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COMPRISING THE PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 1, 1817, TO APRIL 20, 1818,
INCLUSIVE.

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MARCH, 1818.

quiry. The powers delegated by it are restricted to the collection and application of the public revenue. Many, indeed the far greater part of ..? the powers subsequently enumerated, require for & their exercise no appropriation of money whatever. The very few which do require such auxiliary aid, are the most important of them all, as “to raise and support armies,” “to provide and maintain a navy;” and they involve the necessary exercise of many powers, which the mere authority to appropriate the public money does not comprehend. The latter furnishes but one means of attaining the common end of all the powers of Congress, the general welfare. It may be employed for this purpose either singly, or in conjunction with other powers, alikenecessary to this primary and ultimate end of all Government. The defect of the argument which I have sought to answer arises from a supposition that any construction of the clause in question, which extends its import beyond the power of levying taxes, asserts a title to every power whatever, tending in any degree to provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. For myself, sir, I totally disavow any such construction. I ask for Congress but the authority, expressly delegated by this clause, to lay and collect taxes, and, when thus eollected, so to apply them as to provide for the safety and welfare of the Union. Far from being the unbounded authority at which so much alarm has been expressed, it carries along with it several obvious limitations. The end to be obtained by it must be one of common defence, or of general welfare; it must also be one which requires the appropriation of money; and Congress can then no further participate in its attainment, in virtue of this power, than by contributing towards it the public money. It cannot be contended that this power is rendered unnecessary by that contained in the last clause of this section-" to make all laws which are necessary and proper for carrying into” effect the powers expressly delegated to Congress. The former is a primary and independent power; the latter but secondary, or auxiliary. Had the lauer not been expressed, there can be no doubt (to use the language of Publius) “ that it would have resulted to the Government by an unavoidable implication,” as it did under the Articles of Confederation. It was inserted in the Federal Constitution to obviate, not to create, doubts. But, if deemed essential, this authority extends beyond that in question, and comprehends the power to pass other laws, as well as acts of appropriation. It suffices for my present purpose, while it also obviates an objection of one of my colleagues, (Mr. SMyTH,) that among those acts it expressly authorizes all such as are required for the exercise of the power contained in the clause which I have endeavored to expound. Both clauses resemble each other in one quality, which our adversaries seem to disregard: they were designed to enlarge, rather than to abridge (as is contend

Internal Improvements.

ed) the Constitutional powers of Congress. 15th Con. 1st SEss–42

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H. of R. A constitution of government—the offspring of mutual concession among a people jealous of their freedom, and divided into many distinct sovereignties, alike jealous of their authority—ought not to be construed as a treatise of political philosophy—the production of one scientific mind. We cannot be surprised at finding its language redundant in the delegation as well as the limita. tion of power. Of this, the particular section on which I have just commented affords several examples. The powers to provide and maintain fleets and armies are embraced in the more comprehensive authority to declare war, the power to borrow money, and in that of paying the debts of the nation. Yet, all these powers are separately and expressly delegated. I claim no more, Mr. Chairman, in support of that for which I now contend, than that a power as expressly delegated as any of those which I have enumerated, shall not be subverted by any rule of construction whatever. This power has been exercised from the very foundation of the Federal Government, not merely in the purchase of lands for a variety of purposes, more or less intimately connected with the convenience of the Government, or with the military defence and commercial prosperity of the United States. . It has been substantially applied (as has been already remarked) to the encouragement of domestic manufactures, and (in a form less disguised) to the promotion of foreign emigration ; the advancement of agriculture; the cultivation of science, literature, and taste; the diffusion of sentiments of patriotism, benevolence, and piety. The ingenuity of our opponents has not condescended—and surely will not-to distinguish between the release of a debt due to the Treasury, and the appropriation of a sum already collected, in favor of an object of general welfare. One of my colleagues (Mr. SMyth) has consistently pushed his doctrine of construction to its proper extent. He has denied the constitutionality of the appropriations hitherto made to the Cumberland road, as well as that to the relief of the unfortunate sufferers of Venezuela. The same candor will extend this sentence of condemnation to all the pensions which have been granted, and to all the rewards of valor which have been bestowed by the Federal Government; not only to the whole tariff, but to the institutions in general, to the genius and character of the nation. There remains, Mr. Chairman, one other clause of the Constitution, hitherto unnoticed in this debate, to which I beg leave to call the attention of the Committee, in support of the Constitutional authority for which I have last contended. The second clause of the third section of the sixth article confers on Congress a power not enumerated in the section over which we have just passed. It is, “to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory ‘and other property belonging to the United ‘States. The first branch of this authority was designed, as will appear from the context of the whole section, to enable the Federal Government

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