may have been their original cost, been largely productive of advantage both to W. W. Bird, Esq. the Government and to the people?

I believe so.

1081. Especially in Rajpootana?

I believe everywhere; but it has been a matter of regret universally that we have spent so little.

1082. Were not measures taken more than 20 years ago for the purpose of assimilating the pay and allowances of the three armies?

I believe the pay of the three armies has been assimilated in some measure; but whether to as great an extent as possible, I am not aware.

1083. Is it not the fact that it has never been the object of the Government to assimilate altogether the emoluments of the officers in the three Presidencies, respectively occupying similar situations, and that the civil salaries of Bombay and Madras are inferior, upon the whole, to those in Bengal?

They are, in some instances, but not so greatly as might be supposed. The emoluments of some offices are the same, and some perhaps differ a little; I believe the uncovenanted servants are better paid at Madras.

1084. Is the cost of living less at Madras and Bombay than it is in Bengal ? I should think it was more; but I merely give that as my impression.

1085. Inasmuch as 90,000,000 of people appear to be governed by the Governor-general in Council in the two divisions of Agra and Bengal, does it à priori appear necessary to have two separate Governments for Madras and Bombay, with all the establishments of two separate staffs, for a population not exceeding onethird of the population under the Government of the Governor-general in Council?

I think it would be difficult now to discontinue the two Governments of Madras and Bombay.

1086. Does not the question depend upon local circumstances, such as the facility or difficulty of communication, and the distances, as well as upon the amount of population?

It depends, of course, upon a variety of circumstances.

1087. Originally the two Governments of Bombay and Madras were created by the accidental possession of certain factories, and they have gradually risen into the position of Presidencies, with large populations?

Yes; but they have risen to that condition, I think, which renders necessary the continuance of the two Governments.

1088. Has any diminution taken place in the Madras army since the time when it carried on the wars in the Deccan?

I believe there has. I have not correct information upon military subjects; but I understand that both cavalry and infantry have been reduced to skeleton regiments.

1089. In the event of the death of the Governor-general, upon whom does the Government devolve?

Upon the senior member of Council.

1090. The Governor-general might happen to be up the country at the moment, exercising the powers of Governor-general in Council?

Yes.

1091. For the period that would elapse before his death could be known and provided for, there would, in fact, be no Government?

No Supreme Government, except the President in Council.

1092. But none exercising the authority of the Governor in Council? No.

1093. Whatever may be the ability, experience and respectability of the gentlemen selected for the office of members of the Council, might it not happen that the who was the senior member of Council might not exactly be the person person most fit to exercise the powers of Governor-general in Council under circumstances of difficulty?

18th May 1852.

It might so happen.

W. W. Bird, Esq.

18th May 1852.

1094. Yet until recourse could be had to England, as the law now stands, he would exercise those powers?

Certainly.

1095. Do you think that, upon the whole, the arrangement by which the Government devolves by necessity, in the event of the death of the Governor-general, upon the senior member of Council, is the most convenient?

It appears to me that there is no alternative, unless it is meant that some one else should be appointed to succeed as Governor-general who is not in the Council.

1096. Or in the Council, not being the senior?

Or in the Council, not being the senior.

1097. Might not there occasionally be great public convenience in nominating a provisional successor to the Governor-general, without making it known that a successor had been nominated until the time arrived for his acting?

There might be some convenience in it; but, generally speaking, perhaps it is better left as it is now, particularly as we have speedy communication with Europe; there would be less inconvenience than formerly in letting the arrangement stand as it is.

1098. Has the inconvenience, which has been put to you hypothetically, occurred in the history of India?

No, I do not think it has.

1099. Was not the result of the death of Lord Cornwallis, succeeded as he was, an entire change in the policy that was pursued by the Government?

It was so; but I do not know that in that case anybody else in India could have been selected who would have been more suitable.

1100. But, in point of fact, it led to a reversal of the policy of the Government ? It did.

1101. Will you state what are the principal reasons which have induced you to come to the conclusion that it would not be desirable to alter the position of the Governors of Madras and Bombay, and to place them in the same position as the Governor of Agra, and the proposed Governor of Bengal ?

I think I have already stated them; one reason is, that the Governments at Madras and Bombay have military establishments, which is not the case either at Agra or Bengal.

1102. What objection would there be to placing the military establishments of Bombay and Madras under the common management of the Government of Calcutta?

It is under the general control of the Government of Calcutta at present; but whether it would be proper to place the military establishment under a Deputy Governor without a Council, and without a military member of Council, is what I very much doubt.

