tucky from the Federal Union, shall be recognized as a political party in the State, so as to demand that the officers conducting any elec tion shall be composed in part of the adherents of such organization; and no judge or sheriff shall be liable to be indicted or fined for failure to appoint the members of such political organization to conduct elections.

It disfranchises no one, disqualifies no one; is at most only an instruction to the county judges and sheriffs to ignore all political organizations seeking to separate Kentucky from the Union, and not to recognize the right of any set of men to submit that question, or any question looking to that end, to the people at the polls, yet the Committee of Elections, in their zeal, blindness, or desperation, have seized upon this amendment to the law of 1858, and have attempted to argue that it disqualifies any man from acting as an officer of any election in the State, no matter what the proposition to be voted on may be; no matter what his politics may be when he acts, who has ever been in any way connected with the rebellion. According to the arguments made on the other side, though the election officers be now as radical as any of the committee; though he supports the Radical nominees; though the war has been ended for years, and there is no party in the land looking to secession or rebellion, yet if he at any time took part in the rebellion, or in any way gave it aid or comfort, the whole vote of the precinct at which he was either judge, clerk, or sheriff, must be rejected, and the votes of hundreds, it may be of thousands, of legal voters discarded. Such a construction of that law is sheer folly. A mere citation of the law, in connection with that of which it is amendatory, exhausts the argument. If it is plain that two and two make four, it is equally so that the law referred to neither disfranchised, nor disqualified, any citizen of Kentucky from being an officer of the election for justices of the peace, constables, and members of Congress, held on the 4th of May, 1867, and all the efforts of gentlemen on the other side to reject 883 votes cast for Young over McKee on that ground, as is done in the last report, only show how little either law or facts are regarded when party ends are to be subserved.

There is, perhaps, a little more plausibility in the suggestion made in the first report of the committee, that the law of 1858, which required an equal division of the officers of the election between the two political parties, had been violated, as the proof shows that at a number of the precincts a majority of the officers voted for Judge Young.

In answer to that, I would say that it makes no sort of difference whether all these precincts are counted or rejected, because even if they are all rejected Judge Young's majority is nearly six hundred, as the report of the committee admit, if the vote of the returned confederate soldiers cast at other precincts are counted, as they must be. I would say further that the law only fines the officers for failing to make the appointments as therein required; it is not contemplated by it anywhere that the legal voters of the precincts shall by any neglect, oversight, or mistake of the county judges or sheriffs be deprived of their right of suffrage; that acts of officers de facto are (especially in the absence of all fraud, and none is pretended to have existed here) valid, and the rights of third persons will be guarded and protected as though the acting officers were appointed according to all the forms of law, is a principle recognized by the courts of every State in the Union.

I suppose it will hardly be contended that an officer of an election had necessarily abandoned his party because he refused to vote for Colonel KcKee to represent his district in the Fortieth Congress. That is the only evidence he offers to sustain the charge that the Republican party did not have the proper proportion of election officers at several of the precincts. To assume that is to assume that he is the embodiment of Republican principles, faith,

and practice, and that a failure to indorse him personally, morally, and politically, is to destroy the political status of the recusant, and ostracize him as a traitor to his principles-a high and arrogant pretension, surely. I observe by the returns set forth in the brief of Colonel McKee that he received six hundred less votes in 1867 than he did in 1865, and about one thousand less than the Union candidate (as he calls him) received in 1866. Were all these men false to their principles, or did they refuse to vote for Colonel McKee for personal reasons satisfactory to themselves? The presumption, in the absence of proof, is in favor of the latter. Who nominated Colonel McKee as the Republican candidate to represent that district in this Congress? The record fails to show that anybody did. He undertook the race on his own responsibility, calling himself a Radical, and men voted for him or not, just as they pleased. The officers who acted in May, 1867, were doubtless appointed as fair representatives of their respective parties at the time of their appointment, and without any suspicion that a contest would arise in which special personal fealty to Colonel McKee, at a particular time, should be made the test of an officer's political status. Even sound Republicans might well refuse to vote for him or for any individual who sets himself up as the leader of the party; and when he undertakes, as he does, to rely on that failure, he ought to be required, at least, to show that the difference was of a political and not of a personal nature. This he utterly fails to dofails to show that at least half the officers so appointed had not previously acted with the Republican party. The report of the committee, made by Mr. McCLURG, while it seems to admit the correctness of the views I have stated, says, after setting forth the number of precincts at which a majority of the officers of the election voted the same ticket, (I presume for Judge Young,) "a sufficient number of votes are shown by the poll-books to have been given for Mr. McKee to prove that election officers could have been selected from his friends." The committee do not say that these officers were not selected at the time of their appointment from the political party to which Colonel McKee professed to belong, which is all that in any event the law requires, but that they were not selected from among his friends. How, I ask again, could the county judges and sheriffs know who Colonel McKee's friends were. Other State officers were to be elected at the same time who might with equal propriety have claimed that their special friends should be appointed.

