Opinion of the Court.

that is, not produced by inducements engendering either hope or fear, is settled by the authorities referred to at the outset. The facts in the particular cases decided in this court, and which have been referred to, manifested so clearly that the confessions were voluntary, that no useful purpose can be subserved by analyzing them. In this court also it has been settled that the mere fact that the confession is made to a police officer, while the accused was under arrest in or out of prison, or was drawn out by his questions, does not necessarily render the confession involuntary, but, as one of the circumstances, such imprisonment or interrogation may be taken into account in determining whether or not the statements of the prisoner were voluntary. Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 174; Sparf v. United States, 156 U. S. 51, 55. And this last rule thus by this court established is also the doctrine upheld by the state decisions.

In the various state courts of last resort the general rule we have just referred to, that a confession must be voluntary, is generally recognized; although in Indiana there is a stat ute authorizing confessions obtained by inducements to be given in evidence to the jury with all the attending circumstances, except when made under the influence of fear produced by threats, while it is also provided that a conviction cannot be had by proof of a confession made under inducement, "without corroborating testimony." Rev. Stat. Ind. 1881, 1802. And, in the Texas Code of Procedure, article 750, it is provided that confessions shall not be used against a prisoner at his trial, " if, at the time it was made, the defendant was in jail or other place of confinement, nor where he was in custody of an officer, unless such confession be made in the voluntary statement of the accused, taken before an examining court in accordance with law; or be made voluntarily, after having been first cautioned that it may be used against him; or unless, in connection with such confession, he make statement of facts or of circumstances that are found to be true, which conduce to establish his guilt, such as the finding of secreted or stolen property, or instrument with which he states the offence was committed." Tex. Rev. Stat. 1879.

Opinion of the Court.

The English doctrine which restricts the operation of inducements solely to those made by one in authority has been adopted by some state courts, but disapproved of in others, as in Ohio. Spears v. State, 2 Ohio St. 583. Whether it is one which should be followed by this court in view of the express terms of the Constitution, need not be now considered, as it does not arise under the state of facts here presented. In some it is also held that the fact that the accused is examined on oath by a magistrate or coroner, or by a grand jury, with or without an oath, will, per se, exclude confessions, because of the influence presumed to arise from the authority of the examining officer or body. People v. McMahon, (1857) 15 N. Y. 384, followed in People v. Mondon, (1886) 103 N. Y. 211, 218; State v. Matthews, (1872) 66 N. C. 106; Jackson v. State, (1879) 56 Mississippi, 311, 312; State v. Clifford, (1892) 86 Iowa, 550. This doctrine as to examining magistrates is in some States enforced by statutes somewhat similar in character to the English statutes. (2 Taylor Ev. § 888, note 2.)

In some of the States it has been held that where questions are propounded to a prisoner by one having a right to ask them, and he remains silent, where from the nature of the inquiries, if innocent, reply would naturally be made, the fact of such silence may be weighed by the jury. See authorities collected in Chamberlayne's note to 2 Taylor Ev. 5884, et seq.

Having stated the general lines upon which the American cases proceed, we will not attempt to review in detail the numerous decisions in the various courts of last resort in the several States, treating of confessions in the divergent aspects in which that doctrine may have presented itself but will content ourselves with a brief reference to a few leading and well considered cases treating of the subject of inducements, and which are, therefore, apposite to the issue now considered.

In the following cases, the language in each mentioned, was held to be an inducement sufficient to exclude a confession or statement made in consequence thereof: In Kelly v. State, (1882) 72 Alabama, 244, saying to the prisoner, "You have got your foot in it, and somebody else was with you;

