Final order affirmed. the rule that is invoked. The accusa- than questions of discretion, the detory averments of the indictment, ad- termination of which is not for our remitted for the purposes of this proceed- view. ing to be true, make out a prima facie case of an offense against the laws of the United States indictable in the District of Columbia. Hyde v. Shine, 199 U. S. 62, 84, 50 L. ed. 90, 97, 25 Sup.. Ct. Rep. 760; Haas v. Henkel, 216 Ü. The CHIEF JUSTICE dissents. Petitioner, S. 462, 481, 54 L. ed. 569, 578, 30 Sup. [290] WASHINGTON POST COMPANY, Ct. Rep. 249, 17 Ann. Cas. 1112. Appellant's constitutional point merely V. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 290–294.) raises a probability that a defense will JOHN ARMSTRONG CHALONER, Respt. be interposed, and that thus a controversy will arise, the determination of which is within the proper jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment was found. This furnishes no legal obstacle to the removal of the accused to that jurisdiction; nor may the writ of habeas corpus [289] be employed as an anticipatory writ of error. Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 229, 59 L. ed. 203, 206, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54. Libel charge of crime ambiguity. [For other cases, see Libel and Slander, II. a, briefs striking from files. 2. The presence of much irrelevant and scandalous matter in a writing styled "answer to petition for writ of certiorari and discussion of matters of fact in brief for the files. petitioner" requires that it be stricken from [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, V. u, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 316.] It is contended, indeed, that there was no probable cause to believe that the offense charged in the Washington indictment was committed within the District of Columbia; and this upon the ground that appellant was not personally present in the District at the time of the alleged offense, and that he was under no duty to make report there to the Alien Property Custodian. The commissioner, however, found as a matter of fact that the Custodian's office was in the District of Columbia, and as the finding was supported by competent evidence the district court properly held of Appeals of the District of Columthat it was not reviewable on writ of bia to review a judgment which, on a habeas corpus. That being so, the duty second appeal, affirmed a judgment of imposed by the statute to make report the Supreme Court of the District in to the Alien Property Custodian involved favor of plaintiff in an action for libel. the duty to make such report in the Reversed and remanded to the Supreme District of Columbia, and failure to Court of the District, with instructions make it was an offense against the to grant a new trial. United States committed in that District. United States v. Lombardo, 241 U. S. 73, 76, 60 L. ed. 897, 898, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 508; New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. United States, 92 C. C. A. 331, 166 Fed. 267, 269. It is contended that the removal of appellant to the District of Columbia amounts to an invasion of his constitutional right to a speedy trial on the New York indictments, and that the consent of the district court for the Argued April 22 and 23, 1919. Decided N WRIT of Certiorari to the Court See same case below, 47 App. D. C. 66. Messrs. Wilton J. Lambert and Joseph titioner: The words used do not admit of a con struction that an unlawful homicide with malice aforethought had been committed. Brown v. Tribune Asso. 74 App. Div. 359, 77 N. Y. Supp. 461; Gallup v. Belmont, 41 N. Y. §. R. 233, 16 N. Y. Supp. southern district of New York to such removal ought not to have been given¦ Note.-On effect of improper language without requiring from the representa- in briefs of counsel-see note to Sutive of the government a statement of preme Council, R. A. v. Green, 59 L. ed. reasons. These points raise no more U. S. 1090. in 483, affirmed in 135 N. Y. 647, 32 N. E., a nervous breakdown, and was ordered 647; Herringer v. Ingberg, 91 Minn. 71, by his physician to take a long rest. He 97 N. W. 460; Bl. Com. 177; Wharton, decided to visit his old friend, Major Crim. Law, 11th ed. p. 586. Emry, who, with Chaloner, was strumental in founding Roanoke Rapids, a manufacturing town 5 miles from Weldon. Chaloner arrived at Weldon after traveling all night and was immediately hurried to Shadeland, where he received medical attention and temporary relief." The publication was not, as matter of law, libelous per se. Bihler v. Gockley, 18 Ill. App. 496; Thompson v. Lewiston Daily Sun Pub. Co. 91 Me. 203, 39 Atl. 556; Mitchell v. Sharon, 51 Fed. 424; Herrick v. Tribune Co. 108 Ill. App. 244; Feder v. Herrick, 43 N. J. L. 24; Hays v. Hays, 1 Humph. 402; Commercial Pub. Co. v. Smith, 79 C. C. A. 410, 149 Fed. 704. Messrs. E. F. Colladay and Sidney J. Dudley argued the cause, and, with Mr. H. S. Barger, filed a brief for respond ent: se. The words sued on were libelous per Culmer v. Canby, 41 C. C. A. 302, 101 Fed. 195; Raymond v. United States, 25 App. D. C. 555; Herrick v. Tribune Co. 108 Ill. App. 244; Atwill v. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 177; Williams v. Fuller, 68 Claiming damages on account of shame, infamy, and disgrace inflicted, respondent brought an action against the publish-. ing company in the supreme court, District of Columbia. [292] He alleged: "The said defendant, meaning and inwith the crime of murder in the killing tending to charge the plaintiff trary, the fact was, as defendant well of one John Gillard, when, on the congaged in a most laudable effort to preknew, that while the plaintiff was envent the said Gillard from murdering his wife the said Gillard was in fact killed by accidental explosion Neb. 354, 94 N. W. 118, 97 N. W. 246;ing to deprive the plaintiff of his said of a pistol," and "contriving and intendMorse v. Times-Republican Printing Co. good name, credit, and reputation, and 124 Iowa, 707, 100 N. W. 867; Weeks v. to bring him into scandal and disrepute News Pub. Co. 117 Md. 126, 83 Atl. 162; among his friends, neighbors, and acWoolworth v. Star Co. 97 App. Div. 525, 90 N. Y. Supp. 147; Belo v. Fuller, 84 ciously composed and published and quaintances, falsely and maliTex. 450, 31 Am. St. Rep. 75, 19 S. W caused to be composed and published of 616; 17 R. C. L. § 53; Pollard v. Lyon, 91 and concerning the plaintiff in a certain U. S. 225, 23 L. ed. 308; Peck v. Tribune Co. 214 U. S. 185, 53 L. ed. 960, 29 Sup. newspaper, etc.," the above-quoted item. Ct. Rep. 554, 16 Ann. Cas. 1075; Wash-court charged: "The jury are instructed Upon respondent's request the trial ington Times Co. v. Downey, 26 App. that the words contained in the publicaD. C. 258, 6 Ann. Cas. 765; Taylor v. tion sued on by the plaintiff herein imply Casey, Minor (Ala.) 258. that the crime of murder has been com Mr. John Armstrong Chaloner pro se mitted by the plaintiff, and are actionable also filed a brief for respondent. per se." It further said to them: "The only question really, for you to consider, be allowed. You ought to allow him Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the is how much damages the plaintiff should opinion of the court: Saturday, April 3, 1909, the Washing-compensation; no special damages have ton Post, a daily newspaper of wide circulation, published by petitioner, contained the following item: "John Armstrong Chaloner (Chanler), brother of Lewis Stuyvesant Chanler, of New York, and former husband of Amelie Rives, the authoress, now Princess Troubetskoy, is recuperating at Shadeland, the country home of Major Thomas L. Emry, near Weldon, North Carolina, where he had gone to recuperate following a nervous breakdown as a result of the tragedy at his home, Merry Mills, near Cobham, on March 15, when he shot and killed John Gillard, while the latter was abusing his wife, who had taken refuge at Merry Mills, Chaloner's home. Following the shooting, Chaloner suffered been shown and only general damages can be allowed, but where the libel is published, where words are published of the plaintiff which constituted a libel, which charge him with having committed a crime, for instance, as in this case, the law presumes that the plaintiff has been damaged, without proof of any special damage, because the law takes notice of the fact that a libel travels, and it comes to a great many different readers, and that it would be impossible for a plaintiff to trace out the circulation of the libel. and show by whom it had been read, and how it had affected their opinion of him, and all that; so that the jury are justified in allowing substantial damages to a plaintiff against whom a libel has been published, without proof of any particular or substantial damage to him." [293] Judgment in favor of respondent upon a verdict for $10,000 was affirmed by the court of appeals (36 App. D. C. 231; 47 App. D. C. 66). We think the quoted instructions to the jury were erroneous and harmful to petitioner. The applicable rule was tersely stated by the circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit, through Judge Lurton, afterwards of this court, in Commercial Pub. Co. v. Smith, 79 C. C. A. 410, 149 Fed. 704, 706, 707. Citing supporting authorities, he said: "A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So the whole item, including display lines, should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined. When thus read, if its meaning is so unambiguous as to reasonably bear but one interpretation, it is for the judge to say whether that signification is defamatory or not. If, upon the other hand, it is capable of two meanings, one of which would be libelous and actionable and the other not, it is for the jury to say, under all the circumstances surrounding its publication, including extraneous facts admissible in evidence, which of the two meanings would be attributed to it by those to whom it is addressed or by whom it may be read." See Peck v. Tribune Co. 214 U. S. 185, 190, 53 L. ed. 960, 962, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 554, 16 Ann. Cas. 1075. Counsel for respondent admit (and properly so) that, upon the authorities, a published item saying, "C shot and killed G," without more, would not be libelous per se, it does not set forth the commission of a crime in unambiguous words. And we are unable to conclude that, as matter of law, addition of the words, "while the latter was abusing his wife, who had taken refuge at Merry Mills, Chaloner's home," would convert such a statement into a definite charge of murder. On the contrary, they might at least suggest to reasonable minds that the homicide was [294] without malice. Considering the wide circulation of present-day newspapers and their power for doing injury to reputation, it is highly important that the ancient doctrine, "Whatever a man publishes he publishes at his peril," should be strictly enforced. But this cannot be done properly by taking away from the jury doubtful questions of fact. We find no reason to disagree with the conclusion reached by the court of appeals in respect of the other errors there assigned. A writing entitled, "Answer to Petition for Writ of Certiorari and Discussion of Matters of Fact in Brief for Petitioner," signed "John Armstrong Chaloner, Pro Se," and filed here April 21, 1919, contains much irrelevant and scandalous matter and is unfit for our files. It must be stricken from them. The judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded to the Supreme Court, with instructions to grant a new trial. Reversed. Mr. Justice Clarke took no part in the consideration or decision of this cause. [295] CHRISTOPHER L. WILLIAMS, as Receiver of the First National Bank of Bayonne, New Jersey, Plff. in Err., V. MARY A. VREELAND, Deft. in Err. