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meantime, continued their retreat with scarcely any other inconvenience than what was experienced from the badness of the roads, till they reached the Portugueze frontier, where they were distributed in extensive cantonments; and as the season of the year no longer admitted of military movements, the conquerors of Salamanca were allowed to enjoy the repose necessary to prepare them for the toils of another campaign, which was to be scarcely more glorious, but far more decisive.

This memorable retreat, which disappointed so much the hopes and expectations of the British nation, was distinguished by circumstances peculiarly honourable to the British arms. The first circumstance of this kind which demands attention, is the comparative numbers of the forces on each side; and it is fortunate, that, in this instance, we have the means of ascertaining the strength of the allies and of the enemy with more than ordinary precision. The whole of the allied forces in the peninsula, British, Portugueze, and Germans, did not exceed in number 66,000 men, who were thus distributed :-Lord Wellington and General Hill had under them 31,000 British and Germans, of whom 27,000 were infantry and 4000 cavalry; and, in addition to these, they had 21,000 Portugueze, who had become,under British officers, nearly equal to the troops by whose side they had so often fought. The expedition which had been sent to Alicant consisted of a considerable body of British and Si. cilians; a Spanish army of 12,000 or 15,000 was expected to join it, but had been dispersed by the enemy before the junction became practicable. At the close of the campaign, how. ever, 8000 British troops were on their way to join the grand army; but the fate of Spain, for the present year at least, had been decided before it was possible for them to reach head

quarters. The whole allied force, therefore, which could be rendered effective, did not at the period of this retreat exceed 52,000, exclusive of the reinforcement latterly sent out, and the Alicant expedition, so that the means at Lord Wellington's disposal, although undoubtedly sufficient for the great objects in view, had the Spaniards done their duty to their country, were still very limited.-Let us now enquire what the French had to oppose to this force, according to the statements which were given by themselves. They had, first of all, very consi derable detachments under Caffarelli, Decaen, and others, who were occu pied with the irregular warfare maintained by the Spaniards in Navarre, Arragon, Biscay, and Catalonia; but as these troops were not at present employed against the regular armies of the allies, we shall leave them wholly out of account. But the French forces opposed to the armies under Lord Wellington were numerous and well appointed; and nothing can tend more to illustrate the talents of this great officer than a faithful display of the numbers of the hosts which, with the comparatively small force above described, he contrived to set at defiance. Soult alone, who had now assumed the chief command of the armies of Souham and Joseph Buonaparte, had under him no less than 75,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, making in all a force of 87,000 men, that is, almost double the numbers of his antagonist. In addition to these, Suchet still had in the east of Spain about 20,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, thus raising the whole disposable French force employed in the peninsula against the British armies alone, to 112,000 men, well equipped and in the highest state of discipline. In the number of his cavalry in particular, the enemy was very superior; but in its quality it could bear no sort of comparison

with the British. In artillery, the French were very powerful. Soult alone carried with him about 200 pieces of cannon; and in this manner had greatly the advantage of his antagonist in the strength of one mighty arm, of which the English have never perhaps sufficiently availed themselves. In another circumstance, and that not the least material to the efficiency of an army, the French, from a policy not very honourable, had many advantages, we allude at present to the commissariat. It is remarkable, that although the British entered Spain for the avowed purpose of saving it from the most cruel of all tyrannies, and although they had performed the most signal exploits to secure this great object, their armies never were so well supplied with provisions as those of the enemy. The Spaniards were willing enough that the English should fight for them, but they seem never to have been very willing to make any considerable sacrifice to the cause of national independence. The English were too honourable to take any thing by violence, and they were therefore ill supplied; but the French, who des

pised all scruples of this kind, seized without hesitation the property of the Spaniards. These circumstances, when duly considered, will convey some idea of the different situations of the contending armies, they will shew how inferior the resources of all kinds were with which the British general was called upon to resist the enemy, and will go farther to explain the obstacles which he surmounted, and the talents which he displayed in this retreat, than the most laboured panegyric. Let it be remembered, that with means so unequal he set the enemy at defiance, and conducted the retreat of his army in safety; that the French, with all their advantages, never ventured to attack him, and seldom took up a position which they were not careful to secure by all the resources of the military art. This was destined to be the last trial of that admirable self-command by which Lord Wellington kept the natural boldness of his character in subordination to the maxims of prudence; the remainder of his career in the peninsula was to be illuminated by one constant blaze of glory.

