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wife who deserts her husband retains her husband's domicile; Smith v. Smith, 43 La. Ann. 1146, 10 So. 249, holding where husband's conduct has been such as to justify the wife leaving him, she may acquire a separate domicile; Hood v. Hood, 11 Allen, 199, 87 Am. Dec. 710, holding separation by consent does not alter wife's domicile; Shaw v. Shaw, 98 Mass. 161, holding that wife who leaves husband for cause and obtains a new domicile can obtain a divorce for offense committed by husband while both resident in same State. See note to 25 Am. Dec. 378, on husband and wife may have different domiciles; note to 65 Am. Dec. 360, 361, on status of parties after divorce a mensa et thoro, and capacity of wife in such case to sue husband.

Divorce. A decree for alimony is a judicial debt of record against the husband, on which execution or attachment may issue against his person from the court which made the decree, and may be enforced by the wife suing by her next friend, against the husband wherever he may be found, p. 595.

Cited and affirmed in Dow v. Blake, 148 Ill. 87, 39 Am. St. Rep. 163, 35 N. E. 764, Allen v. Allen, 100 Mass. 374, Brisbane v. Dobson. 50 Mo. App. 174, 175, and Bullock v. Bullock, 51 N. J. Eq. 446, 27 Atl. 436, all holding that decree for alimony made by court of competent jurisdiction may be enforced in another State; Conrad v. Everich, 50 Ohio St. 481, 40 Am. St. Rep. 684, 35 N. E. 60, holding that alimony decreed in gross creates a lien on the husband's real estate enforceable by execution; Stewart v. Stewart, 27 W. Va. 175. holding that a decree for gross sum as alimony made by court of another State, is enforceable in West Virginia by a suit in equity: Kunze v. Kunze, 94 Wis. 58, 59 Am. St. Rep. 858, 68 N. W. 392. holding a decree for a gross sum as alimony is enforceable at law in another State; Pancost v. The State, 15 Ohio C. C. 250, holding under the evidence, that husband was unable to pay the alimony. Cited in general discussion in Bullock v. Bullock, 51 N. J. Eq. 447. 27 Atl. 436, on question of faith and credit to be given to judgment of another State.

Distinguished in De Brimont v. Penniman, 10 Blatchf. 440, F. C. 3,715, holding an order of a French court for an American citizen to support his French son-in-law not enforceable in America; Barrett v. Failing, 111 U. S. 529, 28 L. 507, 4 S. Ct. 601, holding that Oregon law giving a divorced person one-third of the real estate, is limited to Oregon divorces.

Divorce. State courts of equity have inherent jurisdiction to grant alimony; wife should sue by her next friend, p. 597.

Cited and principle followed in Gibson v. Patterson, 75 Ga. 553, holding that arrears of alimony may be recovered; Burrows v. Purple, 107 Mass. 435, holding one decree may award past and future alimony; Carter v. Carter, 109 Mass. 310, holding that ali

mony is in the discretion of the court: Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis. 379, holding that "supplementary proceedings" will lie to enforce decree for alimony and a receiver may be appointed; Kempster v. Evans, 81 Wis. 252, 51 N. W. 328, 15 L. R. A. 393, holding that alimony is enforceable in equity not at law.

Miscellaneous. In re Hobbs, 1 Woods, 543, F. C. 6,550, as to the terms "privilege and immunities" in the fourteenth amendment; Fink v. Campbell, 70 Fed. 667, 37 U. S. App. 462, holding husband must be joined in a suit by wife for personal injuries; Barrett v. Barrett, 5 Or. 415, as to right of a divorced wife to question conveyances made by her husband.

XXII HOWARD.

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22 How. 1-19, 16 L. 286, PARKER v. KANE.

Judgment - Partition.— In Wisconsin, a party to partition proceedings, who asserts and litigates his title therein, is bound by that decree in subsequent ejectment proceedings between the same parties, or their privies, over the same title, p. 13.

