be considered a nuisance, he will not be responsible to the trespasser who falls therein. 22 Necessarily, however, this presupposes that the excavation was made in the exercise of a right to make proper use of the premises. A trespasser is not an outlaw, and the owner who resorts to such means of protection as pits, mantraps, and spring guns, which are calculated to destroy life or inflict grievous bodily harm, will incur the risk of a finding that his use has been unreason

20 Miller v. Fisher, 111 Md. 91, 73 Atl. 891, 50 L. R. A. (N. S.) 295; Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28, 17 Am. Rep. 295; Keeler v. Lederer Realty Corp., 26 R. I. 524, 59 Atl. 855.

21 Whitney v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 87 Conn. 623, 89 Atl. 269; Lary v. Cleveland, C., C. & I. R. Co., 78 Ind. 323, 41 Am. Rep. 572; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hurt (Ky. 1890) 13 S. W. 275; Maynard v. Boston & Maine R. Co., 115 Mass. 458, 15 Am. Rep. 119; Hoberg v. Collins, Lavery & Co. (1910) 80 N. J. Law, 425, 78 Atl. 166, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1064; Magar v. Hammond, 183 N. Y. 387, 76 N. E. 474, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1038.

22 Knapp v. Doll (1913) 180 Ind. 526, 103 N. E. 385; Kohn v. Lovett, 44 Ga. 251. Cf. Kleinberg v. Schween, 134 App. Div. 493, 119 N. Y. Supp. 239, affirmed 198 N. Y. 619, 92 N. E. 1089; Beck v. Carter, 68 N. Y. 283, 23 Am. Rep. 175.