1103. You have stated, as one objection to altering the position of the Governors of Bombay and Madras, that there were separate armies: what advantages do you think result from their being separate armies; do you see any objection to placing those armies under one direction and management for the whole of India?

I am not sure that there would be any objection to the whole being placed under the Commander-in-Chief of India, and under the Government of India; but that not being the case at present, I do not think, until that alteration takes place, it would be expedient to leave those Presidencies under the control merely of a single civil officer.

1104. But provided that those alterations took place, and that the army was under one direction and management, then your chief objections to the alteration of the position of the Governors of Bombay and Madras would be removed?

If the military authorities should say that there would be no necessity for any more immediate military control over those armies than that which resides in the Commander-in-Chief at Bengal, then I should no longer consider it an objection to the arrangement proposed of having only Deputy Governors at those Presidencies; but there are other circumstances: there is a Supreme Court in each of the Presidencies, and a state of things has grown up which, perhaps, is too much for the control of a Deputy Governor.

1105. Is

1105. Is there not a totally different system of revenue management from that W. W. Bird, Esq. which exists in Bengal?

Yes. If a member of the Madras service were to be Deputy Governor, that 18th May 1852. difficulty could be overcome; but I am not sure that there are members of the service qualified for that situation, and many other points require to be taken into consideration before I could say that there was no objection.

1106. Would not the selection of a Governor at Madras or Bombay from the civil services of those Presidencies respectively be much more restricted than the selection of a Lieutenant-governor at Agra from the larger civil service of Bengal?

I cannot state whether the civil services of Madras and Bombay are capable of affording persons who could exercise that control; I am not sufficiently acquainted with the character of the gentlemen of whom those services are composed.

1107. You think that the services of Bombay and Madras could not furnish competent persons to fill the office of Lieutenant-governor?

I cannot say that they could not; I only mean that I should like to know whether they could or not, before I give an opinion upon that subject.

1108. You are not a member of the Court of Directors?

No, I am not.

1109. Is it, in your opinion, desirable that persons possessing long experience in the Indian Government should be members of the Court?

I believe that the Court consider it desirable to have men who have had large experience in India to be members of the Court.

1110. What is your own opinion upon that subject?

My opinion is that it is desirable: I do not mean to say it is desirable that the Court should be composed solely of men who have had local experience in India, but it is desirable that some men who have had experience in India should be members.

1111. Is there anything in the mode of election that deters men from endeavouring to obtain that distinction?

Yes; six years of canvassing is of canvassing is a very great objection; it deterred me from the attempt, together with the other inconveniences attending it.

1112. Will you state what those inconveniences principally are?

They arise from being obliged to make personal application to a large constituency residing in all parts of Europe; and, also, it is an arduous undertaking for any man who has spent the best part of his life in Indian service, and possibly he might not succeed. Altogether the difficulties appeared to me to be too great for a man at my time of life to undertake.

1113. Have you any suggestion to make by which the mode of election could be improved?

I have no experience in the matter, and, therefore, I can only speak doubtfully upon the subject; but I think that the difficulties of the canvass have been very much increased by allowing votes by proxy. I know, however, so little about the matter, never having been placed in that situation, that I am not competent to give an opinion.

1114. Upon the whole, do you think that men who have been long in the service in India, are prevented practically from attempting to get into the direction by those difficulties and inconveniences to which you have referred ?

I can only speak from my own experience, and from what I have heard from others; they certainly deterred me, and I believe they have deterred others.

1115. But there is a larger proportion of the Court of Directors consisting of persons who have passed a considerable time in India than there used to be?

Yes; there are a great many men who have been in India, and have been in high situations, and have had great experience, who are members of the Court.

1116. What are the inconveniences to which you refer as connected with the proxy system?

W. W. Bird, Esq. 18th May 1852.

Every proprietor being capable of voting, either by proxy or in person, the canvass necessarily extends to every one, wherever he may be, who has a vote.

1117. Is it, then, only in consequence of the enlargement of the constituency, and the increase in the number of voters, that you consider the proxy system to be inconvenient?

No, not merely so; but every body being able to vote either in person or by proxy, there are a greater number of individuals to be solicited than there otherwise would be, for instance, ladies. There are very few ladies who, I suppose, would attend to vote in person, but they can easily send a proxy. Candidates also, I hear, are not unfrequently exposed to much incivility and annoyance in the prosecution of their canvass.

1118. Inasmuch as a small proportion of the persons forming the present constituency of the East India Company have resided in India, and thereby acquired a knowledge of the qualities, abilities and services of the gentlemen who have served in India, would it not, with a view to the selection of persons of that description for the Court of Directors, be advisable to add, if it could be done, a considerable number of voters who, from residence in India, should necessarily have that practical knowledge?

