cated means, and expended upon such complicated objects, is not liable to fraud, both in its collection and in its disbursement or that the public income can be managed through all its branches better than any individual can manage a large private fortune, though stimulated by motives of personal interest, and enjoying over his property and his agents that permanent controul which is so material in forming and in perfecting economical arrangements, but which, for reasons better than any that can arise out of mere economy, the ministers of a free country neither can nor ought to pos sess. How far peculation may extend, I do not pretend to be accurate ly informed; but I am yet to learn the reason for supposing that it has reached to such a height as to call for a change in the government of the country; or even for thinking that parliament, as it is now constituted, is not fully capable, I will not say of extinguishing it utterly, but of reducing it to its minimum. "But, sir, this subject of abuses adapts itself so admirably to the understandings and feelings of those to whom it is addressed, and to the particular circumstances of the times, that it is impossible to flatter oneself that it would not produce a considerable effect. On the one hand, people labouring under great and increasing burthens, are very apt to give credit to any body that promises them speedy and certain relief; on the other, it was quite natural that the reformers should be desirous to see some share of the popularity belonging to this question reflected upon their own favourite topic, and to connect together, in the estimation of the public, the subject of economical reform, with that totally different species of reform which consists in a fundamental change in the constitution of this country; for if they could once persuade the people, in the first place, that they are suffering neither from the consequences of their own pride and folly, nor from the pressure of external causes, obviously out of the controul of any change in the external administration and government of the country, but from the corrupt management of the revenue; and if, having persuaded them of this, they could, in the next place, convince them, that the corruption itself was owing to the defects in the representation, their cause was evidently gained. But, I apprehend, that they have not only very much exaggerated the evil, but that they have totally mistaken the remedy. For, sir, I would fain ask, in what way is parliamentary reform likely to occasion any improve. ment in the financial administration of the country? Would it insure greater integrity in the immediate and confidential servants of the crown? No person, I am sure, who is at all acquainted with the subject, will maintain, that it would, or even that it could, produce any such effect. For I will venture to say, that there never was any age or country in which the higher class of public men was more completely pure from the stain of corruption than in this. And this is no trifling advantage which we enjoy under the present system, bad as it may be; that though the government of the country may fall, and, as I think, has often fallen into the hands of persons, on other accounts utterly unfit for so great a task, yet, through every change of party, and under every combination of circumstances, it has always remained inaccessible, except to spotless and unsuspected integrity. "But then, sir, might not the house itself be more vigilant, and do more to guard the public against the depredations of persons in subordinate stations? I know very well, that for some years past, it has been very much the fashion among a certain description of politicians, to represent parliament either as conniving at abuses, or at least as taking no effectual steps in order to remove them. Now, sir, I apprehend the fact to be, that parliament has completely gone along with the improvement that has taken place in the public feeling upon this subject. It requires very little knowledge of our history in order to be convinced, that there never was a period during which parliament has laboured more diligently or more successfully in order to extinguish, not only abuses, but every species of unnecessary expense, as during the last thirty years. I need not mention Mr Burke's bill, the many reforms introduced during the admini. stration of Mr Pitt, the labours of the committee in which you, sir, took so distinguished a share, the various par liamentary commissions, and more lately the committee of finance. And then, sir, let us compare these with what have been sometimes called good days-with the time of King William and Queen Anne, and we shall see such a scene of profligacy in the members of this house, and of corruption in those that had the management of the public money, as will make all the most notorious delinquencies that have been detected of late years, appear on ly in the light of venial transgressions. Now it is worthy of remark, in the first place, that all these things hap pened in the time of triennial parlia ments, a very favourite nostrum with some of those who call themselves moderate reformers; and, in the next place, that all this corruption and venality never appears to have suggest ed the idea of parliamentary reform to any of the great men of that age-and no age ever produced greater men, or warmer and more enlightened friends to liberty all this infamy, I say, transacted before their eyes, never seems to have suggested to them the idea of having recourse to such a remedy as a change in the very frame and constitution of parliament itself. And it must be confessed that the lot of parliament would be very singular, not to say a little hard, if after having passed unhurt through times of com parative profligacy and corruption, it should be destroyed at the end of a period through which it has gone in a continually accelerating pace towards the extinction of abuses, if it should at last be overwhelmed by the public in- ́ dignation, and declared to have filled up the measure of its iniquity at a moment when it is undoubtedly far purer in itself, and a far more faithful guardian of the public purse, than it was in those days