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Sec. 5597. The repeal of the several acts embraced in said revision, shall not affect any act done, or any right accruing or accrued, or any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil cause before the said repeal, but all rights and liabilities under said acts shall continue, and
may be enforced in the same manner, as if said repeal had not been made; nor shall said repeal, in any manner affect the right to any office, or change the term or tenure thereof.
Bechtel v. United States, 101 U. S. 597 Suit by the United States commenced October 9, 1872, before the enactment of the Revised Statutes, against a bondsman for a manufacturer of matches who had failed to account for certain stamps. At the trial there were admitted in evidence certain transcripts, including a certificate dated October 11, 1872, pursuant to an act of March 3, 1797. It was contended by the defendant that this act had been repealed by section 5596 of the Revised Statutes. Directed verdict for the United States. Appeal to the United States Supreme Court. One ground of appeal was alleged error in admitting in evidence the certificate issued pursuant to the act of March 3, 1797. Judgment of lower court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that section 5597 saved all rights which had accrued under any act repealed by section 5596, and therefore the provisions of the act of March 3, 1797, and not the Revised Statutes, were applicable to this case.
Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 Action brought in May 1872 in the Supreme Court of New York by Houseman, assignee in bankruptcy of Comstock and Young against Claflin to recover $1,935.57 collected by Claflin on a judgment against the bankrupt firm in fraud of the bankrupt law. Demurrer to the jurisdiction of the court. Judgment for plaintiff and the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed the judgment. Writ of error to the United States Supreme Court. Held, an assignee in bankruptcy under the Bankrupt Act of 1867 could bring suit in State courts whenever those courts were invested with appropriate jurisdiction. Section 5597 of the Revised Statutes provided that repeal of the acts embraced in the revision should not affect any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil cause before repeal. The act of 1867 was controlling in this case and not the Revised Statutes.
To the same effect was
Wilson v. Goodrich, 154 U. S. 640 Error to the Superior Court of Massachusetts. The action was begun March 18, 1872. The case comes within Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130, holding that an assignee in bankruptcy under the Bankrupt Act of 1867 as it stood before the Revised Statutes were enacted, had authority to bring suit in State courts whenever those courts were invested with appropriate jurisdiction. Section 5597 provides that the repeal of the acts embraced in the revision should not affect any suit or proceeding had or commenced in any civil cause before repeal.
Sec. 5599. All acts of limitation, whether applicable to civil causes and proceedings, or to the prosecution of offenses, or for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures, embraced in said revision and covered by said repeal, shall not be affected thereby, but all suits, proceedings or prosecutions, whether civil or criminal, for causes arising, or acts done or committed prior to said repeal, may be commenced and prosecuted within the same time as if said repeal had not been made.
Sayles, Executor, v. Louisville City R. R. Co., 9 Fed. 512 Action to recover damages for alleged infringement of a patent right for improvement of railroad brakes. Patent issued July 6, 1852, and reissued and extended July 6, 1866, for a term of 7 years. Defendant pleaded the statute of limitations under the act of July 8, 1870, providing “All actions shall be brought during the term for which the letters patent shall be granted or extended, or within 6 years after the expiration thereof.". Suit was brought June 18, 1879, within 6 years of the expiration of the extended term but not within 6 years of the expiration of the first term. Defendant has used the brakes from 1864 to 1873. Plaintiff contended that since a subsequent section of the act of 1870 provided that when an extension was granted that “thereupon the said patent shall have the same effect in law as though it had been originally granted for 21 years,” the extension had the same effect as though the patent had been originally granted for 21 years from 1852 and that he should be allowed to recover for the 2 years 1864 to 1866, as well as for the term 1866 to 1873. The provision of the act of July 8, 1870, containing the limitation was omitted
from the Revised Statutes, and the act of 1870 was repealed by section 5596 of the Revised Statutes. Held, the statute of limitations as pleaded was a bar to recovery under the original term of the patent and recovery would be allowed only as to the extended term; that the original term and the extended term were two distinct terms. The act of 1870 was repealed by the Revised Statutes, except as to the statute of limitations contained therein as to causes of action arising thereunder. Section 5599 provided “All acts of limitation embraced in said revision and covered by said repeal shall not be affected thereby, but all
suits for causes arising, or acts done or committed, prior to said repeal may be commenced and prosecuted within the same time as if said repeal had not been made.”
