"2. That belonging exclusively to the State without being for public use and which is destined to some public service or to the development of the national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines, until their cession has been granted. "ART. 340. All other property belonging to the State which has not the conditions stated in the preceding article is considered as private property." The commissioner then says: "The definition of property of public ownership is quite clearly given, and does not embrace public lands,' as the expression is understood and applied in the United States, but article 340 classifies such lands, if the property of the State, as private property. "The point I would raise is whether the so-called 'public lands' of Porto Rico were ceded to the United States by the treaty of Paris as 'Crown' lands, or were they and do they remain the property of Porto Rico as 'State' lands." I shall endeavor to answer the question as I presume you would wish to have it stated rather than as it has been formulated by the commissioner. The commissioner makes a fundamental mistake in assuming that Article VIII is the only provision of the treaty to be interpreted. By Article II Spain ceded to the United States "the island of Porto Rico." It might be admitted that Article VIII of the treaty concerns only buildings, wharves, highways, and other like property without thereby admitting that the lands now in question do not belong to the United States. It may be that the purpose of Article VIII was to cede only such property as article 339 of the civil code embraces under property of public ownership. It by no means follows that the lands not mentioned by Article VIII as such property were, by virtue of the same treaty, to "remain the property of Porto Rico as State' lands." The treaty did not cede anything to Porto Rico. It ceded the island to the United States. If, then, the lands now in question did not belong to Porto Rico before the cession, the treaty has not transferred to Porto Rico the title, but has transferred it as part of the title to the island itself to the United States. The latter part of Article VIII does not purport to give the province of Porto Rico anything it did not already own. Porto Rico unquestionably belonged to Spain by right of discovery and conquest, in consequence of the exertions of the people and Government of Spain, and not of any exertions of any people of Porto Rico. The public lands of Porto Rico, as we understand the expression, thus came into the ownership of the Spanish Government subject to the rights of the Indians, who have gradually disappeared. The lands there not owned by individuals are commonly spoken of as lands of the State (estado), and the State means not Porto Rico but Spain. Exh. R, App. II Rep. Evac. Commission, Porto Rico. 56, 2nd, Sen. doc. 117, pp. 6, 7. Regulations, Law of Em. Domain, Porto Rico (royal decree, 1879), art. 16. Provincial and Municipal Laws, Porto Rico (royal decree, 1896), chap. 3, art. 14. Law of Railroads, Porto Rico (royal decree, 1887), Chap. IV, art. 31; Chap. X, art. 63. Regulations for execution of above, Chap. II, art. 7, 10. Law of Public Works, Porto Rico, Chap. I, arts. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5; Chap. VIII, art. 94, 95, 106, 108, 112; Chap. IX, art. 116. Regulations for execution of above, Chap. VIII, art. 122. Mining Law, Porto Rico (royal decrees, 1883, 1884), Chap. I, art. 2. I have not found in the laws of the Indies or any of the royal cédulas, orders or decrees concerning Porto Rico that for any good or valuable consideration, or otherwise, the title to lands acquired by Spain through the discovery and conquest was transferred to the people of the island or province or to its government. Provinces of Spain, and Porto Rico was one, were capable of owning and did own lands (see citations above). They usually owned them, however, as our States of recent admission to the Union have owned small quantities of former public lands of the United States through special grants by Congress in aid of internal improvements, education, etc., or as the States own land acquired from individuals in consequence of debts and taxes (Alcubilla, Diccionario de la Administracion Española). It may be that the records at San Juan show that the province of Porto Rico owned some land in this way. If so, the latter part of Article VIII of the treaty may embrace its title. But I understand your question to concern the general mass of what we should call "public lands." These, in my opinion, belonged to Spain, and, by virtue of the treaty of Paris, now belong to the United States. Respectfully, The SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. P. C. KNOX. GENERAL APPRAISER-OFFICE-INCOMPATIBLE SERVICE. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: Your request to the Secretary of State to make a report to you in connection with the Treasury and the Attorney-General's Office on the status of Mr. Thaddeus S. Sharretts, a member of the Board of General Appraisers, has come to me from the Secretary of the Treasury after consideration by him and the Secretary of State. It seems that in August of last year the State Department requested the Treasury Department to "detail an expert to represent the United States in the international commission for the conversion of the present Chinese tariff into specific rates." After intermediate correspondence the Secretary of the Treasury selected Mr. Sharretts as such representative of the United States, and thereupon the latter proceeded to China upon this special service under the auspices of the Departments of State and the Treasury, where he now is. I draw from the memoranda of those Departments on the subject the following additional facts: That the service of an expert in the adjustment of the Chinese tariffs was necessary and important for the interests of the United States; that Mr. Sharretts was well qualified by his ability and experience to perform the necessary duties; that while these duties in connection with the international commission are not the usual duties of a United States general appraiser, the Secretary of the Treasury did not believe that the provision of the customs administrative act (sec. 12, act of June 10, 1890), directing that a general appraiser "shall not be engaged in any other business, avocation, or employment" had any application here; that Mr. Sharretts is not in receipt of any pay or emoluments on account of this special service; that his actual and necessary expenses only, while attending to the revision of the Chinese tariff, are paid by the Department of State in accordance with the understanding had with the Treasury Department. In United States v. Maurice (2 Brock., 96) Chief Justice Marshall says: "An office is defined to be a public charge or employment,' and he who performs the duties of the office is an officer. If employed on the part of the United States, he is an officer of the United States. Although an office is an employment,' it does not follow that every employment is an office. A man may certainly be employed under a contract, express or implied, to do an act or perform a service, without becoming an officer. But if a duty be a continuing it seems very difficult to distinguish such a charge or employment from an office, or the person who performs the duties from an officer." one, * * 營 In United States v. Hartwell (6 Wall., 385, 393) the defi nition is as follows: "An office is a public station, or employment, conferred by the appointment of government. The term embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and duties. The employment of the defendant was in public service of the United States. * * His duties were continuing and * permanent, not occasionally or temporary." These views have been invoked in rulings which hold that certain special employment or additional service is not incompatible with an office under the United States, and does not even preclude the payment of compensation for the special employment under the prohibitions of sections 1763– 1765, Revised Statutes, and section 2 of the act of July 31, 1894, 28 Stat., 162, 205 (22 Opin., 184; 2 Comp. Dec., 271; id., 467). Here the question of additional compensation is not involved, and it seems clear that the special service does not constitute an office. Inasmuch as Mr. Sharretts receives no additional compensation and does not fill two distinct places, his case is not covered in either aspect by United States v. Saunders (120 U. S., 126), which held (prior to the act of 1894 above cited) on the one hand that where there are two distinct offices or employments, each with its own duties and compensation, both may be held by one person at the same time, notwithstanding sections 1763-1765, R. S.; and implied very clearly, on the other hand, that where an officer performs added duties under his appointment to a single place, as by direction of the head of his Department, the statute then provides that he shall receive no additional compensation for that class of duties unless it is so provided by special legislation. Nor is there any incompatibility between the office of a general appraiser and the special service in this case, a point touched upon as to two military commissions, in 22 Opin., 237. There are many precedents for such special service by officers of the Government, some of which were indicated by Mr. Griggs in 22 Opin., 184, above cited. There are also recent precedents of which you know. I agree with former Secretary Gage in thinking that the provision in section 12 of the customs administrative act, |