and thus insulted the Russian emperor, both as the ally and the near relative of the family which was dispossessed. The treaty of Tilsit could not, indeed, have lasted much longer, because it was unjust and absurd in its provisions, and must have proved fatal to Russia and to Europe; yet the impatience and rapacity of the aggressor deserve to be recorded. It has been often remarked, that engagements extorted by violence seldom survive the unhappy combination of circumstances in which they have been created; but the impolitic haste with which the French ruler in this instance proceeded to manifest his contempt for all engagements, even those which he had so great an interest in maintaining, was truly characteristic of his nature. The Russian government protested against this act of faithless violence; and the unsatisfactory answer of the French minister amounted to this, that a remonstrance by any power against its ally had no precedent in the history of nations! It was strange policy in Buonaparte, if he expected the aid of Russia, and felt reluctant, as he well might, to hazard every thing in an attempt to subdue her, thus to authorise, by his own example, a breach of the treaty on her part. Yet such was his arrogance or infatuation, that he furnished Russia not only with plausible pretexts, but with sound reasons for violating a treaty which she must at all events have speedily determined not to observe. He pretended that the possession of the duchy of Oldenburgh was necessary to enable him to execute his continental system; and, after his own manner, he proposed that the family, whom he had thus driven out, should receive a compensation for their losses by the robbery of their neighbours. He affected great surprise and indignation that the emperor of Russia should presume to interfere with the affairs of this duchy, which was un

der his own immediate care as protect

or of the confederation of the Rhine and, above all, he maintained, that this act of oppression, although it might seem a violation of the terms, was yet agreeable to the spirit of the treaty of Tilsit. Even had his cause been good, his arguments were too refined to make a strong impression in his favour; the terms of a treaty form a much safer and more palpable basis of interpretation than its alleged spirit; and the majority of mankind are happily more accessible to plain arguments than to logical subtleties. Every one could read and comprehend the terms of the treaty of Tilsit, while few could judge of its spirit; because few persons could pretend to understand the whole scope of these momentous negociations.--The rashness of Buonaparte in the seizure of the duchy of Oldenburgh operated just as the vices and follies of conquerors have often done before, by assisting to rescue the world from their tyranny, and to open the eyes of mankind to the real character of their ambition.

Is has been usual with the revolutionary governments of France to affect moderation after their greatest successes, and to enter into treaties which were calculated to impose on surrounding nations a belief of their sinceri ty. They have often agreed to evacuate countries of which, at the date of the treaty, they had military possession; but they have taken care at all times either indirectly to secure the subserviency of such countries, or have most shamefully violated their engagements, and resorted to a thousand pretexts for retaining possession by violence, long after other nations had sunk into security and repose. In this point Buonaparte has been their constant and successful imitator; and although he stipulated by the treaty of Tilsit, that his troops should evacuate Prussia, it is probable that no one but the Emperor Alexander him

7

self was surprised at the treacherous refusal to fulfil this condition. Prussia, long after the peace of Tilsit, remained in the military occupation of the French; and this flagrant breach of treaty formed another ground of complaint on the part of Russia. The sophistry to which Buonaparte resorted in defence of his conduct will be afterwards noticed; but in this summary of the circumstances which precipitated hostilities betwixt these great empires, it is important to remark, that the French ruler had been guilty at all events of two very palpable violations of the treaty of Tilsit, which were of themselves quite sufficient to have justified the war for which Russia had been making silent preparation.

The chief ground of quarrel assigned by the French, was the infidelity of Russia to her engagements respecting the continental system. The Emperor Alexander could not be long deceived on this subject; and even if he had been rash enough to attempt enforcing that absurd system through out his dominions, he would have been soon awakened from his delusion by the discontent and resistance of his people. He who should attempt in the present state of society to destroy trade, would undertake to oppose all the propensities and habits of mankind; and to sink them once more in barbarism and misery. There are in all countries many degenerate persons who care but little as to the nature of the government under which they live, but all can feel and will avenge any attempt to deprive them of their comforts and luxuries. The most barbarous nations cannot, in the present state of the world, be indifferent to regulations of trade; for there is none so rude and barbarous, as not to have some share in the benefits which it bestows. The Russians, although not perhaps a very refined people, have