Why did he not before the election make known the fact that they were not his friends, so that his friends could have been substituted. He does not pretend that he lost a single vote by the misconduct of any officer. He made no complaint beforehand, though the appointments had been publicly made two months before, and the votes of these men were all on record at the regular stated election in August, 1866, when the Union candidate, according to his own table, received in the district nearly one thousand more votes than he did in May, 1867. It is now too late, even if there is any. thing in the question, which I deny, for Colonel McKee to seek to avail himself of the technicality. There were three parties in the field in May, 1867: Judge Young representing the Democratic party, Mr. Green the Conservative Union party, and Colonel McKee the Radical party. The officers could not be so appointed as to represent each equally. Some years before there were but two parties, calling themselves Democratic and Union parties. The Radicals advanced, the Conservatives hung back, a split occurred, and a triangular race ensued, the great mass of the Conservatives have united with the Democracy, and the Radicals in Kentucky themselves are still very far from being a unit on the present issues. Colonel McKee had taken occasion while a member of the ThirtyNinth Congress, especially on the 20th of March, 1866, (see Globe, vol. 57, pages 1526-27,) to

vilify and traduce his State and her people on this floor in a manner that met with no respouse from the moderate, well-informed portion of his own party. His justification of the arrest and imprisonment of Colonel Wolford and Colonel Jacob, as gallant officers as any in the Federal service; his wholesale slanders of the circuit judges of his State, all of whom had been elected in 1862 as undoubted Union men, and are so still; his charges that rebels were protected while loyal men were prosecuted by the courts and the people were all known to be such false and unfounded aspersions that many of the best men of his party repudiated him and them. For I am not partisan enough to deny that there are very many members of the Radical party in Kentucky of the highest personal character, who would repel all such calumnies, and who would refuse to indorse by their vote or countenance any member of their party who would utter them. How far these things influenced the officers of the election to vote against Colonel McKee I do not pretend to know; but the presumption is that the county judges did their duty in the appointment of officers until some proof is adduced to the contrary.

The Committee of Elections in the case of Blakey vs. Golladay, from Kentucky, at the present session, lay down the true rule. They

say:

"The attention of the cominittee has not been called to any provision in the statutes of Kentucky prescribing in what manner the several county courts are to define political parties and ascertain the exact political faith of each appointee, so as to enable them to comply with the provisions of these statutes. Obviously they cannot resort to the poll-book of the next election, the tests to which the claimants have appealed to show that the statutes have been disregarded, for they are required to make the appointments long before these poll-books have any exist ence. No poll-book of an election to be held atter the appointment is made can afford evidence to guido in making the appointment. If resort is to be had to the poll-book of the election next preceding the appointment to determine the political status of the several appointees, then, for aught that appears in this case, those poll-books would show that status to be what the law requires, for no evidence from these poll-books or elsewhere was offered to show how these several officers of election voted at the election next preceding their appointment. If personal knowledge of the political opinions of men on the part of the county judges, or general political repu tation, are to be the guide in making the appointment of the officers of election, it is difficult to see in what manner this committee could determine that the statute had not been complied with in making the appointment. It is sufficient, however, to say that there was no offer of evidence that any such test was disregarded."

The language of that report applies quite as well to this case as it did to the case of Golla day, and is just what we contend for. The truth is, Mr. Speaker, there never was more than a mere handful of Radicals in Kentucky, according to the now recognized tenets of the party. Colonel McKee had to deny everywhere throughout his district that he was in favor of negro suffrage, and however zealous he may be for it here he could not go back to his district and get the support of a corporal's guard in any County unless he continued to deny it. Our people with signal unanimity believe that the white is superior to the negro race; that this is a white man's Government; that in time of peace the military is and must be subordinate to the civil authority; that the Constitution furnishes a rule for the government alike of rulers and people, North and South, and we intend to show our faith by our works in November next.

It ought not to be matter of amazement to the Radical party that men who voted with them in Kentucky in 1866 voted against them in 1867. You have only to look at the changes that have taken place all over the country. Where are your overwhelming majorities in New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, on the faith of whose support you launched out on the experiment of congressional omnipotence and negro equality? Gone! gone! because of your own illegal and oppressive legislation, aud are now incorporated into the ranks of your opponents. Surely it is to be expected that men in Kentucky whose votes in 1866 showed them to be acting with the

Republican party, and who might therefore be properly appointed officers of an election to represent that party at the polls, might in May, 1867, after you had passed your reconstruction acts and reported your confiscation bill in March, 1867, have halted, and while support ing the magistrates and constables, perhaps put forward by the Union or Republican party in May, have refused to vote for Colonel McKee, who seems to have exhibited at all times a determination to keep up with his party no inatter to what extremes it went.

