was said in the earlier case, "a sacred obligation imposed on its public faith," imposed only an honorary obligation on the state. Northern P. R. Co. v. Townsend, 190 U. S. 267, 47 L. ed. 1044, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 671, was distinguished as having been decided on the ground that in the grant to the railway there was an implied condition of reverter in case the company ceased to hold the land for the purpose for which it was granted,-a ground which, as I have said, is absent here. 571, that no power in the nature of mu-, subject to state legislation," was repeatnicipal sovereignty can be exercised by ed. In Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U. S. the United States within a state; that 168, 58 L. ed. 555, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, such a power is repugnant to the Con- following Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. stitution. This case was referred to in 173, 15 L. ed. 338, it was held that land Withers v. Buckley, 20 How. 84, 15 L. conveyed to the state by the United ed. 816, and it was decided that the act States for the use of schools could be of Congress authorizing the formation acquired by adverse possession under of the state of Mississippi, and provid-state law, and that the trust, although, as ing that the Mississippi river should be forever free, "could have no effect to restrict the new state in any of its attributes as an independent sovereign government," and both these cases were cited upon this point with approval in Ward v. Racehorse, 163 U. S. 504, 511, 512, 41 L. ed. 244, 246, 247, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1076. See also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U. S. 1, 27, 38 L. ed. 331, 341, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 548. In Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558, 15 L. ed. 994, where it was held that the laws of a territory abolishing constructive trusts were ineffectual to protect the holder of a certificate from the United States against the establishment of such a trust, it was said that "when the subject, and all control over it, shall have passed from the United States, and have become vested in a citizen or resident of the territory, then in- | deed the territorial regulations may operate upon it;" and [110] later in the decision there is cited a passage from Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 517, 10 L. ed. 264, 273, to the same effect,-a passage also cited and relied upon by the four justices who dissented and held that the territorial laws governed even then. It has been repeated ever since. McCune v. Essig, 199 U. S. 382, 390, 50 L. ed. 237, 241, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78; Buchser v. Buchser, 231 U. S. 157, 161, 58 L. ed. 166, 167, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 46. | It is said that where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave constitutional [111] questions arise and by the other of which they are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter. United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Delaware & H. Co. 213 U. S. 366, 408, 53 L. ed. 836, 849, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527. I am aware that this principle, like some others, more often is invoked in aid of a conclusion reached on other grounds than made itself the basis of decision, but it seems to me that it properly should govern here. It might without violence. When the Act of 1862 [12 Stat. at L. 393, chap. 75], now Rev. Stat. § 2296, Comp. Stat. 1916, § 4551, was passed, the United States owned territories to which it could be applied with full scope. Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558, 15 L. ed. 994. The greater part of the public land was in those territories. Without stopping to suggest other possibilities of construction, this fact is enough to explain and give validity to the act when passed. There is no need to import to it the intent to anticipate the future, and to reach the states that were still in the bosom of time. Coming to the precise issue, the question of the power of the United States to restrict alienation of land within a state after it had conveyed the land in fee was left open in Wright v. Morgan, 191 U. S. 55, 58, 48 L. ed. 89, 93, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6, but it was said that the clearest expression would be necessary before it would be admitted that such a restric- Of course, the United States has power tion was imposed. In Buchser v. Buch- to choose appropriate means for exercisser, 231 U. S. 157, 58 L. ed. 166, 34 Sup.ing the authority given to it by the ConCt. Rep. 46, it was held that the laws of the United States did not prevent homestead land becoming community property at the moment that title was acquired, and it was said that, the acquisition