had been issued, the treaty of Tilsit, was at an end. The Emperor of Russia had forgotten all that he owed to the clemency and magnanimity of the French government. The seizure of Oldenburgh was necessary to the continental system; but Russia, in contempt of her solemn obligations, had resisted this seizure, had remonstrated against it, and had even gone so far as to dissuade the duke from accepting the indemnity which France was willing to have bestowed on him. These events occurred in 1810, but in 1811 the real designs of Russia, said her enemy, became still more apparent. The Russian armies, raised and supported at an enormous expence, now threatened the army of the duchy of Warsaw, which was compelled to repass the Vistula, although at this very moment all the French troops were within the Rhine, excepting 40,000 men stationed at Hamburgh to preserve the public tranquillity. These preparations could have but one ob ject; yet the French emperor, still unwilling to believe that Russia would again commit herself in a struggle with France, proposed an arrangement which should have been satisfactory. The independence of the duchy of Warsaw, as stipulated by the treaty of Tilsit-the annexation of Oldenburgh, which the war with England had rendered indispensable, and which the spirit, if not the letter, of the treaty of Tilsit prescribed-the recall of the ukase of 1810, and the enactment of clear and efficient laws against trade in English goods, and with denationalized vessels, were the conditions on which Buonaparte was still desirous of coming to a good understanding with Russia. Had the independence of the duchy of Warsaw been acknowledged, Buonaparte would have bound himself to attempt nothing for the freedom of the Poles; he would have consented even to the interfe

rence of Russia in favour of the Duke of Oldenburgh, who, as a member of the confederation of the Rhine, was under the protection of France alone, and he would have acceded even to such a modification of the continental system, as the necessary wants of Rus. sia should seem to demand; but the course pursued by Russia indicated clearly that she wished not to secure the independence of the duchy of Warsaw, but to seize upon it herself; that she cared not about the Duke of Oldenburgh, except as she might make his affairs a pretext for quarrelling with France; and that it was not her own commerce she wished to cherish, but the alliance of England, which she was desirous of cultivating.

To these groundless accusations Russia could have no difficulty in replying. Some doubts, however, seem still to have hung over the mind of the Emperor Alexander; and great as his preparations had been, great as was the necessity for dissolving his ominous alliance with France, he yet hesitated to commit every thing to the decision of the sword. Buonaparte, in the meantime, took care to strengthen the cause of his enemies by some acts of unequivocal violence and perfidy; for, instead of evacuating Prussia, he occupied in greater force than before those parts of it from which Russian Poland could be most advantageously assailed, and then proceeded to seize Swedish Pomerania.-The Russian ambassador, in his reply, availed himself of these circumstances; he ob. served, that the real, and not the nominal, neutrality of Prussia, was indispensable to the security of the Russian empire; that the sincerity of France in her pretended alliance with the latter power was more than questionable, while this important article of the treaty of Tilsit remained unperformed, and while the Russian frontier was thus at all times exposed to the incur.

sions of the enemy. Russia, however, was still desirous of cultivating friendly relations with France; and should Buonaparte instantly recognise the independence of the Prussian states, and faithfully evacuate the fortresses, diminish the garrison of Dantzic, restore Swedish Pomerania, and come to a satisfactory arrangement with Sweden, the Russian government would agree to maintain the continental system throughout its dominions, to modify the custom-house duties agreeably to the desire of France, and rest satisfied with the indemnity which France might offer for the duchy of Oldenburgh. While adhering to the principle of the continental system, however, she claimed a right of trading by licence agreeably to the practice of France herself, -a most reasonable demand, which even the usual arrogance of Buona parte could scarcely have resisted.The strain of this reply shewed that the Russian government had not yet adopted with firmness the line of policy which it ultimately determined to pursue towards the French ruler.

No answer was made by France to this remonstrance on the part of Russia, and the scenes which followed are very characteristic of Buonaparte and his government. He set off with his minister to join the army; the Russian ambassador of course applied for passports, and Buonaparte had the effrontery to declare, that this step" decided the rupture." Before he quitted Paris, the usual report on the state of France had been laid before him by his minister for foreign affairs, in which the approaching war with Russia was descanted upon with much formality. New charges against Russia were made in this document; it was asserved that in the fatal Austrian war of 180 the Russian contingent of auxiliary troops had not been brought forward.-It now appeared more manifest than ever, that the continental system, and the humi

liation of England, formed the great incitements to the enterprise on which Buonaparte was about to enter.-A nominal treaty with Prussia, whose resources were already at the disposal of France, and a new treaty with Austria, in which that power engaged to contribute 30,000 men to support the war with Russia, and recognized the principles of the treaty of Utrecht, were also presented on this occasion. Nothing but the deep degradation of Austria was manifested in these unworthy compliances.

