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facts were that, a statute required a notice | vehicle for giving publicity to a proposed to be published "for two weeks successively" sale of bonds, it seems to us that one publicain a newspaper, and it had been published in only four issues of a daily paper, and the court held that the notice had been published "for two weeks successively," as the statute required.

In Knox County v. Ninth National Bank, 147 U. S. 91, 13 Sup. Ct. 267, 37 L. Ed. 93, a part of the syllabus is:

"An order of court, directing a notice of an election which was to take place in 34 days to be given by publication in a designated newspaper for five weeks, must be construed to mean a publication in each of the five weeks."

We conclude that the rule prevailing in Massachusetts is a better one than that in vogue in Nebraska. In Nebraska, it is held that where a notice is required to be published for a stated number of weeks, its publication once a week for the required period is a compliance with the statute, if it is published in a weekly newspaper, but that, if it is published in a daily paper, it must be published in every issue of that paper during the specified period. If a weekly newspaper has 10,000 subscribers, and a daily paper has that number, other things being equal, we presume that the publication of a notice in the daily paper would impart notice to about as many persons as publication thereof in the weekly paper would.

In the larger cities, the leading dailies have more subscribers and reach more people than the weekly press do, we believe. As a

tion in a leading daily paper is as effective as one publication in a leading weekly. In this matter, the statute requires the publication of the notice "for two weeks before any sale of bonds" in one newspaper in the county where the bonds are to be issued, and in one leading newspaper in the city of Portland, and in one leading financial newspaper in the city of New York. The defendants caused the publication of the notice in the Pacific Banker of Portland, Multnomah county, published weekly, and in the Evening Telegram, published daily in the city of Portland, and in the Daily Bond Buyer, published daily in New York City. The bids for the bonds were to be opened on November 9, 1914. Said notice was published in each of said three newspapers on October 24 and October 31 and November 7, 1914. Said notice was published once a week for two successive weeks prior to the time fixed for opening the bids and selling the bonds. In fact, said notice was published three times in each of said newspapers.

We conclude that the notice, given as stated supra, was a compliance with the said statute, and that the defendants have a right to issue and sell said bonds, and that the plaintiff's complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of suit. The demurrer to the said complaint is therefore sustained, and the suit is dismissed and the decree of the court below is affirmed.

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS

PEOPLE v. MANDAL. (Cr. 264.) (District Court of Appeal, Third District, California. Oct. 27, 1914.) Appeal from Superior Court, Sacramento County; N. D. Arnot, Judge. Leo Mandal was convicted of pimping, and he appeals. Affirmed. Martin I. Welsh, of Sacramento, for appellant. U. S. Webb, Atty. Gen., and J. Charles Jones, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the People.

ed. C. A. Irwin, of Denver, and O. A. Johnson, of Boulder, for plaintiff in error.

GABBERT, J. Plaintiff in error brought suit against the Colorado & Southern Railway Company and the Denver, Boulder & Western Railroad Company, to recover damages for personal injuries and destruction of her property, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendants. At the conclusion of the testimony on the part of plaintiff, the defendants moved for a nonsuit, which was sustained, and the action dismissed. The damages for which plaintiff seeks to recover were caused by the same explosion of powder in the circumstances fully narrated in Willson v. Colorado & Southern Railway Co., 142 Pac. 174, in which case the trial court sustained motions for nonsuit. That judgment was reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial, for the reason that from the testimony the case should have been submitted

BURNETT, J. On this appeal we have not been favored with any argument, oral or written. Nevertheless we have examined the record, and we find that defendant was properly charged with the offense designated in the statute as "pimping," that sufficient evidence of his guilt was received, and that no prejudicial error was committed during the trial. The judgment and order are therefore affirmed. We concur: CHIPMAN, P. J.; HART, J. to the jury. The case at bar is ruled by the

PEOPLE v. TAGGART. (Cr. 263.) (District Court of Appeal, Third District, Califor

nia.

Willson Case, and for the reasons therein stated it was error to grant the motions for nonsuit and dismiss the action. The judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause remandfor a new trial. Judgment reversed. MUSSER, C. J., and HILL, J., concur.

ed Oct. 27, 1914.) Appeal from Superior Court, Del Norte County; John L. Childs, Judge. Orville Taggart was convicted of rape, and he appeals. Affirmed. E. M. Frost, of Eureka, for appellant. U. S. Webb, Atty. Gen., and J. Charles Jones, Deputy Atty. Gen., for the People.