Cited and principle applied in Street v. Benner, 20 Fla. 712, holding, under statute, court of equity could decree a partition without requiring legal title to be tried in court of law.

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Equity Partition.- In partition proceedings in equity, reference to a court of law to adjudicate a legal title put in issue, is unnecessary in a State where law and equity are administered by the same tribunal, although such would have been the course adopted in an English Chancery Court, p. 17.

Cited and principle applied in Street v. Benner, 20 Fla. 714, holding, under statute, court authorized to decree partition, without requiring legal title to be tried by court of law; Weston v. Stoddard, 137 N. Y. 125, 33 Am. St. Rep. 700, 33 N. E. 64, 20 L. R. A. 629, and n., holding, under code, court can determine all questions arising in action of partition. Cited in 67 Am. Dec. 707, note, that disseised co-tenant may compel partition, collecting authorities.

Deeds. A specific description in deed will limit words of a more general meaning, p. 18.

Cited and principle applied in Slater v. Breese, 36 Mich. 82, holding, if thing is satisfactorily designated, the addition of untrue circumstances will not defeat grant. Cited in 38 Am. Dec. 393, note on where descriptions in deed conflict, collecting authorities. Cited to point that map referred to in a deed becomes an essential part of the conveyance, in Birmingham v. Anderson, 48 Pa. St. 260.

Deeds. Under recording acts of Wisconsin, where parties destroyed unrecorded deed, it is inoperative against a purchaser for value, without notice, p. 16.

22 How. 19-23, 16 L. 279, WHITE v. WRIGHT.

Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over judgments of State courts, unless the record show some contract impaired, or right under treaty, or act of Congress, denied, p. 23.

No citations.

918

22 How. 23-28, 16 L. 239, LAWLER v. CLAFLIN.

Appeal and error.- Under Minnesota code, where jury is waived, and case tried without exceptions, appellate court cannot review the facts, p. 26.

No citations.

22 How. 28-45, 16 L. 360, EMERSON v. SLATER.

Evidence. A written contract, not within the statute of frauds, may be changed by a subsequent parol agreement, p. 42.

Cited and principle applied in Swain v. Seamens, 9 Wall. 271, 272, 19 L. 559, 560, Heisley v. Swanstrom, 40 Minn. 200, 41 N. W. 1030, and Rucker v. Harrington, 52 Mo. App. 488, 497, all holding that agreement within statute of frauds, cannot be varied by a subsequent parol agreement; Railroad Co. v. Trimble, 10 Wall. 383, 19 L. 953, declaring that contracts under seal may be changed by a parol agreement; Kirchner v. Laughlin, 4 N. Mex. 394, 17 Pac. 135, admitting contract under seal to show consideration for subsequent parol agreement; Harris v. Murphy, 119 N. C. 36, 56 Am. St. Rep. 657, 25 S. E. 709, reasserting rule; as also in Wilgus v. Whitehead, 89 Pa. St. 133. Cited, note on this topic, 37 Am. Dec. 161, collecting cases; 100 Am. Dec. 169, and 56 Am. St. Rep. 662, 664, note on alteration of contract within statute of frauds, by subsequent verbal agreement, collecting authorities.

Distinguished in The Delaware, 14 Wall. 603, 20 L. 783, rejecting parol evidence of agreement, before or at time contract was executed; Hawkins v. United States, 96 U. S. 689, 694, 24 L. 607, 609, where contract contained stipulation that contract could not be changed except in writing; Smiley v. Barker, 83 Fed. 686, 55 U. S. App. 130, holding strict performance of written contract, within the statute of frauds, may be waived orally.

Frauds, statute of.— Wherever the main purpose of a promisor is not to answer for the debt or default of another, but to serve or benefit himself, the promise is without the statute, p. 43.

