The

for the repeal of these edicts. general topics of argument had already been exhausted in a former debate; and it was only the discoveries which had been made in the course of the late tedious enquiry which the House was now called upon to consider. Mr Brougham, however, made an elaborate speech. He began by stating, that the orders in council had always been defended on the supposed necessity of affording relief to the commerce and industry of the country, yet the people had now come to implore parliament to abandon them to the hostility of their enemies, and spare

them the merciless kindness under

which they were groaning.-That upon the vote of the House the destiny of thousands depended; and if the legis lature should say no to the petitions against the orders in council, multitudes of hungry men must be let loose upon the country, who would either find food or perish.-That commercial capital had been universally locked up -men of great nominal wealth were living without income-trading, or seeming to trade, without profitnumbers of workmen had been dismissed--those who remained were earning only a half or quarter of their wages-even parish rates were increasing-charitable supplies failing, from the reduced means of the higher classes, and the augmented claims on their bounty. But the most prominent feature in this case, was the impending necessity of instantaneously disbanding those, who were now detained only in the hopes of a favourable decision of parliament. That the orders in council had an operation in producing distress, much more enlarged than many persons were willing to believe; that the army in the peninsula was fed from America; that the embargo in that country had raised the price of flour in the Lisbon market above 50 per cent. and had occasioned in one morning an

export from London of 6000 barrels to supply the Portugueze market.-That no attempt had been made by the supporters of the orders in council to meet the evidence which so fully established the distresses of the country; that they had contented themselves with a reference to the custom-house books, -a criterion that might be resorted to when better evidence could not be had, but which is always suspicious, and, in the present instance, had been superseded by the most melancholy disclosures.-But even the customhouse books indicated a great and unexampled depression of trade. Nor was there any reason for believing, that for the loss of the trade of the United States compensation had been obtained in other quarters, since the custom-house books themselves exhibited a general falling off of the whole trade of the country. That the market of South America, instead of having increased the valuable commerce of the country, had introduced a spirit of speculation, which had brought ruin on all those who had ventured to indulge in it.That it was a great fallacy to suppose that any considerable proportion of the goods imported from Britain into the United States, was reexported to South America and the West Indies, since it had been proved by a respectable witness before the committee, that the re-exportation never exceeded one-thirteenth of the whole value, and, of course, that the loss of the trade to North America had not in any way been compensated by the supposed increase in the commerce carried on to the other parts of the world, the trade of which we should at any rate have been able to command. That the home market had also suffered severely by the glut occasioned in all those articles, which had formerly been destined for exportation, and that even of the home trade, which still remained, the great

er part depended on the extravagant demands of that great and unprofitable consumer-the government-That the repeal of the orders in council, so far from being injurious to the stability of our maritime rights, and of the naval power which protects them, seemed essential to their preservation; That the paper blockades, as they were called, were contrary to law, and had never been recognized in any of the courts―That, although the orders in council were repealed, and although England were to relinquish for the present, the rights on which they are founded, it would not follow that she could never again enforce them-That at the peace of Utrecht, after a war of unexampled success, and a series of uninterrupted triumphs, in which the power of England was extended and confirmed, and France and her allies humbled to the dust, we gave up for a time the principle, that free ships should not make free goods; and during the American war we relinquished what is called the rule of the war, 1756, yet without, ultimately abandoning either of these principles-That every right may be abandoned for the sake of expediency, and resumed when this reason ceases -That the loss which was sustained by the obstinate exercise of this right, in the present instance, was enormous; and that the American market was at stake, a market which takes off about thirteen millions worth of our manufactures, and in steadiness and regularity is unrivalled-That by refusing to the Americans the market of England to purchase from, we were driving them to supply themselves, and there was no branch of their commerce which had not now, to a certain degree, been improved; many branches of their manufactures had been created since 1807, and all were rapidly springing up to maturity-That the dread of losing a market such as that of America was quite

VOL. V. PART I.

rational, while the fear entertained by the supporters of the orders in council, that the capital, industry, and skill of England might be outdone by France, was altogether contemptibleThat there was no danger of any loss of honour by seeking to conciliate America; that England never stood so high as she now did in point of military character; that she had it in abundance, and even to spare; that the events of the war had not merely sustained the ancient fame of the nation, they had done what seemed scarcely possible; they had greatly increased it; they had covered the British arms with immortal renown; and the government was bound to profit by the proud height on which England stood for the purposes of peace and conciliation with America.