PER CURIAM. Defendant was convicted by a jury of the crime of rape upon one May Bartol, at the time under the age of consent, and was sentenced to imprisonment for the term of five years. It appears from a fragmentary record sent up to this court that the verdict was rendered on November 12, 1913, and upon the motion of defendant's attorney sentence was postponed from time to time until December 8, 1913. The record of that day reads: "Defendant and attorney in court. Defendant informs court he has no further use for an attorney. E. M. Frost, attorney, makes address to court and retires from case.' 99 Pass

1.

SHULL v. SHULL. (No. 7743.) (Supreme Court of Colorado. Dec. 7, 1914.) Department Error to Logan County Court; Jno. W. Landrum, Judge. Action between A. T. Shull and Leonard Shull, who sues by Alonzo Shull, his next friend. From the judgment, A. T. Shull brings error. Affirmed. Quitman Brown, of Sterling, for plaintiff in error. McConley & Hinkley, of Sterling, for defendant in error. authenticated and properly certified bill of exPER CURIAM. In the absence of a duly ceptions, the questions raised by plaintiff in error cannot be considered. The judgment of the county court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

CHAMBLISS V. STATE.

(Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Nov. (No. A-2102.) kogee County; Farrar L. McCain, Judge. Ed 21, 1914.) Appeal from Superior Court, MusChambliss was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals. Affirmed. Crump, Crump & Garrett, of Muskogee, for plaintiff in error. Chas. West, Atty. Gen., and C. J. Davenport, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

ing of sentence was postponed from time to time thereafter until February 24, 1914. It appears that on that day defendant withdrew his motion for a new trial and his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. Thereupon the court passed sentence upon him. We find in the record what purports to be a notice of appeal from the judgment of February 24, 1914, signed, "E. M. Frost, Attorney for Defendant, PER CURIAM. Plaintiff in error was tried and Henry L. Ford, of Counsel, for Defendant,” to which is attached an affidavit of service upon and convicted on an information which charged to which is attached an affidavit of service upon the unlawful possession of 50 gallons of whisky the district attorney by mail, and marked, "Filed March 6, 1914. W. L. Nichols, Clerk." No and one gallon of wine, with the intention transcript of the phonographic report of the of selling the same, and on the 5th day of There is nothing before July, 1913, in accordance with a verdict of There is nothing before the jury, he was sentenced to be confined for 60 days in the county jail, and to pay a fine of $250, and the costs. amination of the record, our conclusion is that Upon a careful exthis appeal is without merit. The information is sufficient, and it appears that the plaintiff in error had a fair trial. The judgment of conviction is therefore affirmed.

trial has been sent up.

the court for review, if it be admitted that an appeal was properly taken, except the minute entries of the trial kept by the clerk and the judgment of conviction. No error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.

McCAVE v. COLORADO & S. RY. CO., et al. (No. 8075.) (Supreme Court of Colorado. Dec. 7, 1914.) Error to District Court, Boulder County; James E. Garrigues, Judge. Action by Mary McCave against the Colorado & Southern Railway Company and another. There was a judgment of dismissal, and plaintiff brings error. Reversed, and cause remand

COFER v. STATE. (No. A-2229.) (Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Nov. 21, 1914.) Appeal from County Court, Pottawatomie County; Hal Johnson, Judge. Oscar Cofer was convicted of a violation of the prohibitory law, and appeals. Appeal dismissed. W

P. Langston, of Shawnee, for plaintiff in error. tion. The instruction given by the court did
Chas. West, Atty. Gen., and C. J. Davenport, not. The judgment is reversed, and the cause
Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
remanded for a new trial.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff in error was in the court below convicted of the offense of hav

ing the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor with the intent to sell the same. Judgment was entered on the 19th day of August, 1913, and he was sentenced to be confined in the county jail for 60 days and to pay a fine of $250 and costs. He attempted to appeal from the judgment by filing in this court on April 8, 1914, a petition in error with case-made at tached. The Attorney General has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that a petition in error was not filed in this court until long after the expiration of the time allowed by law within which to take such appeal. In misdemeanor cases 120 days is the maximum time within which to take an appeal. In this case more than six months had elapsed after the judgment was entered before the petition in error was filed in this court. As the court failed to acquire jurisdiction, the motion to dismiss must be sustained. The purported appeal is dismissed, and the case remanded.