Also, Hayden v. Oriental Mills, 22 Fed. 103, Circuit Court, District of Rhode Island, which was an action on a patent. The court said R. S. 5599 saved all rights the same as if suit had been commenced before the repeal of the federal statute of limitations of July 8, 1870.
Also, May v. Buchanan County, Iowa, Circuit Court for the Northern District of Iowa, 29 Fed. 469, action on patent right and statute of 6 years under act of 1870 was pleaded. Court said that as to causes of action arising after June 22, 1874, the limitation was repealed by R. S. 5596; but R. S. 5599 continued the act of 1870 in force as to all causes of action then in existence. Demurrer as to the statute of limitations was overruled.
SEC. 5600. The arrangement and classification of the several sections of the revision have been made for the purpose of a more convenient and orderly arrangement of the same, and therefore no inference or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the Títle, under which any particular section is placed.
Doyle v. Wisconsin, 94 U. S. 50 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin issued a writ of mandamus to recall license issued to an insurance company. The writ was served and obeyed. Afterward a writ of error was sued out and bond given to operate as a supersedeas. The plaintiff in error contended that as a writ of error to operate as a supersedeas might issue from the Supreme Court to reexamine the judgment of the State court, a writ to carry the judgment into effect could not issue from the State court until the expiration of 10 days after the rendition of the judgment, under section 1007 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by act of February 18, 1875, which provided: “When a writ of error may be a supersedeas, execution shall not issue until the expiration of 10 days
" after rendition of judgment. The writ of error was issued under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, which is in chapter 11 of title XXXIII, relating to the Judiciary. The provision that a writ of error might operate as a supersedeas, is in section 1007 of the Revised Statutes, as amended, which is in chapter 18 of the Judiciary title. One of these sections was derived from section 23 of the Judiciary Act of 1879 and the other was derived from section 25 of the same act. The change in arrangement did not prevent the court from giving effect to their location in the original act.
Hyde v. United States, 225 U. S. 347 Writ of certiorari to the D. C. Court of Appeals.
Petitioners convicted in the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia of the crime of conspiracy under section 5440 of the Revised Statutes and the conviction affirmed by the D. C. Court of Appeals. The conspiracy charged was that the petitioners conspired to obtain by fraudulent devices from the States of California and Oregon school lands lying in forest reserves, exchange them for lands of the United States open to selection, and then to sell the lands so obtained. Judgment affirmed by the Supreme Court. The main question involved was the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. The court held that overt acts performed in one district by one of the parties who had conspired in another district in violation of R. S. 5440 give jurisdiction to the court in the district where the overt acts are performed as to all the conspirators. In the course of the opinion the court said:
“If the unlawful combination and the overt act constitute the offense, as stated in Hyde v. Shine, marking its beginning and its execution or a step to its execution, section 731 of the Revised Statutes must be applied. That section provides that 'when any offense against the Luited States is begun in one judicial district and completed in another it shall be deemed to have been committed in either, and may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in either district, in the same manner as if it had been actually and wholly committed therein.'. This provision takes an emphasis of signification from the fact that it was originally a part of the same section of the statute which defined conspiracythat is section 30 of the act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 484, c. 169. Nor has the provision lost the strength of meaning derived from such association by its subsequent separation, for it is provided in section 5600 of the Revised Statutes that 'The arrangement and classification of the several sections of the revision have been made for the more convenient and orderly arrangement of the same, and therefore no inference or presumption of a legislative construction is to be drawn by reason of the title, under which any particular section is placed.
To the same effect was Buck Stove and Range Co., 226 U. S. 205; U. S. v. Marsh, 106 Fed. 474; U. S. v. Thomas, 145 Fed. 74.