The ministers had already come to the determination of making some temporary arrangement on this subject, which might at all events evince their disposition to relieve the distress of the country, whether those who suffered were right or wrong in speculating upon its origin. They did not on this occasion, therefore, enter into any very full discussion of the merits of this great question, a discussion, which, in the circumstances of the case, would have been superfluous; but before explaining to the House the nature of the arrangement which it was proposed to adopt, Lord Castlereagh defended the principles on which the orders in council had originally been established. He said, " on such an important subject, he felt anxious to offer to the House the reasons which appeared to him conclusive against the address. He lamented the precipita tion of the honourable and learned gentleman in bringing forward this motion-a precipitation injurious to his own cause. This was the more to be regretted, as the evidence went to such a great extent. He was sorry

that the honourable and learned gentleman, even for the sake of his own character, should have so much departed from all parliamentary prac tice, and should have pressed to a hasty discussion a question than which one more vital never came before parliament. He deprecated any interference on the part of the House in a question of great national importance, involving unquestionably commercial considerations of the most serious nature, but mixed up also with considerations of maritime right. It was certainly not out of the absolute province of parliament to interfere on such an occasion; but it had always been extremely averse, pending a negociation on a delicate subject, to dictate to the executive government the course which it ought to pursue. He admitted that the honourable and learned gentleman had made out a grave case of national distress, as affecting the manufacturers of the country. He further admitted, that there was reasonable ground to believe that if the American market was not opened within a limited period, the pressure would be increased. But still he hoped that parliament would not allow their imaginations to wander so widely with the honourable and learned gentleman, as to conceive that the general commerce and manufactures of the empire were in a state of decay and perishment. He by no means wished to under-rate the pressure on those of our manufacturers who had been accustomed to export to America. He felt acutely for their distresses, and he declared that he had never met with more fair and liberal men than the individuals sent by those manufacturers to represent their case to parliament. He conceded to the honourable and learned gentleman, that if Great Britain revoked her orders in council, America might be disposed to abrogate her non-importation act; but he contended, that on a retrospect of

the past, he was by no means prepared to say that it would have been wise to have kept possession of the American market, by abstaining from those measures; an abstinence which would have exposed the commerce of this country to all the evils with which it had been threatened by France. In justice, however, Great Britain ought to have retained possession of the American market, notwithstanding the system which she had adopted towards France -a system which he admitted was not justifiable on principles of commercial policy, but which was most completely justifiable on the principle in which it originated; namely, the principle of coercing France, and driving her from the system of misrule which she had so extensively exercised. As directed against France, this system had obtain ed its object. Never was a country more commercially depressed than France. By the official documents of the French government, it appeared, that the whole extent of the manufactures and produce of that country, with her population of 36,000,000, consumed internally, as well as exported, did not equal the simple exports of other nations. In the year before last, they did not exceed 54,000,000l. sterling, while ours amounted to 66,000,000l. Never, therefore, would he cease to contend, that the system of his late right honourable friend did originate as much in wisdom as in justice. Even with the loss of the American market, (which he maintained we ought not to have lost,) let the House compare the situation in which the British empire was with that in which it might have been, but for the orders in council. This country (with the exception of the last year, the deficiency of which was occasioned by temporary causes,) exhibited to the world a spectacle of a nation successfully struggling amidst the efforts of war, and rising in wealth and commer

cial prosperity. Indeed, a great part of the deficiency of the last year was occasioned by the preceding extraordinary and even unnatural prosperity. With that exception, the commerce of the country, all but that which related to America, had increased in an accumulating ratio, beyond what it ever had been in times of peace. And even in continental Europe, our commerce, notwithstanding the efforts of the Scourge of the continent, had grown to a considerable extent, particularly since the issuing of the orders in council. The average of our annual exports to the continent during the three years preceding the orders in council was 17,500,000l. The annual average of the three years subsequent to the orders in council, was 23,000,0001. being an increase of near six millions. Even the exports to America, prior to the last year, so far from decaying, had considerably increased. The average of the annual exports to America and the West Indies, during the three years imme. diately preceding the last year, was 22,000,0001.; the annual average during the three years preceding those three years, was only 19,500,0001. The present distress of those manufacturing districts most connected with America was, in a great degree, attributable to the benevolent feelings of the master manufacturers, who had expended their capitals in keeping their men employed on the same scale during the last year as they had done during the three years preceding. He had always denied, that the present system was adopted from any unworthy motive of national gain. It rested on the firm ground of national defence. It rested on the principle, that as the enemy wielded his utmost extent of power against the prosperity of the British empire, we had a right to wield the utmost extent of our power against the prosperity of