But I will not argue this question further. There is no decent pretext for the rejection either of the 625 votes reported by the committee as having been cast for Young by men who had been rebels-although I might show that there is no proof except hearsay as to over two hundred and fifty of these men, that they ever took part in the rebellion-nor of the 883 majority at the various precincts set forth in the report at which men acted as judges, clerks, or sheriff, who had taken part in or favored its success. But admitting, for the sake of argument, that all the committee claim is true; that the 625 votes cast by returned rebel soldiers ought to be rejected; that all the majorities for Young at all the precincts where returned rebels acted in any capacity as offi- || cers of the election, should be thrown out and Judge Young is still elected, even according to the last report of the committee, though they assert otherwise. They set forth the majorities at the various precincts and make the aggre-gate 883; add to this 625 and 8 deserters, and the total is 1,516; deduct Young's official majority, 1,479, and they foot up McKee's majority, when correctly substracted, as 37. In order to get the 883, in giving the precincts they say, as a reason for rejecting 132 majority for Young:

"Centreville precinct. Fleming county, Mason Caywood and William H. Cord, judges of election. Samuel McGuire (p. 96) testifics, Mason Caywood and William H. Cord have been publicly known as southern sympathizers, and in favor of the so-called southern confederacy both during and since the war.' Young's majority in this precinct, 132."

It is not pretended by the committee that any of the election officers at this precinct ever had taken part in the rebellion in any form. The only excuse is, that they were southern sympathizers; and when we turn to the proof to sustain even that, we find that the witness, Samuel McGuire-upon whose testimony alone the committee rely to prove that-swears that he did not know either Mason Caywood or William H. Cord, and that statement of the witness is part of the same answer from which they extract their quotation made in the report. I give the question and answer in full as a fair specimen of the way in which the committee, in their last report, have treated this question, and that the country at least may understand by what rules of justice the rights of Democrats in this House are tested:

Question. Do you, or do you not, know the names of the officers of election in May, 1867, at the Elizaville, Tilton, and Centreville precincts, in Fleming county, and if you know said officers, do you know their political sentiments? Answer fully as to all your knowledge of these points.

Answer. The names of officers at Centreville precinct are Mason Caywood and William H. Cord, judges: George A. Cord, sheriff, and Samuel T. Blair, clerk; Mason Caywood and William H. Cord are reputed Democrats, and voted for John D. Young for Congress. George A. Cord voted for Samuel McKee, and S. T. Blair for Thomas M. Green. At Elizaville, John N. Proctor and 0. H. Dewey were judges, David Adams, sheriff, and Charles Darnall, eferk. John N. Proctor, David Adams, and Charles Darnall voted for John D. Young, and 0. H. Dewey for Samuel McKee. Question. Do you or do you not know if the men named in your last answer, Mason Caywood, W. H. Cord, John N. Proctor, David Adams, Charles Darnail, and Thomas Butler, are, and were during the late rebellion, rebel sympathizers?'

Answer. My personal knowledge extends only to John N. Proctor and David Adams. As to them I answer yes. Mason Caywood and William H. Cord have been, and are publicly known as southern sympathizers, and in favor of the so-called southern confederacy, both during and since the war."

It will be observed that the other persons, John N. Proctor and David Adams, were not officers at the Centreville precinct, and as to Mason Caywood and William H. Cord, the witness personally knew nothing. Yet, as I

said, on that evidence, and that alone, the committee undertake to reject the Centreville precinct, which gave Young 132 majority. Surely this House will not sanction such an outrage; surely the committee will not risk their reputation as judges and fair men on such a state of fact. If these 132 be restored to Young, and the report be allowed to stand as to all else, Young's majority will be ninetyfive, and he must be declared duly elected.

I will not argue at length the question as to Judge Young's eligibility. The distinguished gentleman from Indiana, [Mr. KERR,] one of the committee, and my colleagues [Messrs. GOLLADAY and TRIMBLE] have exhausted that branch of the case.

While I utterly deny that the act of July, 1862, requiring a test oath, is applicable to members of this House, that it is constitutional if it was intended to be so applied, or that this House can prevent the member-elect from taking it if he is willing to do so, yet I know that Judge Young would rather that his right hand should wither and his tongue cleave to the roof of his mouth than take that oath if he did not know that he could take it honestly, conscientiously, and in good faith; and the fact that he is ready and willing to do so is to me the highest evidence that he can do so properly.

The next highest evidence is, that during the whole canvass, which lasted for months, and was an animated and excited one, while Young was publicly defying any and all men to bring aught against him, or against his right and ability to take that oath; while Mr. Green, one of his opponents, was, as he testified, inquiring of men of all shades of political opinion, everywhere throughout the district, for some fact that he could use against Young on that point, and could hear of nothing; and while McKee, thus urged and challenged, failed to make a single allegation, either at Prestonburg, where they all met, or anywhere else, during the canvass or afterward, till the celebrated Willis Hockaday affidavit was, in July last, paraded before this House; these things, I say, ought to be conclusive that no disability in fact exists on the part of Judge Young.