CHAP. XIII.

Affairs of Russia. Causes which led to the Rupture betwixt Russia and France. Preparations of the Parties. The French invade Russia. Progress of the Campaign till the Advance of the Invader upon Smolensko.

No person who knew any thing of the character of Buonaparte, or the policy of the French government, could doubt for a moment as to the real nature of the treaty of Tilsit. It was but a hollow truce, consented to by the French ruler till he should be able to accomplish other more pressing objects of his ambition. That a lasting and friendly intercourse should have subsisted betwixt the French government, in the plenitude of its power, and any state of Europe, not yet reduced to abject dependence, was beyond all sober calculation; the whole course of French policy, all the acts of the new government, whether in peace or war, indicated a fixed design of attaining universal empire. Whether it was at any time very wise, even upon the exclusive views of am

THE campaign of the French in Russia will form one of the most interesting and extraordinary passages in his tory, whether we consider the mighty interests which depended on its issue, the greatness of the means employed on both sides, the singular and striking events which marked its progress, or the momentous consequences with which it was followed. The greatest military power which modern Europe ever saw had been concentrated for the purpose of achieving a conquest, which was expected to lay the whole civilized world at the feet of the conqueror. But all the efforts of genius, discipline, and numbers were rendered abortive by the heroic courage and patriotism of the Russian people; and the vast preparations of the invader, by which he had arrogantly calculated on obtaining universal dominion, avail-bition, to cherish so hazardous a proed him not in this season of unwonted trial. Defeated and disgraced, his armies annihilated, and himself a fugitive, he was compelled not only to abandon his unlucky enterprise, but to leave his former conquests to the unsparing vengeance of his enemies, who, gathering strength as they advanced, and animated by a succession of triumphs, were at last enabled to execute an awful retribution for all the wrongs which they had endured.

ject, is of no importance; but that it was really entertained, acted upon, and even avowed, is beyond all dispute. The Emperor Alexander must have been aware of this; he could not be blind to what the humblest politicians in other parts of Europe had perceived; and how much soever he might have been misled by the artifices of the enemy, and a momentary feeling of dislike towards England, he could not long remain in error as to the

course of policy which he was called upon to pursue towards France. Nor could he be ignorant that his power gave him a fair chance, on the first favourable opportunity, of performing what his duty urged him to attempt -the reduction of the influence of France, which had spread so much misery over the continent. Russia had not indeed made a very conspicuous figure in European wars, waged at a distance from her own frontiers ; and many persons rashly concluded, that she was therefore impotent as to resources, and wholly insignificant in the arrangements of European policy. No intelligent Russian, however, could commit so gross an error; while the Russian government must have been aware of the ample resources of the empire when the hour of trial should arrive, and ought never to have sunk, like the rulers of feebler states, into despondency. It is true, indeed, that Russia, removed at so great a distance from the ordinary theatre of European war, had exercised but little controul =over its results; that she had been found tardy and impotent in the defence of Germany; and had of late sacrificed her political character by a monstrous union with the common enemy. Her alliance had often been unavailing to the continental nations struggling against France, because her troops could seldom be brought into the field till the contest had been decided; because, when they did reach the scene of action, their bravery was rendered unavailing by defective arrangements; and because the poverty of the Russian treasury constantly prevented the military energies of the country from developing themselves. This casual weakness arose out of the general condition of Russia; but it was not of such a nature as to create a suspicion of her real strength, when it should be drawn out under a better system, or roused into full vigour by 6

indignation or despair. The strength of Russia could seldom indeed be rendered efficient at any distance from the confines of the empire; but it might prove not the less formidable when these confines should be passed, and her enemies should be reduced to combat on her own soil, and under all the disadvantages which the extent of the country and the severity of the climate presented to an invader.