Cited and principle applied in Davis v. Patrick, 141 U. S. 488, 35 L. 829, 12 S. Ct. 59, Chapline v. Atkinson, 45 Ark. 76, 55 Am. Rep. 536, Fisk v. Reser, 19 Colo. 95, 34 Pac. 575, Ledbetter v. McGhees, 84 Ga. 230, 10 S. E. 727, Gagan v. Stevens, 4 Utah, 352, 9 Pac. 708, Spinker v. Armstrong, 86 Va. 1015, 11 S. E. 978, and Ivenson v. Caldwell, 3 Wyo. 467, 27 Pac. 564, all holding that if promisor has a personal, pecuniary interest in transaction, the promise is original; Westmoreland v. Porter, 75 Ala. 458, to same effect; Prout v. Webb, 87 Ala. 600, 6 So. 192, holding promise of banker to pay warehouse charges on cotton, of persons dealing with him, is original; Brown v. Harrell, 40 Ark. 430, holding promise original where promisee was to look to promisor for board of his laborers;

Amer. L. P. Co. v. Wolfe, 30 Fla. 371, 11 So. 491, holding promise
of vendee to pay purchase money to third parties, furnishing goods
to vendor, is original; Borchsenius v. Canutson, 100 Ill. 92, holding
promise of widow to pay debts of husband upon surrender of in-
surance policy, need not be in writing; Horn v. Bray, 51 Ind. 564,
19 Am. Rep. 746, holding promise of surety to indemnify others
becoming sureties, is original; Anderson v. Spence, 72 Ind. 316, 37
Am. Rep. 163, holding valid, verbal promise to indemnify one going
bail for third party; Board of Commrs. v. Cin. S. H. Co., 128 Ind.
247, 27 N. E. 615, 12 L. R. A. 505, and n., and Crawford v. Edison,
45 Ohio St. 246, 13 N. E. 83, both holding promise of owner to pay
sub-contractor, in order to secure completion of work, not within
the statute; Voris v. Star City B. & L. Assn., 20 Ind. App. 640, 50
N. E. 782, holding valid, verbal guaranty of school warrants; Joseph
v. Smith, 39 Neb. 265, 42 Am. St. Rep. 576, 57 N. W. 1014, holding
valid, oral promise of mortgagee to secure release of stock; Wills
v. Cutler, 61 N. H. 409, holding promise of employer to pay debt
due from third person to employee, if he will continue in his em-
ploy, not within the statute; Rose v. Wollenberg, 31 Or. 281, 65 Am.
St. Rep. 832, 44 Pac. 386, 39 L. R. A. 383, and n., holding valid, parol
agreement, fixing relative liability of co-sureties; Muller v. Riviere,
59 Tex. 642, 46 Am. Rep. 292, holding valid, oral promise to pay
husband's debts, creditor to delay foreclosure; Bellows v. Sowles,
57 Vt. 171, 52 Am. Rep. 120, holding valid, promise of executor to
pay heir, taking nothing under the will, for forbearing to sue. Cited
in Gerow v. Riffe, 29 W. Va. 466, 2 S. E. 106, discussing original and
collateral promises. Cited, note on this topic, 95 Am. Dec. 255, 258,
collecting authorities.

Distinguished in Furbish v. Goodnow, 98 Mass. 302, holding valid,
oral promise to pay debt of another, original debtor remaining
liable, though a consideration moved from him to promisor. Denied
in May v. Williams, 61 Miss. 132, 48 Am. Rep. 83, holding promise
to indemnify surety on bail, is within the statute.

Frauds, statute of.- Promise of a railroad stockholder to answer
for company's obligation upon contract of construction, is an origi-
nal promise and not within the statute, where such stockholder
was to derive individual profit from its performance, pp. 44-45.

See note to preceding syllabus.

Miscellaneous.- Cited as an instance of contract having mutual
promises for its consideration, in Storm v. United States, 94 U. S.
83, 24 L. 45.

22 How. 46-48, 16 L. 285, OVERTON v. CHEEK.

Appeal and error.— Writ of error, filed without the seal, is void,
and case must be dismissed, p. 48.

Cited and principle applied in City of Washington v. Dennison, 6
Wall. 496, 18 L. 863, holding writ of error not sealed until eleven

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