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ed. But did any body believe all this? Such common-place declamation might serve very well to turn a paragraph in a newspaper, in order to keep alive an impression unfavourable to government, but was hardly worthy of serious refutation; it was very well, to be sure, that it should be used by those who thought the Prince Regent's pleasure could not be properly communicated, because they were not the objects of it. The subject of the present motion was not of that grave nature which had been supposed; and the appointment of Colonel McMahon as private secretary, was neither unlawful nor inexpedient, unless the House were prepared to make the Prince Regent one of the greatest slaves in his own dominions.

The motion was lost by a considerable majority; and never surely was there a more sordid attempt at economy, or a more singular effort to excite jealousy and alarm. In justice to the reader, a general view has been preserved of this memorable debate; it might be convenient for some persons that their sentiments on this, as on other occasions, should be buried in oblivion, but it is for the advantage of the country that such things should be remembered. To what does the question really amount which called forth this marvellous display of constitutional knowledge?-Was the appoint ment of a private secretary to the prince illegal? No; since the crown has an unquestionable power to create new offices-Was it unconstitutional? No; for the private secretary had nothing to do with affairs of state-he had no advice to give he had no responsibility-he had no influence or power. Was it worth while, in point of economy, to dispute about an allowance of 20001. a-year to a person who should relieve the sovereign of this great empire, of labours which he could with the utmost difficulty over

take, and many parts of which it was quite unsuitable to his dignity to perform?-Upon constitutional principles, surely, this appointment could not be assailed, while the spirit of economy which could seek its recal, was altogether unworthy of a great nation.

The tellership of the exchequer, an office of great antiquity, had been conferred on the Marquis of Buckingham and Lord Camden, as a reward for the services of their respective fahers, the one of whom, Mr George Grenville, had been prime minister, and the other (Lord Camden) one of the greatest lawyers of this country. The office is as ancient as the exchequer itself, and, like many other offices bestowed by the crown, confers upon the holder a vested right with which the legislature cannot, under any circumstances, interfere.-The emoluments arise out of certain fees charged on the issue of the public monies, and they increase, of course, with the increase of the public expenditure. A poundage on all sums issued for the ordinary and extraordinary service of the army, navy, ordnance, &c. besides a fee of two and a half per cent. on pensions and annuities are charged by the tellers. From a report of the commissioners of public accounts, dated in 1782, it appeared that the profits of this office, which in time of peace, and when it was conferred, did not amount to more than 25001. per annum to each of the tellers, had risen to 70001. in conse quence of the expence incurred during the American war. From the report of the committee of public expendi ture in the year 1808, it appeared that the emoluments of the tellers amounted at that time to 23,000l. per annum each, and there can be no doubt that a farther increase has since taken place. The principle on which the fees are charged is such, that the emoluments increase, as already stated, in propor

tion to the increase of the public expenditure; and as they are thus indefinite in amount, parliament had upon some occasions interfered, for the purposes of regulation. The annuities lately conferred on the princesses had been exempted from any deduction to the tellers. The subsidies granted to foreign powers had always in practice been exempted; and although the tellers had formerly claimed five per cent. on all sums issued for the extraordinary service of the army, yet on one occasion, when a sum of 100,0001. had been granted for this purpose, parliament reduced the fee to three shillings and nine-pence per cent. On these grounds Mr Creevy founded a series of resolutions, the last of which declared, that "it is the duty of parliament, in the present unparalleled state of national expenditure, and public calamity, to exercise its rights still farther over the fees now paid out of the public money at the exchequer, so as to confine the profits of the Marquis of Buckingham and Lord Camden to some fixed and settled sum of money, more conformable in amount to the usual grants of public money for public services, and more suited to the present means and resources of the nation."