It is certain that all the men who knew Judge Young, regardless of their political opinions or prejudices, testified that while he was at all times opposed, to the prosecution of the war, and strongly suspected, if he did not believe, that it was being waged for the purpose of the conquest and subjugation of the South, and, therefore, sympathized with her people, he, as a citizen of Kentucky and a judge of one of her courts, remained faithful and true to his allegiance to his State, and obeyed all laws, State and Federal, whether he liked and approved them or not. Whenever any friend, neighbor, or acquaintance, no matter of what politics, needed his assistance in any way, or at any time, his hand and heart were alike open, and at any personal risk or sacrifice he relieved the distressed and ministered to the wants of the needy. With such a record from political friends and opponents, he can afford to be rejected by this House, and rely on the men of his district to vindicate his reputation from all the assaults of his enemies.

I am glad to be relieved from the discussion of the testimony of such witnesses as Greenup Nickle and a few other infamous characters, who have been suborned to blacken the fair fame of Judge Young. It has been done already so fully that further exposure would be but repetition. I will, therefore, submit the question so far as I am concerned.

Mr. ADAMS. I now yield my remaining time to the gentleman from Vermont, [Mr. POLAND.]

Mr. POLAND. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend from Kentucky [Mr. ADAMS] for yielding to me his time in order that I may say a few words relative to the position of the Committee of Elections, or rather my own position in reference to this matter. By the favor of the Speaker I have the honor to be a member of the Committee of Elections. This contest between McKee and Young was heard by the

committee early in the winter. The hearing was very protracted. The case was elaborately argued on both sides. The case was further fully considered in the committee; and, as I understood the judgment of the committee, it was unanimous that Mr. McKee was not elected; and a majority of the committee determined that Young had received a major||ity of the votes but was ineligible on account of having been guilty of some disloyal act. As I understood it at the time, and as I continued to understand it up to the time a minority report was filed by the gentleman from Michigan, [Mr. UPSON,] I understood, and I have taxed my recollection in vain to remember when it was any other way, than that the Committee of Elections were unanimous in determining Mr. McKee was not elected, not having received a majority of the votes. During my absence for ten days previous to last Thursday this case was in some way reconsidered by the committee, and a majority of the committee reversed their former action and determined McKee was elected. I saw by the newspapers while I was absent such was the action of the committee, and I was curious to know upon what ground the judgment of the committee was reversed, but I did not learn it until I saw the report here.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I have as much confidence in the judgment of committees, and am as willing to base my action and my vote here on the action of any intelligent committee of this House as any member upon this floor, and I should be sorry to believe that the Committee of Elections was not as much entitled to the consideration of this House as any other committee. If, however, the House do not concur with me they can be accommodated in this case, for they have the judgment of the committee both ways. [Laughter.]

After learning that the judgment of the committee had been reversed, and they had reported Mr. McKee was entitled to the seat, I will say in the limited time since my return I have endeavored carefully to review this case and see whether it was not possible the original judgment of the committee was wrong, and I could agree with the last report of the committee; but, sir, I have been unable to come to any such conclusion. The grounds upon which this last report are based are so fallacious that any gentleman who will give it a careful consideration will see that they cannot be sustained and acted upon by the House.

Now, as I understand, when the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Cook]-who is very candid. and also very careful, in the utterance of his opinions-read to the House the section of the act of March 2, 1867, and declared that it had not come to the notice of the committee until after they had made their report, no other inference could be drawn from what he said than that if they had had knowledge of the existence of that act at the time the report was made this last conclusion of the committee would never have been reached.

Now, sir, I want to say a word in relation to Mr. Young, because I did agree with the majority of the committee in reference to his ineligibility, and I am prepared now to vote that he is not entitled to a seat here. There is certain evidence in the case in reference to disloyal acts by Mr. Young, some portion of which I do not believe to be true. By that I do not mean to say that the witness who testified did not suppose he was testifying to the truth, but I think he was mistaken in reference to Mr. Young being the man who directed the squad of rebel soldiers where to find a Yankee soldier and to arrest him. That portion of the evidence I lay entirely out of the case, because I do not believe it was Mr. Young. It is entirely at war with his whole course as shown by the testimony.