On the 9th of May Buonaparte set out from St Cloud, and on the 6th of June he passed the Vistula. On the 22d of the same month he issued a formal declaration of war against Russia; and in the address to his soldiers, which accompanied it, he gave full scope to his natural arrogance. He accused Russia of breaking her alliance with France at the instigation of England. He dared to pronounce that she was dragged on by fatality, and that her destinies must be accomplished. He promised his soldiers that the second campaign of Poland would be no less glorious than the first; that the peace which he should conclude would be its own guarantee, and that Russia should for ever be excluded from exerting the unnatural influence which she had too long maintained in the affairs of Europe. It was remarked by an illustrious Englishman, who had an opportunity of judging of Buonaparte's real character, by frequent intercourse with him, that his talents were not of the very first order but that the intoxication produced by unexpected success was visible in his whole deportment. His style, characterized chiefly by a laborious effort to reach the sublime, seems, in some measure, to favour the opinion; and never, surely, was this false elevation more apparent than on the present occasion. For his past successes

he had been much indebted to accident, and to the imbecillity of his opponents; he was incapable of comprehending the character of his new enemies, and therefore he hastily pronounced, that they were dragged on by that fatality which was fast precipitating his own ruin.-On the 24th of June he passed the Niemen, and entered the Russian territory, little expecting that he was soon to return as a fugitive from the wreck of a great army, on which he was destined to bring all the horrors that can be inflicted on suffering humanity.

The plan of defence which the Russians had decided upon was well adapted to the circumstances of the country, and the character of the army and of the people.-A general battle was to be avoided, because the superior discipline and tactics of the enemy must, in such a conflict, have given him many advantages. His progress was, however, to be retarded by a bold resistance at all points where a stand could easily be made, without committing the armies in a general engage ment. The country, so far as the invader might be enabled to penetrate, was to be laid waste; every thing useful to an army was to be destroyed or removed; and a scene of desolation to be presented on all sides. Should the enemy, in such circumstances, dare to advance into the heart of the country, it must have been manifest that he could do so only after encountering numerous obstacles, and sustaining severe losses; and when he should reach the interior he would find himself weak and exhausted, his numbers diminished, and his supplies entirely cut off. Should he be mad enough to linger in the interior for any length of time, the approach of winter would seal his

fate;

he must be compelled to retreat

from a scene of famine and devastation; his benumbed and exhausted le. gions would then fall an easy prey to

their pursuers.The execution of such a plan as this required, indeed, great forbearance and self-command on the part of the Russian army, the most entire devotion from the people, and extreme rashness on the part of the enemy; yet all these qualities were in the sequel manifested by the differ ent parties, to a degree which sur passed even the most sanguine expec tation. Had Buonaparte been more cautious in advancing, the struggle might have been protracted for an other campaign; had the Russian army been as impetuous as it was intre> pid, the result of a general engagement might have deferred the hopes of Russia; and had the people hesitated about the unparalleled sacrifices which were required of them, the cause of European independence might have sought in vain the powerful aid of the Russian empire.

How far the Russians should have advanced to meet their invaders,― whether they should have approached the Niemen, or made their first stand in front of their entrenchments on the Dwina, has been the subject of some difference of opinion. There could be no reason, it would seem, for their advance to any point which they did not purpose for a season at least to defend; yet although they did approach the Niemen, they made no resistance to the passage of that river by the French. On the 25th of June, the day after Buonaparte had crossed the river, Koo no fell without resistance; and it is thus impossible to account for the advance of the Russians to the extremity of the empire, without supposing, that they originally intended to prepare for making a stand at this place; and, that the rapidity of the enemy's move. ments rendered this impracticable. Had the Russian army at once taken a position in front of their and strong connected fortifications on the Dwina, they might have avoided the serious

error of a weak and extended line, and would have saved the necessity of a sudden retreat. The extension of their line seemed at first to have given the enemy very great advantages; he crossed the Niemen without resistance; penetrated to Wilna and Minsk, and indulged the hope, that by thus separating the divisions of the Russian army which were posted to the south of the line which connects these plaees, he might secure all the advantages of attacking his enemies in detail, to which he had on former occasions been so much indebted. But in this expectation he was wholly disappointed and if the Russian generals at first committed an error, they made ample compensation for it by the ability and skill of their subsequent move

ments.