The military talent of the Russian commanders had not, generally speaking, appeared of the first order in the great battles to which they had lent their aid since the French revolution; but it was to be expected that the leading men of such a country would, in extremities, display that sort of military genius which, in the operations of a protracted, defensive warfare, might overpower the first tacticians of the age. Such a country as Russia, with a population brave, hardy, and persevering, could not be suddenly conquered; it must, in any circumstances, have made a long and desperate resistance; and it's permanent subjugation appeared utterly impossible to all reasonable men. Such, however, was the melancholy extravagance of many persons, that they considered the conquest of Russia as certain, when Buonaparte left Paris with the avowed purpose of undertaking this hazardous enterprise; and if he condescended, in this instance, to listen for a moment to the advice of his servile admirers, they may justly be charged with having contributed to precipitate his downfal.

The Russian government was sensible of its real condition-of the na tural resources of the country-the devoted patriotism of the people-the means of defence which they possessed-the rashness of the assailants, and, above all, of the impossibility of long averting the struggle into which the circumstances of Europe must one

day hurry Russia with France. They knew that neither the treaty of Tilsit, nor any other obligation, how solemn soever, could avert for a moment the vengeance of Buonaparte against Russia, whenever circumstances might favour its execution. They felt that the treaty, whatever nominal advantages it might have conferred on Russia, had in reality sealed her degradation; and they detested the odious restraints which threatened their country with ruin.—When Buonaparte entered into the treaty of Tilsit, his mind was filled with the arrogant notion that he was destined to effect the downfal of England, which he hated, as the asylum of liberty, the successful enemy of France, and the great barrier to his projects of ambition. He knew that a direct attack on England was altogether hopeless while her navy triumphed on the ocean; while her armies maintained a pre-eminence not less conspicuous, and the stability of the government was fixed in the affections of the people. He had threatened an invasion, which he soon perceived that he could never accomplish; for he was instantly confined to his own ports by fleets which he did not venture to meet; his gasconades were in a few weeks answered by the appearance of more than half a million of men in arms; and England thus exhibited to him the exasperating spectacle of a mighty and generous nation, defying all his menaces. Finding all direct efforts to subjugate her impracticable, he resolved on measures for gradually exhausting her resources. Such was the origin of the Berlin and Milan decrees, by which the commerce of England was excluded from the continent. But while the edicts of Buonaparte were imited in their operation to the states over which he exercised a direct-controul, they were found to be in a great measure ineffectual. His plan, there fore was to render them general

throughout the continent; to seduce or compel all nations to give them effect, and in this manner to dissolve for ever the commercial relations of Great Britain with continental Europe. To induce the nations over whom he dared not yet avow a direct influence, to accede to this monstrous system, he invented many absurd fictions; he represented England as the eternal enemy of the continent, the tyrant of the seas, the disturber of the peace of Europe, and the foe of the civilized world. He strenuously insisted on the principle said to have been recognized by the treaty of Utrecht, that free ships should make free goods, and vainly supposed that in time of war he might thus neutralise the force of the British navy by providing for the permanence of the commercial relations of France. He called his system "The Continental System," as if he himself had already been absolute master of the European continent ; thus betraying his conviction, that nothing short of an entire combination of the continental powers, under one undivided scheme of despotism, could ever affect the prosperity and grandeur of England. He had introduced many singular conditions into the treaty of Tilsit; but that by which Russia bound herself to accede to the continental system, and to exciude British produce and manufactures from her ports, he was chiefly anxious to enforce. The Emperor of Russia soon found that he had been deceived when he agreed to this article, and that he would be compelled to violate the treaty, even should the French ruler hesitate to set him the example.

But Buonaparte did not thus hesitate. Long before the commercial relations betwixt England and Russia underwent any modification, or at least before such modification was made the subject of remonstrance and complaint, he seized the duchy of Oldenburgh;

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