penditure occasioned by war should be entirely provided for by loans. In the event of any farther deficiency, a restoration of the duties on salt, and a selection of "external taxes," as they were called, were recommended; and it was supposed that there would be no difficulty in raising the permanent revenue of the United States to nine millions of dollars per annum. The difficulty of raising the loans at home was foreseen; no chance of finding them abroad presented itself; and the American minister of finance was aware, that an interest much above that allowed by law would be necessary to secure a supply of money for the public service. Still, however, he was convinced that the loans might be negociated, and that no obstacle on this account would present itself to the measures, which were now obviously in the contemplation of the executive.

No sooner were these documents received in England, than it was universally believed that war with Ame rica had become inevitable.

The re

port of the committee, indeed, breathed a very hostile spirit, and seemed to leave no room for conciliation or ami cable arrangement. The whole of its reasonings were built on the assumption, that the French decrees had been really and practically annulled, an assumption which the daily conduct of France, and the experience of the American government, positively contradicted. The committee attempted to avail themselves of a quibbling dis

tinction betwixt the international law asserted by France, and the municipal regulations established for governing the commerce of that country; yet as the French government continued to declare that it would admit no British goods, although become the proper ty of neutrals, into the ports of France and her dependencies, the Americans

were thus deprived of a branch of trade which they formerly enjoyed, and in which of course they had an unquestionable right still to engage. Even if the Berlin and Milan decrees had been fairly revoked as to their operation on the high seas, their principle was still retained to an extent which not only gave neutrals a fair right to complain, but called on America to resist the proceedings of the French government. Great Britain did not insist, as the committee affected to believe, that America should interfere with the domestic regulations or the warlike measures of the French; but she insisted that America should not make herself a party to the violence of France, by submitting to conditions which had never before been imposed on any neutral power. The blockade of the British islands, ón a principle which America herself declared to be a violation of public law, since there was not a single vessel employed to enforce it, was still partially carried into effect by the submission of America. Even if the French decrees therefore had been rescinded, their repeal must have been altogether nuga. tory, since, by a municipal regulation which America defended, a palpable violation of neutral rights was still committed; neutral still powers were compelled to co-operate with France towards the injury of British com merce; and a principle was proclaimed which was altogether novel and extravagant. The Americans, therefore, had at this period no just grounds for going to war with England; nor did the exposition of their financial affairs give them much encouragement to hazard so violent a proceeding.

While a committee of the American legislature was busily engaged in de nouncing the injustice of Great Britain, and apologising for the outrages France, an affair of a serious nature oc

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curred at Savannah, in which the insolence of the French was exhibited in a very striking light. One evening, about the middle of November 1811, while two French privateers were lying in the above port, a rencontre took place between some American seamen and a party of men belonging to the privateers, in which three of the Americans were stabbed and severely wounded. The American seamen in the port were exasperated to the highest pitch; they determined to revenge themselves by destroying the privateers; and having assembled on the evening of the 15th, they set fire to one of them, and burnt her to the water's edge. The other privateer was taken posses sion of by a detachment of Savannah volunteers, by whom she was protected until between eleven and twelve at night, when the seamen procured a lighter-boat filled with tar and other combustibles, which they towed to the privateer, and obliged the guard to abandon her to her fate. She was of course speedily destroyed. The French in this instance were the aggressors; their insolence to the Americans was beyond endurance; yet had not the spirit of the people risen to take vengeance, it is probable that the government would not have thought of interfering.

The sentiments contained in the report of the committee were supported with great violence in the House of Representatives, and it was declared by one speaker to be the unanimous opinion of the committee," that the encroachments of Great Britain were such as to demand war, as the only alternative to obtain justice." Some of the members descanted on the power of America to harass Great Britain as well on the ocean as by land; to exhaust her colonies, and destroy her trade by an active system of privateer ing. They boasted also of their ability to