There is another witness, who testifies to something in relation to his giving a gun to a man who was talking about going into the rebel army. But that evidence is very meager. It possibly would bear the construction which the committee have put upon it, that he fur

nished a gun to a man knowing that he was going into the rebel army. But, sir, while the evidence in relation to disloyal acts of Young is so very meager and unsatisfactory it is clear to my judgment that he was a rebel at heart. I think this was his true position, as shown by the evidence. At the outset of the rebellion, before there was any actual war, his sympathies were with the South. He talked strongly upon that subject, and very likely his leading position in the community might have given him an influence, so that his conversation had such an effect that it may be said that he gave such aid and countenance to the rebellion that he ought not to be allowed to take a seat here, and that he could not properly take the testoath. But, sir, I am disposed to resolve the doubts in reference to his disloyal conduct, in view of what were his known wishes and expressed feelings. His sympathies were all with the rebels; and although the evidence is so meager in relation to overt acts of disloyalty, I am disposed to vote against him upon this principle: I would as soon associate with a man on this floor who fought for the rebellion as with one who prayed for the rebellion. So much in reference to that.

Now, in reference to the right of Mr. McKee. Mr. Young received 1,400 or 1,500 majority of votes in the district. The committee get rid of 625 of those votes upon the ground that they were given by men who had served in the rebel army at some time during the war, and that they stand in the relation of paroled prisoners of war; that in point of fact there is now really existing in legal contemplation a rebel army, or was at the time of this election, in May, 1867; therefore, these men are to be treated as though they were still in the rebel army or as if they were captured and held as prisoners of war.

Now, Mr. Speaker, in my judgment, if there never had been a proclamation by the President; if there never had been any action by Congress, still if the war was in fact over as matter of public history, and the power with which we were at war was destroyed, there would be no sense in saying that those men are still to be regarded as a part of the rebel army in the service or as paroled prisoners or actual prisoners of war. But, sir, on the 20th of June, 1866, the President of the United States issued his proclamation declaring that the war was at an end, that peace reigned throughout the entire country; and Congress, by the act of March 2, 1867, expressly recognized the valid ity of that proclamation. Therefore, what becomes of this theory? I believe it was given up, as I said before, by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. COOK] this morning, so that the entire groundwork or basis upon which those 625 votes are to be set aside is entirely destroyed by that act of 1867. The committee, in my judgment, stand in reference to that precisely as a certain judge I knew who once decided a case on the strength of a statute that turned out to have been repealed some four or five years before. It was generally supposed he cut rather a ridiculous figure.

But, sir, there is another answer to this. There is not a particle of evidence in this case that any of the rebel soldiers who gave these 625 votes were in the war at its close, or but very few of them. I have carefully looked through the evidence on this subject, and there is not evidence to show that more than twenty of them continued in the service of the rebellion until the close of the war. On the other hand, the evidence affirmatively proves that a very large proportion of them were not in the rebel service at the close of the war. I have made some memoranda on that subject from the evidence. M. W. Mitchell testifies to 41 rebel soldiers who voted for Young, and only 18 of them, he says, were in the rebel service at the close of the war. M. Literal testifies to 5, and none of them, he says, were in the service till the close of the war. Henry Whitt testifies to 27 who voted for Young, and only 2 of them, he says, were in the rebel service til the close Frank Hunter testifies to 82 rebel

of the war.

war.

votes that were given for Young, and only 1 of the men, he says, served till the close of the B. J. Bennett testifies to 27 votes, and onlo 6 of them served till the close of the war. B. Hayden testifies to the number of 30 rebel votes, and he says he does not know that any of them served till the close of the war. J. M. Lewis testifies to 9, and only 2 served till the close of the war.

Now, Mr. Speaker, by throwing out these 625 votes, and by throwing out a little more than 800 votes upon another ground, the Committee report that McKee was elected by 41 majority. The evidence shows affirmatively, however, that more than three times the number of 41 of the 625 men who gave those votes were not in the rebel service at the close of the war. They had left the rebel army before. This number includes men, and very many of them, who, it appears from the evidence, were never in the regular rebel service. Some of them were only engaged in some of the guerrilla fights, and they are all spoken of as having served in the rebel army. So that upon that ground, (if it is not entirely demolished in point of law, as I have endeavored to show,) the evidence shows affirmatively that but a small proportion of the 625 men were in the rebel army at the close of the war. This new light, therefore, which the committee discovered about paroled prisoners of war, think is entirely demolished, and may be said to be out of sight.

Then comes the question which has been raised whether the fact that a man has been in the rebel service disqualifies him to vote for members of Congress. It is conceded that there is no statute of Kentucky that disqualifies a man from voting on that ground. They did at one time pass such a statute, but the courts decided that it was unconstitutional, and the Legislature repealed it. That is regarded, as it should be regarded, I think, as a declaration or as an enactment by the Legislature that these men were duly and legally entitled to vote in that State. Well, sir, I am one of those who believe, as I understand my party generally to believe, that this matter of suffrage in the States is to be regulated by the States; that it belongs to them; that Congress cannot interfere with it; that it is beyond our power. But I need not debate that question.. Whether or not it is in the power of Congress to say that men who have served in the rebel armies shall not be voters in the States, Congress never has said so, never has passed any such law. So that whether such power resides in Congress or not, Congress has never attempted to exercise it.