France. He stated it in vindication of the character of the country, and of the government, that he believed no councils had ever been more honourably and faithfully directed to apply the system of retaliation successfully to the enemy, but in a way as little obnoxious as possible to the neutral. Various modifications had been resorted to for this latter purpose, and particularly the order of 1809, limited the blockade to France and the countries immediately under the power of her arms. Adverting to the system of licences, he maintained that the honourable and learned gentleman had fallen under a great error on the subject.

The licences connected with the system of blockade did not form a fifth of the whole licence system of the country. We had a right by our licences to avail ourselves of the relief which the enemy required; and we had never done this to the injury of neutrals, who had enjoyed as much facility in sailing from our ports as our own merchant vessels. But it was not with the licence system that America quarrelled. We had expressed our readiness to return, if America wished it, to the strict measure of 1807, provided she rescinded the act prohibitory of our commerce. He was anxious to call the attention of the House to some circumstances which had occurred since the last discussion on the subject, and since the issuing of the regent's declaration in April. It had been asked in that House, in what way he understood the operation of the French decree recently communicated to government by the American minister? He had no hesitation in replying, that in his opinion it by no means satisfied the regent's declaration, which required the unqualified and unconditional repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as the condition of rescinding the orders in council. The day on which

he had received that decree, was the very day on which the House of Commons had been pleased by its vote, virtually to dissolve the administration; and therefore it was not until the last three or four days that the present government, considering themselves as a government, had deliberated on the subject. On the face of this instrument, however, he had no difficulty in repeating that it appeared insufficient, and was accompanied with circumstances of great distrust and suspicion. It was difficult also to say, whether this decree had not been completely revoked by the sweeping declaration of the Duke of Bassano, that the Berlin and Milan decrees would remain in full force, until the maritime assumptions of this country should be abandoned. There, therefore, must exist considerable doubts on the subject. Nevertheless, it might not be unwise to put the country in a situation to receive explanations upon it. If the American government should be found disposed to make representations to France, to induce her to satisfy the just expectations contained in his royal highness the Prince Regent's declaration, Great Britain would be disposed to consent to the suspension, for a limited period, of the restrictive system of both countries; or, in other words, she would consent to suspend the orders in council, if America would consent to suspend her non-importation act.

The expe

riment might then be tried of the practicability of restoring things to their ancient system. If, by an act of temper and conciliation, not incompatible with the safety of the country, an inducement could be held out to France, in the paroxysm of her power, to return to that system, a departure from which had been destructive of her own commerce, it would be an act redounding to our honour. Should the event be favourable, the advantage

would be great to all parties. Should it be unfavourable, we must return to our present retaliatory system.-If this effort on our part were not met with a correspondent feeling on the part of America, opportunities would be afforded, in the absence of irritation, of fairly considering those circumstances which might restore and cement that friendship which ought always to be maintained between the two countries, and which it was the curse of both had ever been interrupted. If, by the fatal perseverance of France, Great Britain should be driven to re-adopt her retaliatory system, means might be adopted, without endangering its efficacy against the enemy, of rendering it less obnoxious to America. He concurred with the honourable and learned gentleman, that it would be a most unworthy and unwise policy in this country to allow itself to be provoked by the irritation which America had evinced. Was it not the part of a great empire like England to adopt a conciliatory course of conduct towards America, even at the time when her tone, although he trusted it would not lead to absolute war, sufficiently marked the hostile disposition of her councils? Although he did not wish to be too sanguine as to the result of this experiment, yet, persuaded as he was, that there had been moments of such great inconvenience to France, that had she not cherished hopes of final success from the occurrence of certain circumstances in this country, she would willing-ly have abandoned her projects, he could not help entertaining an expectation that she might be induced to return to the ancient system. Under all these circumstances, he trusted the House would not consent to the address. He would content himself with moving the order of the day. Were the documents illustrative of the negociation between this country and