under the United States law being complete, that law had released its control. The statement in Wilcox v. Jackson, supra, that when the title has passed the land, "like all other property in the state, is stitution. But I see no sufficient ground for extending that authority to a case like this. It is not the business of the United States to determine the policy to be pursued concerning privately owned land within a state. According to all cases in this court, so far as I know, when the patent issued its authority was at an end. I am aware that my doubts are con trary to manifest destiny and to a num- a bond conditioned to make honest account- a, 5; IV. b, 7, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 49.] cember 9, 1918. Decided De N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas to review a judg [112] W. S. PAYNE, L. H. Powell, et al., ment granting a writ of mandamus to Plffs. in Err., V. STATE OF KANSAS EX REL. S. BREWSTER, Attorney General. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 112, 113.) compel the secretary of the state board of agriculture to pay certain license fees M. into the state treasury. Affirmed. Constitutional law class legislation -equal protection of the laws due licensing commis process of law sion merchants. A state may forbid the sale of farm produce on commission without an annual license to be procured from the state board of agriculture upon a proper showing and Note. As to what constitutes due process of law, generally-see notes to People v. O'Brien, 2 L.R.A. 255; Kuntz v. Sumption, 2 L.R.A. 655; Re Gannon, 5 L.R.A. 359; Ulman v. Baltimore, 11 L.R.A. 224; Gilman v. Tucker, 13 L.R.A. 304; Pearson v. Yewdall, 24 L. ed. U. S. 436; and Wilson v. North Carolina, 42 L. ed. U. S. 865. As to validity of class legislation, generally-see notes to State v. Goodwill, 6 L.R.A. 621, and State v. Loomis, 21 L.R.A. 789. As to constitutional equality of privileges, immunities, and protection, generally-see note to Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 14 L.R.A. 579. As to state licenses or taxes, generally, as affecting interstate commerce-see notes to Rothermel v. Meyerle, 9 L.R.A. 366; American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 11 L.R.A. 179; Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 L. ed. U. S. 23; Brown v. Maryland, 6 L. ed. U. S. 678; Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. ed. U. S. 217; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 L. ed. U. S. 1041; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 39 L. ed. U. S. 311; and Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 39 L. ed. U. S. 538. See same case below, 98 Kan. 465, 158 Pac. 408. Mr. Ray Campbell argued the cause, and, with Mr. J. Graham Campbell, filed a brief for plaintiffs in error: Whatever justification there may be for the regulation of the sale of produce, fruit, or garden truck on commission for the producer, cannot cure the act in question of any invalidity resulting from the regulation of the grain commission business. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 59 L. ed. 441, L.R.A.1915C, 960, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 240. The grain commission business is in no way affected with a public or general interest. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 31 L. ed. 205, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391, 38 L. ed. 757, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 670, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 45 L. ed. 619, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 49 L. ed. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 49 L. ed. 937, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 539, 3 Ann. Cas. 1133; People ex rel. Valentine v. Berrien Circuit Judge (People ex rel. Valentine v. Coolidge) 124 Mich. 664, 50 L.R.A. 493, 83 Am. St. Rep. 352, 83 N. W. 594. In the multitude of decisions of this court involving the right of a state to regulate a private business, the distinction is always clearly drawn between private welfare and public welfare. Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 55 L. ed. 112, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1062, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 186, Ann. Cas. 1912A, 487; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, 57 L. ed. 156, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1123, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 76, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 192; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, L.R.A. 1915C, 1189, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391, 38 L. ed. 757, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 670, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 61 L. ed. 1336, L.R.A. 1917F, 1163, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. ed. 315, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206. The act in question deprives the plaintiffs in error of equal protection of the laws, is discriminatory, makes an unjust and unwarranted classification of certain businesses, and is unconstitu tional. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co. 184 U. S. 540, 46 L. ed. 679, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 431; Barbier v. Connolly, 113. U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 50 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Vosburg, 238 U. S. 56, 59 L. ed. 1199, L.R.A.1915E, 953, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 675; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U. S. 394, 60 L. ed. 348, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 143, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 927; Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679; L.R.A.1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Tanner v. Little, 240 U. S. 369, 60 L. ed. 691, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379; Brownback v. North Wales, 194 Pa. 609, 49 L.R.A. 446, 45 Atl. 660; State v. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468; Smith v. Farr, 46 Colo. 364, 104 Pac. 401; Re Taylor, 35 Nev. 504, 131 Pac. 133; State ex rel. Wyatt v. Ashbrook, 154 Mo. 375, 48 L.R.A. 265; Kansas City v. Grush, 151 Mo. 128, 52 S. W. 286; State v. Wright, 53 Or. 344, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 349, 100 Pac. 296; State v. Conlon, 65 Conn. 478, 31 L.R.A. 55, 48 Am. St. Rep. 227, 33 Atl. 519; Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 47 L.R.A. 802, 75 Am. St. Rep. 103, 55 N. E. 663, 15 Am. Crim. Rep. 108. The act in question is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiffs in error and others of property and property rights without due process of law. Southern P. Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 537, 57 L. ed. 1610, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1027; Wadley Southern R. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 59 L. ed. 405, P.U.R.1915A, 106, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 214; Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co. 242 U. S. 539, 61 L. ed. 480, L.R.A.1917F, 514, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 217, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 643. Mr. J. L. Hunt argued the cause, and, with Messrs. S. N. Hawkes and T. F. Railsback, and Mr. S. M. Brewster, Attorney General of Kansas, filed a brief for defendant in error: accounts and the making of reports. The law requires only the keeping of These duties are required of commis sion merchants at common law. 19 Cyc. 115, 116, 135, 173; 2 Mechem, Agency, §§ 2524, 2574; Thayer v. Hoff man, 53 Kan. 723, 37 Pac. 125. Even conceding that the showing as to interveners is sufficient to justify their claim that there is no occasion for the law as to them individually, this fact does not make the law void. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, 60 L. ed. 776, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 59 L. ed. 628, L.R.A.1915F, 829, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342; Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 60 L. ed. 771, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 548. The facts, however, show necessity for this law. State ex rel. Beek v. Wagener, 77 Minn. 483, 46 L.R.A. 442, 77 Am. St. Rep. 681, 80 N. W. 633, 778, 1134. A proper police regulation may not be declared void simply because it regulates a private business. Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 345, 60 L. ed. 679, 680, L.R.A.1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 513, 60 L. ed. 771, 774, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 440, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 548; Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 47 L. ed. 323, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168; Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157, 57 L. ed. 164, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 66: Keokee Consol. Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 58 L. ed. 1288, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 856. If there could exist a condition of facts justifying the classification, the court is bound to presume that such state of facts existed. 