In the Estate of Cecilia L. Booth, deceased. ing of the words "signed" and "signature" in the statute of 1851, of the word "signed" in the statute of 1850, and of the same word in the statute of 1714. The last named act (1 Laws of N. J., 7) provided that wills should be in writing and should be "signed" by the testator. When that act went into operation the statute of frauds (29 Charles II, chap. 3) was nearly forty years old. That statute had prescribed by its fifth section that all devises and bequests of lands should be "in writing and signed by the parties so devising the same," * * * and should be "attested and subscribed by three or four credible witnesses." As early as 1680 the court of king's bench decided that, within the meaning of section 5, the position of the testator's signature was immaterial (Lemayne agt. Stanley, 3 Lev., 1). It was held by all the judges that the words, "I, John Stanley," written by John Stanley himself in the exordium of his will, constituted a valid signature "within the statute, which does not appoint where the will shall be signed, at the top, bottom or margin, and, therefore, a signing in any part is sufficient." This decision has been adversely criticised by writers of legal treatises; but the interpretation which it fastened upon the statute of frauds was stoutly upheld in the English courts for more than a century and a-half, and, until the enactment of the statute of 1 Victoria (chap. 26), a subscription by the testator at the foot or end of his will was never deemed essential to its validity (see Cook agt. Parsons, Finch's Prec. in Ch., 185; Coles agt. Trecothick, 9 Ves., 249; Morrison agt. Turnour, 18 Ves., 176; Trott agt. Skidmore, 6 Jur. [N. S.], 760.) The American courts have generally followed in the path of these decisions, though at times somewhat grudgingly. It was declared by the general court of Virginia, in 1815 (Selden agt. Colter, 2 Va. Cas., 553), that in interpreting the statute of wills of that state (a statute which was admittedly borrowed from 29 Charles II, chap. 3), the doctrine of Lemayne agt. Stanley (supra) should be accepted as authoritative. PARKER, J., pronouncing the opinion of the court, said that VOL. II 15 In the Estate of Cecilia L. Booth, deceased. the word "signed," as used in the Virginia Wills act, must be taken as having the legal sense that had been stamped upon it by the English courts, and declared it to be settled law that the insertion of a testator's name in the beginning of a holographic will constituted a sufficient signing. To similar effect see, also, Matter of Sarah Miles (4 Dana [Ky.], 1); Adams agt. Fields (21 Vt., 256); Allen agt. Everitt (12 B. Monroe, 371); Armstrong agt. Armstrong (29 Ala. [N. S.], 538). These cases fully establish the proposition that where the testator's signature is made one of the essential features of the valid execution of a will, his name need not be subscribed at the foot or end of such will, but if written in any part of the instrument will constitute a sufficient signature, provided that such instrument is in the handwriting of the testator himself, and that by inserting his name he has designed to authenticate such instrument without further signature, and provided, also, that such insertion of his name has been made by the testator in the presence of the attesting witnesses, or has in their presence been duly acknowledged. Several of the cases above cited go much further than this; few have fallen under my observation that do not go as far: In Catlett agt. Catlett (35 Mo., 340), cited by the contestant, the so called will was not in the handwriting of the testator and was not put upon paper in his presence. Besides, the testimonium clause clearly indicated that the introduction of his name at the beginning of the instrument was not intended to take the place of a more formal signature. In Waller agt. Waller (1 Gratt., 454), also cited by contestant, the paper in dispute was holographic, but though it concluded with an unfilled attestation clause it bore the names of no witnesses. From these facts the court inferred that the instrument was deliberative merely, and that in its unfinished state its maker could never have intended it as a completed will. Ramsey agt. Ramsey (13 Gratt., 664) and Roy agt. Roy's In the Estate of Cecilia L. Booth, deceased. Ex'rs (16 Gratt., 418), are decisions interpretative of the Virginia Wills act of 1849. That act required not only that a will should be signed by the testator, but that it should be signed "in such manner as to make it manifest that the name was intended as a signature." In view of the exactions of this statute, the courts held in the two cases just cited that the act of a testator in writing his name at the commencement of a holographic will was an equivocal act, and would not constitute a sufficient signing, unless the testator's intention to give it effect as a