I have seen it stated in some newspaper that the reason why the Committee of Elections came to this strange conclusion was in consequence of a principle that had been decided by this House in the recent case of Delano vs. Morgan. Well, sir, what was that? The great question in that case was in reference to the votes of two or three hundred deserters.

Congress passed a law, not declaring that deserters should not vote in the States, but declaring that deserters from the armies of the United States should lose their citizenship, that they should forfeit their citizenship of the United States. That is clearly within the power of Congress. Congress has the right to say how citizenship of the United States may be acquired, and Congress has the right to say how citizenship of the United States shall be lost.

Well, sir, in my judgment, and, as I understand it, in the judgment of the committee, that law did not affect the right to vote in Ohio. But the Legislature of Ohio had declared that one of the qualifications for voting in that State was that a man should be a citizen of the United States Therefore it was by virtue of the law of Ohio, not by virtue of the law of Congress, that a person was disfranchised in Ohio for deserting. Congress could say whether they were citizens of the United States or not, and having declared that deserters were not citizens of the United States, and the law of Ohio having declared that none but citizens

of the United States should vote in Ohio, these deserters were deprived of the right of voting in that State by virtue of the law of the State.

It will be seen by this statement how short that principle falls of what is claimed in this case, how entirely different the question is. There was no attempt in that case, by the Committee of Elections or by the House, to say that Congress had the right to regulate the right of suffrage in Ohio. Of course we had the same right in that respect in Ohio that we have in Kentucky.

There was a suggestion made by the gentleman from Illinois, [Mr. Cook,] who made this report, in the opening of his argument in support of his report, that it would be very odd, indeed, if Congress had the right to say that a man who had aided the rebellion should not have a seat upon this floor, and could not also say that such a man should not vote for a member of Congress. There is a sort of plausibility in that suggestion; but, upon examination, every gentleman upon this floor will see the dis tinction in the power of Congress over the two cases. In reference to the right of a man to hold a seat upon this floor, the Constitution of the United States gives this House the express right and power to determine in reference to the qualifications of its members. Congress, by the passage of the test oath act, has virtually enacted that men who cannot truly swear to what that oath contains shall not be entitled to seats; while, as to who shall be voters in the States, the Constitution gives Congress no power, and if it did, Congress has never exercised it.

[Here the hammer fell.]

The SPEAKER pro tempore, (Mr. TROW BRIDGE.) The time of the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. POLAND] has expired. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. UPSON] is now entitled to the floor for thirty minutes.

Mr. UPSON. The time has so far elapsed that there will not be an opportunity for me to make any extended remarks on this occasion. But there have been some suggestions made by my colleagues on the Committee of Elections, the gentleman from Vermont, [Mr POLAND,] and the gentleman from Indiana, [Mr. KERR,] which make it proper that I should say some thing in relation to the history of this case, and of my connection with it. There is a misapprehension in reference to this case, so far as regards the action of the Committee of Elections.

I never concurred in the first majority report of the committee. And the only reason why I did not write a minority report at the time the majority report was made was the state of my health. A number of days while the case was being heard before the committee I lay upon the lounge in the committee-room, not being in a condition for active labor. But at the time the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. McCLURG] made that report he knew that I had all along dissented from it, as well when the report was made, as when it was being considered by the committee. And I understood the gentleman from Missouri to state, at the time he made the report, that "the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. UPSON] did not concur in the report,' and I went to his seat and told him that that statement made by him obviated the necessity of my making any statement myself to the House. I would ask the gentleman from Missouri to correct me, if I am mistaken.

Mr. McCLURG. The statement of the gentleman is correct.

Mr. UPSON. So gentlemen will see that it is not any new light which has arisen that has governed my action in this case. Afterward, when I anticipated that the case was coming up in the House, I asked permission to make a report, and I accordingly did make, on the 2d of June, 1868, the minority report, which has been referred to so often in this discussion.

I wish now to call the attention of the House to that report in order to show my friend, who has just preceded me, [Mr. POLAND,] that I was not reduced to any necessity of counting

They go on further than overt acts of treason. They say any person "who in any way aided, counseled, or advised the separation of Kentucky from the Federal Union, or adhered to those who were engaged in efforts to separate her from the Union.' Now, then, those men who notoriously sympathized with the rebellion could not have so done without in some way aiding, advising, or counseling it. And it is worthy of remark that, notwithstanding this charge was contained in the notice served on Mr. Young, he did not take any evidence to contradict this evidence brought here on the part of the contestant. And my friend from Kentucky, when he referred to the case of Mr. Coryell, at Orangeburgh, in Mason county, forgot to mention that he was also a candidate for justice of the peace, and disqualified to act as an election officer by the law of Kentucky, which requires the coroner to act in such cases; and therefore, independent of the charge of disloyalty, he was disqualified by the reason that he was a candidate for office at that election.