MERCHANT v. STATE. (No. A-1658.) (Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Nov. 28, 1914.) Appeal from County Court, Stephens County; W. H. Admire, Judge. E. E. Merchant was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals. Reversed. Womack & Brown, of Duncan, for plaintiff in error. Smith C. Matson and C. J. Davenport, Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff in error, E. E. Merchant, was convicted at the January, 1912, term of the county court of Stephens county on a charge of unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquor from one place in said county to another place therein, and his punishment fixed at imprisonment in the county jail for a period of 30 days and a fine of $50. It appears from the evidence that the intoxicating liquor in question was an interstate shipment of beer for individual consumption. It is argued that the court erred in giving the following instruction: "Second. And in this connection I charge you that if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant conveyed intoxicating liquors as charged against him in the information herein, in Stephens county, Okl., on or about the time alleged in the information, from the place and to the place alleged, in the city of Marlow, as charged, then I charge you that you should find the defendant guilty, and so say by your verdict. In such event you may assess his punishment at a fine of not less than $50, nor more than $500, and by imprisonment in the county jail for not less than 30 days nor more than 6 months, as you see proper, but you are not required to assess the punishment." In lieu of this instruction counsel requested the following instruction: "Gentlemen, in this case the state alleges that the defendant conveyed intoxicating liquors from block 114 to block 115 in the city of Marlow, Okl., and in this connection I charge you that it is the duty of the state to prove such conveyance from said block 114 to said block 115 beyond a reasonable doubt; and I further charge you that in the consideration of this case you cannot consider any other place or places from which to which any conveyance might have been made, if any conveyance has been shown, save and except from the place to the place alleged in the information in this case." Without consuming time in the discussion of other assignments, we are of opinion that the court should have given the instruction requested in lieu of the one he did give. The instruction requested

Pete

(Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Nov. PASTORIA v. STATE. (No. A-2119.) 21, 1914.) Appeal from County Court, Pittsburg County; B. P. Hammond, Judge. Pastoria was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals. Reversed. J. W. Crow and J. R. Miller, both of McAlester, for plaintiff in error. Chas. West, Atty. Gen., and C. J. Davenport, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff in error was tried and convicted on an information which charged that he did unlawfully have in his possession intoxicating liquor, to wit, about 16 gallons of Choctaw beer, with the intent to sell the same, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $50, and 30 days' confinement in the county jail. The first assignment of error is that the court erred in overruling defendant's application for continuance. The application was based on the absence and sickness of the wife of the defendant, who had just given birth to a child and could not attend court, and that, if present, she would testify that the Choctaw beer did not belong to the defendant, but to two other Italians, who were building a blacksmith shop for the defendant, and on the absence of Alphonso Lanzei, and Edward Zaccanti, the parties who were working for the defendant, building the shop, and who, if present, would testify that the Choctaw beer found there belonged to them, that they made it for their own use, and that the defendant had no interest therein. The record shows that the defendant had these two witnesses in attendance the day before the case was called for trial, that at that time it was agreed by and between the county attorney and the defendant's attorneys that the state would not be ready for trial on account of the absence of the sheriff who made the seizure, and that the case would be passed, and relying thereon the defendant excused the witnesses, and they left and went home. When the case was called for trial the next day, the court refused to recognize the agreement as made, stating that he would require the state to make a showing in open court why the case should not be tried. We are inclined to think that the defendant had a right to rely on the agreement, and that the court exceeded its discretionary power in overruling the application for continuance. The next assignment is "that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict." We think this assignment is well taken. There is no evidence tending to show that the so-called Choctaw beer found on the defendant's premises was intoxicating liquor. On the other hand, the testimony of the witnesses for the state tended to show that it was nonintoxicating. For the reasons stated, it is ordered that the judgment be and the same is hereby reversed.

SEARS v. STATE. (No. A-2157.) (Criminal Court of Appeals of Oklahoma. Dec. 12, 1914.) Appeal from County Court, Seminole County; A. S. Norvell, Judge. John Sears was convicted of violating the prohibitory law, and appeals. Affirmed. J. A. Patterson, of Wewoka, for plaintiff in error. C. J. Davenport, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

PER CURIAM. Plaintiff in error, John Sears, was convicted at the July, 1913, term of the county court of Seminole county on a charge of selling intoxicating liquor, and his punishment fixed at a fine of $50 and imprisonment in the county jail for a period of 30 days. The appeal was filed in this court on December 31, 1913. The cause was assigned for hearing at the November, 1914, term thereof. No briefs have been filed on behalf of plaintiff in error,

ment. The Assistant Attorney General, in open court, moved an affirmation on the ground that the appeal had not been properly prosecuted, and had been abandoned. The motion is sustained. The judgment of the trial court is therefore affirmed. Mandate ordered forthwith.