In support of the resolutions, it was maintained, that the principle which gives existence to and governs every public office, is the benefit of the state. Government requires that various branches of business should be transacted, and persons must be found to transact them. The acceptance of a public office implies an engagement to do the business and a right to a compensation; the officer has powers delegated to him necessary for the execution of his duties, but he has no other right than to the reward of his labour; he has no right to any specific quantity of business; that quantity must fluc tuate according to circumstances, or may be regulated by the convenience

of the state. If the good of the community require a diminution or annihilation of the business of his office, or the transference of it elsewhere, the officer cannot oppose to new regulations the diminution or annihilation of his profits; because, not the emolument of the officer, but the advantage of the public, was the object of the institution. To suppose a right in him to make such an objection, would be to suppose the office created for his benefit, that is, to suppose it to originate in a violation of public trust, an abuse of power, and an offence against the state. Where law or usage has annex. ed terms to the grant which limit the right of the executive power to resume or take it away, the reason seems to be, the expediency of leaving the officer in the exercise of the duties of his office, and independent of the influence of that power, which might otherwise at pleasure remove him; but when it is no longer for public convenience that such duties should be exercised, or when the exercise of them becomes an unnecessary expense to the public, it would be an inversion of the principle which governs such establishments to suffer that private emolu. ment, which was no motive for the institution, to prevent or retard the abolition of them. It matters not what the duration or condition of the interest may be, whether for life or years, during good behaviour or pleasure; all offices are equally subject to that governing principle for the sake of which they were created-the good of the public.

The public cannot afford to maintain officers of any description at such an expense. This nation is in debt many hundreds of millions. It raises every year to pay the interest and charges attending that debt an enormous sum, of which a poundage is to be paid to these officers for business from whence the public derive no be

nefit; and should additions be made this year to the public debt, unless the legislature will interpose its authority, these fees of office will have their addition likewise. The profits arise in proportion to the increase of the public distress. If parliament thought it reasonable formerly to make a reduction, because 100,000l. were issued, what ought to be done now when seven millions are issued for extraordinaries of the army? It is not only the right, therefore, but the duty of parliament to interfere.

But the reasons urged against the resolutions were deemed conclusive. Some one had said, that he wished this question to be discussed as a mere question of private property between man and man. This was admitted to be a fair principle; but it should.always be recollected that one of the parties is the judge on this occasion, as parliament must represent the interest of the public. It could not be denied that the tellership of the exchequer was an ancient office, coeval indeed with the exchequer itself, and legally within the gift of the crown. The right of the present holders to the joint office was a vested right which could not be touched; and the emoluments of the office legally granted, formed also a vested interest which must be protected. Most of the landed estates in the country were enjoyed on no better title than a legal grant from the crown. A case of parliamentary interference to regulate the office of auditor of the exchequer had been referred to; but in that case, Lord Sandys the auditor had by some negligence put it in the power of the attorney-general to have had the grant of the office recalled. It was the interest of the auditor in such circumstances to consent that the office should be reformed in the manner which government thought reasonable. The conduct of parliament in 1782, when it limited the emo

luments of the tellers to be afterwards appointed, clearly recognised the principle that the legislature had no right to interfere with the regular emoluments of persons enjoying vested rights. The most serious consequences might be apprehended from any infringement on the rights of private property; consequences compared with which the receipt of forty or fifty thousand a-year by the present tellers during their lives was of little moment. The proceedings of parliament in 1782, which did not infringe upon those vested interests, while they regulated the emoluments of the tellers who should be subsequently appointed, amounted to a clear parliamentary recognition of the rights, and a parliamentary pledge that they should not be disturbed. An honourable gentleman (Mr Bankes) who had lately brought in a bill for the abolition of sinecure offices, uniformly acknowledged the principle, that the vested interests of those to whom the offices had been legally granted should not be disturbed. Who could determine where the opposite principle if once admitted might stop? If parliament should once interfere with the emoluments of the tellers of the exchequer, and declare the compensation to be too great for the merits or labours of the noble lords, what should prevent its interference with the church also, to determine what bishops have rewards disproportioned to their talents and services? Why not enquire into the state of tithes also, and the rights not only of the clergy, but of the lay proprietors? Where would such a scrutiny end if, disregarding the vested rights of individuals, parliament were to enquire into the adequacy or inadequacy of the remuneration for labour or services? Parliament had no right to consider whether Lords Buckingham and Camden had received rewards which were too great; the

only question was, whether they were entitled to the ordinary emoluments of offices which had been legally confer red on them.-The present motion might defeat the object of the sinecure office bill in another place. It might be said, "see what the Commons are doing they send up a bill professing to respect vested interests, and intending merely to abolish sinecures; but look at their votes, and you will see that they are going on to the destruction even of vested rights." Such arguments would be powerful against a good bill. The office which was the subject of the motion, although obnoxious on account of its enormous profits, could not continue very long ; one of the holders was above sixty years old, and the other nearly of the same age, so that parliament would, at no very distant period, be enabled to regulate or abolish the office without injustice to individuals.-These arguments prevailed, and the motion was negatived by a considerable majority. One singular circumstance occurred in this debate ; the opposition were still more active to oppose the motion than the ministers; and Messrs Tierney and Ponsonby not only voted but spoke at length on the same side with the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