There being 863 of this class of votes thus illegally returned, I find that even allowing all the rebel votes it would leave a majority of 273 for Mr. McKee. But I insist that the law of the case has not been changed at all by the law which was read to-day, and which was referred to by the gentleman from Vermont, [Mr. POLAND.] The mere fact that Congress referred to the date of a certain proclamation as the date from which two years should run for certain military purposes does not affect this question in the least. The simple question is this: when men engage in war against their country, and take up arms against it, do they or do they not forfeit any political rights? Gentlemen will not claim that while waging war against the Government they have a right to elect members of Congress. Then when peace is restored I deny that these men's original political rights spring up immediately into action without any act of the sovereign power of the nation. I am willing to go before the people of the country upon that issue. I say that when a rebel throws down the cartridgebox he cannot take up the ballot-box and immediately assume either to come into this House, or send an agent here to represent him, without the consent of the sovereign power of the nation. The effect would be nothing more nor less than to permit him to reorganize rebellion on the floor of this House under legal forms and proceedings. No republican government can exist on any such basis. tlemen say there is no precedent. Well, of course, in the very nature of things, there can be no precedent. There is no precedent for such a rebellion, and I hope to God there will never be another. But in order to prevent it it is necessary for us to distinctly lay down and assert the principle that all political rights do not necessarily revert to all men who engage in rebellion when peace is first restored as they were before the rebellion unless by the permission of the sovereign power of the people.

Gen

The gentleman from Indiana says that this is a matter which is wholly controlled by the local authorities of the States. I submit to him that the local authorities of the States have no control over the naturalization laws of the country, and that that is an exclusive power in the General Government. But the position which he lays down, if carried out, abrogates that clause of the Constitution, strikes at the whole power of naturalization, so far as allowing men to vote for Federal officers is concerned, and would make it null and void. I submit to him that no republican government can exist in safety which will permit a man who has been engaged in arms against it the moment the rebellion is overpowered to go to the ballot-box and vote for a Representative in the national Legislature.

Mr. JONES. I will ask the gentleman if the reconstruction acts passed by Congress do not permit such men to vote?

Mr. UPSON. Those men in the South derive their power to vote solely and wholly

from the acts of Congress. Can the gentleman show any such law of Congress in relation to rebels in Kentucky?

Mr. JONES. I cannot.

Mr. UPSON. It is by virtue of the reconstruction acts of Congress, not by any inherent right of their own, that they have the right to vote in the southern States, and when I look into the State of Kentucky and find that every man who is black, no matter how intelligent or moral he may be, is disfranchised, I do not think it lies with them to exclaim so loudly about the injustice of excluding rebels from the polls.

Mr. JONES. Is there any difference between persons who went out of the State and fought and those who remained in the State?

Mr. UPSON. One reason why I insist upon a rigid construction of the State law is because of the condition of things in Kentucky, consequent upon the rebellion. There are some things which are matters of history. If the gentleman who quoted the proclamations of the President on Saturday [Mr. GOLLADAY] had examined the same book a little further (McPherson's Manual.) he would have found therein the terms of the surrender of Lee and Johnston, which he so persistently denied.

Now, in relation to the necessity of enforcing these laws of Kentucky in relation to election officers, I call attention to the fact that, as a matter of history, we know and can take notice judicially in this House of the fact that a large portion of the citizens of that State went into the rebellion, and that there has been there a great deal of irregularity, violence, and intimidation of Union men ever since the rebellion was overthrown. I saw but a few days since a notice in the papers that a marshal of the United States had recently been killed in Kentucky because of his Unionism.

And even as late as September 30, 1867, Major General Thomas, in his report from the headquarters of his department, which will be found in the last annual report of the Secretary of War, in writing of the violence and bloodshed in his department, and of the mur ders and robberies in the country districts in Tennessee and Kentucky, makes use of this language:

"The town of Columbia, in Maury county, Tennessee, may also be mentioned as standing prominently forth for obstacles thrown in the way of obtaining justice through the civil courts by any who were not identified with the confederates. The petty officers of the law, particularly a sheriff, by virtue of that freemasonry existing among rebels and rebel sympathizers in that locality, oftentimes could make life almost unbearable to those who had not remained consistently disloyal to the Government. Nor did Kentucky yield to Tennessee the palm for disorder and violence, particularly in localities not easily accessible to troops. A band of desperadoes, known as 'regulators,' taking the law into their own hands, or rather setting all law at defiance, scoured the country, marking their victims and dealing murders and robberies with a profuseness unparalleled in any civilized community. When called upon by those suffering from these incursions for assistance, I helplessly referred the complaints to the State authorities, who, although perfectly willing to act, and though deploring the condition of the affected localities, could find no remedy through the law, and, they failing, it became necessary for me to so post my troops throughout Kentucky that by their presence they might intimidate, if they could not prevent, the existing lawlessness.