FRANCIS v. THIENES. (Supreme Court of Oregon. Dec. 22, 1914.) Department 2. Appeal from Circuit Court, Lane County; L. T. Harris, Judge. Action by I. M. Francis against W. C. Thienes. Judgment for the plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Appeal dismissed. H. E. Slattery, of Eugene, for appellant. Fred E. Smith, of Eugene, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Upon the hearing of this case it appeared that all the questions upon which the defendant relied upon this appeal were settled and determined by a decree in the equity suit of W. C. Thienes v. I. M. Francis and A. M. Brewer, in which an opinion was heretofore rendered by this court (138 Pac. 845), in which suit W. C. Thienes filed a complaint in the nature of a cross-bill in equity. Therefore, there being no question presented for review or consideration, and it remaining only for the parties to carry out the decree heretofore rendered, this action should be dismissed; and it is so ordered.

ent.

quash the indictment. Geo. Livesey, of Bellingham, for appellants.

PER CURIAM. On March 11, 1914, in the superior court of Whatcom county, defendants were convicted of maintaining a common nuisance, and they now appeal from the final judg ment and sentence entered upon the verdict of the jury. Appellants were indicted by a grand jury, and moved to quash the indictment for moned, drawn, or impaneled as required by the reason that the grand jury was not sumlaw. Error is assigned upon the denial of this motion. It has been stipulated by the prosecuting attorney and appellants' counsel that the grand jury which returned the indictment herein was the same grand jury that returned the indictment in State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court for Whatcom County, 144 Pac. 32. In that case we held that the grand jury had not been drawn and impaneled as required by law. In view of the stipulation above mentioned, and upon authority of the Murphy Case, and for the reasons therein stated, the judgment of the lower court is reversed, with directions to quash the indictment heretofore filed against appellants,

STATE v. HARDIN. (No. 12543.) (Supreme Court of Washington. Dec. 15, 1914.) Appeal from Superior Court, Whatcom County; Guy C. Alston, Judge. A. E. Hardin was BAUER v. BAUER. (No. 12117.) (Su- convicted of maintaining a common nuisance, and preme Court of Washington. Dec. 15, 1914.) he appeals. Reversed, with directions to quash Department 1. Appeal from Superior Court, the indictment. John A. Kellogg and Howard King County; Everett Smith, Judge. Action C. Thompson, both of Bellingham, for appellant. for divorce by Marie Katherine Bauer against Jacob Bauer. Decree for defendant, and plain- superior court of Whatcom county, defendant PER CURIAM. On April 11, 1914, in the tiff appeals. Affirmed. Frank M. Egan and George A. Meagher, both of Seattle, for appel- was convicted of maintaining a common nuilant. Peters & Powell, of Seattle, for respond-sance, and he now appeals from the final judgment and sentence entered upon the verdict of the jury. Appellant was indicted by a grand jury, and moved to quash the indictment for the reason that the grand jury was not summoned, drawn, or impaneled as required by law. Error is assigned upon the denial of this motion. It has been stipulated by the prosecuting attorney and appellant's counsel that the grand jury which returned the indictment herein was the same grand jury that returned the indictment in State ex rel. Murphy v. Superior Court for Whatcom County, 144 Pac. 32. In that case we held that the grand jury had not been drawn STATE v. GERI et al. (No. 12385.) (Su- and impaneled as required by law. In view of preme Court of Washington. Dec. 15, 1914.) the stipulation above mentioned, and upon auAppeal from Superior Court, Whatcom Coun- thority of the Murphy Case, and for the reaty; Ed. E. Hardin, Judge. Raffael Geri and Raffael Geri and sons therein stated, the judgment of the lower another were convicted of creating a nuisance, court is reversed, with directions to quash the and they appeal. Reversed, with directions to indictment heretofore filed against appellant.

PER CURIAM. This is an action for divorce. After a full hearing in the court below, the prayer of the plaintiff's complaint was denied. There is no question of law involved. The court below decided that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient to warrant a decree. A majority of this department are of opinion that the findings and decree of the lower court should not be disturbed. Affirmed.

END OF CASES IN VOL. 144

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