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now, if you did break open the door, the best thing you can do is to tell all about it, and to tell who was with you, and to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth;" in People v. Barrie, 49 California, 342, saying to the accused, "it will be better for you to make a full disclosure;" in People v. Thompson, (1890) 84 California, 598, 605, saying to the accused, "I don't think the truth will hurt anybody. It will be better for you to come out and tell all you know about it, if you feel that way;" in Beery v. United States, (1893) 2 Colorado, 186, 188, 203, advising the prisoner to make full restitution, and saying, "if you do so it will go easy with you; it will be better for you to confess; the door of mercy is open and that of justice closed;" and threatening to arrest the accused and expose his family if he did not confess; in State v. Bostick, (1845) 4 Harr. (Del.) 563, saying to one suspected of crime, "the suspicion is general against you, and you had as well tell all about it, the prosecution will be no greater, I don't expect to do anything with you; I am going to send you home to your mother;" in Green v. State, (1891) 88 Georgia, 516, saying to the accused, "Edmund, if you know anything, it may be best for you to tell it;" or, “Edmund, if you know anything, go and tell it, and it may be best for you;" in Rector v. Commonwealth, (1882) So Kentucky, 468, saying to the prisoner in a case of larceny, "it will go better with you to tell where the money is, all I want is my money, and if you will tell me where it is, I will not prosecute you hard;" in Biscoe v. State, (1887) 67 Maryland, 6, saying to the accused, "it will be better for you to tell the truth and have no more trouble about it;" in Commonwealth v. Nott, (1883) 135 Mass. 269, saying to the accused, "you had better own up; I was in the place when you took it; we have got you down fine; this is not the first you have taken, we have got other things against you nearly as good as this;" in Commonwealth v. Meyers, (1894) 160 Mass. 530, saying to the ac cused, “you had better tell the truth;" in People v. Wolcott, (1883) 51 Michigan, 612, saying to the accused, "it will be better for you to confess;" in Territory v. Underwood, (1888) 8 Montana, 131, saying to the prisoner that it would be better

Opinion of the Court.

to tell the prosecuting witness all about it, and that the officer thought the prosecuting witness would withdraw the prosecution or make it as light as possible; in State v. York, (1858) 37 N. H. 175, saying to one under arrest immediately before a confession, "if you are guilty you had better own it;" in People v. Phillips, (1870) 42 N. Y. 200, saying to the prisoner, "The best you can do is to own up; it will be better for you;" in State v. Whitfield, (1874) 70 N. C. 356, saying to the accused, "I believe you are guilty; if you are you had better say so; if you are not you had better say that;" in State v. Drake, (1893) 113 N. C. 624, saying to the prisoner, "if you are guilty, I would advise you to make an honest confession; it might be easier for you. It is plain against you;" in Vaughan v. Commonwealth, (1867) 17 Gratt. 576, saying to the accused, "you had as well tell all about it."

We come, then, to a consideration of the circumstances surrounding, and the facts established to exist, in reference to the confession, in order to determine whether it was shown to have been voluntarily made. Before analyzing the statement of the police detective as to what took place between himself and the accused it is necessary to recall the exact situation. The crime had been committed on the high seas. Brown, immediately after the homicide, had been arrested by the crew in consequence of suspicion aroused against him, and had been by them placed in irons. As the vessel came in sight of land, and was approaching Halifax, the suspicions of the crew having been also directed to Bram, he was arrested by them and placed in irons. On reaching port, these two suspected persons were delivered to the custody of the police authorities of Halifax and were there held in confinement awaiting the action of the United States consul, which was to determine whether the suspicions which had caused the arrest justified the sending of one or both of the prisoners into the United States for formal charge and trial. Before this examination had taken place the police detective caused Bram to be brought from jail to his private office, and when there alone with the detective he was stripped of his clothing, and either whilst the detective was in the act of so stripping him, or after he was

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denuded, the conversation offered as a confession took place. The detective repeats what he said to the prisoner, whom he had thus stripped, as follows:

"When Mr. Bram came into my office I said to him: 'Bram, we are trying to unravel this horrible mystery.' I said: Your position is rather an awkward one. I have had Brown in this office, and he made a statement that he saw you do the murder.' He said: He could not have seen me. Where was he?' I said: 'He states he was at the wheel.' 'Well,' he said, 'he could not see me from there.""

The fact, then, is, that the language of the accused, which was offered in evidence as a confession, was made use of by him as a reply to the statement of the detective that Bram's co-suspect had charged him with the crime, and, although the answer was in the form of a denial, it was doubtless offered as a confession because of an implication of guilt which it was conceived the words of the denial might be considered to mean. But the situation of the accused, and the nature of the communication made to him by the detective, necessarily overthrows any possible implication that his reply to the detective could have been the result of a purely voluntary mental action; that is to say, when all the surrounding circumstances are considered in their true relations, not only is the claim that the statement was voluntary overthrown, but the impression is irresistibly produced that it must necessarily have been the result of either hope or fear, or both, operating on the mind.

It cannot be doubted that, placed in the position in which the accused was when the statement was made to him that the other suspected person had charged him with crime, the result was to produce upon his mind the fear that if he remained silent it would be considered an admission of guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed for trial as the guilty person, and it cannot be conceived that the converse impression would not also have naturally arisen, that by deny ing there was hope of removing the suspicion from himself. If this must have been the state of mind of one situated as was the prisoner when the confession was made, how in reason