conquer Canada,-a threat which excited ridicule in England.--There were still many persons, however, who deprecated a war with America as one of the greatest evils to which this country could be exposed, and who indulged a hope that hostilities might be averted. No one surely could have desired a rupture with America on its own account; but it was difficult to discover how it could be avoided at this period, when the absurd pretensions of the American government were considered. They had already used the language of defiance; they boasted that they could destroy our commerce; that they could conquer Canada; and that upon war they had already resolved. To have yielded in such circumstances would have been unwise, because it would have been yielding to menace and insult. A repeal of the orders in council at this season would have been imputed to fear; and it is certain, that America had already determined not to rest satisfied even with such a concession. There is a prudence which is wise, and there is also a false and despicable prudence, the result not of caution but of fear. The British ministers had wisely determined to act on the principle so well unfolded by Mr Burke, "That in sinall, weakly states, a timely compromise has often been the means, and the only means, of drawing out their puny existence. But a great state is too much envied, too much dreaded, to find safety in humiliation. To be secure it must be respected. Power, and eminence, and consideration, are things not to be begged. They must be commanded, and they who supplicate for mercy from others, can never hope for justice through themselves."-In one respect, perhaps, the conduct of the British government was not altogether de serving of approbation. The ministers were determined to concede nothing

to the Americans from fear; but they were resolved, and perhaps too obstinately resolved, to let their enemies follow their own plans, and to avoid being the first to draw the sword. They imagined it to be of advantage to cast on America the odium of first resorting to hostilities; but perhaps they persevered in this system too long, after it had been announced from America that war was determined on. The enemy declared, that, although his resolves were fixed, he would not commence hostilities till his preparations had been completed; and the British government allowed him to finish his preparations, and thus lost the chances of attacking a known and bitter enemy by surprise. There was no longer any hope of an amicable adjustment. The war party had obtained an overwhelming superiority of numbers in congress; and nothing could moderate the fury with which they were animated. To have struck the first blow in such circumstances, might have been a wise, and surely would have been a vigorous policy.

With the view, however, of averting the evils of war with America, Mr Whitbread, on the 13th of February, moved in the House of Commons, that an address should be presented to the Prince Regent, praying that he would give directions to lay before the House copies of all correspondence which had passed betwixt the British and American ministers from the 1st January, 1810, to the latest period, together with the documents referred to in the correspondence. In support of this motion, it was observed, that although the governments of both countries had from the beginning professed to be actuated by the most friendly and conciliatory dispositions, the breach betwixt England and America had been widened from day to day, till it ap. peared that war between the two coun⚫

tries must be the inevitable consequence of the perseverance of England in her present system; that the information demanded by this motion was already before the whole world, with the exception of the two houses of parliament; that it had been the prac tice of the House, when it entertained suspicions that the business of the state was not well conducted, to require in formation from the executive power; and that the only ground upon which such information had ever been refused was, that a disclosure might disturb or impede the pending negocia tions; That as the information required was already before the world, no such plea could in this case be offered. From a perusal of the papers, it appeared that the conduct of those who managed the negociations had been yery culpable, yet it was impossible to bring a charge against them till the documents were produced; that the British ministers at home had behaved with the greatest inattention to the American envoy, and had shewn a neglect amounting almost to diplomatic incivility, while our ministers in the United States had acted in a manner scarcely less repulsive. conduct of Mr Jackson and Mr Foster while in America, had not been conciliatory; while the correspondence of the Marquis Wellesley with Mr Pinckney, which commenced in January, 1809, and terminated in February, 1810, had been such as to raise the indignation of the American government. The behaviour of Mr Pinckney, on the other hand, had been deserving of great praise. When he entered on the duties of his mission, a strong feeling existed in America in consequence of what had occurred in the course of Mr Jackson's embassy; and the Americans were naturally anxious as to the character of the person who was to be named by Great Britain

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to renew the negociation. On the 2d of January, 1809, Mr Pinckney wrote to the Marquis Wellesley on the subject, but no answer was given to this letter till the 14th of March. On the 15th, Mr Pinckney again wrote to Lord Wellesley respecting the English system of blockade,-a subject most interesting to America ;-but to this letter he did not receive an answer for more than a fortnight. On the 30th of April, Mr Pinckney wrote to Lord Wellesley on the subject of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, but to this letter he never received any answer at all; and a complaint which he made against the infamous practice of forging ship's papers in London, and making an open traffic of them, was treated with the same neglect. That many other in stances had occurred, in which the communications of the American minister had been treated in a manner not less contemptuous, and in particular to his letter of the 15th of September to Lord Wellesley on the subject of the blockade of Elsineur by Sir James Saumarez, and stating some circumstances as to the seizure of four American seamen in the Viola, he received an imperfect answer only on the 6th of December, which noticed the letter so far as it related to the blockade, but said nothing at all on the subject of the impressment. That the latter subject was one of the greatest delicacy; and although the seamen had afterwards been released by a judgment of Sir William Scott, yet the secretary of state had considered the original complaint as unworthy of his notice. Such had been the conciliatory spirit of the noble secretary, who permitted the sentence of a court of justice to answer the communication of a foreign minister, whom he himself would not take the trouble of satisfy ing on so interesting a point. Although Mr Pinckney had on numerous

