herence on their part to the enemy; they submitted to all the military inflictions which their, firmness occasioned; they bore the devastation of their country without repining; and in no single instance were they false to the common interest." The noble lord concluded by moving the following resolution :-"That it is the opinion of this committee, that a sum, not exceeding two millions, be granted to his majesty, to enable him to continue to main tain in his pay a body of Portugueze troops, and to give such further aid and assistance to the government of Portugal, as the nature of the contest in which his majesty is engaged may appear to him to require."

Mr Freemantle was almost the only member who opposed this grant. He "denied that the noble lord had satisfied his mind with respect to the propriety of the proposed grant. The noble lord had adverted not to the general state of the war, but to the particular state of Portugal. To all that the noble lord had said in praise of the exertions of Portugal he heartily subscribed. But he could not allow an additional burden of two millions to be imposed upon the country, without bringing back to the recollection of the committee the original object, for the attainment of which this grant was in the first instance voted. That object had failed; and therefore to continue such grants, was merely to persevere in a system of lavish expenditure, from which no satisfactory result could be expected. When the first grant of this nature was proposed, it was to afford British aid towards rescuing Spain from the gripe of France. At that time he concurred most cordially with the whole country in the effort. But four years have elapsed, and not an inch of ground having been gained, he had a right to alter his opinion on the subject. So far were we from ha

ving emancipated Spain, that we had not a single man there, nor could we entertain a rational prospect of making any impression on the enemy in that quarter. He put it to the committee, whether if four years ago the merely remaining in Portugal had been described as the ultimate object of our efforts, the proposition to make those efforts would have been received with that acclamation and support which actually accompanied it? "In objecting to the present motion, he felt that he trod on ground not most popular just then, of course he should have to contend with the gentlemen opposite; he should also have to contend with many with whom he was in the general habit of political accordance. But so strong was his conviction on the subject, that he felt it imperative upon him to express his opinion. He had patiently listened to every argument and opinion connected with it, both in parliament and in private society, but hitherto no one had been able to persuade him that, under the present circumstances, Great Britain ought to persevere in a system so lavish, that it must eventually lead to her utter destruction. It was on the ground of expence that he argued against the motion. We had failed in every effort which we had made to drive the enemy from Spain. We had failed, not from any want of courage in our troops, not from any want of skill in our officers, but from a want of co-operation on the part of the Spaniards, from a want of that assistance which we expected from them, and which we had a right to expect. In the present state of the committee he would not enter into any details of the war in the pe ninsula; but he would implore them to pause before they fruitlessly ex pended two millions of the public money. Let them consider, that two millions was near one-sixth of the pro

duce of the Income Tax. Let them look at the enormous expenditure of the country, and endeavour to devise the means of diminishing, rather than of augmenting it. The present annual expenditure of Great Britain amounted to nearly 100,000,000! He would defy any minister to maintain the present expenditure of the country, with resources so diminished, and trade and commerce so circumstanced. He need only refer the right honourable gentleman to what he had stated last year, when proposing a subsidy for Portugal-when at the same time there was a petition from the manufacturers, complaining of the decay of trade, and praying some relief. On that occasion, the right honourable gentleman had said, that it was impossible to afford the relief prayed for, until Buonaparte had altered his prohibitory decrees. Since then the ruler of France had increased them, and, therefore, the situation of the country in that respect was worse. Under these circumstances he should most earnestly recommend to the House to adopt economy-to diminish the expenditure, and make it more commensurate with the means of the country. The noble lord had stated that the revenue of Portugal was materially improved since the former subsidy was voted by parliament. If so, she had no right whatever to call upon Great Britain for further aid; the increase of the revenue of Portugal ought to be applied to the maintenance of her army, especially as our revenue was on the decline. If England was menaced with a foreign invasion, would Englishmen, he would ask, condescend to receive pay for carrying muskets in defence of their liberties and of their country? The fact was so with the Portugueze, for the subsidy was grant-ed for the express purpose of assisting them in defence of their own country. He would state a few facts in detail