4 Enc. U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 48 L. ed. 971, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Erb v. Morasch, 177 U. S. 584, 44 L. ed. 897, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 819; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Arkansas, 240 U. S. 518, 60 L. ed. 776, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443. There are ample reasons for the law, 248 U. S. of which the court will take judicial concerning matters of this kind, and we notice. State v. Wilson, 61 Kan. 43, 47 L.R.A. 71, 58 Pac. 981; State ex rel. Beek v. Wa Wagener, 77 Minn. 483, 46 L.R.A. 442, 77 Am. St. Rep. 681, 80 N. W. 633, 778, 1134. Laws of this character have been held constitutional. State ex rel. Beek v. Wagener, supra; Ferguson-Hendrix Co. v. Fidelity & D. Co. 79 Wash. 528, 140 Pac. 700; Hawthorn v. People, 109 Ill. 302, 50 Am. Rep. 610; Lasher v. People, 183 Ill. 226, 47 L.R.A. 802, 75 Am. St. Rep. 103, 55 N. E. 663, 15 Am. Crim. Rep. 108. The secretary of the state board of agriculture is a state officer, and the manner of his election is immaterial. Throop, Pub. Off. § 85; Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Oswego Twp. 7 C. C. A. 669, 19 U. S. App. 321, 59 Fed. 58; Sturgis v. Spofford, 45 N. Y. 446; Re Bulger, 45 Cal. 553. The practice of conferring administrative duties upon nonjudicial officers, as in the law in question, has often been sustained. Meffert v. State Bd. of Medical Registration (Meffert v. Packer) 66 Kan. 710, 1 L.R.A. (N.S.) 811, 72 Pac. 247, 195 U. S. 625, 49 L. ed. 350, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 32 L. ed. 623, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 231; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505, 47 L. ed. 563, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 390. Memorandum opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds: The validity of chapter 371, Laws of Kansas 1915, "An Act in Relation to the Sale of Farm Produce on Commission," is challenged by certain grain dealers carrying on business in that state. It forbids the sale of farm produce on commission without an annual license, to be procured from the State Board of Agriculture upon a proper showing as to character, responsibility, etc., and a bond conditioned to make honest accounting. A fee of $10 is required. [113] Plaintiffs in error maintain that the statute is class legislation which abridges their rights and privileges; that it deprives them of the equal protection of the laws and also of their property without due process of law,—all in violation of the 14th Amendment. Manifestly, the purpose of the state was to prevent certain evils incident to the business of commission merchants in farm products by regulating it. Many former opinions have pointed out the limitations upon powers of the states think the present record fails to show that these limitations have been transcended. Rast v. Van Deman & L. Co. 240 U. S. 342, 60 L. ed. 679, L.R.A.1917A, 421, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U. S. 340, 60 L. ed. 1034, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 561, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 522; Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 61 L. ed. 1336, L.R.A.1917F, 1163, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973. The judgment of the court below is affirmed. FRANK NICOULIN, Plff. in Err., V. JOHN J. O'BRIEN. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 113, 114.) States waters jurisdiction over boundary Virginia Compact. No limitation upon the power of the state of Kentucky to protect fish in the Ohio river south of the low-water mark on the Indiana side results from the provision of the Virginia Compact that the tucky on the Ohio river shall be "concur jurisdiction of the proposed state of Kenrent only with the states which may possess the opposite shores of the said river." For other cases, see Courts, II. b, 4; States, VII. c, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 113.] Submitted October 21, 1918. Decided De cember 9, 1918. IN ERROR to the Court of Appeals of the State of Kentucky to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, in that state, denying a writ of prohibition to restrain a justice of the peace from enforcing a conviction for seining fish in the Ohio river south of low-water mark on the Indiana side. Affirmed. See same case below, 172 Ky. 473, 189) S. W. 724. Mr. Augustus Everett Willson submitted the cause for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Richard Priest Dietzman and Edmund Andrew Larkin were on the brief: The Virginia Compact conferred juris Note. As to jurisdiction over boundary river-see notes to State v. Moyers, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 366, and Roberts v. Fullerton, 65 L.R.A. 953. As to jurisdiction to determine the rights of private parties in interstate stream-see note to Taylor v. Hulett, 19 L.R.A. (N.S.) 535. diction upon both Indiana and Kentucky, to regulate by legislation the methods of fishing in the Ohio river where it forms the boundary line between those two states. Arnold v. Shields, 5 Dana, 18; McFall v. Com. 2 Met. (Ky.) 394; Meyler v. Wedding, 107 Ky. 310, 92 Am. St. Rep. 347, 53 S. W. 809, 107 Ky. 691, 60 S. W. 20, 192 U. S. 573, 48 L. ed. 570, 66 L.R.A. 833, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322; Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U. S. 315, 53 L. ed. 528, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Re Mattson, 69 Fed. 535; Ex parte Despeiro, 152 Fed. 1004; State v. Moyers, 155 Iowa, 678, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 366, 136 N. W. 896; Columbia River Packers' Asso. v. McGowan, 172 Fed. 991; Handly v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 374, 5 L. ed. 113; Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479, 34 L. ed. 329, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1051; Ex parte Marsh, 57 Fed. 719; Vattell, Droit Des Gens, liv. i. chap. 22, § 266; Lawrence's Wheaton, International Law, p. 347; Holland, Jur. 9th ed. chap. 18; Delaware Bridge Co. v. Trenton City Bridge Co. 13 N. J. Eq. 46; Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 184; Dugan v. State, 125 Ind. 130, 9 L.R.A. 321, 25 N. E. 171; State v. Plants, 25 W. Va. 119, 52 Am. Rep. 211; State v. Faudre, 54 W. Va. 122, 63 L.R.A. 877, 102 Am. St. Rep. 927, 46 S. E. 269, 1 Ann. Cas. 104. The Virginia Compact requires concurrence of agreement in legislation on the part of Kentucky and Indiana in order that the laws regulating fishing on the Ohio river, where it forms their boundary line, may be valid. Re Mattson, 69 Fed. 535; Ex parte Despeiro, 152 Fed. 1004; Delaware Bridge Co. v. Trenton City Bridge Co. 13 N. J. Eq. 46; Arnold v. Shields, 5 Dana, 18; Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U. S. 315, 53 L. ed. 528, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; 22 Harvard L. Rev. 599; Webster's Dict. "Concurrent;" 2 Words & Phrases, p. 1391; Allen v. Moore, 173 Ky. 394, 191 S. W. 93. Cases involving permanent structures attached to river bed, oyster beds, ferry privileges, are distinguishable. Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Ward, 2 Black, 485, 17 L. ed. 311; State v. Mullen, 35 Iowa, 199; State v. Faudre, 54 W. Va. 122, 63 L.R.A. 877, 102 Am. St. Rep. 927, 46 S. E. 269, 1 Ann. Cas. 104. The following line of cases, by reason of the decision of this court in Nielsen v. Oregon, 212 U. S. 315, 53 L. ed. 528, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383, is no longer the law: Lemore v. Com. 127 Ky. 480, 105 S. W. 930; Church v. Chambers, 3 Dana, 274; State v. Moyers, 155 Iowa, 678, 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 366, 136 N. W. 896; Nielsen v. Oregon, 51 Or. 588, 131 Am. St. Rep. 765, 95 Pac. 720, 16 Ann. Cas. 1113; State v. Cunningham, 102 Miss. 237, 59 So. 76, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 182; Welsh v. State, 126 Ind. 71, 9 L.R.A. 664, 25 N. E. 883; Memphis & C. Packet Co. v. Pikey, 142 Ind. 304, 40 N. E. 527; Sherlock v. Alling, 44 Ind. 184; Sanders v. St. Louis & N. O. Anchor Line, 97 Mo. 26, 3 L.R.A. 390, 10 S. W. 595. "Concurrent jurisdiction," as contended for by plaintiff in error, does not violate § 10, art. 1, of the Federal Constitution. Wharton v. Wise, 153 U. S. 155, 38 L. ed. 669, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 783; Covington & C. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 38 L. ed. 962, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 649, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1087; Broadway & N. Bridge Co. v. Com. 173 Ky. 165, 190 S. W. 715. If the Virginia Compact be construed as giving Indiana and Kentucky the right each to regulate the conduct of its own citizens with reference to the Ohio river, then this 1916 Act of Kentucky is in violation of the 14th Amendment of the Federal Constitution, as being an improper exercise of the police power. McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248. Mr. D. A. Sachs, Jr., submitted the cause for defendant in error. Mr. Joseph G. Sachs, Jr., was on the brief: The boundary of Kentucky is the lowwater mark on the Indiana side of the Ohio river. McGowan v. Columbia River Packers' Asso. 245 U. S. 352, 62 L. ed. 342, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 129; J. S. Keator Lumber Co. v. St. Croix Boom Corp. 72 Wis. Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U. S. 479, 62, 7 Am. St. Rep. 837, 38 N. W. 529; 34 L. ed. 329, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1051; Gilbert v. Moline Water Power & Mfg. Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U. S. 573, 48 L. Co. 19 Iowa, 319; Com. v. Garner, 3 ed. 570, 66 L.R.A. 833, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. Gratt. 655; McCready v. Virginia, 94 322; Handley v. Anthony, 5 Wheat. 375, U. S. 391, 24 L. ed. 248; Smith v. Mary-5 L. ed. 113; Henderson Bridge Co. v. land, 18 How. 74, 15 L. ed. 270; Wedding Henderson, 173 U. S. 592, 43 L. ed. 823, v. Meyler, 192 U. S. 573, 48 L. ed. 570, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553. 66 L.R.A. 833, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322; A state owns navigable waters within |