in Alicant by the very superior force which was brought against him; and Lord Wellington, whose plans had been formed on the supposition that he would be actively supported by the combined English and Spanish armies in the east, was totally abandoned by them, and exposed to the concentrated attack of all the enemy's forces. The fate of this expedition to Alicant was such as to excite against the Spaniards, whose obstinacy occasioned its entire failure, the ridicule and indignation of the British army. It could not be imputed as a fault to Lord Wellington, therefore, that he did not discontinue his operations in the north to proceed upon Alicant; but it was the fault or misfortune of those to whom that expedition was entrusted, and by whom he ought to have been supported, that his operations were not attended with all those great consequences to which they promised at one time to have led.

The restoration of Madrid to the Spaniards was not the only immediate consequence of the victory of Salamanca; the raising of the siege of Cadiz was another which might at that time have been turned to very great advantage by the Spaniards. The command of the French armies in the south of Spain had been entrusted to Marshal Soult, who enjoyed the highest reputation of all the French generals, and seemed to merit the confidence of his government not less by his zeal than by his ability. He was obstinately bent on retaining his hold over the southern provinces, and had determined never to evacuate them but in the last extremity. The victory of Salamanca, however, made a wonderful impression on his mind; and the fears which he began to entertain for his own safety prevailed over all other considerations. He had long maintained his position at Seville, upon which the safety of the troops enga.

ged in the siege of Cadiz manifestly depended. But General Hill with a large British force was now upon the confines of Estremadura; a Spanish army was on the Niebla, and Ballasteros, who had hitherto discovered much activity and patriotism, was stationed on the Ronda. Soult perceived the dangers to which he was exposed; he saw that if he were unable to maintain his communication with the besieging force, that force must be withdrawn altogether; and he accordingly came to the determination of retreating. The harangues which he addressed to his soldiers before he had recourse to this painful alternative, were distinguished by a circumstance which may well be considered as singular in French accounts of military operations, and could no where appear more extraor dinary than in an oration of Marshal Soult-a confession that "misfortunes had befallen the imperial eagle," and that it would require all the efforts of his army to repair these disasters. He immediately began to evacuate Andalusia; and on the 24th of August, the siege of Cadiz was raised.

What then was the actual condition of Spain at this auspicious moment? Gallicia, Leon, and the Asturias were entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, while Madrid, the greater part of New Castile and La Mancha, had been by one great blow recovered to the Spaniards. The French in Biscay were concentrating to evacuate that province also, and to join the wreck of Marmont's army-the siege of Cadiz had been raised, and Soult was preparing to evacuate Andalusia. Arragon was partly in possession of the Spaniards, and partly in that of the enemy-in Catalonia a spirited resistance was maintained, which rendered the enemy's hold of the province very precarious; and in Navarre, the par tizan Mina had not only operated with great effect against the enemy by cut.

ting off his straggling parties and intercepting his supplies, but had frequently penetrated into France, where he spread terror and devastation, and took an imperfect revenge for the sufferings of his country. In Murcia and Valencia, where Suchet commanded, and where, from the beginning he had been but inadequately opposed by the undisciplined armies of Spain, the enemy maintained a doubtful dominion; but from these provinces also it was to be expected that the French would soon be driven by the allied forces which were collecting against them.

The enemy, on the other hand, still possessed a very formidable army in the peninsula. The whole forces under Clausel, (who had succeeded Marmont) Suchet, Soult, and Joseph Buonaparte, amounted to 150,000 men ; and as the misfortunes of the French had hitherto arisen in great part from their separate and disjointed plans of operations, they determined to profit by experience, and, if possible, to avoid so great an error in future. Their plan was, that the remainder of Marmont's army, reinforced by the troops from Biscay, should move in the direction of Burgos, and watch the British troops destined for the siege of that place, while Soult with Joseph Buonaparte and Suchet should advance upon Madrid, and compel the British to evacuate it. They hoped that Lord Wellington would thus be placed in critical circumstances that the enemy's approach to Madrid and to Burgos at the same time would ultimately force him either to fight on disadvantageous terms, or to retreat. To execute this extensive plan, they hesitated not to make any sacrifices, and considered even the evacuation of the north and south of Spain as of comparatively trifling importance. A very unfortunate combination of circumstances, which happened at this

period, gave the French an advantage which they little expected. The absence of Lord Wellington at Madrid was in some measure favourable to their views, for it afforded them an opportunity of rallying, and, with the aid of the reinforcements which they received, of attempting once more to act upon the offensive. They sent strong detachments along the Douro-they raised the sieges of Toro and Zamora, and were enabled to withdraw the garrisons established in these forts. They hoped to be successful in saving Astorga, which was besieged by the British troops; but in this instance they found themselves anticipated by the superior activity of the assailants, to whom the fortress had surrendered. The army which endeavoured to relieve this place returned to Valladolid, but was speedily compelled to retreat before Lord Wellington, who had by this time retired from Madrid. So great was the panic with which they were seized on the approach of the British, that they not only abandoned Valladolid, but left Burgos wholly defenceless, and retreated towards the Ebro.