of the expences of our army in that quarter. At this moment, it must be admitted on all hands, that the extent of it was not under 50,000 men at least available for service-the expence of the establishment of mules employed in carrying stores, &c. was not less than 4,000l. per diem, and this he could prove, if necessary. Each horse cost this country 5s. per day, beside the provisions for the cavalry, which were imported from America into Lisbon, and thence transported to the army, and their horses were expected to be furnished from this country. The expence of transporting the heavy ordnance from Oporto to Ciudad Rodrigo cost this country 20,000l. With respect to keeping up the force we had in the peninsula, our means were not adequate to the effort, for the militia regiments were called on to supply their quotas for the line, and many of the militia regiments were not complete, for some of the counties could not afford a ballot. There was no chance therefore of deriving assistance again from that source. It was impracticable to keep up the cavalry regiments; he could affirm, that one regiment, which at the end of the year 1808 was complete, consisting of eight troops, containing 640 men and horses, landed in Portugal, was now reduced, though it had since been recruited five times, to 480 men, and when in the field could not muster more than 400 men. In recommending economy, he did not mean that our armies should be withdrawn, or that at the first charge the country should surrender at discretion. His only object was to induce the House to look at the situation of this country, and by its conduct prevent the furtherance of what he must deem a ruinous system, carried on in a country where so fair a prospect was not now present. ed as at the commencement of the contest. He therefore could not avoid

recommending the adoption of measures more conducive to the security of the empire, and upon a scale more consistent with its resources."

The Honourable Mr Ward, although connected with the opposition, came forward on this occasion, and made a satisfactory reply to the preceding speaker. He observed, "That he was one of those who originally thought that we should not have entered as principals into the war in the peninsula; he still thought so, but he conceived that there was a great difference between such an opinion and that which he might entertain after that war had been so commenced, and continued for years. Whether they should have entered into it on the scale they had done, and whether they should now abandon it, were quite different questions; for the policy of abandoning it might be a great deal worse than the policy which induced us to commence it. He could not agree with his honourable friend who spoke last; for in the system which he recommended, though he said he would not abandon the war, yet his opinions would lead him to starve it. That would, indeed, be carrying on the war so as to be burdensome, while at the same time it afforded no probability of succeeding in any one object of it. Though he still thought it would have been wiser to have acted differently, yet it should be recollected, that there was nothing so disgraceful to the character of a great nation as a changeable vacillating policy. It often happened in the concerns of nations, that it was better to pursue a course which was not in the first instance rightly selected, than to give it up altogether, after following it for a considerable time. If we now abandoned it, or did what was almost the same thing, starve it, and if we thas suffered the French to gain near9

ly all their objects, what would any statesman say what would all Europe say to our conduct? They might say that when we were unsuccessful,

when we were defeated in our objects,-when our gallant general was slain, then we were disposed to continue the war; but that now, when we had obtained brilliant successes,― when we had secured our position in the peninsula, when our armies were commanded by one of the greatest generals of modern times; now, a new light had broken in upon us; now, we found that we could not afford to continue the means of farther success; now, we felt ourselves indisposed to grant the necessary succours to our allies! His honourable friend thought it discreditable to the Portugueze character to be paid by England. But what was the fact? The Portugueze had first done all that was in their power, and then they received our assistance to make still greater efforts. His honourable friend said, that we, in England, would not think of being paid by another nation for defending ourselves. God forbid that such an event should ever happen as to drive us to a question of such a nature! Should the necessity of defending ourselves in our own land occur, we should, doubtless, perform all that lay within the compass of our own ability; and he trusted that we should feel no necessity to resort to the supplies of other governments. But really he could discern nothing disgraceful in the conduct of the Portugueze, who, without the financial means of exert ing all their powers, and calling forth all their own resources, received the pecuniary assistance of their allies in a common cause. What they had done, had been the practice of some of the greatest states in Europe; several instances of which, he imagined, his honourable friend approved of. What

had been the case respecting our allies during the whole of the war for near twenty years? Was it ever said, that the emperor of Germany was a disgraced person because he accepted pecuniary loans and subsidies from this country, to enable him to send his armies into the field? But if affording pecuniary aid to Portugal were expedient, and justifiable on the score of policy, it was yet much more so at present, on the ground of honour. In fact, we were pledged as strongly as we could be to assist Portugal; and she had done nothing lately to forfeit the fulfilment of our promises of support; he meant not that hollow, niggardly, illusive support that some recommended; but a real, efficient, and vigorous assistance. With regard to Spain, he thought that if she had ever deserved our aid, she deserved it peculiarly at the present time; for she had lately endeavoured to increase her own means of resistance, especially in her abolition of a weak and execrable government. He was not, however, disposed to deny that the time might come, when this question would appear under a very different aspect,— when we might find ourselves pressed by domestic difficulties, which would render it advisable to husband our resources with the utmost economy; and he would fairly own, that he was not altogether free from apprehensions on that subject. The time might possibly arrive sooner than most persons expected. Yet he must maintain upon every consideration, whether of national policy, or of public honour, that if we should deem it proper to abandon the vigorous prosecution of the war in the peninsula, we ought to do so slowly and reluctantly. Such a measure ought, in his mind, to be the result only of well weighing, and duly estimating whether we were really unable to persevere in that war. We

