to use, they have every thing, apparently, to learn. The discrimination between different sounds, and the knowledge of figure, magnitude, color and distance of external objects, are very slowly obtained, and only by experiments often repeated. Less is known of the acquirements of the other senses, excepting, that the sense of feeling appears to be always on the alert, and that its disagreeable action is frequently manifested. 96. After some few years, all the senses appear to have undergone the discipline of experience to the effect of answering the common purposes of life. What the senses have attained to by experience, must depend on the sort of experience, or on the employment in which they have been engaged. The senses of a number of young persons who are equally gifted by nature in this respect, will acquire different habits, according to the accidental circumstances, in which they are placed. Children brought up in a city, those who have been only in a small village, those who have been at school, and those who have been employed in manual labor, will have their senses very differently disciplined. If each of these were brought together, and acted upon at the same time, by the same causes, each class would be differently affected, and the individuals of the same class would be affected in different degrees. The senses, therefore, may be said to be subjects of instruction from experience, from early infancy. 97. The only proposition which it is necessary to establish is, that the senses are subjects of discipline and of habit in every person, whatever his vocations in life may be. Another proposition which is self-evident is, that all knowledge of external objects, and substances, must be obtained through the senses. Those who are blind from birth, cannot have any knowledge of forms, nor of comparative distances, except the imperfect knowledge which the other senses give; and they must be entirely ignorant of color, and of all other acquirements to which the use of the eye is indispen sable. The deaf, from birth, must be entirely ignorant of all knowledge of sounds. The senses are, therefore, necessary avenues of knowledge to the mind. 98. It must be admitted, then, that the action of the senses is indispensable to the development of the mind. It does not follow from this well known fact, that the mind is not independent in itself, of material organization. One is apt to suppose that the mind is a perfect independent being, and is so from the commencement of life. It is quite as reasonable to suppose that the mind expands, and is progressive, in conformity to the action made on it, first through the senses, and then by its own operation. 99. It is not improbable that the soul, or mind, or spirit (meaning by these terms the same thing, that is, the immortal part of our being) is generally taken to be something perfect in its own nature, which takes up its residence in the human frame when life begins, and continues that residence, while life remains. It is not inconsistent with some analogies in nature, that the principle of the soul is originally given to every human being, and that the action of life developes and makes it whatsoever it becomes. It is not more difficult to suppose that the Creator intended that the soul of man should take its character from the experience of life, than to suppose that it is given, at first, a separate, independent perfect being, and that it goes through no change from birth till death. On the contrary, it accords with our perceptions of moral accountability, that the immortal part of man should be adapted to its future state, in the scenes of this life. At the same time, it may be supposed that the righteous Judge of all the earth, exacts no accountability, but according to the means enjoyed of finding out duty, and according to the obedience, or disobedience, which follows a knowledge of it. If this supposition be admissible, it may reconcile some disputed points, and may support the proposition which is to be illustrated, viz. that the capacity to learn the law is given, and that neglect of it, refusal to follow it, or voluntary breach of it, are the omissions and acts for which we shall be held accountable. Whether this supposition be well or ill founded, and entitled to respect or not, still the truth as to the action of the senses on the mind, is to be sought out. From this source and from what is known of the operations of the mind on the materials which the senses transfer to it, must be rested the sum of all knowledge on this subject. 100. It is certain from observing those who are deprived of one, or more of the senses, that their agency is indispensable to the development of the faculties of the mind. It is also certain, that the senses have a kind of community among themselves. If the sense of smelling be entirely obstructed, that of tasting seems to be equally so. Sight and touch have a like community. The sense of hearing is connected with organs, with which that sense has no apparent physical connexion. It is connected with sight, and sight is often indispensable in deciding from what place sound proceeds. This is curiously exemplified in the art of ventriloquism. The deaf, are dumb, because they cannot imitate sounds. But the senses which remain, render some services which belong to those which are lost, or not given. The blind hear, and touch, better than those who see. The deaf and dumb touch and see, more perfectly than those who have all the senses. It is also certain that the senses are the subjects of discipline and of habit. No doubt the retina of every eye, which is perfect, has precisely the same picture made on it, which is made by the same object, on every other perfect eye. But the report made of that picture to the mind, depends on the discipline and habit of the eye, and on the habit of the mind in receiving, and using, that report. 101. Let us suppose that a military chief, a husbandman, a mathematician, the captain of a ship of war, and a physician, are examining, from the same point of vision, a numerous body of soldiery, prepared for the exercise of their vocation; each of these individuals would have the same picture made on the retina, but each of them would have very different perceptions, and very different intellectual action from this picture. From this truth it follows, that the eye and mind are disciplined by habit. Suppose the same persons are equally perfect in the sense of hearing, and that all of them hear the same sound at the same time. Each of them would have the like quantity of the same sort of action, on the organ of hearing, but the ear of each would notice and report to the mind, according to the habit of that sense, and according to the use which the mind has been habituated to make of the report derived through that sense. 102. The senses of individuals vary, not only in consequence of habitual discipline, but also, in their natural and original formation. Some persons whose organs of vision are apparently perfect, and who see as far and as clearly as any do, cannot distinguish colors; or only very imperfectly. The same sounds are to some ears sweet and harmonious music, to others indifferent, and to others disagreeable. The sense of hearing is variously affected by the common tones of voice. The same tones are fascinating, indifferent, or disgusting, according to the ear on which they fall. 103. The inference to be drawn from such facts, seems to be this, that the connexion which is formed between the senses, and the mind, depends on two things, the original formation of the senses, as to perfection, or the falling short of it; and on the habits which have been formed in using them. The mind is, what its original faculties and powers, its own discipline and habits, in attending to the reports of the senses; and its power and habits in retaining and using these reports, have made it to be. This is all that is known on this very difficult subject; and it is very little. How impressions, from exterior substances are made on the senses; and how the mind takes cognizance of these impressions, is entirely hidden from all human search. Although human beings are thus ignorant of these subjects, they have attained to some knowledge of the faculties and operations of the mind, which are next to be considered. CHAPTER XVI. Proofs drawn from the Human Intellect, continued. 104. It seems to be the most satisfactory way to learn all that can be known of the human mind, to examine one's own experience. Let us suppose that a person of competent age, and the common degree of intelligence and instruction, should turn his thoughts inwards, and ascertain for himself, what he can, of his own mind. 105. The first thing that will strike him as certain, is, that he exists; that he is conscious of that fact. No reasonable person can doubt that he is a human being. No one can doubt that he may act, or not act; that he can command the use of his muscles. No one doubts that he has perceptions of external objects; nor that he can recall and think of them, when they are not acting on him; nor that he is capable of feeling pain, and of having pleasing and grateful emotions. No one doubts that he can remember what he did a few hours ago, nor that he can think of what he will do a few hours hence ; and resolve on the means of doing what he wants to do. Such things are the common, every day experience of all persons. 106. Suppose such a person seated in a room, and accidentally reminded of Eve's affectionate address to Adam in Milton, To whom thus Eve, with perfect beauty adorn'd- Unargued I obey: so God ordains: God is thy law, thou mine: to know no more All seasons and their change, all please alike,' &c. |