a deep interest in commercial affairs, and naturally love to cultivate a friendly intercourse with England, which, of all other countries, is best calculated to supply their wants, and relieve them of their surplus produce. The cessation of intercourse with Great Britain threatened ruin to the nobility and landholders of Russia; and they are supposed to have resisted the continental system with firmness and vigour. The emperor could not have disregarded their remonstrances, even if he had been insensible to the degra dation of his country; and he could not, therefore, have continued the suspension of commercial intercourse with England, even although the renewal of it threatened him with the whole vengeance of his new ally.

It was a singular feature in the policy of Buonaparte, that, although he insisted on the most rigorous execution by his allies of the Berlin and Milan decrees, he presumed himself to set them at defiance. The pressure of the continental system on France was intolerable; the sufferings of the people surpassed all endurance; and, what was more likely to influence a despotic government, the revenue sustained the most serious defalcation. Still affecting an adherence to the principle of his decrees, Buonaparte in the meantime ventured on very frequent relaxations of them in practice; he granted licences under which considerable importations from England took place, and he thus relieved the growing embarrassments of his treasury. Surely the Emperor of Russia was entitled to follow his example, and to abate in some measure the sufferings of his people; nor could Buonaparte with any semblance of justice have objected to this course, even if the treaty of Tilsit had bound the Russian emperor to go hand in hand with him to accomplish the humiliation of England. His wants were

greater; the condition of his empire more imperiously demanded the sacrifice of his strange policy; and on no principle could he be called upon to take the lead in the execution of the frantic project which the French ruler had conceived, or submit to greater hardships than the author of this novel scheme of warfare. When the Russian government, therefore, prohibited the importation of British goods, except under special licences, and in neutral ships, it did all that it was bound to do towards executing the treaty of Tilsit; for this very obvious reason, that it did all which the author of this very compact had been able to perform even within the confines of his own dominions.

This imperfect obedience, however, did not satisfy the French ruler; and the Russian government must have known from the beginning that it would not. Preparations had accordingly been made so early as the spring of 1811, to meet the crisis which was fast approaching. Two hundred thousand troops were concentrated in the western provinces of the Russian empire; 500,000 muskets and 2000 pieces of ordnance were manufactured with unexampled rapidity; the cannon from the arsenals in the interior were secretly dispatched towards the frontier, and the fortifications on the Dwina were strengthened and improved.

The open violation of the treaty of Tilsit by the seizure of the duchy of Oldenburgh, might have been followed by an immediate declaration of war from Russia; but her preparations were yet far from being completed, and she was still engaged in hostilities with Turkey. Even at this period, however, it thus appears that she had

a formidable army, which, had she been hurried into the contest, might have enabled her to meet it without very great apprehension. Her whole force in in fantry consisted of more than 300,000 men; her cavalry amounted to 40,000, in addition to which there were 50,000 cossacks, and a numerous militia rapidly organising. But one hundred thou sand of her best soldiers would at this period have been unavailing in any contest with France; they were employed against the Turks and Persians, and in watching the movements of Sweden. Delay was, therefore, of great importance to Russia; and it was, perhaps, of no less importance to her enemies.

Buonaparte had been more urgent and imperious in his demands than active in his preparations. In 1811, he had about 60,000 men in Germany, including the garrisons of Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau ; from the duchy of Warsaw he might have drawn about the same number; while the confede. ration of the Rhine, whose contingent was 100,000 men, could not at this time have supplied more than the half of that number. By the spring of the following year, however, the French armies had been greatly augmented; the troops of the confederation had been raised to the stipulated quota, and the kings of Saxony and Naples had been compelled to prepare for embarking in the great enterprise against Russia. The armies which Buonaparte had thus assembled on the frontiers of Russian Poland, amounted, by the most moderate computation, to upwards of 400,000 men, and by other accounts to upwards of 600,000, in a state of the highest discipline and equipment, accustomed

VOL. V. PART I.

Y

to victory, and commanded by the first military talents of the age.