A bill introduced by Mr Bankes for abolishing sinecure offices, gave rise to a discussion of some interest. The bill had for its object to abolish sinecure offices executed by deputy, preserving, at the same time, a respect for the rights of those in the actual possession of the offices at the time. From the profits of these offices as they should fall in, it was intended to establish a fund out of which the civil servants of the public might, after a certain length of time, be provided with pensions corresponding to their merits. The measure had been raised into favour with the people by many exaggerated accounts of the ad

stance:

In support of the bill it was said, that no better method could be found of rewarding high and efficient services in the state than by salaries proportioned to their importance. That as the House had formerly agreed to certain resolutions which laid down the principle that sinecure offices should either be abolished or regulated, it was bound to support the present bill, which was, in fact, framed upon these resolutions.

An opinion had been intimated that the power of the crown had not increased of late years; but was it possible to look at the immense expenditure of the country; at the great military and naval establishments; the vast patronage thus placed in the hands of the crown; at the increase of the revenue, and of the number of people employed in its collection; was it possible to look at these things without being convinced that dependence on the crown was extended to all parts of the country in a degree quite unexampled in former times? It was no light consideration, also, that some of the greatest commercial and corporate bodies in the country were in the habit of looking up to the ministers of the crown for favour and protection. There had been times, indeed, when the influence

of the crown was more openly exerted in the Commons House of Parliament; but could there be a doubt that much of open corruption still remained, and had become an object of just abhorrence to the people? The present measure, if adopted, would have the bene. ficial effect of purifying the future parliaments of the country.-It was enough to excite suspicion, that the offices which this bill proposed to abolish, were represented as, in some measure, the outworks necessary to the protection of the crown, while they are, in truth, as a mill-stone attached to the monarchy, threatening to weigh it to the ground. The recent vote of the House, by which the sinecure office of paymaster of widows' pensions was abolished, had raised the

character of the Commons in the estimation of the country. There never was a moment when it was more important to preserve and increase that estimation. Let the House now prove that the act alluded to proceeded not from the effervescence of the moment, but that the Commons were prepared to advance upon principle to the abolition of sinecures at once useless and odious.It might be wrong to delude the people with the idea that the measures now recommended would materially diminish the public burdens; but great joy would be diffused by the conviction that parliament had determined to sanction such branches of expenditure only as the public service indispensably required. If the bill passed into a law, it would remove much of the existing corruptions of parliament. Had Mr Pitt and Mr Burke been alive, they would have given their cordial support to the bill, which did not propose to deprive the crown of the power of rewarding merit, but to prevent the public money from being lavished in disgraceful sinecures. The bill before the House would form a safe-guard to the crown,

particularly at a time when the people were so much disgusted with sinecures. The House had, by a former vote, given the country a pledge of its independence, and would, by the vote of that night, redeem this pledge.

It was answered, that, as the House appeared to be in some measure pledged to the principle of the bill, it had been the wish of those who opposed it, that it should be carried through the committee, and presented in the most perfect shape to which it could be brought; but now that this had been done, it was proper that the objec tions to it, both in the details and in the principle, should be considered.

In considering the details, it appeared that the bill proposed a most inconvenient union of different offices, as in the instance of the keeper of the great seal, and justice general of Scotland; while the proposal of retaining many offices, and abolishing the sala ries attached to them, was rather an extraordinary one. The bill propo sed, also, to incorporate the office of auditor-general with that of president of the council, and thus to save the salary of the former place; but it was difficult to conceive upon what principle of justice the president of the council could be called on, without any additional remuneration, to take upon himself the responsibility of auditor of the exchequer. It had been said that this office might be discharged as hitherto by deputy; but it was contrary to every principle of justice to make any man responsible for the conduct of a deputy not of his own appointing.-The bill also provided, that the office of clerk of the pells should be united to that of keeper of the privy seal; yet, on a very recent occasion, when money was to be raised, the deputy clerk of the pells exercised a controul upon the privy seal. bill, after stating the offices to be abolished in Ireland, contained this re

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