VOL. V. PART I.

ought to look around us carefully, and examine what other branch of expenditure we could retrench or give up, rather than for the sake of the cost to abandon the defence of our allies. Thus much he felt himself bound to say, because he certainly thought, and had before said, that in the commencement, it would have been better policy for us not to commit ourselves so far, as principals in the war. But when he heard gentlemen argue in favour of stopping the career in which we had been engaged for several years, and to which we were now so strongly pledged, he must declare, that he could not hear such sentiments without stating, as he had done, his opinion on the present occa sion as to the policy and honour of this country.

But it is time to return to the operations of the armies. So soon as Lord Wellington had repaired the works of Ciudad Rodrigo, and perIceived that Marmont had abandoned his intention of fighting, he moved the greater part of his army towards Badajoz, which he determined should follow the fate of Ciudad Rodrigo. This place had for some time been blockaded by General Hill, with about 12,000 men, supported by the Portugueze army under Marshal Beresford. The force now at the disposal of the British commander was formidable; the enemy's armies of the north and south were entirely separated; and it was probable the operations of this important siege might be carried on without interruption. It was only by the union of all their forces that the French could venture on any attempt to relieve it; and Lord Wellington therefore determined to improve the opportunity which so favourable a conjuncture presented. He resolved to push the siege with the greatest vigour; he knew the vast im,

U

portance of this place to his future operations; and although he was sensible that the resistance of a numerous garrison, commanded by one of the most able engineers in the French ser vice, and entrenched behind works which his skill had contrived, threat. ened a severe loss to the assailants, he wisely reflected that this loss would still be inferior to that which his army must sustain in conducting the siege and fighting a general battle at the same time. The event amply proved the sagacity which guided his determination.

He directed the operations of the siege in person. By the middle of March, Badajoz was completely in vested, the first parallel having been formed within 200 yards of the outwork called La Picorina. General Sir Thomas Graham moved on Santa Martha Sir Rowland Hill proceeded to Merida, and compelled Drouet to retire. Generals Graham and Hill were without interruption allowed to occupy the whole line formerly held by Drouet, and thus effectually to separate Marmont and Soult for the present. On the 19th of March the garrison made a sortie against the right of the British works, but were instantly repulsed with considerable loss by Major General Bowes. On the 25th the besiegers fired into the place at a distance of about 200 yards; and on the very same day carried Fort Picorina by storm, and put the garrison to the sword. The progress which had thus been made was unexampled in the history of sieges. By the 6th of April no less than three breaches had been made, which were considered practicable; and the storming of the place was immediately determined on. Lieutenant-General Pic. ton, with the third division, was ordered to attack the castle of Badajoz by escalade. Major Wilson, with a detachment from the fourth division, was

to assail the ravelin of St Rocque. Major General Colville, with the remainder of the fourth, and the light division, was to attack the bastions of La Trinedad and Santa Martha. The conduct of a false attack was committed to Lieutenant-General Leith, with instructions to turn it into a real one should circumstances prove favoura ble.

About ten o'clock in the evening of the 6th of April, Lieutenant-General Picton set out on his arduous enterprise. He crossed the river after some resistance, and in the short space of an hour and a half was master of the castle of Badajoz. Major Wilson, with 200 men, carried the ravelin of St Rocque; but the resistance which the light division met with was more serious. They advanced to the covered-way, descended into the ditch, and proceeded to storm the breaches; but such were the obstacles of all kinds which the contrivance of the enemy had thrown in the way, that although the assault was often resumed, they were unable to establish themselves in the place. The false attack, however, under General Leith, was converted into a real one; and the besiegers having entirely succeeded at all other points, the light division was drawn off.

Both the castle and the town were in possession of the British. The French governor, with his staff, retired into Fort St Christoval, and surrendered on the following day. The garrison, which amounted originally to 5000 men, had lost 1200 killed and wounded in the previous operations, besides those who perished in the assault. The British and Portugueze sustained a loss of about 809 killed and 2000 wounded; a loss which might be thought considerable, if the value of the service, and the rapidity of the operations, were not fairly estimated. Thus had the British army, in the short space of one month, re