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 295–300.) Appeal review of facts directed verdict requested by both parties. 1. When both parties request a peremptory instruction and do nothing more, they thereby assume the facts to be undis puted and in effect submit to the trial judge the determination of the inferences proper to be drawn therefrom. And upon under such circumstances must stand if the review a finding of fact by the trial court record discloses substantial evidence to support it. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, VIII. 1, 3, a; Trial. XI. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Evidence - relevancy negativing inference. ratification. a 2. Facts and circumstances concerning wife's indorsement in blank of national bank stock certificates are admissible in evidence to negative the inference that by such indorsement she ratified a prior unauthorized transfer of such stock to her by her husband and assumed the duty promptly to remove her name from the bank books or suffer the liability imposed upon duly reg istered shareholders. 3. The mere transfer of stock in a na tional bank from husband to wife, without the latter's knowledge and consent, does not impose upon her the individual liability attached by law to the position of a shareholder, and she cannot be deemed to have approved, ratified, or acquiesced in such transfer so as to assume the position of a shareholder by indorsing the certificates in blank, in the belief that she was enabling her husband to correct his avowed mistake. [For other cases, see Banks, IV. d, 3, a, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [No. 318.] Beutell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154, 39 L. ed. 654, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566. Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court: Williams, as receiver, sued defendant in error in the United States district court for New Jersey to enforce [296] an assessment against her, levied by the Submitted April 23, 1919. Decided June 2, Comptroller of the Currency (Rev. Stat. IN 1919. N ERROR to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the District Court for the District of New Jersey in favor of defendant in a suit by a receiver of a national bank to enforce an assessment against an alleged stockholder. Affirmed. See same case below, 156 C. C. A. 632, 244 Fed. 346. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Stuart G. Gibboney submitted the cause for plaintiff in error: The defendant in error was a record shareholder. Cecil Nat. Bank v. Watsontown Bank, 105 U. S. 217, 26 L. ed. 1039; Harvey v. Stowe, 134 C. C. A. 635, 219 Fed. 17. She is liable, as an owner, for the assessment. Matteson v. Dent, 176 U. S. 521, 44 L. ed. 571, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419; Kenyon v. Fowler, 83 C. C. A. 567, 155 Fed. 107, affirmed in 215 U. S. 593, 54 L. ed. 341, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409; Keyser v. Hitz, 133 Ú. S. 138, 33 L. ed. 531, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290; Scott v. Deweese, 181 U. S. 202, 45 L. ed. 822, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585. § 5151), because she apparently owned certain stock of the First National Bank when it failed, December 6, 1913. She admits that the certificates were made out in her name, and at time of the failure were so entered on the bank books. But she claims that, without her knowledge or consent, her husband caused them to be thus issued and entered. And further, that although she signed blank powers of attorney indorsed thereon, and thereby made it possible to transfer the stock from her name, she never really approved, ratified, or acquiesced in the transfer to herself. Each side asked for an instructed verdict without more; the trial judge directed one in favor of Mrs. Vreeland, and in support of this action said: "Although the burden was upon the defendant to show that she was not in fact the owner of the stock (Finn v. Brown, 142 U. S. 56, 67, 35 L. ed. 936, 939, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136), I think that she has borne the burden by proving that the placing of the stock in her name in the first instance was unauthorized,-without her knowledge and consent, and that she did not thereafter acquiesce in this act or in any way ratify it. I am constrained to hold, therefore, that the defendant is not liable and that a Mr. Pierre P. Garven submitted the verdict should be directed in her favor." cause for defendant in error: The defendant in error was not a shareholder, and is not liable for the assessment. Richmond v. Irons, 121 U. S. 27-66, 30 L. ed. 864-877, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 788; Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138, 33 L. ed. 531, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290; Pauly v. State Loan & T. Co. 165 U. S. 606, 612, 41 L. ed. 844, 847, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465. It is conceded that there is no disputed question of fact. Both parties requested the court to direct a verdict. It has been held in this court that this action on the part of counsel was necessarily a request that the court find the facts; and the parties are, therefore, concluded by the findings made by the court upon which the resulting instruction of law was given. Final judgment entered