Burgos had at one time been considered by the Spaniards as among the most important of their strong-holds; but this opinion was formed at a period when the artifices of modern warfare were almost wholly unknown. The characteristic indolence of the Spaniards had suffered it to fall into such decay, and the defence of it was upon the whole so feeble, that the invader in his progress through Spain found but little difficulty in reducing it.

The French, however, employed themselves with their usual diligence and skill in improving the fortifications; they made Burgos the centre of their operations in the north of Spain, and zealously employed themselves for two years in rendering it one of the strongest places in the peninsula.

in Alicant by the very superior force which was brought against him; and Lord Wellington, whose plans had been formed on the supposition that he would be actively supported by the combined English and Spanish armies in the east, was totally abandoned by them, and exposed to the concentrated attack of all the enemy's forces. The fate of this expedition to Alicant was such as to excite against the Spaniards, whose obstinacy occasioned its entire failure, the ridicule and indignation of the British army. It could not be imputed as a fault to Lord Wellington, therefore, that he did not discontinue his operations in the north to proceed upon Alicant; but it was the fault or misfortune of those to whom that expedition was entrusted, and by whom he ought to have been supported, that his operations were not attended with all those great consequences to which they promised at one time to have led.

The restoration of Madrid to the Spaniards was not the only immediate consequence of the victory of Salamanca; the raising of the siege of Cadiz was another which might at that time have been turned to very great advantage by the Spaniards. The command of the French armies in the south of Spain had been entrusted to Marshal Soult, who enjoyed the highest reputation of all the French generals, and seemed to merit the confidence of his government not less by his zeal than by his ability. He was obstinately bent on retaining his hold over the southern provinces, and had determined never to evacuate them but in the last extremity. The victory of Salamanca, however, made a wonderful impression on his mind; and the fears which he began to entertain for his own safety prevailed over all other considerations. He had long maintained his position at Seville, upon which the safety of the troops enga.

ged in the siege of Cadiz manifestly depended. But General Hill with a large British force was now upon the confines of Estremadura; a Spanish army was on the Niebla, and Ballasteros, who had hitherto discovered much activity and patriotism, was stationed on the Ronda. Soult perceived the dangers to which he was exposed; he saw that if he were unable to maintain his communication with the besieging force, that force must be withdrawn altogether; and he accordingly came to the determination of retreating. The harangues which he addressed to his soldiers before he had recourse to this painful alternative, were distinguished by a circumstance which may well be considered as singular in French accounts of military operations, and could no where appear more extraor dinary than in an oration of Marshal Soult-a confession that "misfortunes had befallen the imperial eagle," and that it would require all the efforts of his army to repair these disasters. He immediately began to evacuate Andalusia; and on the 24th of August, the siege of Cadiz was raised.

What then was the actual condition of Spain at this auspicious moment? Gallicia, Leon, and the Asturias were entirely freed from the presence of the enemy, while Madrid, the greater part of New Castile and La Mancha, had been by one great blow recovered to the Spaniards. The French in Biscay were concentrating to evacuate that province also, and to join the wreck of Marmont's army-the siege of Cadiz had been raised, and Soult was preparing to evacuate Andalusia. Arragon was partly in possession of the Spaniards, and partly in that of the enemy-in Catalonia a spirited resistance was maintained, which rendered the enemy's hold of the province very precarious; and in Navarre, the par tizan Mina had not only operated with great effect against the enemy by cut.

ting off his straggling parties and intercepting his supplies, but had frequently penetrated into France, where he spread terror and devastation, and took an imperfect revenge for the sufferings of his country. In Murcia and Valencia, where Suchet commanded, and where, from the beginning he had been but inadequately opposed by the undisciplined armies of Spain, the enemy maintained a doubtful dominion; but from these provinces also it was to be expected that the French would soon be driven by the allied forces which were collecting against them.