when it was not only unassailed by any domestic enemy, but regarded with envy and admiration by all Europe, as the most splendid model of a popular assembly the world had ever seen. "Is it ability? is it disposition? is it the means of enquiry that are wanting in the present House of Commons? None of these, as I apprehend. The house contains a large proportion of acute and vigilant persons, whose eyes are constantly directed towards this object; no minister dares refuse, even if he is disposed to do so, of which I am very far from suspecting the right honourable gentleman opposite me,no minister dares refuse information in those instances where his consent is necessary in order to obtain it; and any discovery, or feasible plan of retrenchment, is sure to be immediately attended by such a share of importance and popularity to the discoverer, as ensures a proper degree of attention to an object which so well rewards the promoters of it. In one very material point, I will venture to say, that this house is very superior to any reformed house-that is, in ability to carry plans of retrenchment into effect. Whatever merits any schemes for parliamentary reform that I have seen may have in other respects, and however much they may differ from each other, they a *all agree in this that they have a tendency to diminish the number of men of business in the house; of men, who, from their education and habits, are likely to bring to the investigation of financial questions, that skill and attention, which, more perhaps than al most any other subject, they require. "On the whole, there cannot be a more absurd, or a more pernicious opinion, or one which it is more the duty of every real friend to his country to combat, than that it is possible, so long as the p present war lasts, to make any perceptible reduction in our expences, or to relieve the people from any part of their burthens. Reform ed, or unreformed, we must continue to make enormous sacrifices in order to maintain that awful struggle in which we are engaged; fortunate, indeed, if we do not increase to an intolerable degree those evils which the present course of external events seems to be preparing for us, by our own internal dissentions, and by tampering with that order of things, under which, in the undisturbed enjoyment of domestic tranquillity and happiness, we have been enabled to make efforts unequalled even by the convulsive energy of revolutionary warfare, and to bear up against difficulties, untried, nay, unthought of by our forefathers. "Sir, the next great evil under which, as I conceive, we labour; an evil connected with, and arising out of the other, is the enormous influence of the crown. And undoubtedly, those per sons who, agreeing with the right honourable gentleman opposite me (Mr Rose,) think that this influence, far from having exceeded its proper bounds, is only just sufficient to carry on the government, argue the question of re form to much greater advantage than those who, still unconvinced by his pamphlet, think that it has reached to a height which may give reasonable ground of jealousy even to the firmest friend to the monarchical part of our constitution. But, sir, though I per ceive the full extent of this evil, though I acknowledge that this influence.exi ists, and though our attention to its existence has been most powerfully drawn of late years by the manner in which it has been abused, yet I see nothing in all this that should incline me to parliamentary reform.d "If, indeed, the influence of the crown consisted entirely in the disposal of certain offices held by members of this house and their connections, a re form in parliament (or even a place bill) would prove a very effectual check to the evil, as the house would then have more to fear from the resentment of the people than it would have to hope from the favour of the crown. But unfortunately this influence is so extensive that it reaches not only to the house but to the people itself, and acts quite as powerfully upon the constitu ent as upon the representative body. Our establishments are so enormous, and such a vast proportion of the whole population of the country eat the king's bread, that there is hardly any educated person that may not hope either directly, or through his connec tions, to become an object of royal fa vour. It is quite natural that people in this situation should be desirous that some share of the political power which the constitution enables them to delegate, should be exercised ofo their own advantage; I do not mean to their own advantage on any liberal extended scale of public utility, but to their own private benefit, emolument, and promotion. The real wish of their hearts is, not for an able independent representative, but for an active useful agent, some person that may repre sent them not merely within the walls of this house, but at the door of the treasury; a channel through which some rivulet from the great stream of patronage may be drawn to fertilize their own native spot. The only bad votes, in their view of the case, are those that disqualify the voter from becoming a successful suitor to those in power when any revenue officers are created, when an incumbent drops off, or when a son is to be provided for in the civil or military service of the honourable company. They care mighty little for the distant result of wise measures and free government, when set in opposition to immediate tangible be nefit to themselves and to those in whom they take an interest. Patriotism, they think, is no bad thing, and they have heard something about the necessity of watching and even opposing the ministers of the crown. But these advantages, like all others, may be paid for too dear, and cannot be much regarded by those who look to the favour of the government to assist in providing for their families. They have no natural preference to a weak administration or a bad measure, but they had ten times rather the administration should be supported, and the measure justified by a majority of this house, than that the course of jobbing should be interrupted for a single day. An elector looks much less to the vote of his representative, than to the good things