well-known liberality, and the majesty of the Roman name, which had already delivered him from two invasions, would diffipate with the same sacility the rebellious army of Gaul. The officers of experience and ability, who hadserved under the banners of Maximian, were at length compelled to inform vhis effeminate son of the imminent danger to which he was reduced; and, with a freedom that at once surprised and-convinced him, to urge the necessity of preventing his ruin, by a vigorous exertion of his remaining power. The resources of Maxentius, both of men and money, were still considerable. The Praetorian guards felt how strongly their own interest and safety were connected with his cause; and a third'army was soon collected, more numerous than those which had been lost in the battles of Turin and Verona. It was far from the intention of the emperor to lead his troops in person. A stranger to the exercises of war, he trembled at the apprehension of so dangerous a contest; and as fear is commonly 'superstitious, he listened with melancholy attention to the ru

menace his life and empire. Shame at length supplied the place of courage, and forced him to take the field. He was unable to sustain the

CHAP.
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contempt of the Roman people. The circus resounded with their indignant clamours, and they tumultuoufly besieged the gates of the palace, reproaching the pufillanimity of their indOIEnt sovereign, and celebratng the heroic spirit of Constantine 63. Before Maxentius left Rome, he.c0nsulted the Sibylline books. The guardians of these ancient oracles were as well versed in the arts of this world, as they were ignorant of the secrets of fate; and they returned him a very prudent answer, which might adapt itself to the event, and secure their reputation whatever should be the chance of arms 54.

The celerity of Constantine's march has been compared to the rapid conquest of Italy by the first of the Caesars; nor is the flattering parallel repugnant to the truth of history, since no more than fifty-eight days elapsed between the surren. der of Verona and the final decision of the war.l Constantine had always apprehended that the tyrant would consult the dictates of fear, and perhaps of prudence; and that, instead of riskz ing his last hopes in a general engagement, he would shut himself up within the walls of Rome. His ample magazines secured him against the danger of famine; and as the sittiation of Constantine admitted not of delay; he might have been reduced to the sad neceffity of destroying with fire and sword the Imperial city, the noblest reward of his victory, and the deliverance of which had been the motive, or rather indeed che P. the pretence, of the civil war "5. It was with equal . __ _' _.

its flanks, and the undisciplined Italians fled' without reluctance from the standard of a tyrant whom they had always hated, and-whom they no longer feared. The Praetorians, conscious that their offences were beyond the reach of mercy, were animated by revenge and despair. Notwithstanding their repeated efforts, those brave veterans were unable to recover the victory: they obtained, however, an honourable death; and it was observed, that their bodies covered the same ground which had been occupied by their ranks 63. The confusion then became general, and the dismayed troops of Maxentius, pursued by an implacable enemy, rushed by thousands into the deep and rapid stream of the Tyber. The emperor himself attempted to escape back into the city over the Milvian bridge, but the crowds which pressed together through that _narrow passage, forced him into the river, where he was immediately drowned by the weight of his armour '59.- His body, which had sunk _v'ery deep into the, mud, was found with some