occasions addressed the British minister on the subject of the Berlin and Milan Decrees, he had never received any satisfactory answer, and he accordingly demanded his audience of leave.

Little appeared to have been afterwards done towards effecting the important objects which both governments professed to have so much at heart.

Mr Foster had been sent out with no new instructions; he went to offer what had been previously rejected, and to restate what had often before been stated in vain, so that his mission was only productive of disappointment-That it was of the utmost importance to conciliate America; that this object might at one time have been thought unattainable, but from some measures recently adopted by congress for admitting English manufactures into the ports of the United States, there was reason to believe that it was still the wish of the Americans to avoid a rupture-That the prosperity of America contributed much to the welfare of this country, and that America had committed no fault, except that as she was placed in an extraordinary situation, as the only neutral in the world, she had endeavoured to avail herself of her advantages-That the intelligence which had so recently been received from America, made it more important than ever thoroughly to consider this subject; that the bill spoken of as likely to pass through congress would give umbrage to France; and it was the duty of the English government to endeavour, by conciliation, to avail itself of any difference of this kind that might arise.

The members who opposed the motion, censured Mr Whitbread and his friends for the hasty decision which they had ventured to pronounce on the conduct of Great Britain towards America, and upon the policy of the

orders in council; They maintained that England, instead of having acted unjustly towards America, had the strongest case against that power that one nation ever had against another; That no benefit could result from a premature agitation in the House of Commons of the differences betwixt the two countries, but, on the contrary, the greatest inconvenience and mischief might thus be produced. Government had uniformly expressed but one sentiment with regard to the disputes with America, and was sincerely desirous that a war with that country might be avoided, if that could be done without injury to the maritime rights of Great Britain, which never could be yielded to the pretensions of France That the prosperity of America is not so essential to Great Britain as many persons imagine; that all the predilections of America closely united her to France, and partly from the influence of these feelings, partly from more sordid motives, she insisted that England should allow her to take up the whole carrying trade, nay, even the whole coasting trade of her enemies That it was for America to decide the question of peace or war; she had adopted a new system, and made new and unheard-of pretensions, to which she knew well that England would never concede; That by moving for papers, it must be intended to create à discussion on them when granted; yet any parliamentary discussion which could take place on the subject, must necessarily increase the irritation on both sides-That the spirit of conciliation always professed in the diplomatic correspondence between the two countries had been most sincere on our side; but the British government would never abandon these maritime rights, which the country had so long maintained, and which are necessary to her greatness-That the Marquis

Wellesley had acted wisely in decli ning to go into details, as to the prin ciples of the blockade which we were called on to abandon; That the first letter of Mr Pinckney alluded to in the debate, had been written for the purpose merely of asking Lord Wellesley some questions on this point; that the British government was deter

mined not to confound with the discussion on the orders in council this question of blockade; and that it was absurd to suppose that Eng. land should be ready to declare to France how much of her rights she would surrender, in order to pur chase for the Americans a revocation of the obnoxious edicts of Buona. parte. As to the letter of Mr Pinckney on the subject of the recal of Mr Jackson, which was said not to have been answered by Lord Wellesley, the American minister himself had, in his correspondence with his own govern ment, stated that he had had commu nications with Lord Wellesley on the subject, and repeated opportunities of personal intercourse; and that he had been informed by his lordship, and had no doubt of the fact, that a minister would be sent out to America without delay. If the letter had not been formally answered therefore, the omission was fully explained; and the information desired by Mr Pinckney had been communicated to him in an other manner. The ostensible reason of Mr Pinckney for demanding his passport was, that no minister had been sent out to America; yet he had been previously informed, that the de lay in sending out a minister had ari sen from the situation in which the government found itself for the two months preceding, in consequence his majesty's illness-That the orders in council did not originate with the present government, the system having been acted upon by those who now

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