signature was somehow made apparent on the face of the paper. Whatever construction I might give to the words "signed," and "signature," in the New Jersey statute of 1851, if the question of their meaning were now res integra, the weight of authority fully sustains the proponent's claim that Mrs. Booth's insertion of her name in the opening sentence of the paper before me constituted, when taken in connection with the attendant circumstances, a valid and sufficient signing. In Hoysradt agt. Kingman (22 N. Y., 372), DENIO, J., referring to the re-enactment in this state of the statute of frauds and to the decisions of the English courts interpreting that statute, declared that those decisions were "authority with us to the same extent as in the English courts." In Davis agt. Shields (26 N. Y., 352-358), our court of errors clearly recognized the technical distinction between the word "sign" and the word "subscribe." So also did our court of appeals in James agt. Patten (6 N. Y., 9). So did the legislature of this state when, in 1830, the existing wills act was placed upon the statute book. The express direction in that act contained, that a testator's name must thenceforth be subscribed at the end of his will, was avowedly inserted to prevent the recurrence of the mischiefs that were supposed to have resulted from the loose interpretation of the word sign in the statute of frauds. Similar restrictive provisions were enacted in Pennsylvania three years later, and by the British parliament in 1837. It In the Estate of Cecilia L. Booth, deceased. was after these conspicuous events that the legislature of New Jersey addressed itself in 1851 to the modification of the statute of 1714, respecting the execution of wills. The word "signed" had then a precise technical meaning which had been firmly established by a long line of adjudications. Surely that much construed word would not have been made to do duty in the amended statute if the legislature had intended to prescribe more stringent rules than had theretofore existed respecting the place of a testator's signature. Third. The evidence does not distinctly show that the witness Mamie Clifford saw the name of Cecilia L. Booth written by the decedent; and it is possible that at the time it was written Miss Clifford was not in the same room with the decedent, but in the room adjoining. Under all the circumstances, however, the signature was probably made in her presence within the decisions of Compton agt. Mitton (7 Halst, 70); Mickle agt. Matlock (17 N. J. Law, 88), and Ludlow agt. Ludlow (35 N. J. Eq., 489). Besides, there can be no doubt that when Mrs. Booth was writing the will both the witnesses were at hand for the purpose of attesting it; and that when in their presence she declared it to be her will, she intentionally placed it before them so that her name stood revealed. This was a substantial acknowledgment of the sig nature (Beckett agt. Howe, 39 L. J. R. [N. Š.], Prob. & M., 1; In the Goods of Janaway, 44 L. J., P. & M., 6 ; Ilott agt. George, 3 Curt., 172; Keigwin agt. Keigwin, 3 Curt., 611; In the Goods of Bosanquet, 2 Rob., 577; Gwillam agt. Gwillam, 3 Sw. & Tr., 200; Baskin agt. Baskin, 36 N. Y., 416). Petition granted. Spencer agt. Wait. SUPREME COURT. GORDON P. SPENCER agt. ELIZA WAIT. Justices' court-Judgment - Effect of filing justice's transcript in county clerk's office-Code of Procedure, section 63 — Code of Civil Procedure, section 3017. The filing of a justice's transcript in the county clerk's office, makes the judgment of the justice a judgment of the county court for all purposes. The statute of limitations applicable to such a judgment, is the statute applicable to judgments rendered in courts of record. Jefferson Circuit, June, 1883. On the 15th day of November, 1867, one Henry G. P. Spencer recovered a judgment in justices' court of Jefferson county against Eliza Wait, defendant, for forty-four dollars and seventy-three cents damages and three dollars and fifty cents costs. On the second day of December thereof, a transcript of said judgment was duly filed in the Jefferson county clerk's office. On April 20, 1883, H. G. P. Spencer assigned to plaintiff said judgment. This action, which is on said judgment, was commenced April 23, 1883. James A. Ward, for plaintiff. Charles D. Wright, for defendant. VANN, J. Although the judgment sued upon in this action was rendered in a court not of record, it became the judgment of a court of record upon the filing of the transcript. In the language of the statute, "thenceforth the judgment is deemed a judgment of the county court of that county" (Code of Civil Pro., sec. 3017). For what purpose? must be for every If no particular purpose is specified it purpose. Is any purpose specified? No purpose is directly specified, and no limitation is made. Is the statute to be construed as impliedly specifying the purpose of enforce |