he has obtained, or is likely to obtain, for himself or his neighbours; and for the purposes of a sure reelection, a morning well employed in Downing-street, is worth many an evening spent in this house. To hear the language of many persons upon this subject, one would really imagine that in all those instances in which the decision of this house had appeared most questionable, the majo. rity had consisted entirely of the nominees of peers, and members for rot ten boroughs overpowering by a dead weight of profligate votes a virtuous minority of county members and re. presentatives of large towns. Now, sir, every body must know that this neither is the fact, nor any thing approaching to the fact. If, for instance, I might without irregularity arraign any vote of this house, it would undoubtedly be that which was given in vindication of the expedition to Wal cheren. And yet even from the result of that memorable devision no inference whatever can be drawn as to the question of reform. Quite as many of the real representatives of the people voted for the minister as against him, nor do I see any reason to suppose that if parliament had been dissolved the next day, any gentleman would have found reason to repent of the support which he had given to those persons who still enjoy the favour and dispense the patronage of the crown. "And so long as that patronage remains undiminished, so long this evil will remain without a remedy. Indeed I cannot help thinking, though I am well aware how uncertain all predictions must necessarily be as to great political changes-I cannot help thinking, that, as things now are, a reform in parliament would be more likely to increase than to diminish the influence of the crown. By stripping the aristocracy of their boroughs, it would very much diminish their weight in the scale-it would diminish a power which has hitherto been, and which still is, the great, steady,effectual counterpoise to the influence of the crowna power which, according to the vulgar theory of the constitution, they ought to exercise only within their own walls, but which, according to a practice coeval probably with the very existence of parliament, and which may be most clearly traced through the happiest and most brilliant periods of our history, they have, with the most salutary effects, exercised by what are invidiously called their nominees in this. Indeed I do not see how any person can consider the present state of the country, and call to mind from what quarter it is, that all substantial opposition to the will of the crown has for many years proceeded, without being persuaded that the best chance we have of resisting its encroachments, is afforded to us by the preservation of a large share of political power in the hands of those persons, who, from their wealth, their dignity, and a certain hereditary attachment to the principles of free government, are less liable to those daily increasing temptations, which have already proved too strong for the great mass of less considerable individuals. Parliamentary reform, then, would not relieve the country from either of the great evils under which it labours. And here perhaps the argument might fairly rest, since no man is so zealous innovator as to think, that we ought to have recourse to any great change without a prospect of effecting some essential good. But then I maintain that when we have stated this, we have stated only the least considerable part of our case, and that there is the strongest reason for believing not merely that reform is incapable of produring any good, but that it would give birth to great and irremediable evils. "Among the greatest evils arising from parliamentary reform, I do not hesitate to class the immediate effect it would give to the will of the people upon the votes of this house, and consequently upon the decisions of the legislature, and upon the measures of the government. For the reasons I have already stated, I am inclined to think that the crown, in the present state of patronage, would find as little difficulty in managing a reformed as an unreformed parliament-that is, in the ordinary course of measures which would be much less accurately discussed, and much less vigorously opposed than they are now. But then it must be recollected that occasions now and then occur, on which the people are very violent; and when they are very violent they are in general very wrong occasions on which all other considerations give way to a momentary passion, and the great mass of society assumes the character and feelings of a ferocious ignorant mob. They clamour for peace when peace would be disgraceful-they ask for war when war would be impolitic or unjust-or they desire to persecute some religious sect, the followers of which are filling the ranks of their army and navy. It is on occasions like these that we feel the advantage of having a House of Commons which speaks the sense of the people, not from day to day, but from period to period, which accommodates itself (as has been well said) to the average, and not to the fluctuations of public opinion, which is the faithful portrait of the national character in its ordinary attitude of dignity, sedateness, and repose, not the mirror in which those transitory but disgust-, ing forms are reflected, which it assumes when under the dominion of ignorance, prejudice, and passion. But it may be said, and, I believe, with truth, that these delusions never last long, and that however wrong it may be for a time, the public is sure to recover its senses at last. But in the mean time the evil may be done, and done irretrievably. We may have plunged into a disastrous contest, we may have made peace upon ignominious terms under the pressure of temporary difficulties, or we may have inconsiderately swept away some of our most valuable institutions. That the public opinion and wish ought ultimately to prevail, I most readily admit-it is a doctrine that lies at the very foundation of all free government. But what I maintain is, that the House of Commons, as it is now constituted, expresses that opinion in a more eligible and a more authentic manner than it could be expressed by a reformed house. Indeed |