upon the consequent verdict was approved by the circuit court of appeals (156 C. C. A. 632, 244 Fed. 346). conclusions therefrom the latter court In respect of the evidence and its said: ant was a shareholder of record and that "The plaintiff proved that the defendshe did nothing to remove her name as such. This was sufficient to establish prima facie the defendant's liability. Finn v. Brown, supra; Matteson v. Dent, 176 U. S. 521, 530, 44 L. ed. 571, 575, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 419. The burden then shifted to her (Finn v. Brown) to show that the act of making her a shareholder was in the first instance [297] unauthorized; that it was without her knowl The court's decision, as evidenced by its instruction to the jury that they render a verdict for the defendant, was a finding of fact, which concluded both parties as effectually as if the same fact had been found by the jury." The established rule is: "Where both parties request a peremptory instruction and do nothing more, they thereby assume the facts to be undisputed, and. in effect, submit to the trial judge the determination of the inferences proper to be drawn therefrom." And upon review, a finding of fact by the trial court under such circumstances must stand if the record discloses substantial evidence to support it. Anderson v. Messenger, 85 C. C. A. 468, 158 Fed. 250, 253; Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 157, 39 L. ed. 655, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566; Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 210 U. S. 1, 8, 52 L. ed. 931, 936, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 607, 15 Ann. Cas. 70; Sena v. American Turquoise Co. 220 U. S. 497, 501, 55 L. ed. 559, 561, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; American Nat. Bank v. Miller, 229 U. S. 517, 520, 57 L. ed. 1310, 1311, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 883; Mead v. Chesbrough Bldg. Co. 81 C. C. A. 184, 151 Fed. 998, 1002; American Nat. Bank v. Miller, 107 C. C. A. 456, 185 Fed. 338, 341. edge or consent; and that she has not, unauthorized act; that question was one since acquiesced in or ratified it. That of fact; upon it depended her liability. she has sustained the burden upon the first two points is not disputed; therefore the remaining question is as to evidence of her ratification. .. Considering this testimony in connection with corroborating testimony, it appears to us that what Mary A. Vreeland did, in legal effect, was to make a valid execution of a power of attorney for the transfer of stock. That act, in so far as it authorized a transfer of stock, she cannot avoid by pleading ignorance. As the question here does not involve the validity of the act to effect a transfer, but concerns its evidential imputation of the knowledge with which it was done, we are of opinion that the circumstances which attended the act were a part of it and affected the evidential inferences to be drawn from it. These circumstances show that before acting, the defendant requested to be informed as to what she was asked to do; this information was denied her. It was denied her under representations and influences which, when she acted, led her to believe she was doing something entirely different from that which she was actually doing; that is, she was made to believe she was correcting a mistake of her husband, a mistake affecting his affairs, not that she was dealing with or assigning away her own property. Therefore, we think the circumstances were such as to negative the knowledge which otherwise it is presumed her act would have imparted. They contradicted the normal imputations of her act, and left her without that knowledge which was a prerequisite to a valid ratification of her husband's unauthorized act." It further held: "Instead of submitting the case to the jury, however, each party asked the court for binding instructions in his favor, which, under Beuttell v. Magone, 157 U. S. 154, 39 L. ed. 654, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566, is not a submission to the court without the intervention [298] of a jury, within the intent of Rev. Stat. §§ 649, 700, Comp. Stat. 1916, §§ 1587, 1668, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. pp. 130, 205, but is equivalent to a joint request for a finding of fact by the court, and when the court, acting upon such request, directs the jury to find for one of the parties, both are concluded on its finding. In this case the parties submitted to the court the question of the wife's ratification of her husband's Counsel for the receiver maintained that, when Mrs. Vreeland indorsed the certificates in blank at the request of her husband, who declared this necessary to enable him to correct his mistake, she thereby indisputably ratified his unauthorized transfer of the stock to her and assumed the duty promptly to remove her name from the bank books or suffer the liability imposed upon duly registered shareholders. But we think the courts below rightly held that facts and circumstances concerning this indorsement could be shown in order to negative the inference which [299] would have followed if unexplained. Glenn v. Garth, 133 N. Y. 18, 36, 37, 30 N. E. 649, 31 N. E. 344. And as without doubt there is substantial evidence tending to show she had no actual intention to ratify, affirm, or acquiesce in her husband's unauthorized act, we must accer that as finally established In Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138, 33 L. ed. 531, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 290, which involved the liability of a married woman for an assessment levied against national bank stockholders, speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, this court |