Yes, that might be of advantage; but it is difficult to foresee how it would work.

1119. Would not a man of high service in India have a much better chance of being elected at once a member of the Court of Directors if a large proportion of the constituency consisted of persons who, having been resident in India, were acquainted with his services?

Yes, I think he would.

1120. Would not that great increase in the number of the body of voters be such as to make that personal canvass actually impossible, which at present is not impossible, but so irksome as to deter many gentlemen from engaging in it? It probably would.

1121. Do you think it would be desirable to permit the Company's servants still in their employment to have votes?

No: I think the period of residence should be such as to preclude those who are at home on leave of absence, and still in the service of the Company, from voting.

1122. In short, they should only be entitled to vote when they have ceased to hold office under the Company?

I think so; that is to say, that the term required to enable them to vote should be beyond the period of furlough.

1123. Would not one consequence be, that canvassing would go on of those persons previously to their coming away, who would have votes when they arrived in England?

I dare say it would.

1124. Do not you think that there would be practically inconvenience, and some degree of impropriety, in that canvassing for their votes to which persons still in employment in India would be liable?

Any answer on my part to that question would be a mere matter of conjecture. I have no means of knowing what would be the effect of such a

measure.

1125. If a vote was reckoned valuable, of course it might give rise to certain indiscretions and improprieties in order to obtain it?

No doubt it might.

1126. You have used the terms "covenanted" and "uncovenanted" servants; will you have the goodness to explain to the Committee the meaning of the distinction?

The covenanted servants are those who are appointed to India by the Court of Directors from home; uncovenanted servants are servants appointed by the Government of India to perform duties subordinate to the covenanted servants.

1127. Then

1127. Then may the Committee understand that, speaking generally, the W. W. Bird, Esq. covenanted servants are those who fill the more responsible and the more important offices, and that the uncovenanted servants are those who fill the less 18th May 1852. important offices?

Yes.

1128. But is it not the case that some of the uncovenanted servants do hold places of greater trust and greater importance than the lower class of covenanted

servants?

Certainly, much greater.

1129. But in those cases is not the career of promotion and of honourable ambition open even to those subordinate covenanted servants to an extent to which it is not open to uncovenanted servants?

Certainly.

1130. What was the origin of this distinction, and what was the meaning of the "covenant"?

The meaning of the covenant is, that individuals who are appointed from home to the civil service enter into an engagement with the India Company to serve for a certain period of years.

1131. Do they enter into pecuniary responsibility?

I forget now what the terms of the particular engagements of the covenant were it is an old form, quite inapplicable to the present state of things. The covenanted service has the superintendence of the internal administration of the country, and succeeds to the places of those who retire or become disqualified, from age or infirmity, for further service. The uncovenanted servants are those, whether of European, mixed or native origin, who are appointed by the Government to discharge all the subordinate duties under the covenanted service. In fact, the uncovenanted service has been so much extended, that at this moment almost the whole of the judicial administration in the lower courts is in their hands.

1132. Is there any definite distinction laid down by any law, or by any rule, with regard to the offices to which uncovenanted servants may be eligible? Yes; rules are laid down for that purpose in all departments. They are most extensively employed in the judicial, where they dispose of almost all civil suits in the First Instance. The covenanted service now only take cognizance of cases in appeal; most other duties are carried into effect by uncovenanted servants, and it is done extremely well.

1133. Whilst you were in India, you had an opportunity of observing how the duties of the uncovenanted service have been performed by the natives of India? Yes, as much, perhaps, as almost any other person.

1134. There are judicial functions exercised by those uncovenanted servants in the Tribunals of First Instance?

Yes.

1135. Practically speaking, has the mode in which those duties have been performed given satisfaction in India?

Very great satisfaction.

1136. Has the result been such as to impress upon your mind, and, in your judgment, to impress upon the minds generally of the intelligent Europeans residing in India, speaking as a whole, a favourite opinion of the trustworthiness and ability of the individuals so employed?

Yes; formerly the uncovenanted judicial servants were very ill paid, and were removable at pleasure; they had no security for the continuance of their appointments; and, of course, under such a system it was not in very high esteem; but this has been altered; men are appointed after due examination of their qualifications, and they cannot now be removed from their situations without the sanction of the highest Courts, and even in some cases of the Government itself; and pensions are allowed to them when they retire. Every inducement has been held out to them to continue upright and honest, and not to avail themselves of their opportunities to do wrong, and the consequence, I think, is, that they have become very valuable, and, I may add, trustworthy servants; in fact they have great (88.5.)