The enemy, on the other hand, still possessed a very formidable army in the peninsula. The whole forces under Clausel, (who had succeeded Marmont) Suchet, Soult, and Joseph Buonaparte, amounted to 150,000 men ; and as the misfortunes of the French had hitherto arisen in great part from their separate and disjointed plans of operations, they determined to profit by experience, and, if possible, to avoid so great an error in future. Their plan was, that the remainder of Marmont's army, reinforced by the troops from Biscay, should move in the direction of Burgos, and watch the British troops destined for the siege of that place, while Soult with Joseph Buonaparte and Suchet should advance upon Madrid, and compel the British to evacuate it. They hoped that Lord Wellington would thus be placed in critical circumstances that the enemy's approach to Madrid and to Burgos at the same time would ultimately force him either to fight on disadvantageous terms, or to retreat. To execute this extensive plan, they hesitated not to make any sacrifices, and considered even the evacuation of the north and south of Spain as of comparatively trifling importance. A very unfortunate combination of circumstances, which happened at this

period, gave the French an advantage which they little expected. The ab sence of Lord Wellington at Madrid was in some measure favourable to their views, for it afforded them an opportunity of rallying, and, with the aid of the reinforcements which they received, of attempting once more to act upon the offensive. They sent strong detachments along the Douro-they raised the sieges of Toro and Zamora, and were enabled to withdraw the garrisons established in these forts. They hoped to be successful in saving Astorga, which was besieged by the British troops; but in this instance they found themselves anticipated by the superior activity of the assailants, to whom the fortress had surrendered. The army which endeavoured to relieve this place returned to Valladolid, but was speedily compelled to retreat before Lord Wellington, who had by this time retired from Madrid. So great was the panic with which they were seized on the approach of the British, that they not only abandoned Valladolid, but left Burgos wholly defenceless, and retreated towards the Ebro.

Burgos had at one time been considered by the Spaniards as among the most important of their strong-holds; but this opinion was formed at a period when the artifices of modern warfare were almost wholly unknown. The characteristic indolence of the Spaniards had suffered it to fall into such decay, and the defence of it was upon the whole so feeble, that the invader in his progress through Spain found but little difficulty in reducing it.

The French, however, employed themselves with their usual diligence and skill in improving the fortifications; they made Burgos the centre of their operations in the north of Spain, and zealously employed themselves for two years in rendering it one of the strongest places in the peninsula.

The British general was severely censured for wasting so much valuable time at Madrid, and neglecting to follow up his successes; but a satisfactory explanation may easily be given of his conduct on this occasion. He considered himself with great justice as the ally only of the Spanishenation; he did not imagine that it was his duty to fight their battles without support; he expected the active co-operation of the Spaniards themselves in vindicating their independence; and upon reaching their capital, he was naturally desirous of bringing their principles and feelings to some test. He despised the feeble system of government to which the destinies of Spain were committed; and he was anxious to countenance and promote some great political changes. He was not less a politician than a soldier; he knew well, that by such military exertions as Spain was able to make in her degraded condition, she could never resist with effect the force opposed to her; and he was anxious, therefore, to infuse into the Spaniards those noble and generous sentiments which were necessary to their situation. It was his great object, therefore, on entering the Spanish capital, to revive and elevate the people-to inspire them with true patriotism, and to excite in them a feeling of heroic perseverance, which, under any change of circumstances, must have rendered them invincible. Such was the grand object of his stay at Madrid; and if he failed in his purpose, the fault lay with the Spaniards, and not with him, who had delivered them from oppression, and who, if the destinies of Spain had been committed to his care, would have elevated a race of men, whom an odious tyranny had so long debased.

The French armies retired on the approach of Lord Wellington to the siege of Burgos. The city presented no serious obstacle to the besiegers;

it was on the castle which commanded the neighbouring roads, and on the hill of St Michael's, that the French had exhausted all the efforts of their skill. Lord Wellington had obvious reasons for pushing the siege with vigour; and he therefore ordered the outwork upon the hill to be immediately stormed. This service was performed during the night, with the same success which had marked allthe other operations of the army; but so thick was the darkness, that some mistakes were committed by the assailants, in consequence of which their loss was more than usually severe, amounting to 300 men killed and wounded. The French stationed in the works were 500 in number, only 63 of whom were made prisoners, the remainder having perished in the fury of the assault. The possession of these heights enabled the British to take a more accurate survey of the strength of the castle; and they soon perceived that they would have a formidable resistance to encounter. It may be presumed, however, that their energy and perseverance would have triumphed over all resistance, but for a series of untoward events, which for a season interrupted their career of glory,

The rapidity of Lord Wellington's advance had prevented him from bringing up his heavy artillery, without which nothing but the imperious necessity which he felt at this time for the most vigorous operations, could have justified him in attempting to take the castle of Burgos. He was thus compelled to abandon the ordinary method of attack, for want of a proper artillery train, and to resort to the slower and more uncertain process of sapping the works.-The defence was conducted with great skill and resolution by the garrison; the governor had instructions to hold out to the last extremity. So soon as the British had got possession of St Michael's