The Emperor Alexander was still at Wilna. Buonaparte, therefore, pushed on with great rapidity, and on the 28th of June, made himself master of the capital of Russian Poland. What were his hopes and expectations at this moment it is not difficult to conjecture. It might seem a proud circumstance to him, that he had compelled the Russian emperor to retire upon his approach ; and he might imagine, that his rapid entrance would create consternation, and frighten his enemies into submission. The love of art fice, and the affectation of magnani. mity, seduced him into declarations when he reached Wilna, which, in the issue, rendered his duplicity more apparent. He knew the enmity which the Poles entertained towards Russia, and he therefore counted on their aid in his invasion. Unfortunately for the character of the Poles he was not disappointed; for in spite of his conspicuous want of good faith, and his frequent violations of it, even in the case of Poland, they were again seduced by his promises, that he would restore

their constitution' and independence. Yet he scrupled not to make a rëservation, in this act of pretended benefi cence, of the interests of Austria, because she was now his ally in the Russian war; and he had not many months before offered to Russia herself to abandon Poland to its fate, if he had been allowed to keep possession of the duchy of Warsaw. The Poles must have been fully aware of all this, yet on the mere restoration of a nominal independence, they embarked with eagerness in the war against Russia, and cast their strength into the scale of a despot, who threatened to extinguish liberty throughout Europe. Their just hatred towards Russia can alone account for such infatuation; but France herself has never inflicted, because it was impossible to inflict, greater evils, than those which Poland had already suffered from Russia. In what light soever these proceedings may be viewed, it is incontestable that the Poles yielded to the seductions of Buonaparte, who, upon entering Wilna, proclaimed the independence of Poland, assembled a diet, and bestowed on the Polish nation the shadow of liberty.

The French armies, meanwhile, advanced; but instead of following the Russians to the Dwina, whither they had retired, they spread themselves out towards the south. They had two objects in view by this movement; to cut off the second corps of the Rus sian army under Prince Bagration, which was already separated from the first, and to turn the Russian entrenchments on the Dwina, which they wish. ed to avoid storming..The bul letins which Buonaparte was in the habit of issuing in the course of his campaigns, have been read with avidity throughout Europe; and never were they so interesting as they had now become. But already they be gan to change their character; ne

victories were gained; no cannon or colours, and very few prisoners had been taken from the enemy, in the course of a long and eager pursuit. Already the Russian climate had begun its ravages upon his army; his horses perished in thousands; his artillery was buried in the mud; and the desolating system of Russian warfare even now intimated to him what he might expect in his future opera

tions.

So soon as the Emperor Alexander became acquainted with the nature of the movements made by the enemy, he issued orders to the different divisions of the Russian army, that they should re-unite at Drissa, where a strong entrenched camp had been formed. The divisions of the army were at this time scattered over a wide extent of country; the vast frontiers which they had to defend, and the uncertainty of the point to which the enemy might direct his attack, had rendered this necessary. The whole Russian force was broken into two great divisions, one of which was called the first, the other the second army.-Before the evacuation of Wilna, the four divisions of the first army, which was commanded in chief by General Barclay de Tolly, were thus distributed :-The right of the first division, consisting of 30,000 men, commanded by Count Witgenstein, was posted betwixt Chawli and Vilkomie, considerably to the north of Wilna. The second division of 25,000 men, commanded by General Baggavoat, had evacuated Kowna on the approach of the enemy, and was now stationed at Schervintz, betwixt Vilkomie and Wilna. The third and fourth divisions, consisting of upwards of 50,000 men, under Generals Schouvaloff and Touchkoff, stretched betwixt Nortcoki and Lida to the south of Wilna.-The second army consisting of 60,000 men, com

manded in chief by Prince Bagration, was partly stationed at Bialisock and Wilkowisk, a great way farther to the south. From this army General Dochtoroff's division had already been detached; and a part of it occupied Grodno. A corps of observation of 25,000 men was left under General Tormozoff at Loutzk, and another of 20,000 under Generals Essen and Steingel, defended Riga. It is manifest from this disposition of the Russians, that the occupation of Wilna by Buonaparte gave him a chance of separating the first and second Rus sian armies.

It was difficult to re-unite an army thus divided; but no sooner was the order for this junction made, than all the different corps were in motion. Wittgenstein advanced from Vilkomie on Breslaw; the reserve of guards marched forward towards the Dwina; and it seemed that the communications had been nearly.re-established.-General Dochtoroff was eagerly followed by the enemy, and had several affairs during his retreat with the corps Soult, Borde, Nansouty, and Pajol, whom he continually repulsed.-On the 4th of July, he reached Brodno, secured his passage of the Dwina, and his junction with the main army.

of

On the 6th, the rear-guard of the right of the army, under Generals. Korff and Kutusoff, was attacked near the Dwina by the troops of Murat, supported by a strong corps of flying artillery under General Montbrun. The enemy was received, however, with bravery, and quickly repulsed by. the Cossacks of the guards, who took some prisoners, among whom was the Prince Hohenloe Kirchberg, in the service of the King of Wirtemburg. The Russians then passed the river without molestation, and destroyed the bridges; and on the 8th of July, the main body of the first army crossed