Also, King v. McLean Asylum (64 Fed. 331), in which it was said:
“This section (5600) is expressly limited to arrangement and classification, and does not extend to changes in phraseology."
Page v. Burnstine, 102 U. S. 664 This was an appeal from a decree of the Supreme Court for the District of Columbia dismissing a bill by the personal representatives of Robert C. Page to recover for the estate the value of a life insurance policy issued November 22, 1866, over and above amounts due Burnstine for loans made by him to Page on the policy. Loans were made from time to time and assignments taken to the extent of lender's interest. On January 7, 1873, assignment of the policy was madę purporting to transfer Page's entire interest. Plaintiffs admitted Burnstine's interest but prayed an accounting. The defendant resisted the suit on the ground that at the death of Page he was the absolute owner of the policy and entitled to all the proceeds. The life insurance company paid the amount due on the policy into court abiding the result of the suit. Some depositions were taken, among them being one of Burnstine with reference to the loans and the several assignments. As to this, plaintiffs contended Burnstine could not testify as to any transaction with or statement by the deceased unless called on by them or required by the court, relying on section 858 of the Revised Statutes. Defendant contended that his right to testify was determined by Sections_876 and 877 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia. Plaintiff's bill was dismissed and appeal taken to the United States Supreme Court, where the decree was reversed and the cause remanded directing an account of the amount due Burnstine for loans or other payments made to keep the policy in force, and holding that Burnstine could not testify in the suit on his own motion.
In view of the conflict between sections 876 and 877 of the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia and section 858 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the Supreme Court examined the legislative history of the basic statutes to determine the intent of Congress. The act of July 2, 1864, relating to the law of evidence in the District was carried into the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia as sections 876 and 877, without change; the third section of the act of July 2, 1864, with respect to appropriations, and the amending act of March 3, 1865, were carried into the Revised Statutes of the United States as section 858, without change; and the act of February 21, 1871, was carried into the Revised Statutes for the District of Columbia as section 93. The court said that by the third section of the act of July 2, 1864, and the amending act of March 3, 1865, witnesses could not testify in such a case; that the act of February 21, 1871, made the rule applicable to the courts of the District of Columbia unless locally inapplicable, which it was not; and that this was the law as it existed at the time the two revisions went into effect. It said these provisions having been carried into the two revisions, respectively, without change, Congress did not intend to change the law with respect to the rule of evidence in the District of Columbia, having so provided by section 1296 of the Revision for the District and by section 5600 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. In this connection the court said:
“We should not, therefore, permit the mere collocation of rearrangement of the previous statutes in the new revisions, adopted on the same day, to operate to change the law, and thereby defeat the will of Congress
*. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that Burnstine could not, on his own motion, testify as to any transaction with, or statement by, the decedent, Page. His deposition as to such transactions, and statements, must be excluded from consideration” (in the further proceedings in the lower court).
McDonald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.
A decree was rendered April 17, 1878, and appeal was taken September 6, 1883. Defendant was sued in New York City upon the decree, judgment rendered against him, and he was thrown into jail, 1879. Appeal having been taken 5
years after entry of the decree, the Government contended that under section 1008 of the Revised Statutes no judgment or decree shall be reviewed by the Supreme Court unless the appeal is taken within 2 years after the entry of the judgment, except in case of some disability such as insanity. Appellant contended the statute of limitations was suspended by reason of his incarceration. It was held that in order for a disability to suspend the statute it must exist at the time the right arises, which here was upon entry of the decree, and before the appellant was jailed. Section 1008 of the Revised Statutes was taken directly and without change from the second section of the act of June 1, 1872. This last act was a revision of the twenty-second section of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The language was substantially the same. The court said:
"The phraseology of the act of 1872, and of the one thousand and eighth section of the Revised Statutes is so nearly identical with that of the twenty-second section of the act of 1789, in reference to the point under consideration, that we must presume they were intended to have the same construction, and the act of 1789 contains no language which requires that it should have a different construction from that which had long been established in reference to all the statutes of limitation then known, whether in the mother country or in this. On the contrary, as we have seen, the terms of the act of 1789 fairly call for the same construction which had for centuries prevailed in reference to those statutes."