"In Kentucky as well as in Tennessee the administration of justice depends in a great measure upon the personal characters of the judge, sheriff, and jurors, the laws seemingly making but little differ

ence.

This, as I have stated, is from a report from General Thomas, made as late as September 30, 1867, more than four months after this election was held in Kentucky. In this State the voting is viva voce; the name of each voter and the candidate for whom he votes being publicly cried by the sheriff or his deputy, and recorded by the clerk.

From the nature of their powers and duties as well as from the condition of Kentucky consequent upon the rebellion, it will be seen how important it was that these election officers should be impartially selected and appointed as required by law, equally from each of the two political parties, and also that no participant in or adherent of the rebellion

should be allowed to be appointed or to act as such election officer; and the law of Kentucky recognizes this importance by imposing a penalty on all officers of that State, having the power to appoint any of such election officers, who fail to observe these requirements.

And I might refer to the evidence to show how intimidation prevailed at this election, and the necessity for having these laws enforced. The county judge of Mason county, who was a paroled prisoner from Camp Jackson, appointed all these officers in that county, and he himself was by law one of the county board of canvassers of the election.

In addition to that, I may call the attention of the House, in the few minutes that remain to me of my time, to some testimony to further show the necessity of a proper enforcement of the State law. On page 39 you will find this:

"Question. Please state if in this county, at the May election, 1867, any violence, force, or threats were used against Union men; and if so, state all you saw or knew.

"Answer. I was at the Mud Lick Springs precinct, and saw force used, or weapons, against Union men. The circumstances were these: one Enoch Pergram shot Thomas Clark, a Union man, for no other reason, as I thought, than that he declared himself in favor of negro suffrage. Pergram said any man who votes for that ought to be shot, and he did shoot him. After Clark was shot he ran off some twenty steps and crossed the fence. I went to him and saw he was fatally shot, and assisted him to the house and waited on him. I saw across the road Mr. Pergram and several men flourishing pistols and making demonstrations, and I went to Robert Wells, the sheriff of the county, and asked him to arrest Pergram, and he said he could not do it then. I offered to assist him. I was then advised by Union men to get away from there, and I did go away.

Question. Was any arrest made, and did the man Clark die?

Answer. There was no arrest made while I stayed, and the man Clark did die. There might have been an arrest after I left. I do not believe that the sheriff or any one else would have been safe to have attempted making an arrest at that time."

Let me now read from pages 47 and 48 of the testimony what Mr. Roberts swears to:

"Answer. I was during the month of April in the following counties: Lewis, Lawrence, Boyd, Floyd, Morgan, Pike, Montgomery, and Bath, and had an excellent opportunity of ascertaining the feelings of the people in those counties, (in Morgan and Floyd particularly.) where the rebel element prevails. Captain McKee was threatened, if the word of some of the most prominent citizens can be relied on. As for myself I would not have undertaken to canvass those counties advocating the principles of Captain McKee without sufficient guard to prevent disturbances; I would consider that I was hazarding my life. In West Liberty, Morgan county, the meeting of which Captain McKee was the speaker was interrupted by a gang of returned rebel soldiers, and several pistols were drawn, and had it not been for Captain McKee's bold effrontery they would, no doubt, have either killed or crippled him. I heard previous to Captain McKee's going there that it would be unsafe for him to attempt to speak there, as there had been threats made against his life. Daring the disturbance I heard some of the crowd say. 'Kill the d-d nigger,' (referring to McKee.)

Question. From what you saw and know of the state of feeling at certain points in this congressional district in May, 1867, do you or do you not believe it would have been dangerous for men to vote for MeKee at some of the precincts of the upper counties, and do you or do you not believe that some loyal men were deterred from voting at said May election for Samuel McKee because of a dread of violence then or afterward to themselves?

"Answer. From what I saw and heard I do firmly believe that there was danger of men voting for MeKee being either violated or disturbed either in person or property; at some of the precincts in the district it was not safe for a man to vote his sentiments."

This was in precincts which I insist should be thrown out; and if they are, it elects McKee.

I read from page 66 to show the fear of personal violence under which some of these wit nesses testified :

"Question. What is the character of all the men named by you as voting for Young? Are they not peaceable law-abiding citizens?

not.

Answer. Many of them are, but some of them are

"Question. Please name the man or men of the above number who were not peaceable, law-abiding citizens, on the 4th of May, 1867.

"Answer. I cannot and will not answer this question; I am afraid of personal violence."

I may also add that in numerous instances, as shown by the testimony, the officers before whom the testimony was taken, assuming to themselves the prerogatives of this House, took upon them to decide on the legality and admissibility of testimony; overruled ques