Such were the mighty preparations made on each side. They corresponded to the greatness of the interests which were at issue; the Russians were about to contend for their very existence as an independent nation; the French, on the other hand, were now to aim a blow which should bring the whole continent of Europe under their dominion. In numbers the combatants were not at first on a footing of equality; and in discipline, in science, in the organisation of the army, the French had a marked superiority. The whole resources of a mighty empire, pre-eminent in civilization, yet devoted to war, had been exhausted; every aid which experience and skill could give in the application of these resources had been contributed; the accumulated means and varied talents which twenty years of successful war had created, were concentrated in this formidable host. It was composed of soldiers grown old in victory, or of the successors of those who had perished in the midst of triumphs; and

all were animated by the lively enthu siasm so characteristic of that people, and so natural to the circumstances in which the army was now placed, Their courage, the result of this en thusiasm, prompted by vague aspirings after military glory, and sustained by feelings of devotion to their country, promised great enterprise and temerity in the outset of the campaign; an en terprise which had often triumphed over the supineness of their enemies, and a temerity which had more than once given the imposing aspect of su perior genius and power to frantic da ring and extravagance. The fatal in. fluence of that intrigue which had pur. chased so many conquests to France, formed an important item in the cal culation of her present fortunes; and all these circumstances, thus combined, seemed to bestow upon her councils and armies many important advantages over those of the enemy.

The Russians possessed other advantages for the approaching contest, which may seem almost to have over balanced those of the enemy. They had been driven into a state of warfare by

1812.

the necessity of defending their country from a foreign yoke; they had made every concession which justice and policy demanded, and it was almost certain, therefore, that the people would be animated by the most furious and desperate courage. They had few distinguished generals, but they had many men of bold and vigorous minds, who required only the strange combination of circumstances, which Buonaparte was hastening, to draw forth their natural talents. The military art, it has been often remarked, requires not the highest gifts, either of the head or heart; and barbarous nations in general possess a great deal more of that species of talent which qualifies a man for the conduct of a fierce and obstinate contest, than their more polished neighbours. The Russian generals might be defective in science, but they possessed, in great perfection, all the characteristics of patient, daring, and intrepid soldiers. In their natural and personal qualifications—in courage and perseverance, they excelled their antagonists; and it was to be hoped, that a protracted struggle would bestow on them that experience in which they might at first be deficient. The Russian soldiers had long maintained a very high character; if they were less active than the French, they were far more resolute and steady; if their onset might be less hasty and vigorous, they could sustain the conflict with more firmness and determination; if they had less discipline, they had more native courage; if they could not rally so fast, neither would they be so soon thrown into disorder; if they had not, in the present instance, the hopes of conquest to animate them, they had a sense of duty, the feelings of patriotism, and the sanctions of religion to confirm their native bravery. The Russian soldier was never known to abandon the post committed to his charge-to disobey the

commands of his superiors, or to disre gard the calls of religion and patriotism in the hour of danger. The fear of death never invaded his breast; the wretched sophistry which would have made him indifferent to the fate of his country, was too subtle for his honest mind; the impiety, which in the more civilized states of Europe has threatened to unhinge society, had never penetrated the remote regions which he delighted to call his home. The Russian government thus possessed the most powerful resources of defence in the genius, condition, and character of the people-in their native braverytheir passive obedience-their devoted patriotism, and their amiable superstition. Had a general and decisive battle been risked at the beginning, the science and discipline of the enemy might indeed have prevailed, but the triumph would have been achieved only after the most severe loss, and the progress of the enemy would have been over the dead bodies of the Russians. With a population so brave and persevering, that nothing could overcome its resistance-a country so extended, that a million of soldiers would have been unable to retain even military possession of it, and an army, which in numbers was nearly equal, in courage superior, and in discipline alone inferior, to the enemy, there seemed to be but little chance that the French would succeed in their enterprise.

Before entering upon hostilities, to which Buonaparte seemed in this instance more than usually reluctant, he addressed, through his minister for foreign relations, various remonstrances to the Russian government. Russia, he said, had violated the treaty of Tilsit; that treaty, the principles of which she had solemnly espoused in her de claration of war against England. So soon as the ukase of the Russian government, permitting the importation of British goods under neutral flage