Upon a revision of statutes, a different interpretation is not to be given them without some substantial change of phraseology, some change other than what may have been necessary to abbreviate the form of the laws.
Sec. 5601. The enactment of the said revision is not to affect or repeal any act of Congress passed since the 1st day of December one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, and all acts passed since that date are to have full effect as if passed after the enactment of this revision, and so far as such acts vary from, or conflict with any provision contained in said revision, they are to have effect as subsequent statutes, and as repealing any portion of the revision inconsistent therewith.
United States v. Auffmordt, 122 U. S. 197 Action by the United States against Auffmordt and others composing the firm of C. A. Auffmordt & Co., to recover $321,519.29 with interest for alleged false entry as to value of merchandise by reason of which defendants forfeited the value of goods in the above amount to the United States, consigned to them from & manufacturer in Switzerland, After the opening by the United States at the trial, defendants moved for a directed verdict on the ground that there was no statute of the United States whereby the value of the merchandise could be recovered by reason of the acts alleged to have been committed by the defendants. The District Court so ruled and directed a verdict for defendants. Judgment affirmed by the Circuit Court and the case went to the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error.
Section 2864 of the Revised Statutes, as originally enacted, in providing for a forfeiture of merchandise omitted a provision in the basic act providing for forfeiture of the value thereof. The Revised Statutes were enacted on June 22, 1874, but embraced only the laws in force on December 1, 1873. The act of February 18, 1875, C. 80, 18 Stat. 319, entitled "An act to correct errors and to supply omissions in the Revised Statutes of the United States,” amended section 2864 by restoring the omitted provision. It was contended by the United States that Congress intended by this amendment that R. S. 2864 should provide that the value of such goods should be forfeited. However, this amendment was in conflict with a statute passed on June 22, 1874, which did
not provide for forfeiture of value. The court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court, saying the sole object of the act of February 18, 1875, was to correct errors and supply omissions in the text of the Revised Statutes, as its title indicated, so as to make the same truly express the statutes in force on December 1, 1873. It was in no sense new legislation nor a new law enacted to take effect from the date of its passage, in such wise as to alter any enactment made since the passage of the Revised Statutes. The intention was to make section 2864 read as it ought to have read in the printed volume, in the shape in which it was in force on the 1st of December 1873, as a part of section 1 of the act of March 3, 1863, c. 76, 12 Stat. 738. It left the act of June 22, 1874, to have its full effect in respect to section 2864, in like manner as if the words "or the value thereof” had been contained in that section, in the printed volume of the Revised Statutes. There was a law in force on December 1, 1873, and subsequently thereto, down to June 22, 1874, authorizing a forfeiture of the value of merchandise for the causes stated in section 2864, and the fact forfeitures of such value might have been incurred during the intervening period between December 1, 1873, and June 22, 1874, was a sufficient reason for the correction made in section 2864.
See also U. S. v. Mason, 34 Fed. 129; U. S. v. Bain, 40 Fed. 455; U. 8. v. North American Commercial Co., 64 Fed. 145.
See also The North American Commercial Co. v. United States, 171 U. S. 110, where in reversing the Circuit Court as to the amount owed by the lessor, the Supreme Court said the Revised Statutes were approved June 22, 1874; that by section 5601 provision was made that legislation between December 1, 1873, and the date of enactment of the revision should take effect as if subsequently passed; that the act of May 24, 1874, giving the power of limitation to the Secretary of the Treasury operated by way of amendment to the Revised Statutes and removed the restrictions provided in sections 1960 and 1962 of the revision.
See also U. S. v. The “Grace Lothrop," 226 U. S. 527, holding section 5601 of the Revised Statutes provided the revision did not repeal subsequent legislation.